Is reason exclusive to humans (as far as beings that have a physical presence in the world)? Gangadean, like Aristotle, Descartes and a number of others before him in an attempt to get to the essence of humankind have argued that the presence of reason or mental life (that instantiates reason) is found only in man. But what about dolphins, dogs, cats, apes, chimpanzees? We seem so naturally to attribute to them thoughts, feelings, desires, and beliefs. A dog seems to run after a bone because it has a particular belief that there is something rather than nothing to go after and also because it wants the bone. If such attributions are warranted then it seems likewise appropriate to attribute mentality and even reason. This would mean that reason, or mindedness isn't unique to humanity in fact, it may be in a great number of species. If so, then this threatens, to some extent, the idea that reason or the capacity to reason is what sets humans apart from other beings. This doesn't of course mean that humans aren't reasoning or essentially reasoning beings (nor does it prove that reason is essential to humans either)--it just extends the set of reasoning beings to include other animals. Importantly however, it does block any straightforward argument that seeks to figure out the good of man based on man's capacity to reason at least if the argument sets out to distinguish man from other animate beings such as dogs, penguins and crows in virtue of the essential capacity of humans to have mental life or reason. Moreover, for Gangadean, consciousness, or mindedness makes up a substance distinct from corporeal existence--- the soul is what accounts for the mindedness of humans (and God). So there is much at stake for Gangadeanians in this current debate. They believe that other animals are not rational, fail to have mentality because they believe non human animals do not have souls and are merely material (or the explanatory direction might go the other way). If there is reason to believe that non human animals have mentality, rationality and the like, then this requires a pretty significant revision of Gangadean's views.
Now it seems to me that there is good reason to believe that other animals are minded. They exhibit behaviors consistent with having a rich mental life. I take this to be an obvious point. Just observe how animals live. They seem to communicate with one another, exhibit behavior as if they are sometimes depressed, bored, happy or scared. Some animals even exhibit rather advanced problem solving skills, the making of tools (see Primates and Crows) to get at rewards. It's really an incredible claim to say that animals do not have mentality.
In response, Gangadean et al. will argue that our attributions of mentality to animals are at best inductive or abductive. Behavior of mentality doesn't indubitably indicate mentality. Just like acting as if one is in pain doesn't actually mean one is experiencing pain. So while animals appear to act in ways that would make sense if they were minded beings, it doesn't necessarily follow that they in fact instantiate reason, or mentality. Similarly, though computers can act as if they are minded, we wouldn't grant that they are reasoning beings (so the argument goes). This is the main argument I have heard repeatedly from Gangadean and his followers. I want to start by saying they are impeccably correct. To be sure, concluding that a being is minded just because it acts as if it is, is to commit a formal fallacy (affirming the consequent). Now this doesn't mean that there isn't good reason to believe that non human animals are minded---it just means that we don't have definitive proof. In fact, abductive arguments (common to science and philosophy) are just that, affirming the consequent. I've spoken often about how this requirement of proof for belief or knowledge is a bad one that actually causes major issues for Gangadean. So here's another instance of the kind. Suppose that Gangadean is right that we need to have proof that animals are minded in order to rationally belief (or know) that animals are minded. The problem is that I don't have definitive proof that Gangadean, or anyone else for that matter is minded. This is but a token of a type of problem traditionally called the problem of other minds.
How do I know that I am minded? Well, I have a kind of first-person access to my own mental life, and the occurrent mental states that constitue my mentality. I know it like I know that I have perceptions; I know it immediately or non-inferentially. The problem of other minds arises because I don't have this same epistemic status vis-a -vis other presumed human persons. Other bodies that look a lot like mine (though also different in important ways no doubt) communicate with me and exhibit behaviors that are consistent with having minds, but these are mere indications or evidences, rather than proof of mindedness. But this is just what was the objection presented by Gangadean to deny mentality to "lower" animals (or at least to argue that we shouldn't believe that animals have mentality). So if this lack of first-person access is thought to show that we aren't rationally entitled to attribute minds to animals, then it also follows that we lack that entitlement to attribute minds to other (presumed people).
Recognizing this problem, Gangadean's response is that we can know other humans qua humans in virtue of a shared language which consists of the communication involving concepts, judgements and arguments. Two humans from distinctly different backgrounds (the argument goes), without a common language would over time develop a way to communicate that is, develop a shared language. But though we have coexisted with other animals (presumably since the beginning of human history) we have no such language in common with them. But notice this appeal to the phenomena of language (which can be found in both Descartes and Locke) is appealing to merely one more behavioral/observational phenomena. That is to say, it is merely one more indication that a purported human does indeed have a special kind of mentality such that they rightfully belong to the set of all humans (as defined by reasoning and physically embodied beings), but it certainly doesn't prove it. Likewise it fails to prove that animals, and other beings lack minds too. Just as it is the case that the presence of mere behaviors consistent with having reason, fails to demonstrate genuine mentality, so it is that the absence of behaviors (including communicating concepts) consistent with mentality cannot prove the absence of mentality.
Sunday, January 11, 2015
Gangadean on the Problem of Evil.
One purported solution to the problem of evil is to give an account of a positive or morally good reason for which God would permit evil. On the view I have in mind (Gangadeanian/Westminster Fellowship), God "permits" moral evil (e.g., sin) to reveal his divine justice and mercy. Natural evil in turn, is imposed (by God) in order to restrict, remove, and recall man from moral evil. The idea is that suffering in various forms (toil, strife, old age, sickness and death) makes us stop and think (where not thinking/seeking and thus not knowing certain fundamental propositions is the root of our moral evil). I will explore of few criticisms I have against this view.
For one thing, we need to get clearer on what this account of God and his relation to evil amounts to. The view I have in mind takes it that God is not the author of sin, but simply permits man to sin (this is stated in the Westminster confession of faith). I don't think this distinction helps or even makes much sense. It seems to me a playing around with words to avoid an unfavorable philosophical conclusion. After all we need to ask what then is the cause of moral evil? Gangadeanians will say that humans by their very nature are mutable beings--we necessarily either change towards good or evil. Further, it is God that must uphold us if we are to avoid changing towards evil. This represents a Calvinistic committment that Gangadean maintains. So if we want to explain why there is moral evil, why there was a fall, then it looks like we turn to the fact that humans are created to necessarily change, and apart from God's upholding, necessarily towards evil. But this is hardly an attractive picture.
Think about it. On this picture (what I take to be Gangadean's view), God creates humans with a particular design in mind and with foreknowledge about what this design entails. He creates man such that man is essentially changeable (among other things). This means man must (necessarily) change for good or for evil. Further, God creates man in such a way that unless God sustains him, he will necessarily sin (that is, he must change for evil). Again God knows this due to his foreknowledge. Still, as the story goes, God creates man (i.e. a being that must sin if not upheld by God) and then stops upholding him.
The result of course is that man sins --indeed there was no other way it could go. If God created man and all the sufficient conditions for man to sin, then God is the ultimate source of sin. If this doesn't count as "author" of sin, then I don't know what does. Perhaps the Gangadeanians take "author" to mean something like "the most immediate source". But why does immediacy make a relevant difference here? Think about the holocaust. The soldiers carrying out the executions were more immediately connected to particular genocides than Hitler, but that doesn't allow that Hitler was any less responsible for the executions. My intention to bang a hammer against a nail is less immediately connected to the hammer hitting the head of the nail, but surely my intention is an essential cause or source of the nail going into whatever surface it happens penetrating. Examples abound. If there's some other notion of author (as distinct from permitter) that is relevant, then Gangadean needs to explain this. What is important is that God is the creator of all things including the necessary and sufficient conditions for man to sin on Gangadean's picture. And this is all I can think 'author of sin' to mean. My suspicion is that there is a real tension here between Gangadean's soft determinist/compatibilist views and his desire to not implicate God in discussing the ultimate origin of sin.
A further issue arises when we consider what Gangdaean et al. mean by 'sin'/'moral evil.' Gangadean and company believe that evil/sin is defined as acting against one's nature and good is to act according to one's nature. But then what are we to make of a good human in light of the metaphysical views that Gangadean is committed to in fleshing out his theodicy? If the picture is that humans when not upheld by God are such that they must sin, isn't this saying something about the nature of humanity? So then shouldn't we define a "good" human in light of this essential fact about humans? Again God created us a particular way such that without his upholding, we have to sin. But since he stopped sustaining man from sin, it seems that it would be good (according to the above definition) for man to sin when not being upheld by God. So then did man really sin? Alternatively, it would be evil for man to seek consistently apart from God. Things are equally as tricky when we think about what it means that man is born into sin (i.e., the doctrine of total depravity). Was there some metaphysical change in humans after the fall? If so again, shouldn't we alter our definition of what it means to be human (i.e., the nature of humanity)? In turn we'd have to redefine what is good for post-fall humans and of course, what is evil. That is to say, man post-fall is a being that is in total depravity and so good for this being is to be in total depravity to it's fullest. Now if the fall of man was not a metaphysical change, then in what sense is it impossible for man to seek God without an act of God? So denying that the fall changed man fundamentally seems to have the problem that we can't account for total depravity. Now one might have this idea of "ideal man" in mind. But I need to ask what the basis of this notion comes from? This "ideal man" must be something like "how God created man to be". But you see the problem, don't you? If God created man to be a particular way, then that is just how man would need to be. So how we are is how God created us to be (unless you allow that humans can stray from God's design/intention). So there appears to be a dilemma with two unattractive horns here for the Gangadeanians.
A third and more focused issue pertaining to the theodicy is that Gangadean assumes (rather than proves) too much to employ it. So let's grant for the sake of discussion that natural evil (non-agent driven evil) is imposed by God as a call back from moral evil. The problem is we'd be dishonest if we didn't wonder whether God could have figured out a different way (in all his knowledge and power) to reveal himself without requiring all this evil. Does the earth have to have so many people? Do so many people have to grow old and sick and die? Couldn't we have been compelled by a story of hypotheticals? It seems to me that God could have simply made us believe how things would go if we were to sin. Say, in a vision or simply by telling us subjunctive conditionals in a compelling way. We could then gain true beliefs about God this way and come to know him. More specifically, but rather crudely we might say that if revelation is the goal of God he could have written a "book version" of human history that was convincing. Adam and Eve could be created in this world and then God tells them, look, supposing that you were to sin, this is all that would happen [enter vision of hypotheticals involving the fall, evil and redemption]. Gangadean in his book actually addresses this in his attempt to offer a theodicy. He writes,
For one thing, we need to get clearer on what this account of God and his relation to evil amounts to. The view I have in mind takes it that God is not the author of sin, but simply permits man to sin (this is stated in the Westminster confession of faith). I don't think this distinction helps or even makes much sense. It seems to me a playing around with words to avoid an unfavorable philosophical conclusion. After all we need to ask what then is the cause of moral evil? Gangadeanians will say that humans by their very nature are mutable beings--we necessarily either change towards good or evil. Further, it is God that must uphold us if we are to avoid changing towards evil. This represents a Calvinistic committment that Gangadean maintains. So if we want to explain why there is moral evil, why there was a fall, then it looks like we turn to the fact that humans are created to necessarily change, and apart from God's upholding, necessarily towards evil. But this is hardly an attractive picture.
Think about it. On this picture (what I take to be Gangadean's view), God creates humans with a particular design in mind and with foreknowledge about what this design entails. He creates man such that man is essentially changeable (among other things). This means man must (necessarily) change for good or for evil. Further, God creates man in such a way that unless God sustains him, he will necessarily sin (that is, he must change for evil). Again God knows this due to his foreknowledge. Still, as the story goes, God creates man (i.e. a being that must sin if not upheld by God) and then stops upholding him.
The result of course is that man sins --indeed there was no other way it could go. If God created man and all the sufficient conditions for man to sin, then God is the ultimate source of sin. If this doesn't count as "author" of sin, then I don't know what does. Perhaps the Gangadeanians take "author" to mean something like "the most immediate source". But why does immediacy make a relevant difference here? Think about the holocaust. The soldiers carrying out the executions were more immediately connected to particular genocides than Hitler, but that doesn't allow that Hitler was any less responsible for the executions. My intention to bang a hammer against a nail is less immediately connected to the hammer hitting the head of the nail, but surely my intention is an essential cause or source of the nail going into whatever surface it happens penetrating. Examples abound. If there's some other notion of author (as distinct from permitter) that is relevant, then Gangadean needs to explain this. What is important is that God is the creator of all things including the necessary and sufficient conditions for man to sin on Gangadean's picture. And this is all I can think 'author of sin' to mean. My suspicion is that there is a real tension here between Gangadean's soft determinist/compatibilist views and his desire to not implicate God in discussing the ultimate origin of sin.
A further issue arises when we consider what Gangdaean et al. mean by 'sin'/'moral evil.' Gangadean and company believe that evil/sin is defined as acting against one's nature and good is to act according to one's nature. But then what are we to make of a good human in light of the metaphysical views that Gangadean is committed to in fleshing out his theodicy? If the picture is that humans when not upheld by God are such that they must sin, isn't this saying something about the nature of humanity? So then shouldn't we define a "good" human in light of this essential fact about humans? Again God created us a particular way such that without his upholding, we have to sin. But since he stopped sustaining man from sin, it seems that it would be good (according to the above definition) for man to sin when not being upheld by God. So then did man really sin? Alternatively, it would be evil for man to seek consistently apart from God. Things are equally as tricky when we think about what it means that man is born into sin (i.e., the doctrine of total depravity). Was there some metaphysical change in humans after the fall? If so again, shouldn't we alter our definition of what it means to be human (i.e., the nature of humanity)? In turn we'd have to redefine what is good for post-fall humans and of course, what is evil. That is to say, man post-fall is a being that is in total depravity and so good for this being is to be in total depravity to it's fullest. Now if the fall of man was not a metaphysical change, then in what sense is it impossible for man to seek God without an act of God? So denying that the fall changed man fundamentally seems to have the problem that we can't account for total depravity. Now one might have this idea of "ideal man" in mind. But I need to ask what the basis of this notion comes from? This "ideal man" must be something like "how God created man to be". But you see the problem, don't you? If God created man to be a particular way, then that is just how man would need to be. So how we are is how God created us to be (unless you allow that humans can stray from God's design/intention). So there appears to be a dilemma with two unattractive horns here for the Gangadeanians.
A third and more focused issue pertaining to the theodicy is that Gangadean assumes (rather than proves) too much to employ it. So let's grant for the sake of discussion that natural evil (non-agent driven evil) is imposed by God as a call back from moral evil. The problem is we'd be dishonest if we didn't wonder whether God could have figured out a different way (in all his knowledge and power) to reveal himself without requiring all this evil. Does the earth have to have so many people? Do so many people have to grow old and sick and die? Couldn't we have been compelled by a story of hypotheticals? It seems to me that God could have simply made us believe how things would go if we were to sin. Say, in a vision or simply by telling us subjunctive conditionals in a compelling way. We could then gain true beliefs about God this way and come to know him. More specifically, but rather crudely we might say that if revelation is the goal of God he could have written a "book version" of human history that was convincing. Adam and Eve could be created in this world and then God tells them, look, supposing that you were to sin, this is all that would happen [enter vision of hypotheticals involving the fall, evil and redemption]. Gangadean in his book actually addresses this in his attempt to offer a theodicy. He writes,
It [the theodicy] assumes, second, that there is no other way to deepen the revelation of divine justice and mercy. Some things cannot be known except by experience-- such as hunger or pain, both physical and spiritual. A book version of human history, or a movie version, cannot supply this experience and is incomprehensible without it. Virtual reality works insofar as it is distinguishable from reality. Some experience is necessary for imagination to work, so there is no way to deepen the revelation apart from providence in the fall and redemption of mankind.Yes, Gangadean's theodicy does assume a lot, we agree on that much. But does he support these assumptions? Not really. As far as I can tell, he just gives us more controversial assumptions. For instance, is it certain that some things can only be known via experience? Hunger? Physical and spiritual pain? How would we even begin to verify this? Sure it might seem common sensical, but Gangadean surely wouldn't rest his views on common sense. Further, doesn't God know what it is like to be hungry? In pain? If not, are there things that God doesn't know? Further, does virtual reality work only on the basis of its being distinguishable from reality? Again how does he know this to be true? Why think that "Some experience is necessary for imagination to work?" How does he know so much about what is requisite for imagination from the arm chair? These are mere assertions or intuitions that Gangadean seems to make but each of these points should not be taken for granted.
Gangadean also gets wind of a further problem which is the issue of whether this revelation of God's justice and mercy are worth all the suffering. It's natural to ask whether divine revelation is a worthwhile goal when considering the cost. That is, according to some Christian accounts (including Gangadean's) a lot of people are going to suffer eternally (just try and wrap your mind around unending suffering for lots and lots of people). So is it worth it that God reveals who he is to us if the cost is so grave? Sadly, the author gives only this in response:
Thirdly, it [the theodicy] assumes that the deepened revelation and knowledge of this revelation is worth the suffering. This third assumption is not so clear because it can be asked before or after the revelation is seen and it can be asked of those who do see it and of those who never come to see it. Here testimony is relevant. Job struggled before seeing, and, after seeing, was silenced in awe and repentance. Paul the Apostle said the sufferings of this life cannot be compared with the glory that is to be revealed. Many throughout the ages have confessed the same. The figure of the pearly gates symbolizes that through suffering we come into the knowledge of the glory of God. The answer to the question "Is it worth it?" is a presumed unqualified yes. (Emphasis mine).
On one reading of this text, it seems to me that Gangadean has lost sight of the dialectic here. On this reading, the bible (which is revelation from God) gives us the answer that suffering is worth it (for the believer). Hence his appeal to the testimony of Job and Paul. So we can trust this testimony insofar as it is part of God's word (and so infallibly true). Now if the problem of evil is set up against Theism, it is inappropriate to appeal to biblical passages qua revelation from God (which presupposes God exists) to inform a premise of an argument used to rescue theism from the problem of evil. Indeed the way he and Owen Anderson present it in their classes, they take the problem of evil to be devastating to theism if left unaddressed. [ Note: I disagree with this since, the problem of evil is not really a logical problem. It is an evidential problem (i.e., isn't the pervasive nature of evil some evidence against God's existence) as most philosophers of religion see it.] So the point is, you can't then presuppose God exists (and that the bible is the word of God) in order to argue that God exists despite all the evil in the world.
A second reading is something like, "well look there are what these persons in this book say and it feels right to me too." This would be a very weak argument. (Perhaps this is why he hedges his statement above with "presumed unqualified yes"? Italics mine.) I don't really get what a "presumed unqualified yes" is. Presumptions are qualifications after all. In other words, his answer is something like "a qualified, unqualified yes." And there's good reason to qualify this answer. I mean, it is far from obvious that all this suffering is worth the revelation that Christians get about God's justice and mercy. Now from the vantage point of one challenging theism on grounds of the problem of evil I would offer this response. Who cares what these people named Job and Paul are thought to be saying in some purported revelation (I say this because we are trying not to presuppose that the bible is the word of God yet)? What makes them right? So there are no legs to this reading of the answer to the question of "is it worth it?"
Alternatively, maybe Gangadean just thinks it's intuitive. Christians get a sense that they know God and think it is the best thing since sliced bed. So they are willing to allow that grave suffering of millions upon millions of persons (some who will suffer eternally!) is worth it. But I certainly don't share this intuition, even as a believer. More importantly, just because a bunch of Christians (who are on the winning side) feel good about it, doesn't make it true that it is in fact worth all the suffering. Worth it to whom? To those who are eternally dammed? That's doubtful. Further, it seems consistent for even a Christian who is not going to be spiritually dead for eternity, that it isn't worth it because they feel compassion for those that don't make the cut. One might then be tempted to talk about value (i.e., whether it is worth it) from some objective vantage point, but one wonders if this makes much sense.
I think what the person questioning whether all the evil is worth the revelation is getting at is whether it is ultimately consistent with the idea that God is perfectly good. Here we get to the question I raised above about whether God's creating beings that must necessarily sin apart from him, is consistent with his being all good.
A second reading is something like, "well look there are what these persons in this book say and it feels right to me too." This would be a very weak argument. (Perhaps this is why he hedges his statement above with "presumed unqualified yes"? Italics mine.) I don't really get what a "presumed unqualified yes" is. Presumptions are qualifications after all. In other words, his answer is something like "a qualified, unqualified yes." And there's good reason to qualify this answer. I mean, it is far from obvious that all this suffering is worth the revelation that Christians get about God's justice and mercy. Now from the vantage point of one challenging theism on grounds of the problem of evil I would offer this response. Who cares what these people named Job and Paul are thought to be saying in some purported revelation (I say this because we are trying not to presuppose that the bible is the word of God yet)? What makes them right? So there are no legs to this reading of the answer to the question of "is it worth it?"
Alternatively, maybe Gangadean just thinks it's intuitive. Christians get a sense that they know God and think it is the best thing since sliced bed. So they are willing to allow that grave suffering of millions upon millions of persons (some who will suffer eternally!) is worth it. But I certainly don't share this intuition, even as a believer. More importantly, just because a bunch of Christians (who are on the winning side) feel good about it, doesn't make it true that it is in fact worth all the suffering. Worth it to whom? To those who are eternally dammed? That's doubtful. Further, it seems consistent for even a Christian who is not going to be spiritually dead for eternity, that it isn't worth it because they feel compassion for those that don't make the cut. One might then be tempted to talk about value (i.e., whether it is worth it) from some objective vantage point, but one wonders if this makes much sense.
I think what the person questioning whether all the evil is worth the revelation is getting at is whether it is ultimately consistent with the idea that God is perfectly good. Here we get to the question I raised above about whether God's creating beings that must necessarily sin apart from him, is consistent with his being all good.
Tuesday, January 6, 2015
Discussing Surrendra Gangadean's Book...Facebook Page
I am now the sole administrator of this Facebook page. I appreciate the previous admin handing over the reins on this project. It is the first result that comes up when "Surrendra Gangadean" is searched on google so I'm happy for the opportunity to reach more readers (traffic to this blog has already increased). My mission remains exactly the same as it was when I began this blog this Fall. I just want to critically analyze the views of Gangadean et al. to the best of my abilities so as to provide a resource for anyone that has in someway been affected by his teachings. Indeed I will essentially use the facebook page to promote the discussions in this blog. School is underway and so I might be a bit less active in the coming months, but will do my best to keep adding material.
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