I've recently been challenged by a reader to provide a more concise statement of my fundamental disagreement with Gangadean. It's a bit tricky to do so because the disagreements are textured and often subtle which requires some detail. But I think it's worthwhile to give up on some precision to make something more accessible and bite-sized.
If I had to boil down my main disagreement with Gangadean I would have to say that it's a disagreement about 1) the need for, and 2) the inevitability of clarity.
Gangadean's entire worldview hinges on two fundamental claims.
1) That there is clarity at the basic level. Gangadean thinks that it's impossible for some subset of his beliefs to be mistaken or false. That is to say, for a significant portion of his beliefs about reality, it's in the strongest sense impossible for him to be wrong. For instance, he believes the laws of thought are universal and exceptionless. He believes that God exists. He believes that the bible is the word of God. He believes that humans are rational animals. He believes matter is not eternal. He believes that good for humans is to gain knowledge of basic things. He believes that evil for humans stems from failing to know what is clear. He believes that free will is compatible with divine foreknowledge and predestination. He believes that knowledge = maximally justified true beliefs. He believes that the self exists. He believes that the self is not eternal. He believes that reality is composed entirely of either matter or spirit. There are lots and lots of others, but you get the drift. It all supposedly starts from the laws of thought (e.g. 'a is a') and via deduction (or "good and necessary consequences") gets you to an airtight, knock-down, argument for each of the propositions just enumerated (and more!).
2) That, in some sense, we need this kind of clarity. Without clarity at the basic level, without this kind of indubitable certainty of basic things, we're in really bad shape. Worst of all, skepticism (i.e., we can't have any knowledge) follows. But also, nihilism (life has no meaning) follows. Further, without this kind of clarity, there's no point in arguing, or talking---absurdity and contradictions follow.
For Gangadean, the two are related. He uses 2) to support 1). That is, he asks his objector to consider what the world would be like if there was not clarity at the basic level (this is part of Gangadean's "transcendental method"). Would there be any knowledge? Would there be meaning? Would there be any point to talking? Arguing? Could we even have thoughts? If not, then the things enumerated in 1) must be clear to reason.
Where I fundamentally disagree:
I fault Gangadean for failing to make an indubitable case for 2) which in turn undermines his reasons for accepting 1). In other words, he tries to argue for 1) by appealing to 2), but fails to establish 2) and thus fails to establish 1).
To date, I have yet to hear a watertight case from team Gangadean establishing the need for clarity (i.e., thesis 2)). I think that our world could very well be a world in which we can't have that kind of certainty about anything. But importantly, I don't see how nihilism, skepticism, or contradiction follows from this fact. This is where Gangadean seems to make elementary errors in reasoning--by helping himself to unproven assumptions and ultimately begging the question.
Let's take the issue of skepticism since I think that's supposed to be the main boogey-man. In its extreme form skepticism is the thesis that knowledge is impossible for anyone to ever attain about anything. Gangadean claims that without clarity at the basic level, this extreme form of skepticism follows. Further, it would be a contradiction for one to affirm this skepticism, since in doing so, you're claiming to know something (namely that we can't know anything) while denying the possibility of knowledge, something must be wrong. So skepticism must definitely not be true, in which case there must be clarity at the basic level.
The problem with this approach is that Gangadean is already assuming that knowledge is connected to clarity in a way that helps his ultimate agenda. That is, in order to establish the need for clarity, he's helping himself to a particular conception of the nature of knowledge, which requires clarity. But just why should we think that knowledge requires clarity in the first place? Where's that argument? I hope you can see where this is going. If it turns out that we can have knowledge without clarity, then skepticism simply doesn't follow from a lack of clarity. So Gangadean must show that we cannot possibly have knowledge without clarity at the basic level--and to date, he hasn't done so. He merely assumes as much. [Note the above reasoning is also mistaken because one can affirm skepticism without claiming to know that skepticism is true because affirming isn't equivalent to knowing.]
The same is true of the charge of nihilism. Just why or how does nihilism (meaninglessness) follow from the lack of clarity/certainty at the basic level? This again isn't a thing argued for--it's taken as obvious by Gangadean. Of course, if Gangadean is allowed to define 'nihilism' however he pleases, then the point will be trivial. But we needn't allow that. Or if Gangadean is permitted to stipulate his favored concept of nihilism or meaninglessness, then again the point could be trivial---but we needn't allow that. Gangadean needs to present his case for his favored concept or definition of meaninglessness in the pertinent sense and then explain how it logically follows from the lack of clarity. That's a tall order. Relatedly, why should talk be pointless? Why should arguing be pointless if it's possible for us to be wrong about everything?
Finally, Gangadean's case for 2) ultimately fails because it depends on a bad conflation. Gangadean and his followers are prone to conflate possibility with actuality. To deny the clarity thesis consits in merely allowing that it's possible for all of us to be wrong about even our most basic beliefs. [Recall how Gangadean defines clarity: "for p to be clear to S is for it to be impossible that S is wrong about p"]. Importantly, that's not the same as claiming that we are in fact wrong about the most basic things. The former is about what's possible and the latter, what is actual. To say that it's possible that I could be wrong that God exists, or that 'a is a' is not to say that my belief in those propositions is actually wrong. And if by challenging the clarity thesis I am not saying I am actually wrong about my belief in 'a is a', then none of the other doomsday predictions that Gangadean makes, follows from the denial of the clarity thesis. [Again you have to pay close attention to just what the clarity thesis is--to say P is clear for you, is to say that it's impossible for you to be wrong about P].
It's perfectly consistent for me to believe that God exists while in the same breathe believing that it's at least possible for me to be wrong. Just as it perfectly consistent for me to believe that it will rain tomorrow, while believing that I could be wrong. Even more, in either case, I can rationally remain confident in each proposition provided my reasons provide ample support even if the reasons aren't conclusive. And my beliefs can be correct and the basis of rational decision making. Indeed even in a situation where it's possible for me to be wrong about my belief that God exists, I can know that God exists. Thus, skepticism doesn't follow from denying clarity. Neither does nihilism follow. Thinking continues to happen. Talk and inquiry continues to have a point. Conversations need not end. It's not the end of the world. We don't need clarity not even at the basic level. We can have knowledge without clarity, we can have meaning without clarity--we can fail to have our cake and fail to eat it too.
