New posts up!

I've been slacking the last week or so but am making up for lost time. I just put up 3 new articles today.

Clarity, Inexcusability and Knowledge.

I have challenged the idea that we can have absolute certainty of the things Gangadean claims to have. More precisely, I have tried to show that whatever system or method that Gangadean appeals to in trying to attain certainty turns out to be inconsistent. Notice my claim needn't be that we can't have certainty. It's simply that Gangadean hasn't shown us a way to certainty. This is so, even if the kind of certainty he is after is logically possible--he hasn't shown us the way to it. His account ultimately fails its own test. This is because his most basic beliefs end up being grounded in intuitions or otherwise groundless. Unfortunately, I've heard no direct answer to any of my objections. Often I have asked for supporting arguments for a number of the central claims that Gangadean rests his worldview on, but have heard nothing. For instance, I have asked Gangadean to rationally support his theory of knowledge. He tells us what his theory is (though he doesn't recognize it as just one of many theories), but he doesn't tell us why we should think his theory is correct. He still hasn't answered this.

Instead, one psuedo-response has been to shift the direction of the discussion in the following way. He says that the kind of knowledge he is interested in, is the kind that makes sense of the inexcusability of unbelief according to Christian Theism or the bible. In other words, he's sort of conceding in a roundabout way that there are many different conceptions of knowledge out there. But rather than prove that his theory is the correct one, he's saying that his theory plays a particular role in his theorizing about a particular Christian doctrine. Furthermore, he's claiming that it's the only kind of conception of knowledge that will do this job and it's the kind of knowledge that we should have regarding our most basic beliefs, according to Christianity.

So let me put a little pressure on this line of "response."

1) Just because a particular conception or theory fits one's philosophical/theological project, it doesn't mean it's true. These are just two entirely different things.

2) Gangadean hasn't proven from reason alone that we should care about explaining the inexcusability of unbelief. In fact, he derives the notion from the bible (Romans 1:20). But the issue of whether he's got the right kind of theory of knowledge, and whether it must be clearly knowable by reason alone that God exists, are supposed to be known via reason alone. So it achieves nothing on that front to merely appeal to scripture as if they support his claims-- that's putting the cart in front of the horse. He's got to prove these claims via reason. How does Gangadean know by reason alone that i) unbelief in God leads to maximal consequences, ii) unbelief in God is inexcusable and iii) that maximal consequences implies maximal clarity? That is, he can't just insist these things are true, he ought to prove them and should not appeal to the bible to do so. I have raised these and related concerns before.

3) As I've written about in this post, his Calvinism implies that, even if it were clear that God exists, unbelief is still excusable because the unregenerate can't possibly desire to seek God. This desire to know what is clear is requisite (and sufficient) according to Gangadean to know what is clear, but it's also entirely out of the unbelievers hands whether they have this desire to know/seek or not to begin with. Pair these considerations with the fact that Gangadean maintains the ought-implies-can principle, and you have the following result. If I ought to desire to seek God, then I can desire to see, which is false given his commitment to soft determinism/Calvinism (the unregenerate cannot desire to seek, because they are dead in their trespasses). And so if it isn't the case that they can seek, it follows that they are not required to seek, which means they shouldn't be held responsible for not seeking. So the unbeliever is with excuse or rather, they need no excuse because they haven't done anything wrong.

4) Now even supposing that it were legitimate for Gangadean to reach into the bible for a proof text (which it certainly isn't), we still have the problem of interpretation. I've written about this issue before as well. Briefly, the problem is that Gangadean has a particular conception of "without excuse" and "clear" when he reads Romans 1:20 which states that "being clear from what is made so that man is without excuse." And he's got a particular doctrine of the consequences of unbelief in mind which inform what he draws from this text. But there is controversy all along the way. Why should we think that Paul was thinking of "clear" and "without excuse" in the way that Gangadean has in mind? Can Gangadean prove that he was? Again take a look at this post where I discuss these matters in more detail.

5) The reason that Gangadean thinks inexcusability of unbelief implies clarity is because he thinks that there are maximal consequences (spiritual death) that is part and parcel of unbelief in what is clear. So we can derive from that that any belief which failure to have results in maximal consequences/spiritual death are going to be absolutely clear or can be known with certainty.

However, according to the most common forumlations of Christianity including Gangadean's, spiritual life (avoiding spiritual death/maximal consequences) requires more than belief or knowledge that God exists. It requires, among other things, belief in Christ's redemptive work, which requires that one believes that Christ actually existed, took on the sins of the world and the like. And I take it that Gangadean is committed to the further view that belief in these claims is not enough, but one must have knowledge, his kind of knowledge. But one can't possibly know that Jesus existed, was the incarnation of God and died for our sins just by thinking about it. We need the divine revelation of God, the message of the gospel via the bible. So now it seems like according to Gangadean's standards one must also know (with certainty) that the bible (at least with respect to what it says about Christ's redemptive work) is true. So there is a lot to know here, and to know with absolute certainty according to Gangadean. Since failure to know any of these things leads to maximal consequences, it follows from Gangadean's position that each and every one of these propositions must be provable via a deductively sound argument. In other words, Gangadean must be able to prove how he can know that Jesus existed, was the incarnation of God, and took on the sins of the world and that the bible is true (at least insofar as it speaks of Christ). Can he prove each of these via reason? Here again is the post where I explain this objection and here is another that shows how Gangadean's can't prove that the bible is special revelation (i.e., actually the word of God).

6) Since Gangadean is so keen on citing Romans 1:20 as a proof text and appealing to particular words (in English translations) such as "without excuse" and "clearly" to make substantive philosophical claims, I wonder why he ignores the fact that Paul is speaking about unbelief with respect to God, rather than knowledge.  Knowledge according to Gangadean requires certainty, but belief does not. We have all sorts of beliefs and not all of what we believe counts as knowledge. So perhaps all Paul is saying in that passage is that one ought to believe that God exists, because there are compelling reasons to believe even if these reasons don't provide knowledge or Gangadeanian knowledge (certainty).

More on "response to critics": Is Gangadean a Fideist or Skeptic?

About a month ago, I found a new Gangadeanian website featuring articles, one of which was a "response to critics." Here is the article and here was my initial reaction to it. Gangadean featured some of my objections, but did a poor job at addressing them. Partly due to ignorance. It's hard to respond properly to a challenge when you don't understand it very well. Anyway, below is another excerpt from Gangadean's article. I've suggested before that Gangadean's theory of knowledge actually leads to a form of skepticism. If you maintain that knowledge requires absolute certainty like Gangadean does, then much of what you think you know turns out to be instances of ignorance. If you consider a great many of my articles you will see that I've been pushing this line. I've attempted to show how Gangadean's worldview is internally inconsistent. He disavows skepticism about basic things, but his theory of knowledge if held consistently, actually leads to skepticism about these very things. He disavows fideism ("belief without proof" as he defines it) but he rests his most foundational views on immediate, non inferential beliefs. Sometimes he refers to these beliefs as "self-attesting" but what about the belief that a is a is self-attesting? Is it self-attesting that it is self-attesting? How does he know when something is self-attesting? Isn't this belief without proof since proof requires argument and there is no argument given for when something is self-attesting rather than not? Again, that is the way to inconsistency. As I see it Gangadean sort of endorses fideism about the most basic things under the guise of "self-attesting" principles though he won't admit it. But what I want to focus on here, is how his views lead to skepticism. Below we have one of the "objections" and "responses" that Gangadean presents on his website. 

Objection 13: Reason cannot get you very far beyond a is a. 

Response:

1. Reason is first the test for meaning. What violates a law of thought lacks meaning; a meaningless statement cannot be true, but is necessarily false (by reductio ad absurdum).

1. The contradiction of what is necessarily false must be true.

1. We can know by reason that there must be something eternal and that only some is eternal; we can know by reason that the good for a being is according to the nature of that being.

1. Therefore, the basic things about God and man and good and evil are clear to reason (PC).

1. The Principle of Clarity has substantial content that can be extended by the Principle of Rational Presuppositionalism, both of which are affirmed in Common Ground.

Ignoring for now how he has just dished out more mere assertions (i.e., he never argues for the claim that reason is first a test for meaning**), the main issue with this representation of the dialectic is that it doesn't do justice to the objection. Basically the objection is given as if it is merely an assertion and then the response is essentially "nope." It's puzzling to me how this would be helpful for anybody. But it seems consistent with the way that Gangadean and his people approach these matters at least in my experience so far. Unfortunately, it's makes for poor philosophy. So let me see if I can fill this stuff out so it's actually of some use. 

First what is the objection? Well it isn't that reason doesn't get us very far in terms of knowledge (again a misconstrual on Gangadean's part). Instead the objection is that Gangadean's requirement that one must always avoid fideism (belief without proof) in order to come to know things that severely limits what we can know. Proof that God exists is not attained by having excellent reasons or evidence that God exists.  Having proof that God exists according to Gangadean means having a deductively sound argument where the conclusion "God exists" necessarily follows from indubitably true premises (although as I mentioned in this post, even this account of proof faces serious worries).  So any belief you have on the basis of anything falling short of a sound, impervious, deductive argument, is a belief that fails to be knowledge. You are being fideistic according to Gangadean should you believe something without such proof and also if you're unable to recite that proof. Of course he'll cite "self-evident" or "self-attesting" principles, but as I've already pointed out, these are dubious notions. He needs to tell us why we should think there are such things in the first place and also give us a method of determining when something is genuinely self-attesting/self-evident (is something self attesting because it seems to him to be?). Now he grants that there are a great many things, "less basic" things that you can't know on his theory of knowledge. You can't know ahead of time who will win the next world series. You can't know how the stock market will do tomorrow and the like. But what he fails to realize (though I've presented my case to him on more than one occasion) is that his theory of knowledge actually takes away much much more than what he professes it does. He may not want admit it, but that's precisely what follows form his own views!

For instance, Gangadean criticizes empiricism for relying on sense impression as an infallible source of knowledge. He argues that our perceptual faculties (e.g., vision) can fail us as in cases of optical illusion. That is, at any given moment, we can't be sure what our sense report to us is truly representative of the world out there. This means that any time we have a sense impression, the veracity of the impression is called into question. So Gangadean uses this line of thinking to call empiricism into question. The problem is, he never gets around to explaining how it is that reason helps solve the problems he has exploited. We can't depend on our senses alone to know things (with certainty), and so we should depend on reason, so he claims. And then he goes on to present arguments that purport to prove that God exists entirely apart from our unreliable senses, (recall that he actually appeals to the senses in arguing this. See this post). Though I think and have argued that he fails in this "proof", let's just suppose that he has succeeded. So you know with certainty that some spirit must be eternal (see this post to see that he actually fails to do this as well). But what about other things? If knowledge of some proposition requires that you have (in some suitable way) proof of that proposition (and presumably believe the proposition on the basis of that proof), then you don't know anything that doesn't meet these criteria. If you don't have a sound proof of any proposition or you don't believe some proposition on the basis of a sound proof, then you don't know the proposition, period. That is Gangadean's view. But since he's just called into question the trustworthiness of our senses, that means anything you believe, even partially on the basis of your senses, is something you can't possibly know with certainty. You can see how this leads to skepticism. And it gets worse. Induction (the crown jewel of any hard science) falls short of proof. So to believe something on the basis of induction, is fideistic, it leads to ignorance rather than knowledge. 

Again, I had more than one conversation about this with Gangadean. I noted that I couldn't possibly know that I exist on this standard. I don't have a proof that I exist, nor do I believe on the basis of any proof that I exist. I just believe it immediately. So that means I can't know that I exist by Gangadean's lights. I can't know that I am a man (since this belief depends on my senses). I can't know that I was born at such and such date, or that I am married (these depend on the senses and testimony). I can't know that I wake up next to my wife each morning --I just don't have a deductive proof, bur rather depend on my senses and induction! What is more, much of these beliefs involve moral matters (by his lights). Think about any decision you make, maybe it's having a sexual relationship with the person you take to be your spouse, or maybe it's being a witness in a criminal jury, or maybe it's investing money to a good cause. Or maybe it's disciplining your children for something that you strongly suspect and have every reason to believe they did wrong. The examples are plentiful. In fact, Gangadean at some point concluded that I was a reason-denier and thus shouldn't be at his church. This, too, was based on his sense impressions of me (or my express behaviors) as well as his interpretations of those sense impressions. Bottom line, we don't have anything like a deductive proof about propositions that are relevant to important decisions and actions we take. If I am about to have sex with the person I take to be my marital partner, but I can't trust my senses and so can't know that this person is actually my partner, then I had better opt out. 

This way leads to skepticism. That is my objection. It's isn't that reason doesn't get us very far. It's that Gangadean's requirements on knowledge, his views about fideism (and how it's somehow wrong to believe things without proof) actually leads to a form of skepticism. Gangadean ought to be a skeptic if he's being consistent. 

In a personal conversation, Gangadean simply insisted that on his view you could be absolutely certain of all the things that I've called into question.  He essentially gave a Cartesian response. You see, the French philosopher Descartes once tried to argue for a similar view as Gangadean. He thought you could be sure of something just in case you had a clear and distinct idea of that thing. The problem of course is that he hasn't really told us what counts as "clear and distinct" and more importantly, how we can be sure when we have a clear and distinct idea vs. falsely thinking we do. Gangadean has essentially replaced "clear and distinct" with "self-attesting" "self-evident" or "makes questioning possible." But again, same problem. He hasn't told us how we know when something fits any of these and how we can determine for ourselves when we falsely believe something to be for example, self-attesting rather than not. Anyway, Descartes ran into this problem when it came to propositions that we believed on the basis (at least partial basis) of our senses. Given that our senses sometimes fool us, even when we don't see any reason to doubt them, he had to explain how we could trust our senses at all. This is just the problem that plagues Gangadean and he seems to have followed Descartes down a dubious path. It is the blind leading the blind. So Gangadean's response was something like, "well, we already have proven that God exists via reason and we know that God is perfectly good, so we can trust that God would not fool us when it comes to propositions that are relevant to moral matters." 

I was actually quite shocked that this was his response and I hope he has since changed that view or that I have grossly misunderstood him. The problem of course is that you need to be able to know that your senses are faithfully reporting reality in order to even determine whether some belief is going to be morally relevant in the first place. Presumably, my stealing something in a dream is not an iniquity. I just don't have any sort of control over my dreams and more importantly, no actual harm has been done as a result of my imagined action. Now suppose you just saw someone leave an expensive cellphone at a restaurant. You ask yourself, did I just imagine this, am I dreaming, or did someone in fact, leave a cellphone in the restaurant?  That is, you ask yourself whether you can trust your senses on this occasion. Gangadean's response is that if it is a morally relevant belief, then you can rest assured that God would not let you be fooled about your senses. The problem is, you need to first determine whether this is going to be a morally relevant belief and it's only morally relevant if it's real and your senses didn't play a trick on you and you're not dreaming! So you are again faced with the problem. How do I know when I can trust my senses and when I can't? So this "response" is actually of no use. It's a case of what I call the philosophical runaround. 

Once we understand the real objection we can see that the "response" featured above on behalf of the Gangadeanians, is nothing of a response. 

**Note Gangadean does say that "meaning is more basic than truth" in Philosophical Foundation. But this is not an argument for the claim that reason is first a test for meaning. It's just another assertion. He then follows this with an example. "All glics are grue" and notes that you cannot know whether it is true or false until you first know what it means. Neither is this a sound argument unless arguments don't have premises and deductive relations. Instead it's an example that is supposed to elicit an intuitive reaction from the hearer.

More on Gangadean's Theodicy

Previously I wrote about Gangadean's take on the problem of evil.  Gangadean thinks that the presence of both moral and natural evil presents a problem for the theist. In particular, in his book, he focuses on the logical problem of evil, but as I've said before, it isn't really a logical problem. There is no strict contradiction between the proposition that God exists and the proposition that evil exists.  At best, the reality of evil and suffering is an evidential problem (the presence of evil seems to be some evidence against the proposition that an all-good, all-powerful God exists). But since Gangadean is after ruling out all possibilities of God's failing to exist, he has to take, even the evidential problem, seriously. He's got to answer it given his own epistemological standards. In the previous article, I noted that Gangadean's approach to the problem, his purported theodicy is a non-starter. It badly begs the question against the one raising the problem of evil as a challenge against theism.

Here's something else that is problematic having to do with an unproven assumption upon which his theodicy seems to rest.  In his book (see Philosophical Foundation pp. 111-114) Gangadean first addresses the question of why there is moral evil even despite the fact that an all-good and all-powerful God exists. He then shifts to talking about natural evil. Importantly, his explanation of natural evil depends on his explanation of moral evil. Roughly, moral evil is the kind of evil that is agent driven i.e., results somewhat directly and in some way from moral agents like us. While natural evil is not (e.g., famine, old age, sickness, "natural" death, and the like). So here's what it means that Gangadean's explanation of natural evil depends on his explanation of moral evil: In some way, Gangadean presupposes that moral evil is more basic than natural evil. He never justifies this claim. He never even bothers to question whether it's actually true that moral evil is more basic than natural evil. This is strange. In other words, his explanation of why there is natural evil (on a theistic picture) depends crucially on what his explanation is for the reason that there is moral evil. Natural evil is imposed by God, according to Gangadean, in order to remove moral evil. But why should anyone grant Gangadean this relationship between the two types of evil? Is he claiming that it is clear to reason that natural evil ought to be explained in terms of moral evil, and so moral evil is somehow more basic than natural evil? If he is claiming this, then I'd like to see an argument. If not, then again his whole theodicy fails before it begins. Since as he sees it, the problem of evil threatens the clarity of God's existence, if it isn't clear that natural evil ought to be explained in terms of moral evil (such that the latter is more basic), then his theodicy for natural evil will merely be speculative. It won't be clearly, true. In which case, the challenges to theism, that come with the problem of evil, will not clearly have been answered. In which case, it isn't clear that God exists. So Gangadean has no choice. He needs a deductively sound argument that has as its conclusion that natural evil should be (rationally) understood in light of moral evil. And he can't presuppose that the bible is special revelation to begin with, in doing so (since that would be question begging).

On pg. 114, Gangadean states that natural evil must be imposed rather than original in creation. So maybe he's thinking that it can't be more basic than moral evil because moral evil came first. But this won't do. First of all, temporal priority (priority in time) doesn't entail explanatory priority. Just because X happens prior to Y in time, doesn't entail that X should be explained in terms of Y. For all we know X and Y are entirely independent events (see the fallacy called, post hoc ergo propter hoc) having no explanatory relationship whatsoever. And anyway, how could Gangadean possibly know that moral evil came before natural evil, in time from reason alone? Again, he can't just appeal to scripture since the problem of evil is raised as a challenge against belief in God. Secondly, moral evil doesn't seem "original in creation" or at least to say this would be a bad result for Gangadean. So if neither moral evil or natural evil are "original in creation" then we can't use that notion to derive our explanatory order.

Our First Guest Blog: Clarity, Skepticism, and Disagreement

*Note to my readers: The following article has been written by a friend that studies philosophy and is also familiar with the Gangadeanian worldview. I think he raises some interesting challenges against some of the things that Anderson as argued in print. It's nice to see a different perspective or angle highlighted. Perhaps I'll add my reaction to this piece in the comments or with a followup post. 

Clarity, Skepticism, and Disagreement

I recently found myself looking over Anderson’s book The Clarity of God’s Existence wherein he tries to defend the audacious claim that God’s existence must be maximally clear if, as Historic Christianity teaches, persons are maximally responsible for belief in God. Anderson entertains several attempts to avoid the need for clarity – skepticism, fideism, probability/plausibility, mysticism, etc. – in order to undermine these positions. In my perusal of the book, Anderson’s discussion of skepticism seemed particularly inadequate.

He points out that many think that knowledge of God isn’t possible given widespread and intractable disagreement over the question of whether God exists. I interpret Anderson’s construal of this particular kind of skepticism to be this: Given that there is irresolvable disagreement over whether God exists, this fact is evidence that God can’t be known (i.e., God’s existence is unclear). Alternatively, Anderson argues that the mere fact that there is irresolvable disagreement over the question of whether God exists doesn’t show that God can’t be known; rather, he proposes, it shows that not all seek to know God. I take Anderson to be saying that irresolvable disagreement over God’s existence is better explained by the possibility that not all seek to know God rather than the possibility that God’s existence is unclear.  

I have several concerns about Anderson’s critique of skepticism vis-à-vis clarity. For example, he merely proposes the possibility that not all seek to know God without explaining what he means by ‘seek.’ This seems to be another manifestation of the Gangadeanian tendency to confidently assert terms without providing any corresponding analysis (something the administrator of this blog has routinely criticized: http://reasontodoubt.blogspot.com/2015/06/objectivity-in-art-another-symptom-of.html). Further, he seems to employ an inference to the best explanation (IBE), but it’s not clear how an IBE – a form of probabilistic reasoning – comports with Anderson’s commitment to a strong sense of knowledge in which one can be epistemically certain that God exists (See http://reasontodoubt.blogspot.com/2015/04/anderson-on-knowledge-vs-knowledge.html). In addition, Anderson fails to inform the reader how the possibility that not all seek to know God explains why there is intractable disagreement concerning God’s existence. Without any elucidation on this mark, the reader is at a loss as to how to judge the probabilistic strength of Anderson’s IBE in comparison with competing explanations.

Despite these concerns, I wish to raise a more serious skeptical problem for Anderson. He cites the fact of irresolvable disagreement over the question of whether God exists as a reason why the skeptic thinks that God’s existence is epistemically unclear. However, note that disagreement considerations with respect to some question can be divided into two different kinds of worries:

First-order worries: disagreement over some proposition, P, directly undermines the evidence for P.

Higher-order worries: disagreement over some proposition, P, directly undermines the claim that one has rationally assessed the evidence for P.

My reading of Anderson’s discussion of skepticism inclines me to think that he is primarily preoccupied with first-order worry with respect to disagreement over God’s existence. Yet, the more pressing challenge for clarity arises from the higher-order worry, which has been called within the philosophical literature the epistemological problem of peer disagreement. The problem of peer disagreement can be put as follows: how ought one to treat the reliability of one’s cognitive faculties with respect to some question (in our case, the question of whether God exists) when one finds oneself in a disagreement with a peer (an individual who is seemingly equally qualified, informed, and intellectually virtuous)? Philosophers who work on this problem argue over whether one is issued a higher-order worry when one finds that a peer has reached a conclusion that contradicts one’s own. That is, philosophers argue over whether one ought to give one’s disputant equal-weight and conciliate or whether one should remain steadfast in one’s conclusion despite the fact that one’s peer believes differently from oneself. Regardless of whether one thinks that one ought to conciliate or remain steadfast in these situations, it must be granted that the higher-order challenge that disagreement presents is the more pressing worry for any commitment to clarity. If it turns out that conciliation is a more rational response in these situations, then one ought to lower one’s confidence in the proposition that God exists. And if one ought to lower one’s confidence in the proposition that God exists, then irresolvable disagreement among peers entails that one can’t be certain that God exists (i.e. God’s existence is not clear).

With the more challenging skeptical problem for clarity vis-à-vis peer disagreement before us, how should one in fact respond when one finds oneself in these situations? I assume that Anderson will hold that it is rational to remain steadfast in circumstances of peer disagreement, and so in the remaining portion of this post, I will try to persuade Anderson (and his followers) that there is something rationally untenable about a steadfast response and that a position more akin to conciliation (i.e. reducing one’s confidence in one’s position) is more rationally acceptable.  

To get a sense of the problem with a full-blown steadfast position, consider the following example from David Christensen (‘Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism’).

Mental Math: After a nice restaurant meal, my friend and I decide to tip 20% and split the check, rounding up to the nearest dollar. As we have done many times, we do the math in our heads. We have a long and equally good track record at this (in the cases where we’ve disagreed, checking with a calculator has shown us right equally frequently); and I have no reason (such as those involving alertness or tiredness or differential consumption of coffee or wine) for suspecting one of us to be especially good, or bad, at the current reasoning task. I come up with $43; but then my friend announces that she got $45.   

In the Mental Math case, many philosophers argue that I should become significantly less confident that my portion of the bill is $43. This is because I am not able to adduce any reasons that are independent of my disputed reasoning for thinking that I am right about my share of the bill. Christensen contends that there would be something unacceptably question-begging if I were to maintain confidence that my portion of the bill is $43 by arguing as follows: “Since my friend fails to see that the facts support an answer of $43, I have good reason for thinking that, contrary to my expectation, she is not (at least at this moment) a reliable judge of the question we are disputing; therefore, her disagreement gives me no reason at all to question my answer.” To argue like this would be circular since I would be assuming the reliability of my reasoning even though my reasoning is the very thing the disagreement with my friend is calling into question. To avoid circularity, I need to provide reasons independent of my disputed reasoning that show me to be a more superior calculator than my friend. If I can’t provide any dispute-independent reasons, then, Christensen holds, I ought to lower confidence in my position.

These considerations from Christensen ought to show Anderson what would be rationally unacceptable about preserving his high level of confidence in the question of whether God exists when engaged in peer disagreement. When Anderson disagrees with a peer over God’s existence  (that is, when he disagrees with someone who is aware of all of the same arguments, inferences, and evidence), how ought he to respond? In order to remain steadfast, Anderson needs to provide a dispute-independent reason to think that he has more rationally assessed the evidence concerning the question at hand. However, it’s hard to see what kind of independent reason Anderson could proffer given that his disputant is in possession of all of the same arguments, inferences, and evidence. Unless Anderson can provide a dispute-independent reason, he ought to conciliate by reducing his confidence that God’s existence is as clear as he thinks.

There have been many proposed strategies to avoid the conciliatory pressure that disagreement presents, none of which Anderson will find appealing. In order to avoid full-blown skepticism, some argue that question-begging responses are rationally acceptable in cases where a dispute-independent evaluation fails to give one a reason to think that one’s disputant is equally credentialed (Christensen, op. cit., 15). Anderson needs to determine, however, whether he is comfortable with using circular reasoning in order to avoid the skeptical threat. Others have attempted to deflect skeptical pressure by appealing to externalist considerations (Plantinga, ‘‘Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exlusivism’). Plantinga argues that, although there may be parity among internal epistemic factors between two disputants (i.e. symmetry among argument, inference, and evidence), this need not mean that there is parity among external epistemic factors (e.g. properly functioning cognitive faculties within environment aimed at truth). Yet, I doubt that Anderson will find this strategy attractive given his commitment to an internalist conceptualization of knowledge and justification (See http://reasontodoubt.blogspot.com/2014/12/anderson-on-externalism-vs-internalism.html). Others have tried to avoid skeptical pressure by appealing to more Bayesian theories of rationality. Pittard articulates a particular way of probabilistically conditionalizing on disagreement (he calls it ‘instrumentalism’) and argues that, since religious disagreements involve one’s most fundamental rational starting points, it is not possible to take up a position antecedent to them in order to employ Bayes’ theorem. Therefore, any response to disagreement will have to make use of those fundamental rational starting points, which will result in a readout that is inevitably self-favoring (Pittard, ‘Fundamental Disagreements and the Limits of Instrumentalism,’ MSS).  However, Anderson probably won’t find appeals to Bayesian rationality and probabilistic reasoning helpful (See Clarity, pp. 28-9, where he criticizes probability/plausibility to avoid clarity). And others have tried to avoid the skeptical pressure of disagreement by appealing to ‘permissive’ theories of rationality, which says that, in some cases, a body of evidence can warrant more than one rational conclusion. For example, subject A can rationally believe p given E and subject B can rationally believe ~p given E, and disagreement between A and B need not require conciliation because both A and B have rationally responded to E (See Schoenfield, ‘Permission to Believe’).  

These strategies of avoiding global skepticism with respect to disagreement-related concerns are by no means exhaustive. My intention in citing these various proposals is only to show that (1) there have been some novel ways of avoiding full-blown skepticism, and (2) that Anderson has his work cut out for him since I take it he won’t find any of these proposals compelling. However, lest clarity be threatened by disagreement, it is incumbent on Anderson to articulate a theory of how one ought to respond to disagreement that avoids extreme conciliation. Yet, if it’s true that Anderson is committed to internalism, and if the problem of disagreement assumes symmetry prevails among disputants with respect to internal epistemic factors (argument, inference, evidence), I’m not sure how Anderson can advocate for steadfastness without having to accept the viability of some kind of benign circularity. I will leave it to Anderson to decide whether circularity is an appropriate response to disagreement.

What I hope to have modestly shown is that skepticism is by no means easily defeated. Anderson unfortunately characterized a weak form of skepticism, but I’ve tried to demonstrate that a more threatening form is to be found in terms of the higher-order worry of peer disagreement. Although I don’t think that disagreement needs to force one to be skeptical of all of one’s beliefs, I think that we need to consider seriously how widespread disagreement with equally qualified individuals might negatively bear on the reliability of our reasoning on various theoretical issues. Such an evaluation of our cognitive abilities will divulge, I think, that our epistemic lives are far more messier and fallible than Anderson would have us believe, which might imply that God isn’t as clear to our reasoning abilities as Anderson unreservedly holds.

Objectivity in Art: Another symptom of the Gangadeanian chauvinism.

I've written before about how Gangadean and his kin tend to make bold assertions about definitions or otherwise make equally audacious claims about analyses of concepts and the like. We saw this with respect to the meaning of the word 'knowledge' as well as Gangdean's unsupported theory of knowledge. Gangadean doesn't argue for his theory of what knowledge is, instead he just "lays down the law". He says knowledge is such and such, but never tells you why you should agree with him. The same goes for his theory of the nature of reason. The same with free will. The same with God, goodness, evil, sin and a host of other concepts, words and things. He gets a tad warmer when he tries to defend his view (the Aristotelian view) that humans are rational animals--but as I've noted in a previous post, his justification fails his own standard. Since Gangadean and his followers are always big on denying a view whenever that view means that one cannot settle disputes, perhaps we have good grounds on this consideration alone to deny their way of doing philosophy. Case in point, Anderson argues that externalism about knowledge leads to irresolvable disputes about whether a person knows or not and this is taken as a reason to deny externalism.

That is, suppose that Gangadean's way of "laying down the law" (e.g., merely asserting analyses) represents one way that he does philosophy. But if he can do it, then it seems like anybody ought to be able to merely state definitions or theories for concepts, words, or things like knowledge. But now this will lead to unresolvable disagreements whenever the definitions/theories/analyses disagree. For instance, Gangadean merely says that knowledge = maximally justified true belief, but doesn't present arguments for why he thinks that this is correct. But it turns out that most philosophers disagree with him about this. So they might also "lay down the law" with their own theories or definitions. And now we're stuck with an unresolvable disagreement. The moral that I want to draw here is that it inconsistent for Gangadean to ever merely assert a theory (of a thing) or definition (of a word) or an analysis (of a concept) because this will be in tension with his view that reason ought to settle disputes. And now this places a heavy burden for him to rationally defend each theory, each definition, each analyses as the correct theory/definition/analysis. When he fails to do so we have no reason to accept his claims. And you will notice that these theories, definitions and analyses do a lot of heavy lifting in his central arguments in the form of premises.

I first caught wind of this problem of "laying down the law" when Gangadean spoke about the "objective standards for art." If you talk to a Gangadeanian about art they will be quick to draw a distinction between mere decoration and art. Not every pretty thing that you frame and hang on the wall counts as art according to them. And different artists are objectively better than others just as certain pieces of art are objectively better than others. I found this view highly contentious and still do. But it gained currency quickly among the Gangadeanians. Now it is their view that art should express the universal (foundational messages that transcend time, gender, race, social class etc). Further it should instantiate some level of complexity and mastery of the trade. However, these details are not important for the point I'm making. The important point is why we should accept their standards as the correct ones? Gangadean merely proclaims that there are objective standards to art and then tries to spell them out. From what I can gather this is an attempt to get an intuitive reaction out of people. But this is not the same as giving a rational justification for 1) the claim that there is objective standards of art and 2) that their specific construal of these standards is correct.  Again, there are many that disagree with Gangadean on either 1) or 2). But the Gangadeanians are merely laying down the law again. Which means those that disagree should be able to as well. Which means we have an insoluble disagreement and something will have went wrong (according to Gangadean). So Gangadean is committed to the view that he is rationally obligated to defending (rather than merely stating) each of his definitions, theories, and analyses on pain of consistency with his own worldview. But since he hasn't done this it appears he's being inconsistent. 

Much of what I've said here is reminiscent of other posts. So my apologies for repeating myself. But the bit about art has not been featured on this blog yet and I think it brings out nicely how the philosophical chauvinism that I've accused Gangadean of is no isolated case. It afflicts even "less basic" matters. Indeed, it even infects his heurmeneutics. That is, I listened on more than one occasion at his interpretation of certain passages in scripture where he claimed that his was the only correct interpretation. To be fair, he was pressed on at least one occasion to prove his reading of a certain passage and he attempted to motivate his reading, but what he didn't do was give a demonstrative proof that this was the case though he certainly acted as if he had.

If a view or position fails because accepting that view and putting into practice means there will be irreconcilable disputes, then merely stating definitions/theories/analyses will not do.  If Gangadean can merely state rather than defend his definitions, theories, analyses, then anybody can. And where there are disagreements arising as a result (e.g., where people disagree about what knowledge, free will, or human nature consists in) there will be no settling such disputes via the method of merely laying down analyses or theories in the way that Gangadean does. Thus, Ganagadean ought to either stop complaining about views that lead to irresolvable differences or else he should give up his practice of merely stating definitions/theories/analyses i.e., being philosophically chauvinistic. Chauvinism leads to dogmatism, and the dogmatist is simply not in the business of settling disputes. 

Who is the skeptic? reason-denier? lacking in Integrity? which view leads to meaninglessness?

On more than one occasion, I have been accused by a Gangadeanian of being a skeptic. This goes hand in hand with being a "denier of reason", "lacking integrity", and falling into the abyss of meaninglessness, according to them. Just to set the record straight, I don't take myself to be any of these things. These are actually what is up for debate between me and Gangadean so it ought not to be presupposed at the outset. In fact, I suspect that if anyone is denying reason, lacking integrity, holding views that lead to meaningless or skepticism, it's the Gangadeanian. Let me explain.

My objections and criticisms are often of this theme: I try to point out uncertainties regarding the beliefs that Gangadeanians claim to be certain about. So it may appear that I am some kind of skeptic. Since skepticism is often associated with the sort of view you want to avoid, I worry that my being labeled a skeptic or thought of as a skeptic makes it too easy for some to merely dismiss what I have to say. I suspect that at least some Gangdeanians and sympathizers get in mind that "my way" leads to skepticism, and since they associate skepticism with meaninglessness, they can too quickly conclude that my objections don't seem worthwhile to engage with.  

But I think this is all wrong. My primary method in this blog has been to assume (for the sake of discussion) some of what Gangadean assumes and then to show how it stands in tension with some of his other claims. When I ask Gangadean for proof that his theory of knowledge is the correct theory, I am merely upholding his claim that positions need always to be rationally justified. The same for what counts as "common ground" and his many merely asserted definitions. I'm asking for him to rationally justify these definitions or analyses. I am assuming for the sake of discussion his mantra that "meaning is more basic than truth" and asking him to justify (rather than merely state) the meanings he assigns to his terms. The same for "self-attesting" and how he knows when something is self-attesting. I assume his theory of knowledge and ask how he comes to know when some proposition is self attesting on this very same theory of knowledge. You see, if he thinks one ought to be rationally justified in all of one's beliefs, then he should hold himself to the same standards. He ought to rationally justify each and every one of his beliefs. And if he claims to know with certainty a bunch of claims, and he holds others to a particular standard of knowledge, then he should be in a position to explain how he knows everything he claims to know, by the very same standard. And if Gangadean claims that some basic things are as clear as he says they are, then he ought to give us extremely precise, well developed theories of all the things upon which his beliefs rest. My objections or criticisms are in effect trying to point out that he fails to do so or at least that if he were to be consistent through and through, he would end up with contradictions or inconsistencies or at least very problematic views---and all this by is own lights!

So this brings us to an interesting juncture. Gangadeanians accuse me of denying reason, of holding views that lead to meaninglessness, as being a skeptic and of lacking integrity. But if internal incoherence of a system of beliefs leads to meaninglessness (which I take the Gangadeanians accept), then I am actually accusing Gangadean and his kin for having views that lead to meaninglessness by their own lights. If internal incoherence amounts to the denail of reason (again something I think they would agree with), then I am bringing the charge that Gangadean's views amount to the denial of reason by their own lights. And if skepticism follows from having a belief system with contradictions/inconsistencies, then I am accusing Gangadean of skepticism by their own lights.  Finally, insofar as having mutually inconsistent views without being willing to recognize it, or insofar as holding others to philosophical standards that one does not hold oneself to amounts to lacking integrity, I am accusing Gangadean of lacking integrity. What I am not doing is merely asserting that Gangadean and his kin are any of these things. Instead, I'm trying to show that they are via arguments and I would hope that my philosophical opponents would do the same.