The Last Word on Anderson's Youtube Debate.

It looks like the youtube conversation has dried up. It went like I thought it would. A specific challenge was brought up and Anderson found a way to avoid answering it and he did so on the basis of a fundamental assumption which he merely asserts rather than shows to be true. Somehow he thinks he's proven his point so that he has updated his blog with the following. 

Final update: The conversation ended with Spencer in self-referential absurdity.  I post the dialogue here so that I and others can use it as an illustration in teaching.  It is an example similar to a Socratic dialogue with sophists.  Here, Spencer denies that we can be certain about reality while asking for answers about reality.  On the pretense of evaluating an original argument about what is eternal, it is quickly evident that the main point of contention is that some basic things are clear to reason.  In Socratic dialogues, the sophists try to point out contradictions in others but don’t see their own self-contradiction.  This is where they are without excuse. (Emphasis mine). 

I'm starting to sound like a broken record here, but again, to say that a set of views is self-referentially absurd, is not the same as having shown that it is. And nothing that Anderson has done throughout the conversation has shown so much. He keeps insisting and presupposing the very thing that he needs to prove. What exactly is self-referentially absurd about doubting that we can have certainty about basic distinctions, while asking someone for arguments for their view that certainty over such matters is possible? (Note Anderson has slipped into talk here about denying basic distinctions again which is not the same as doubting that we can have certainty regarding them). He doesn't say. He just says that it is self-referentially absurd and we have to take his word for it.

Now here's a relative of my position (as well as Spencer's) that does seem self-referentially absurd: If a person maintains that they are certain that no certainty is possible. That seems problematic. But that's not my position nor does it represent Spencer's. As I've pointed out before we should keep some important distinctions in mind. Among them: Doubting that P is not the same as being certain that not-P. (i.e., Doubting that some things are clear is not the same as saying that it is clear that some things are not clear).

In other words, Anderson needs my position or Spencer's position to be stronger than it actually is to get something self-referentially absurd. He needs me or Spencer to be claiming that we know with certainty that no certainty is possible or something of the sort. But we hold no such view. Perhaps that's why he continues to conflate things. It seems he's got a huge blindspot here.

He goes on to add:

By way of contrast, I maintain that some things must be clear to avoid meaninglessness.  If nothing is clear then this includes anything we think or say.  Such thoughts aren’t clear, or, such thoughts are meaningless.  We can’t ask for “clarification” because nothing is clear.  Any claim to the contrary isn’t clearly different than its opposite.  The immediate subject is about what is eternal and presupposes that we can distinguish “eternal” from “non-eternal.” (Emphasis mine).

Again, Anderson just casually glosses over the very heart of the matter. We all get it. You believe that "if the basic things are not clear, then it leads to meaninglessness." But the challenge is to explain why we should think this to be true.

I agree that if nothing is clear, it follows that any claim isn't "clearly different than its opposite." Again, that's not being debated here. What I'm wondering is why anybody should care to have clarity in the first place. In other words, consistency demands that if one doubts clarity/certainty concerning basic distinctions, then they should doubt clarity/certainty about the difference between eternal and non-eternal and other such distinctions. But that's not the same thing as denying basic distinctions simpliciter. So what if consistency demands that I merely believe to a high degree that eternal is distinct from non-eternal as opposed to claiming that I am certain of it? This is the question that the Gangadeanians seem unwilling and unable to answer. Neither skepticism nor nihilism follow from the view that we can't be absolutely certain of basic distinctions (unless you define knowledge and meaning as requiring certainty in the first place). What the Gangadeanians have failed to show is that there is anything self-referentially absurd or problematic about a person that thinks we lack certainty (in the Gangadeanian sense) all the way down, but knowledge and meaning don't require certainty to begin with. 

Anderson writes:

Spencer asks why we must begin thought with the laws of thought instead of a shared intuition or common sense (he doesn’t define these).  I point out that the laws of thought, for instance the law of identity (a is a), are inescapable.  When we use intuition we are using intuition and not non-intuition.  For thought, the laws of thought are the highest and self-attesting authority.  They cannot be questioned because they make questioning possible.  In this they are different than all other authorities.  Whatever else we appeal to in thought, we are making use of the laws of thought.  Any argument we give relies on the laws of thought.  As an experiment to see if this is the case you can try to think a thought that isn’t a thought.  Try to escape reason and give an explanation about doing so (an explanation that is a non-explanation).  This is the self-referential absurdity. (Emphasis mine). 

I've already pointed out how this is simply restating, in different ways, the thing in question. Anderson can keep insisting that there are these "laws of thought" and that they are exactly as he views them so that they "make questioning possible." But what he hasn't shown us is that any of this is accurate or true.

Why should we grant him that his definition of "the laws of thought" is correct in the first place? Perhaps there are laws of thought, but he's got them all wrong. How does he know what constitutes a law of thought to begin with? How does he know what makes questioning possible? Why should we think that the law of identity is "inescapable" or "authoritative" in the the relevant sense?  These are all the very things under question just under different guises. In other words, he just continues to argue in a little circle by assuming the very thing he needs to prove all the while acting like he's shown something. The utter lack of self-awareness is surprising.

It's also important to point out that one can raise the very initial challenge to Gangadean's argument which spawned this entire conversation without doubting (let alone denying) that some things are clear. Remember, the conversation broke out because I pointed out that Gangadean gave a poor argument for why the self cannot possibly be eternal. That challenge was quite simple really. I wanted to know what reasons Gangadean could give for thinking that, "X is eternal in time" entails "X is all knowing". But nothing about raising this objection required of me to doubt (let alone deny) that reason was ontological, or that somethings (like the law of identity) are clear to reason. I was granting all of that and still the objection remained. We shouldn't lose sight of this despite Anderson's best efforts to make us forget. You can grant Anderson and other Gangadeanians all of their most basic claims concerning the principle of clarity and still find lots of missteps in their arguments for God's existence (among others).

It's hard to believe... part 2

Last time, I didn't directly address all of Anderson's last response. Instead, I merely noted how his general technique was to shift the burden of proof and essentially to argue again in a circular manner. This time, I want to be a bit more comprehensive.

One of the things Anderson accuses Spencer of is getting side-tracked. He offered us a list of things that he alleges Spencer has said or questioned throughout the conversation. Anderson goes so far as to say that he's answered all of them through the course of the conversation--he's done no such thing. Here they are.

11. I can’t understand, why won’t you give a non-circular proof that we need proof? 

12. I can’t understand, why isn’t there an infinite regress of proofs? 

13. I can’t understand, why do we begin thinking with the laws of thought? 

14. I can’t understand, why must we begin affirming some things are clear to avoid nihilism (the claim that nothing is clear)? 

15. Why can’t our ultimate source of authority in thought set aside the laws of thought? 

16. It isn’t clear to me what it means for something to be clear. 

 I'll take each on in turn.

11. I can’t understand, why won’t you give a non-circular proof that we need proof?

I don't see where Spencer said this, but suppose he did. Is that supposed to be a problem? If the Gangadeanian view is that belief without proof (for any belief) is fideistic and that we ought to avoid fideism, then it would be their own view that commits them to the requirement of proof even over the claim that we need proofs for all claims in the first place. That's just being consistent.

Now, it turns out that Gangadean and Anderson conveniently allow that some claims can justify themselves, or are "self-evident" or "immediately known" or "make questioning possible." So not all "belief without proof" is bad. But as I've argued before, that only opens them up to a new set of challenges. How are we supposed to determine (or know) when a claim has any of these properties or enjoys these statuses? What if there's disagreement about them? How are we to settle such disputes using "reason"? Another worry is this: Gangadeanians are going to be motivated to say that some claims are self-justifying (i.e., they justify themselves) because they want to avoid infinite regresses. But can they present an argument for why the idea that some claims don't need justification or can justify themselves is any better (rationally) than an infinite regress, or even circularity? I have no idea what that kind of argument would look like.

12. I can’t understand, why isn’t there an infinite regress of proofs?

Again, not sure how this represents Spencer's remarks. As we've just seen, Anderson is committed to either proving everything he purports to be clear to reason or else to claim that it is self-evident, self-certifying, immediately known, or "makes thought possible." These are the only two ways according to Gangadean on how we can know things with certainty. There's no third option. All else is fideism (belief without proof). And the issue at this point in the conversation is whether or not the following of Anderson's claims is true:

"It would be inconsistent for any person to evaluate an argument, unless they are certain that 'a is a' ".  

So it could be that Anderson is telling us, in a very roundabout way that there is no proof for such a principle. But then, insofar as he claims to know that it is true, he must think it's somehow self-evident, immediately known, or makes thought/questioning possible. But again, how are we to determine that it is in fact, self-evident, immediately knowable, or "makes thought/questioning possible?" Do we just have to take Anderson's word for it?

13. I can’t understand, why do we begin thinking with the laws of thought?

What Anderson intends with this representation of Spencer's comments is, I think, to point out some sort of obvious absurdity. But there is only such an absurdity if we grant Anderson the very thing that is the object of dispute at this point in the conversation.

Remember we're wondering if Anderson can prove the principle that we must have certainty regarding the laws of thought if we are to have intelligible discussions, evaluate arguments and the like. Here he seems to be suggesting that Spencer inasmuch as he raises question 13, is contradicting himself in some way so as to state something absurd. We should ask what would make 13 absurd.

Well, if it was already proven that thinking by its very nature required what Anderson refers to as "the laws of thought" to be exceptionlessly true, then asking (in the same breathe) why we need to begin thinking with the "laws of thought" would be weird. But again, that's the very thing at issue. We should think of Spencer's challenge (and mine) at this point as asking Anderson to prove that the law of identity, is without exception true. That is to say, we're asking Anderson to prove that 'a is a' is a law of thought in the relevant sense. Just because Gangadean and Anderson call it a law of thought, doesn't make it so. In other words, it's begging the question for Anderson to assume from the start that 'a is a' is a "law of thought" because what he means in labeling it a "law of thought" is that it is the sort of thing that makes thinking possible and so must of necessity be true! This is just a very sly way to assume the very thing you need to prove.

Can Anderson show us that thinking requires the law of identity? While it's obvious that he can find different ways of repeating the same thing (e.g., that 'a is a' is necessarily true, or that we must be certain that 'a is a' or that we must be certain that "reason is ontological" or that 'a is a' is a "law of thought") that's not to have shown anything besides how many different ways he can beg the question against his opponent.

14. I can’t understand, why must we begin affirming some things are clear to avoid nihilism (the claim that nothing is clear)?

Notice that this is supposed to be some obvious contradiction because "nihilism" is apparently, according to Anderson, the view that "nothing is clear." And it's crazy to question why we need clarity to avoid the lack of clarity. But this is really bad. It's this sort of thing that makes me question either Anderson's abilities as a critical thinker or his honesty. Nihilism isn't the view that nothing is clear to reason. Not even according to Gangdaean's lexicon. Nihilism is the view that there is no meaning or intelligibility. And according to Gangadean it's supposed to follow from Skepticism, which is the view that knowledge is not possible. As I've pointed out, the Gangadeanians haven't shown that we need clarity for knowledge, and so they haven't shown that we need clarity for meaning. So contrary to what Anderson would like us to believe, there's nothing incoherent about asking 14.

Now you might think that what Anderson intends here is that if basic distinctions are not clear, then Nihilism follows and he's just skipping at step. But as I've pointed out before, we need a proof for why "if we can't be certain of basic distinctions, we can't have meaning or knowledge" is true.

Once we remove the parenthetical which suggests a false identity claim between "possibly, nothing is clear" and "there is no meaning" (nihilism) 14 is a reasonable question to pose. It's something I have called into question often. The point being, the Gangadeanians owe us an argument about why we need certainty or clarity if we are to have knowledge, or meaning/intelligibility. And we've already seen one such argument from Kelly Fitzsimmons Burton and it's bad.

15. Why can’t our ultimate source of authority in thought set aside the laws of thought?

Again this question is supposed to be absurd to ask. How might it be absurd? Well, if it was already obvious or established that 'a is a' (among others) are in fact, the "ultimate source of authority" regarding thought. If Anderson had proven to us that for example, the law of identity was "the ultimate source of authority regarding thought," then it would be weird to in turn, "set it aside" in thinking. But again, that's assuming what needs to be shown. Spencer is wondering what reasons Anderson has for believing that the law of identity (for example) is the "ultimate source of authority" in the first place.

16. It isn’t clear to me what it means for something to be clear.

Well, as I've pointed out before, the manner in which Anderson and Gangadean use the word 'clear' is not the ordinary, everyday notion. It's a Gangadeanian term of art, a technical notion with a stipulated definition. That's why both of them in their respective books provides a definition. So there's nothing absurd about someone asking what they mean by 'clear'--perhaps Spencer hasn't read their books.

It's hard to believe...

Since my last update, Spencer raised the very issue of which I took note. Anderson at some point claims that if someone is not certain that 'a is a' (or that reason is ontological), then they can't consistently evaluate an argument and so there's no point in further dialogue. The principle that Anderson is assuming is this.

(A) A person can consistently evaluate an argument, only if they are certain that 'a is a'. 

Spencer and I have wondered what on earth could justify (A) in the first place. Why should anybody think it's true? Anderson's reply was to simply restate it. And that's to argue in a very tight circle. In fact, it's no argument at all. The closest thing that approaches an argument is Anderson's claim that if we aren't certain that 'a is a' then "perhaps" eternal is non-eternal.  But as I pointed out last time, that doesn't help in the least. 'Perhaps', here is the operative term. It marks a mere possibility. So maybe he's arguing for (A) by way of the following principle.

(B) If a person believes that it's even remotely possible that 'a is not a', then s/he cannot consistently evaluate an argument. 

But then what makes (B) true? Why should we buy it? Because Anderson says so? In fact, (B) is just a rewording of (A).

Spencer then pointed some of this out to Anderson. He asked Anderson to rationally justify the truth of (A) as opposed to merely restating it. And that's simply holding Anderson to the Gangadeanian standard. Remember they oppose "belief without proof." That's fideism. So we need some reason to accept (A) or (B).

That brings us to Anderson's response. 

@Spencer Hawkins And here I thought you were the one begging the question! Your post helps illustrate why you had a hard time correctly stating the original argument and making any progress since then. Your last few replies have been ignoring my responses and now you’ve officially ended the conversation in self-referential absurdity.

Earlier I was listing the many sidetracks you were bringing up. We can add: 

11. I can’t understand, why won’t you give a non-circular proof that we need proof? 12. I can’t understand, why isn’t there an infinite regress of proofs? 13. I can’t understand, why do we begin thinking with the laws of thought? 14. I can’t understand, why must we begin affirming some things are clear to avoid nihilism (the claim that nothing is clear)? 15. Why can’t our ultimate source of authority in thought set aside the laws of thought? 16. It isn’t clear to me what it means for something to be clear. 

I’ve already given sufficient answers above to address these. Go back and try to work it out. Do we even agree on the meaning of the terms we are using? What does it mean for something to be “clear”? What does it mean for something to be “eternal”? Can we distinguish “eternal” from “non-eternal”? How? How can this be known outside of experience and epistemic horizons? 

Your replies show that you haven’t given any thought to my answers. This disregard is inconsistent with your asking me for answers and arguments, and you have lost this one chance to work through it with me. See my last reply about why you can’t continue the discussion if nothing is clear. Try to figure out the argument and how it addresses your concerns. Figure out why your not being able to be sure about the law of identity affects each of your replies and ends the conversation. 

After all, perhaps discussions aren’t really discussions!

The first thing to note is that Anderson claims to think that Spencer is begging the question. But of course he doesn't say how. Both Spencer and I have pointed out explicitly where Anderson is assuming the thing he's been asked to prove. And he claims that Spencer's objection is somehow self-referentially absurd, but again he doesn't bother to explain where the contradiction lies.

More importantly, ask yourself: does this tell us why (A) or (B) is true? Does this prove (A) or (B)? Of course not.  Anderson is again simply assuming (A) or (B) and then shifting the burden of proof to Spencer. Basically, Anderson has been caught either arguing in a circle or taking (A) or (B) on faith and his response is simply to try and wiggle out of the conversation. Of course, it's not Spencer's job to "Try to figure out the argument and how it addresses" the charge of circularity. Anderson and company are the ones insisting that we need clarity at the basic level if we are to be able to evaluate arguments and make dialogue intelligible. That is they are claiming that (A) and (B) are true. They are also the ones that demand proof or rational justification for our beliefs. It's not Spencer's job to explain or "figure out" why that must be so.

That Anderson avoids answering the current challenge is par for the course. It's a pattern. I suspected this would be the result from the start. At least this time, it's been done in public for all to see. This latest comment is nothing more than presupposing the thing in question (namely, (A) or (B) above). All this stuff about not being able to "agree on the meaning of terms" or to determine the meaning of "clear" or "eternal" or distinguishing between eternal and not-eternal without clarity at the basic level, presupposes that we need clarity at the basic level to do all these things. And that's the very challenge at hand. That's the very thing we're asking Anderson to rationally justify!

I have a hard time believing that the other Gangadeanians can't see the glaring problem here. How can people that are intent on knowing the truth and critically examining their basic beliefs, fail to see how Anderson has illegitimately shifted the burden of proof after arguing in a tight circle? How can they fail to see that (A) or (B) is being presupposed rather than rationally defended? How can they not see that their very own worldview demands more than that? And how can Anderson take his own remarks seriously? I'm baffled at this point.

Thanks!

It looks like I've found the platform to run a live chat session. Chatroll seems to be a winner. Thanks to those who stopped by--I'm sorry, if I missed you today!

Anderson's latest is to argue in a circle.

I've basically got Anderson right where I want him and I'm glad that Spencer was able to draw this out in public. Recently, Anderson accused Spencer of not "affirming" very basic distinctions and so concluded that he wouldn't (consistently) be able to evaluate any argument--so Anderson concludes, no point in discussing any further. To that, Spencer responded:

@Owen Anderson Since we both believe that 'a is a' applies to reality, the questions now seem to be, why think that we must have clarity of basic distinctions to have intelligible discussion in the first place? This is your assumption, but it's not obvious that you're right. Perhaps our basic distinctions are ultimately grounded in our shared intuition, and nothing (epistemically) more. If we lack clarity at the basic level, why do you insist that discussion is impossible? Do you have an argument? (Note: I'm open to there being clarity at the basic level, if you can show it.) 

In addition, why do you insist that we must have clarity of basic distinctions to have knowledge?...

The point here is that they are not disagreeing over whether 'a is a', but rather whether we need to be absolutely certain that 'a is a' if we are to be able to consistently evaluate arguments (and thus have rational grounds to continue the convo).

So Spencer, rightly asks Anderson to prove his view that merely believing in basic distinctions is not enough. That is, he's asking Anderson (as I have before) to prove the claim that we must have certainty of basic distinctions if we are to have intelligible discussions, and consistently evaluate arguments. To that, Anderson replied,

@Spencer Hawkins You said "why think that we must have clarity of basic distinctions to have intelligible discussion in the first place?" Perhaps basic distinctions aren't clear, including the distinction between agreeing and disagreeing, and really these are just the same thing. If so there isn't much left to discuss. (Emphasis mine).

It boggles my mind that Anderson would think this is a sufficient response. He's not a dummy. Again I don't know which is the more charitable reading of the situation--is he just that ignorant when it comes to questioning his basic assumptions? Or is he knowingly presenting bad arguments with the hope that people won't call him out on it?

True, if one doesn't affirm with absolute certainty that 'a is a', then it follows trivially that by one's lights, it's remotely possible that "agreeing" is "disagreeing" for example. So, "perhaps" agreeing is disagreeing. That much is granted by all parties. But why should anybody think that it follows from this that "there isn't much left to discuss?" This is extreme reasoning if not melodramatic. It's like telling someone that consistency demands they never get on an airplane as long as they believe it's at least possible that it could crash (and provided they don't have a death wish).

There's nothing about "it's possible that agreeing is disagreeing" that logically entails that there is no room or point in further discussion. Consider:

(1) It's possible that even our most basic distinctions do not reflect reality. 

(2) Therefore, we have no way of evaluating arguments, (i.e., discussions are pointless). 

Spencer is asking Anderson to prove that (2) follows from (1) and Anderson's response is to restate that it does! That's textbook circularity!

In fact, it's not even clear how one would go about proving that (2) follows from (1). It's not like the very meaning of (1) is just the meaning of (2) so there isn't an analytical relation. So how does Anderson know with certainty that the entailment which he merely presupposes, holds? That's the challenge.

Live Chat?

I've been toying with the idea of hosting a live chat on matters relating to Gangadeanianism. One of the reasons being that I find blogging fairly restricting in that it's not the most conducive for dialogue. Among other things, this leaves much more room for misunderstandings. I'm not sure how many of you would be interested in this sort of thing, but it would be a refreshing change for me.

In any event, if any of you has an idea of what platform might work best for this kind of chat, please send me a comment or email (reasoniidoubt@gmail.com). It would be best if people could participate in the chat without having to download/install any software or go through much of a sign up process and I think anonymity would be important, too. Currently, I'm leaning towards Reddit, but it looks like I would need to create a subbreddit in order to host a chat and that requires that I have an account that is at least 30days old (I don't) and that I have reached some unknown threshold of "karma" (I haven't).

More from Anderson on Youtube

There's been a bit more action on youtube between Spencer and Anderson. But as I suspected, Anderson has again managed to avoid presenting an answer to the original objection.

To set the stage a bit: Anderson recently asked Spencer if he affirmed that "reason is ontological" that is to say, that our thinking at least sometimes tells us about the world as it were (as opposed to just our thoughts). And Spencer made some remarks that made Anderson (and me) think he didn't affirm that reason was ontological. To that, Anderson claimed they had no basis for further dialogue, because Spencer wouldn't be in a position to make basic distinctions and so he wouldn't be in a position to evaluate any arguments. Since that time Spencer has responded quite unequivocally. He wrote,

@Owen Anderson But we do agree that the laws of thought are ontological. I've said in this thread that I "believe" and "agree" that 'a is a' applies to reality and is universal. So you're just wrong to say that "we don't agree on whether the laws of thought are also laws of being (ontological)." 

Our difference seems to be on the epistemic status of our belief that reason is ontological. I think it's a presupposition of experience, or perhaps a non-inferential intuition. You think it's "clear to reason", meaning, you can show, without relying on intuition or a mere brute starting point, that reason is ontological. I'm asking what that demonstration looks like. Do you have an argument? 

If you insist that the only coherent "common ground" is one where we can demonstrate that reason is ontological, it would seem that you shoulder the burden to show why that's necessary. You haven't done that. Thus, it's a loaded assumption on your part to maintain that we "know" (it's "clear to reason") or that we must "know" that reason is ontological, without showing it first. 

To be clear, my asking you to show how it is that you know reason is ontological without appealing to intuition or common sense is not the same as me denying that reason is ontological.

So it's quite obvious from this passage that he agrees with my position in that he affirms that reason is ontological even though he doesn't necessarily buy the other Gangadeanian baggage of thinking we can or even must have certainty about such matters (i.e,. the principle of clarity and the need for clarity).

Anderson has just responded with:

Spencer Hawkins No I don't think I'm wrong that we disagree. Here's what you said above:"To answer your question, I do, in a sense, "affirm" or "know" that 'a is a' beyond my own experience, but not in the way that you're assuming. I don't claim to be deductively certain when I claim to "affirm" or "know" the meaning of terms, the consistency that the world takes, and so on. I think human knowledge is fallible and the quest for a foundationalist (internalist) basis in incorrigible or infallible certainty is a lost cause." (Emphasis mine). 

We can't know whether "eternal" is "non-eternal" so we can't assess the argument together.

This comment doesn't reflect the attitude of someone that is engaged in an honest dialogue. He quotes something Spencer said several comments back without paying attention to Spencer's explicit remarks in the latest comment. If there is a tension between what Spencer has just said and what he said before, someone who was pursuing a philosophical conversation in good faith would ask their interlocutor to clarify their position as opposed to assuming the most self serving and uncharitable reading. He should have asked Spencer which of the two comments in tension really represents his view and also allow him to revise his positions. What matters is what Spencer believes not whether he's perfectly clear or consistent in what he says. Again it's not hard and Anderson should know better. What this looks like to me is someone who is trying to avoid answering a challenge and trying to save face in the process because he's been called out.

In fact it's worse than all of that. In the older comment that Anderson cites, Spencer clearly states that there is a sense in which he affirms or knows that 'a is a'. So there isn't even a tension between that comment and his latest remarks. But he adds that it isn't "knowledge" according to Anderson and Gangadean (which entails certainty). As I've noted before, the Gangadeanians have a quirky definition or analysis of 'knowledge' which they merely stipulate. I say it's quirky because the rest of us philosophers simply disagree. And they don't ever bother to justify their definition which is to say they never answer the question, "how are you certain that your definition or analysis of 'knowledge' is correct?" So when Anderson ends with, "We can't know whether "eternal" is "non-eternal" so we can't assess the argument together" he's using the verb 'know' to track the Gangadeanian definition which requires certainty. And by Spencer's own admission, he doesn't agree to that. But what Anderson needs to explain now is why we need that kind of knowledge (certainty) in order to assess an argument. 

Anderson is right that if we can't know with Gangadeanian certainty whether eternal is non-eternal, then we can't know with Gangadeanian certainty whether an argument employing those notions is sound or not. Nobody is doubting that. But this triviality is simply of no consequence.

In contrast, if we can have knowledge without Gangadeanian certainty (which the VAST majority of philosophers accept) then we can know without Gangadeanian certainty whether eternal is non-eternal and we can assess arguments which employ those concepts just fine. So what the Gangadeanians owe us is an argument for why we need Gangadeanian certainty or Gangadeanian-Knowledge in the first place. If you're thinking this relates closely with some of my other recent posts, you're right. It's all connected to the idea of clarity. As I've been stressing for some time, the Gangadeanians have simply failed to demonstrate the principle of clarity (that some things are clear) and the need for clarity (that some things must be clear), which is to say they've fail to show that the core principles at the center of their entire worldview are clear to reason.

Kelly Fitzsimmons Burton on the Principle of Clarity

A new talk has been posted on one of the Gangadean affiliated sites on the principle of clarity-- i.e., the claim that some things are clear to reason. The last time I linked a talk by Burton I noted how she claims to simply take the principle for granted and wasn't in a position to show that it was true. In this latest talk she attempts to show that it's true or to provide definitive grounds for us to accept it. Hence, confusion persists about just what is her official position--maybe she's still working things out?

The most recent talk adds to the confusion in another way in that she begins her remarks by emphasizing that the principle of clarity is a "first-principle" or "starting point." What's peculiar about that statement is that philosophers don't normally try to demonstrate that their "first principles" or "starting points" are true--they simply take them for granted (usually on the basis of intuition) much akin to the axioms of mathematical systems which you use to prove other things, but don't prove within the system itself. This would be compatible with her initial claim in the previous talk that she isn't in a position to show that the principle of clarity was true. But then again she proceeds to try and prove that it is true which is the topic of this post.

In any event, either approach works against the Gangadeanians. This is because the argument that Burton provides (which is one I've already criticized before) is a bad one. So, either they accept the principle as an article of faith, or they stand behind it on the basis of a bad argument--whichever way they go, it seems that they fail to satisfy the very standards of rigor with which they are quick to burden others.

A quick word about the structure of Burton's argument. It looks to be a reductio ad absurdum. In this sort of argument you have a claim that you want to prove say, P (in this case, P = some things are clear to reason). The manner in which you get to proving P is by starting with its denial (not-P). If you can derive, a contradiction by starting with not-P and nothing more than uncontroversially true premises and valid rules of inference, then you've just proven that not-P is false (or that P is true). As we'll see in a moment, unfortunately for Burton's argument, the premises are not all uncontroversially true.

Also keep in mind that for something to be clear according to the Gangadeanian lexicon is for the opposite to be (determined as) impossible in the strongest sense. This is the manner in which clarity relates to the burden of proof for the Gangadeanians--to show that P is clear you have to demonstrate by way of a sound argument that not-P couldn't possibly be true. So in evaluating Burton's argument you shouldn't employ the ordinary everyday notion of 'clear.' For instance, I'd say that it's perfectly clear (in the mundane sense) that I am currently typing on a computer. Here, I'm using the word like most competent English speakers to denote something like "obvious." But I have to admit that it's at least remotely possible that I'm in a matrix like scenario so that there is in fact no computer and thus no typing and instead only the experience as if I'm typing on a computer (because I'm plugged into the output of a sophisticated program). So on Gangadean's view of things, it wouldn't be clear to reason that I am currently typing on a computer even though on the more ordinary notion, it remains obvious/clear that I am so typing because remote possibilities of that sort are just intuitively too ridiculous to take seriously. That's the sense of the word to keep in mind. Note: things would be different if I could somehow prove that I'm typing on a computer (i.e., if I could show that it's literally impossible for me to be in a matrix like scenario) which is something Gangadean attempts, but fails to do in his book. Okay enough with the prelims., here's the argument presented by Burton.

(1) Nothing is clear to reason. [Assumed for Reductio]
(2) If nothing is clear, then no distinctions are clear.
(3) If we can't make clear distinctions, then (meaningful) thought and talk are impossible.
(4) But it seems like (meaningful) thought and talk are possible.
(5) Thus, some things are clear. 

The implicit contradiction is found between (3) and (4). So that's supposed to be grounds to deny premise (1) which is to prove that some things are clear to reason i.e., the principle of clarity.

To begin, premise (4) is interesting. Notice how Burton includes "it seems like" in presenting (4). We normaly call that a "hedge"--that is, it flags a lack of full confidence in what follows. Why does Burton employ it if she's after demonstrating the principle of clarity? I'm not sure. Again more confusion. What is more, I wonder if what Burton is tracking here is the fact that it isn't obvious how such a thing is to be known by the Gangadeanians given their standards of proof and knowledge. Is it somehow self-attesting or self-evident that thought and talk are possible? If so, how is it that one goes about determining that something is "self-attesting" or "self-evident"? Or does it all boil down to just another basic intuition which the Gangadeanian's refer to by a different name? And just to anticipate a mistaken response, when I ask how it is that Burton or any Gangadeanian for that matter knows that (4) is true, I'm not thereby saying that I believe (4) is false. I'm merely inquiring into whether the Gangadeanian system is internally consistent and can get the advertised results.

The real stinker in this argument is Premise (3). There's no justification given for it and it's doing all of the heavy lifting. Just why is meaningful thought and talk impossible if we can't "make clear distinctions"? Burton doesn't say. The crucial word here is 'clear' as it features in Premise (3). The claim isn't that intelligible thought and talk are impossible if we can't make distinctions per se, but rather that intelligible thought and talk are impossible if we can't make clear distinctions. So what does it mean that we can't (consistently) make clear distinctions as opposed to that we can't make distinctions simpliciter? Since epistemic certainty is the thing at issue with this argument, what the Gangadeanian means is that in doubting clarity at the basic level, one cannot be absolutely certain that the distinctions one's draws are correct or reflect reality. I agree. But this is of no help to the Gangadeanians in establishing the truth of Premise (3).

You see, I can sort of see how if one is rationally unable to make basic distinctions per se, that intelligible thought and talk might be threatened. But what I don't see why we need to make clear distinctions. Or in other words, why must we be certain that our distinctions track reality in order to have intelligible thought and talk. Why do we need certainty or clarity for meaningful thought and talk to be possible? This is the central claim that needs to be shown for the argument to work. Premise (3) needs to be proven rather than merely taken for granted.

For good measure: Can Burton just drop the word 'clear' as I have done in my discussion so that Premise (3) changes to the following:

(3)* If we can't make distinctions, then (meaningful) thought and talk are impossible.

As I've just said (3)* is intuitively more agreeable than (3). Unfortunately, that won't work either. Doing so would render Burton's argument invalid. The argument's validity depends crucially on an inference rule called "hypothetical syllogism" which requires a kind of matching up of the consequent of one premise with the antecedent of the subsequent premise. To illustrate, let's take a schematic version of Burton's argument using letters to stand for sentences.

(1)' ~P (assume)
(2)' If ~P, then Q.
(3)' If Q, then R.
(4)' ~R
(5)' Thus, P.

Notice that 'Q' occurs in the consequent of Premise (2)' and the antecedent of Premise (3)'. If it were not so, the argument wouldn't be valid.

[note, I'm glossing over the fact that Burton's presentation of the argument is actually missing a premise between (3) and (4) namely, the premise that meaningful thought and talk are not possible--or in the above schematic, 'R'. That's the only way you get a contradiction which is required for a reductio ab absurdum to be valid. The sharp reader will notice that I spoke of the contradiction as implicit--and now you know why!]

If you change the wording of Premise (3) in the way required to make it more tenable (by dropping the word 'clear') you change the meaning of it. It would then be like changing 'Q' as it occurs Premise (3)' to some other letter not yet occurring in the above schema like 'T'. In which case, it becomes invalid and there's no reductio ad absurdum to speak of.

(1)'' ~P
(2)'' If ~P, then Q.
(3)'' If T, then R.
(4)'' ~R
(5)'' Thus, P. 

So Burton's "proof" for the principle of clarity, fails. It fails not only because Burton on pain of inconsistency shouldn't help herself to Premise (4), but more importantly because she needs to prove Premise (3). That is, she needs a sufficient answer the following: why do we need to make clear/certain distinctions for meaningful thought or talk to be possible? The only other way out is to render her argument invalid.

A Gangadeanian response to one of my challenges.

Here are some remarks from a Gangadeanian that seems closely related to one of the disagreements between me and Gangadean. My point in discussing this person's comments is not intended to throw any shade on them, but rather to shed light. I've also decided not to link the conversation in an effort to keep their identity private, because I don't think this person is doing the kind of harm that Gangadean and Anderson are. Since Gangadean and Anderson refuse to respond to my objections, I use this person's remarks as representative of their positions. In fact, Anderson (in the convo in question) endorsed what this person said as a "great analysis" so I'm not taking a giant leap, here. I think it will be helpful for my readers to see how a follower of Gangadean frames things and in particular, where it goes wrong. It's a long comment, so we'll take it piecemeal.  They write,

When I shut off all my senses and just think about my thoughts and I think “what is thought?” What I first find is I have thought 1 (T1) and thought 2 (T2) (and yes, time passed between me having those, so those are in time).

The context: how do we get to Gangadeanian certainty about say, the law of identity as an exceptionless true principle i.e., as applying to all possible thought? What's interesting here is what this person is helping themselves to. Recall that in my critical response to Gangadean's talk at GCU, I noticed that one of Gangadean's premises was that human souls/minds (or the self) have one thought after another which implies that the human soul is in time. And I wondered how he could be certain (in the Gangadeanian sense) of such facts as this. My point of course is not to argue that we are not in time or to deny that our thoughts are temporally ordered. On the contrary, my question is intended to uncover the fact that Gangadean is actually appealing to intuition when it counts most--for his most basic premises/assumptions. We know these things not in virtue of an argument, nor is it the case that the claim "I have one thought after (temporally) another" "makes questioning possible" so that it's self-attesting. Instead, it's something we just know, immediately. The author of this passage just takes it for granted that they are having one thought after (temporally) another, but my question at this juncture would be how (or in virtue of what) do you know (with Gangadeanian certainty) that your thoughts are distinct and that they are temporally ordered in the first place? They will want to deny that it's on the basis of an intuition, but my claim is that they can't with integrity. They go on to say,

Where, even before my thoughts are of concepts of things out there in nature, I merely have the concepts of T1 and T2 themselves. Where, T1 is T1 and T2 is T2 (a is a); and T1 can’t be T2 in the same respects at same time (can’t be a and non-a). If this is not so, my mind just starts eating itself, because it means I can’t even distinguish between thoughts, and thus “nothing is sound” including that statement, and that statement, ad infinitum as I reach for the bottle. And that is all just me looking at my thoughts regardless of what they are of. It’s the very nature of thought, and the nature of thought offers me no other alternative. I find myself this way. I find thought this way, I discover the nature of thought, I don't determine it. Contra Descartes "I think therefore I am,” it's, "I think therefore I think." And thinking is something, it has a nature

I don't know what this person means by the mind "eating itself." That's quite the imagine, but it's too imprecise to evaluate for truth. More importantly, there are a few things to take note of, here.

First, we should be careful to distinguish between affirming the law of identity (a is a) per se on the one hand with affirming it and claiming to be absolutely certain of it, on the other. As I've said many times before, one can affirm it without claiming to be certain of it because there are various ways to "affirm" a claim (you could for example, believe that it is true and that it's at least possible that you're mistaken). The author of the comment is trying to make the standard Gangadeanian move which is to suggest that one must affirm (with certainty) the law of identity inasmuch as one wants to allow that we have a basis for distinguishing between one thought and another. Given that it seems (intuitively) obvious that we have some basis for distinguishing one thought from another, we must affirm (with certainty) the law of identity, so the thinking goes. But what the Gangadeanians fail to establish is the "with certainty" part. I see no reason for thinking that I somehow have no rational basis for making basic distinctions just because I don't affirm the law of identity with Gangadeanian certainty. I can affirm the law of identity to a lesser degree or extent and consistently draw basic distinctions. Just like you can believe (but be less than certain) that it will rain tomorrow and be entirely rational in using this claim in your reasoning about whether or not to take an umbrella.

Secondly, notice the egocentricity of the many claims in this person's remarks e.g., "I find myself..." The method here seems to be that this person sits and reflects on their own thoughts (much like Descartes) and then attempts to capture what they find (via introspection) through the use of certain words (in a public/shared language) and then proceeds to draws very general conclusions about the nature of all possible thought. They write, "I merely have the concepts of T1 and T2" and "I find thought this way". What conclusion should follow from facts about this person's own experiences at particular times? If we're being careful, not much. We shouldn't generalize to the very nature of all possible thought on the basis of this one person's self-reports of their experiences. I believe they call those "hasty generalizations." There are really two issues here.

1) How does this person know with Gangadeanian certainty that they are accurately capturing/expressing/describing their experiences?  

2) How do they know that their judgments concerning their own experiences of thought generalize to all possible thought (i.e., to the very nature or essence of thought)?

We are in need of arguments for each. Moreover, there's a more general dialectical issue. One of the main motivating reasons behind Gangadean's "rational presuppositionalism" and his express denial of appeals to common sense and use of intuition is that on his view, there must be some "objective" means by which we can settle disputes. He worries that if we are allowed to appeal to intuitions for belief in God for instance, then when two people disagree, there is nothing further that can be done to come to an agreement. So I'm contending that we should hold the Gangadeanians to the very same standards. Now ask yourself, if someone disagrees with (or more modestly, doesn't find obvious) all of what this person says above about the nature of thought, about what one finds when one reflects on their own thoughts, and the like, is there any way to "objectively" settle these issues? What would that even begin to look like? 

The reason that there is no "objective" means to settle such disputes is that there is no argument offered for the claims. All the author has done is presented a series of assertions about what they believe to be the nature of all thought, by giving words to their inner experiences and then generalizing beyond their own experiences, but what they haven't offered is an "objective" non-question begging means of determining whether or not what they say must be true. The payoff: this way of framing things does no better at settling disputes, than an appeal to intuition or common sense. And that's a serious problem for any Gangadeanian. I say more about this below.

The author goes on:

We don’t determine the laws, we discover them. We are using the laws to see the laws. Meaning, the laws of thought are not more basic assumptions behind thinking, but a way to articulate the inescapable nature of thought itself, where to think of any opposing idea rests on the very thing I am aiming to discredit. In some respects, it’s not even that the laws of thought make thinking possible, but that they are the precise features of thinking itself.

That's all fine and well, but again the natural question is, how do you know, with Gangadeanian certainty, that your judgments about the nature of thought are ultimately correct and generalizable?  How does one come to know, with  certainty, a thing like, "the laws of thought are a way to articulate the inescapable nature of thought itself?" Again, to plainly assert that we "discover" them is to presuppose that there's something to discover, which is the very thing at issue here. What the author of these comments seems to be doing is taking liberties to presuppose that their introspective judgments are veridical so much so that it yields knowledge about the nature of all and any thought. The lack of self-awareness here is troubling.

Then, if I say “I’m not sure that holds up,” that is to use the nature of thought (laws of thought) to try and debunk the nature of thought, which is clearly self-defeating. It’s like standing firmly on a high beam 100 feet in the air claiming it can’t do what it is doing. Even to say, “I’m not sure it can hold me” while it is holding me is stupid. So, I either accept (not merely assume) the nature of thought as it is (much like I accept my lungs and heart have a nature as they are) or I use reason to deny it and, to be consistent, leap off the beam—because literally every single other thing I think or say is derived from, made possible by, and rests on this nature of thinking 

There's a lot wrong with this section. At least inasmuch as it's intended to target a person like me, it's again making the same conflation that Anderson and company frequently make: there's nothing self-defeating about being less than certain that the laws of thought are true. Gangadeanians keep insisting that there is, but they don't present any reasons in favor of such a claim. Unfortunately, merely repeating a claim doesn't show that it's "clear to reason."

This person's own analogy is helpful in showing where their thinking goes wrong in relation to my disagreements with Gangadean. In short, what the analogy conflates is the metaphysical with the epistemological. There is nothing absurd about a person being supported by a beam (a metaphysical state), while being unsure (an epistemological state) that the beam is holding her up. That's because there are all sorts of facts (things that are true) of which we are not aware unless of course you're all knowing! And it's perfectly rational to doubt or call into question claims which you don't know to be facts! In contrast, there's something absurd about a person who is certain (epistemological) that there is a beam holding her up while at the same time not being sure (epistemological) that there is a beam holding her up. That's what the Ganagdeanian needs my position to be in order to say that it is self-defeating. But doing so on the basis of bad conflations is not the way. There's a failure of mesh in their comment owning to a failure to distinguish between the metaphysical and the epistemological which is where it goes wrong.

The analogy as presented is misleading because the narrator has stipulated the metaphysical fact that there is a beam that is holding the person up. But that's a poor analogy if one is trying to characterize my dispute with the Gangadeanians over whether or not we can (and need) Gangadeanian certainty about say, the laws of thought. The better analogy is that the Gangadeanian claims to know with certainty that I am in fact being held up by a beam and I'm not certain, and I'm asking them to show why I should be certain and how they are certain (while being consistent with their own standards of proof). In other words, whether or not we are in a position to be certain that there is a beam that is holding me up is the very thing in question and so to respond as this person has with, "you're standing firmly on a high beam 100 feet in the air" is clearly to assume what needs to be shown.

Remember the Gangadeanian is trying to use rational presuppositionalism as a way of settling disputes and the dispute at this juncture is over what is analogous to whether or not the beam is holding the questioner up. If the protagonist in the story is unsure (an epistemological state) that the beam is holding her up (she might for instance suspect that there is an invisible force keeping her afloat), then there's nothing absurd about her uncertainty. In such a situation, it's not self-defeating for her to doubt that the beam is holding her up. The pertinent question then is, whether she can know (and how) that she is being held up by a beam (and perhaps, that there is a beam in the first place). That's analogous to the question, how can/does the Gangadeanian know that there are these general laws of thought that hold without exception?

Let's take the analogy a step further. How might a person in the story who questions whether there is a beam that is supporting her, determine the truth of the matter?  You might just say that she can open her eyes and observe that there is a beam and perhaps she can run some relevant experiments, look for hidden wires around her person and the like. So when I challenge the Gangadeanians to explain how they know that the laws of thought hold without exception, I'm asking for two things.

1) What is the analogue of "visual observations" when it comes to determining that the laws of thought are without exception, true? (Hint: from the author's remarks, it looks to be introspection/intuition).

2) How can one come to know with certainty that this analogue of a process is veridical?

I want to know how, for example, the author of the above comments comes to know (with certainty) that "literally ever single other thin[g] I think or say is derived from, made possible by, and rests on this nature of thinking." Put in those terms, it's obviously no good for the Gangadeanian to respond with, "your very act of questioning presupposes that the laws of thought are exceptionless" because that simply doesn't answer either of 1) or 2). Additionally, remember that a person can raise 1) and 2) while herself believing that the laws of thought are in fact, exceptionless. Just like a Ganagdeanian can ask a fellow theist how they  know with certainty that God exits, while herself believing that God exists. There's simply nothing self-defeating about that. If the Gangadeanian disagrees then they don't understand what is meant by "self-defeating." He goes on with,

All things considered, this seems the most common and basic split between those who disagree: What I see as simply accepting the reality of thought as it is (and seeing no other alternative because any alternative requires thought), others call it going by intuition or common sense, or even being fideistic, which goes on to undermine any claims for clarity. That I just see it and accept it without proof. That it is a bit like, “I put my faith in reason.” Granted faith as understanding, but still, I simply accept it.   

But, I vehemently reject there is anything blind going on when I see (and accept) thought has a nature that is fixed and I cannot override. I reason to it. I see that I literally and existentially cannot not think, and literally, having thought itself, includes, shows, and inescapably declares its own existential nature. Where, much like I find myself needing air to breathe, and food to eat (because my lungs and body have a particular nature) I can do absolutely nothing to alter this nature of thought. It is what it is. So, finally my question: As opposed to just asserting "reason can't be questioned because it makes questioning possible" does it boil down for this to be the proof: that the alternative is not just inconsistent but literally and existentially unthinkable? If that works, I want to request of the skeptic, not just for a commitment to reason as the laws of thought, but because this is the nature of thought itself, "give me your arguments without using thought." Is any of that a fair way to approach it or too convoluted? Or, could it be the case that just like some want to show “something must be eternal” before showing what it is, we need to show in epistemology that "something must be self-attesting" before showing what it is?  

And now we start to approach at least this particular Gangadeanian's answer to my question about how they know about the very nature of thought and that reason is transcendental and the like. Basically, this person claims to just "see" some things as true. Now if my question is, how do you know with certainty about the very nature of all thought? To answer this with, "I just see it" is nothing more than an appeal to something like an immediate judgment or in other words an intuition. If that's the case, then Gangadean's philosophy is really mistaken in decrying appeals to intuition in others. The natural question then becomes, why can't a believer likewise "just see" that God exists? and claim that it is obvious? Of course, Gangadeanians will cite the fact that not everyone just "sees that God exists." But the same with this person's assertions about the nature of all thought! Are the Gangadanian's willing to go so far as to say that every possible person just "sees" that all thought must presuppose the laws of thought (and also that this entails that we can and must be certain of this fact)? The payoff is that the Gangadeanians can't have it both ways. Either allow for the legitimacy of immediate judgments (which will open Pandora's box for their worldview) or provide a non-question begging way to prove these claims about the nature of all thought that you're making to someone that just doesn't "see" what you claim to "see." To say, as this person has, that they "simply accept the reality of thought as it is" is clearly begging the question! It's like responding to a person who asks you for a proof of God's existence with, "I simply accept the reality that nature is as it is, which includes God's existence."

What's confusing is that the author of the remarks goes on to insist that none of this is based on intuition or blind faith, instead it's something they "reason to" adding that "I see that it literally and existentially cannot not think, and literally, having thought itself includes, shows, and inescapably declares its own existential nature." In doing so, they are using the phrase :"reason to it" incorrectly. When we reason to things, we draw inferences from say, premises to conclusions. Again, the Gangadeanian can't have it both ways. Either you "just see some things as true" or your "reason to them" but you can't just see something as true and count that as an instance of "reasoning" in the relevant sense.

This is the spot between the rock and hard place that the Gangadeanians will find themselves in if they "critically analyze their basic beliefs" far enough and with consistency. They must make room for at least some immediate, non inferential judgments or they bear such a ridiculous burden of proof that all they can do is continually run away from discussions. Whether or not they want to call these 'intuitions' really doesn't really matter. They can call them "ponies" for all I care. The point is that these basic beliefs have the very feature of intuitive judgments, which the Gangadeanians find problematic. There is no objective means to "settle disputes" regarding them. Either you just "see," as the author of the above remarks, that the laws of thought are presupposed by all of your own thoughts or you don't. There's nothing more to say about the matter. But the reason the Gangadeanians should find no solace in this result is that this it opens up the possibility that there are other (perhaps many) beliefs of just this sort. And now they need a non-arbitrary manner by which to distinguish between when these immediate beliefs are rational and when they are not.

The fact that Anderson did not see such obvious problems with this person's remarks and endorsed them as "a great analysis" is telling though I'm not sure in what direction. Either Anderson simply didn't pay close attention, or he's just that bad at thinking, or he's being dishonest so as to be quick to endorse any account that comes to the same basic conclusion. I'm not sure which of these is the most charitable.

The Gangadeanian Evasion

In his latest, Anderson remarks,

This is another good example of why we aren't able to assess the argument. We can't assess the argument because we don't agree on whether the laws of thought are also laws of being (ontological). You don't know if "eternal" is "non-eternal" in reality. And now you've repeated your claim that you can't know if the laws of thought apply outside of your experience ("reality beyond our experience," or your "epistemic horizons"). What is "eternal" is outside of your experience. Therefore, you won't be able to know about what is eternal due to this epistemic horizon. You won't be able to assess arguments about what is eternal. This isn't a matter of who shoulders the burden of proof. It is a matter of whether there is sufficient common ground to have mutual understanding to proceed. As I noted above, it is a loaded question to maintain these limitations and yet ask for an argument.

Spencer basically requested that Anderson show that reason (as the laws of thought) is ontological. As I stated before, "accepting that the laws of thought are ontological" is Gangadean-speak for accepting that we can know at least some very basic things about the world "out there" (mind-independent reality)--namely things like, "a thing is what it is"--in virtue of just thinking alone. Anderson here, is arguing that if Spencer doesn't "agree" that reason is ontological, then they have no basis to evaluate arguments (and thus no reason to continue talking).

It's very important at this juncture to emphasize where it seems Spencer and I part ways, as well as where Anderson/Gangadean and I both agree and disagree. I agree with Anderson/Gangadean that reason is ontological and Spencer seems to be calling this into question. Importantly, where Gangadean/Anderson and I diverge is on the matter of how it is that we know a thing like this and whether or not we can be absolutely certain of it. I know such things on the basis of an intuition (non inferentially)--it just strikes me as obviously true, which is bad according to Gangadean. I'm not sure how they get can consistently affirm such claims without the employment of intuitions at some level. I suspect they think that there's some sort of reductio--that if you assume reason is not ontological, while inquiring into reality by way of reason, then you're just obviously stuck in some sort of contradiction or absurdity. But how they know that it is in fact an absurdity without an appeal to a non-inferential judgment (aka intuition) is beyond me. Maybe team-Gangadean just doesn't know what the word 'intuition' means and that's where the worldview got off on the wrong foot.

At any rate, this is why I've never denied the claim that for example, 'a thing is what it is'. Remember, the only thing I've repeatedly called into question is how Ganagdeanians can consistently decry the use of intuitions while requiring a high standard of knowledge (via either deductive proof or "self-attesting" principles) and at the same time claim to know with certainty that reason is ontological (among other things). My claim is that if you adopt their epistemic standards consistently you will land yourself in an extreme kind of skepticism. I worry that most Gangadeanians just aren't being careful enough in understanding my views so that they conflate my asking them to show how they know something on the one hand, with my denying that thing on the other. Clearly, these two come apart. (E.g, Gangadeanians frequently ask fellow Theists to prove that God exists, but that doesn't entail that Gangadeanians deny God's existence!)

So with these considerations in mind, it should be apparent that Anderson's move above, of citing the lack of common ground to evaluate arguments, won't work in relation to any of my objections. That is to say, I believe (and even take myself to know) that reason is ontological and yet I still find Gangadean's arguments really terrible. Now the curious thing is that, Gangadean actually ended discussions with me years ago citing that we didn't have enough common ground. So what gives?

Well, Gangadean was just not thinking clearly during our interactions. Frequently, he would try to get me to "admit" that I denied the laws of thought. Just as frequently, I would point out how I didn't deny the laws of thought and that he was missing the point of my concerns. Instead I was merely calling into question whether we could (rationally) be absolutely certain that they were true as Gangadean was insisting (I also questioned whether we needed to be certain). And he really struggled to keep these two things apart (maybe he didn't want to?) as did other Gangadeanians with whom I spoke. Hence, he ultimately dismissed me from the conversation citing that we didn't have enough "common ground." Of course, that's false. As I've already pointed out on more than one occasion, even if I don't think we can have (or need) the kind of Gangadeanian certainty about basic things, I can (with consistency) believe or even know the very same things, because neither belief nor knowledge requires Gangadeanian certainty in the first place (at the very least they haven't proven otherwise). So that means I can affirm basic distinctions, have knowledge, meaning, and of course, intelligible philosophical debates about reality. In other words, we had plenty of common ground, Gangadean was just being hasty and small-minded. So, he discontinued discussions with me on the basis of a pretty glaring mistake. Gangadean had this weird hang up that we had to go further--not only must we agree that 'a is a' (and the like) if we are to have intelligible discussions, but we also had to agree that we could be absolutely certain that 'a is a' by way of reason. Did he ever argue for this further point? Of course not--it was nothing more than a strange bias.

My theory is that at some point, Gangadean and some of his followers may have begun to figure out that my position is more nuanced than they had initially appreciated. Perhaps they finally see that they can't justifiably cite the lack of common ground as a reason to avoid engaging with me, as Anderson is attempting to do with Spencer and as Gangadean once mistakenly did with me. My objections all grant the laws of thought, and that reason is ontological because I believe those things (even if I don't agree that we can have or even need Gangadeanian certainty concerning them). So what can they do? Sadly, they can't answer my objections head on (at least they've given me no reason to believe that they can). The answers are simply not there. To attempt to do so would only reveal that Gangadean's life work has been predicated on a series of rather basic mistakes. So they resort to discrediting me personally and engage with only those dissenters that they can exclude from the conversation by the standard Gangadeanian move of citing the lack of common ground.

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Postscript: I should add that I'm not suggesting that Anderson's latest "response" to Spencer is all that good either. It really is a kind of red-herring. If the question to Anderson is, how do you justify the claim that an eternal mind (in time) is necessarily omniscient? Anderson hasn't answered that.  One way to frame the question is that it's one about the internal consistency of Anderson's worldview--since he and Gangadean themselves require rational justification for all of their own beliefs (unless they count as so called "self-attesting" principles), we can read Spencer as asking whether Anderson can show that this belief (that an eternal mind in time is necessarily omnisicient) is rationally justifiable working from his own assumptions. Framed in those terms the common ground required seems very minimal and I don't see why they must agree that reason is ontological. If they grant certain basic rules of inference and the meaning of certain sentences and expressions like 'eternal' and 'omnsicient', they should be able to determine whether or not Anderson can provide a reason for his belief which coheres suitable within his own worldview. Anderson might have a point that there's something absurd about positively denying that reason gets us to mind-independent reality in the course of a philosophical debate (insofar as it's about mind-independent reality), but that's just a different discussion altogether. My point is that one can accept that reason is ontological and raise Spencer's worries ( I'm the one that originally raised the worry) because nothing about the objection hinges on the denial of reason being "ontological." We are now 25 comments in and still without an answer. Evasion indeed.

Here's a thought for Anderson: post your answer to the challenge in the comments so that other people following the conversation can benefit, even if you don't think Spencer can.

Important Distinctions about Attitudes.

For those still following the Youtube exchange, I noticed Anderson has posted a couple of new responses (yet still no answer to the original question!). He seems to be a bit confused. For one thing, Anderson appears to be conflating things I've said with those that Spencer has said in the exchange. Case in point: Spencer talks about things "beyond (Gangadean's) epistemic horizon" and Anderson keeps using that phrase. But he's entirely missed Spencer's original point. I take it that the original point is captured in this quote from Spencer.

Also, Gangadean seems to be unjustly assuming that no facts exist beyond his epistemic horizon. If his soul were eternal in time, it could still be the case that a set of undiscoverable facts exist, given his epistemic limitations. Donald Rumsfeld famously called such facts "unknown unknowns".

The point there is just that there are some things that we don't or can't know. For some reason Anderson keeps trying to force a non-sequitur, here as if a kind of extreme skepticism should follow if what Spencer says here is true. But everyone should grant that there are some things that we don't/can't know (e.g., the current position of every electron in the universe). And the reason that Anderson seems to think skepticism follows from "there are some things we don't/can't know" is that he somehow takes this to entail that "reason is not ontological." But I just don't see the connection.

Anderson writes,

We still aren't in agreement if we can even assess arguments. If reason isn't ontological, reason doesn't apply to being, then it won't matter whether there is or is not a contradiction because perhaps there are contradictions in reality. I think reason is ontological. As I understand it you aren't sure one way or the other. So you aren't saying it isn't, but you also aren't saying it is. Perhaps the eternal is non-eternal and you've reached your epistemic horizons.

Again, I think that he's getting his wires crossed. He seems to be picking up on the point that I (not Spencer) raised about doubting or calling into question the proposition that some things are clear/certain in the way that Gangadean defines 'clear' or 'certain'. And then he's gone on to talk about whether or not reason is ontological (rather than about the principle of clarity). Spencer's original claim doesn't call either of those into question. Maybe Anderson is confusing his quantifiers here and reading "there are some things we can't know" with "everything is such that we can't know it."

Still, I want to address Anderson's remarks head-on because I think they'll be instructive and will help those unfortunate souls still attempting to follow the rather confusing conversation on Youtube. To do so, let's imagine he's talking to someone like me, someone that is unsure that the principle of clarity is true, and likewise uncertain that reason is ontological. What I want to explore is whether or not being unsure that reason is ontological entails that one cannot meaningfully evaluate any arguments or make basic distinctions as he seems to charge above. This is just another iteration of the standard Gangadeanian, boogeyman approach which I spoke about here---if you deny that we can be certain of basic things, then something absurd follows.

I'll use the proposition that "reason is ontological" as our target claim. To say "reason is ontological" is just a fancy way of saying that, at least sometimes, our beliefs reflect reality (the way the world is). To say that one is not certain or has doubts concerning it, is not the same as outright denying the claim or affirming the opposite. So if I say that I am not certain that reason is ontological, what I'd be saying is that I'm not certain that our beliefs ever accurately reflect reality. Now it turns out that there is more than one way to not be sure that something is the case. I'll enumerate three. 

1) No belief: I might have no opinion whatsoever about some issue--say because I've never even thought about it. If I have no opinion about whether or not reason is ontological (for example), then I'm not certain that it is.  

2) Indifference: I could believe that it is equally likely that reason is ontological and that it isn't. That's not quite the same as the above state because at least I have some sort of attitude towards the proposition, but it's one of ambivalence. We might model this by saying that I assign .5 to the proposition that reason is ontological and .5 to the proposition that it isn't, for example. Again, if I'm in this state (i.e., I think it's a toss up) regarding a proposition, then I'm not certain that it's true. 

3) Uncertain Belief: But there's a third way. I could believe that reason is ontological, without being absolutely certain that it is. For instance, I might believe that reason is ontological but also that it's at least possible that I'm wrong, even though unlikely (perhaps even very unlikely). One way to describe my state is that I believe that it is more likely than not (perhaps, vastly so) that reason is ontological. If you want to model this in terms of probabilities, then my belief here in the proposition that reason is ontological is going to be any value that is greater than .5, but less than 1 (it might even be very close to 1). In fact, most of our beliefs are going to fall into this category.

I think Anderson is trying to force someone like me (and perhaps Spencer) to say that their view about reason being ontological, is akin to the state of indifference described in 2). That's perhaps because in Anderson's mind, if you are thoroughly ambivalent about whether or not your beliefs ever reflect reality, then I guess consistency demands that you adopt the same ambivalence in your beliefs about basic distinctions (being vs. non-being). This in turn is supposed to be absurd and hence grounds to accept wholeheartedly that reason is ontological (or deny your original ambivalence). I don't see how that follows, but I won't press the point, here. We can grant Anderson that questionable inference and still resist his main approach. The main takeaway here is that 3) describes a manner in which one can have it both ways. One can be less than sure (unsure) that reason is ontological, believe that it is, and thus have every basis to draw basic distinctions, evaluate arguments, and whatever other activity that the Gangdeanians take to be important, as I've already argued here.

My most recent posts and memes have been circling a set of related distinctions which Gangadeanians like Anderson have not taken sufficient care to track.

Morpheus recently taught us that

A person can (consistently) be less than sure that P, without believing that P is false.  

A person can (consistently) doubt that we can be certain that P, without believing that P is false. 

The "think about it" dude taught us that

A person can (consistently) doubt that anything is clear to reason, while taking themselves to know all kinds of things (i.e, skepticism isn't rationally required for those that call into question the principle of clarity). 

And now we can add to our list:

A person can (consistently) be less than sure that P, while believing (even, confidently) that P.