Gangadean, Descartes, and the Ontological Argument.

I've been reading some Descartes lately. He's always a fun read. As I've said before, Gangadeanians are Cartesians at heart. It was Descartes after all that sought an indubitable foundation upon which to build an entire worldview. Throughout his meditations, he seeks to find that which he can't possibly doubt. And if you've ever taken a philosophy course with a Gangadeanian, it's likely that you'll hear the cogito argument. I know of no other philosopher either in the past or present that seeks certainty in the way that Descartes does with the exception of Gangadean of course.

There are other similarities which is what prompted this post. For instance, Descartes believed that by simply unpacking the content of an idea, we could come to know about the world beyond our concepts. For instance, Descartes begins with his idea of a triangle and says the he perceives that the nature of triangle is to be (among other things) a three-sided figure. And importantly he could ascertain this nature simply by reflecting on his idea of a triangle. Indeed since he doesn't believe that triangles actually exist (he believes they are merely imperfectly instantiated in the concrete world), there is no other way he could come to know about them except via the reason.

Gangadean similarly takes it that "in a concept, one grasps the essence of a thing". That is to say, we can know at least some things about substantial reality in virtue of reflecting on our concepts of things. For example, as Gangadean sees it, you can just sit and reflect on the concept/word 'knowledge' or the concept/word 'eternal' and certain indubitable truths will come to mind. For instance, 'eternal' just means without beginning and end. 'Knowledge' just is a justified true belief. 'Evil' just is that which is contrary to one's nature. 'God' just is a spirit, that is infinite, eternal and unchanging in his being... 'Friendship' just is a relationship with a mutual aim towards the good...I'm only scratching the surface. As I've noted before Gangadeanians have their own vocabulary and it is in virtue of this vocabulary that many of their deductions turn out valid (although far from sound). So the similarity with Descartes is hard to deny. Descartes speaks of ideas, and Gangadean speaks of concepts, but they are functionally the same thing. Descartes speaks of the natures of things, and other times the essences of things, and Gangadean does the same. More importantly, both thinkers are committed to this idea that we could learn about the nature of things just by unpacking our concepts or ideas of those things. To be clear, neither Descartes or Gangadean are saying that you can know the nature of an idea by unpacking the idea (that would merely get one to idealism). Instead, they are both saying that by simply reflecting sufficiently on our ideas, we can know about things "out there" beyond our minds (that's what Gangadean means by "grasping the essence of things").

In his Fifth Meditation, Descartes, after speaking about triangles, seems to realize that if he can know (with certainty) about the very nature/essences of triangles simply by thinking about his idea of a triangle, then he should be able to extend this method to prove that God exists. After all, he's got a "clear and distinct" idea of God. Just like he has a "clear and distinct" idea of a triangle. So in the manner by which he could come to know about the nature of triangles by thinking about his idea of triangles, he argues that he can do the same as it concerns God.

Now for Descartes and many other theists that he was following, the very idea of God contains (necessary) existence. That is to say, just like one cannot really have an idea of a triangle that doesn't contain the idea of a three-sided figure, according to Descartes, to think of God is necessarily to think of a being that exists. On the other hand he says his ideas of other things like that of a lion or a mountain, do not have this feature. He can think of a lion that doesn't exist and he can think of a mountain that doesn't exist without committing anything like a contradiction or conceptual confusion. And insofar as his idea of God contains within it the further idea of existence, he concludes that this proves that God really does exist. Just like he can prove that a triangle has three sides by thinking about his concept of a triangle and realizing that he can't separate (in his mind) three sides from a triangle, he can prove that God exists by merely reflecting on his concept of God. He can't by his intellect separate his idea of God from his idea of existence, so he concludes that it is the very nature/essence of God to exist.

It's an ontological argument which are fascinating beasts even though they are largely rejected. However, the merits or faults of the argument itself are not what I'm interested in. What I'm wondering is how or on what grounds a Gangadeanian would reject such an argument. That is, how does it differ structurally from Gangadean's argument that "something must be eternal"? Recall, that that argument depends on the conceptual analysis that 'eternal' just means without beginning, and that 'none is eternal' entails that 'all began to exist'. If you ask a Gangadeanian how s/he knows that 'if none is eternal, then all is temporal and all began to exist' they will say that it's a matter of definition--that is to say, it's a matter of conceptual truth. One can just sit and reflect on the concept/idea of 'eternal' to realize what it entails about beginning to exist and temporality. Well, this is just what Descartes thinks is happening in his ontological argument for God's existence. It's perfectly plain to him that the very concept of God contains within it necessary existence. Thus it is in virtue of his definition of God, and his commitment to the idea that (in Gangadeanian terms) "reason is ontological" that the conclusion that God really exists, follows.

As I recall, Gangadean rejects this kind of ontological argument. What I'm currently interested in is whether he's got good grounds for rejecting it. Does he reject Descartes claim that it is part of the very concept of God that he exists? That is, does Gangadean believe one can have the idea of God and at the same time imagine God as not existing? I doubt it. Isn't God according to Gangadean, by definition, a being that is infinite, eternal and unchanging? And doesn't Gangadean believe that 'eternal' just means always existing? If so, it seems he must agree with Descartes' definition of God in an important sense. That is, to have a concept of God is to have a concept of an eternal (or always existing) being.

So if Gangadean wants to legitimately reject the Cartesian argument, he must looks elsewhere. As I see it there are only two more exit points. Gangadean must either reject the claim that we can know the nature of God by reflecting on our concept of God (i.e., he must say that one can have the concept of God without grasping the essence of God), or else he must deny the final inference that Descartes makes namely, "if it is part of the very essence of God to exist, then he does exist." But I don't see how he could deny either of these. To reject the first is to admit to a counterexample to his foundational claim about concepts. Remember, he says that "in a concept we grasp the essence of a thing". But if we can have a concept of God without thereby grasping the nature of God, then his thesis about concepts is falsified. To reject the latter of Cartesian moves is to admit that it is in God's nature to exist and yet God can somehow fail to exist. But again, if Gangadean accepts that by reflecting on his concept of God, he grasps the essence of God which includes eternal existence, then it's hard to see how Gangadean could reject the Cartesian inference unless of course something can have as its very nature existence while failing to exist.

Where this leaves us is that regardless of whether or not Gangadean actually rejects the ontological argument, there's a question about whether on pain of inconsistency, he should. I think we have reason to think his views actually force him to accept Descartes Ontological argument for God's existence and so much worse for his view. This is the cost of his commitment to the claim that we can know the essences of things just by a priori, analysis of our concepts in conjunction with his definition of 'God'.

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