Dead Links to Anderson's Articles

I recently noticed that the links to Anderson's articles that I featured in a couple of my own posts are no longer available. He seems to have removed his blog from his personal website which means the hyperlink I included in this post is gone. He has also apparently deleted the link that was included in this one as well. So apologies to my readers. I don't know whether Anderson has done this in response to my posts or whether this is merely incidental.

Gangadean and (Really) Easy Knowledge.

Note: My apologies to my readers for a slightly more technical post. I think (or at least hope) that it still manages to be accessible, but I'm certainly not the best judge of that. At any rate, I think it's a pretty nifty argument that was at least fun to think through.

On Gangadean's view, God could not fail to exist. That is to say, God must necessarily exist. This means that the proposition, "God exists" is a necessary truth (just like "2 + 2 = 4"). Now it's a matter of the conventions of logic that any proposition (whatsoever) entails a necessary truth. This means that an argument that has as its conclusion, a necessary truth, will be valid no matter what the premises end up being. Remember, an argument is valid by definition, if and only if, provided that the premises are true, the conclusion couldn't be false (note Gangadean agrees with this definition of validity).

The thing is whenever you are dealing with a necessary truth, it simply can't ever be false, period. So that means if you make an inference from any proposition whatsoever, to a necessary truth, the premise will entail the conclusion which means the inference will be valid by way of the definition of validity. Again an inference is valid whenever if the premises are true the conclusion is also true. But when you have a conclusion that can't possibly be false (i.e., a necessary truth), that definition is satisfied no matter what the premise (even a false premise).

Now if we have an argument or inference (an argument is just a set of inferences) that not only fits this pattern but also contains only true premises, you will have not only a valid argument, but a sound one as well. A sound argument is valid and has only true premises.

Now all of this might sound innocuous at first, but it get's problematic in a hurry. In fact, it would appear that for Gangadean and his kin, a person that believes that God exists on the basis of any true premises whatsoever, counts as knowing (with certainty) that God exists. This is based on the considerations we have just covered in conjunction with Gangadean's views about knowledge. He thinks that knowledge of God's existence (for instance) consists in truly believing that God exists on the basis of a sound argument with "God exists" as the conclusion. In other words, by Gangadean's lights a person that believes that God exists on the basis of the following argument, knows (certainly) that God exists.

(A) 

1) There are no married bachelor's
2) Therefore, God exists. 

As I mentioned, as a matter of logic, the premise entails the conclusion in (A) because any proposition whatsoever entails a necessary truth (and we're granting Gangadean that 2) expresses a necessary truth). Further, since the only premise of this argument is true (i.e., it's also a necessary truth), it turns out that this is also a sound argument. So strictly speaking, someone that actually believes that God exists in virtue of this argument knows (with certainty) that God exists according to Gangadean's theory of knowledge. After all, such a person couldn't possibly be wrong in believing a necessary truth and they are certainly justified in believing that God exists because they believe it on the basis of a logically valid and sound argument.

Admittedly, we'd be hard pressed to think that someone might be convinced by the argument just considered. The premise doesn't seem to have anything to do with the truth of the conclusion (despite the entailment). Still, the above is a proof--a demonstrative one. It isn't enough to say that it won't be very convincing for some people (or even many people) since Gangadean thinks that proving something comes apart from convincing someone of it, and it is the former that matters to knowledge not the latter. But this is a really odd result. It just seems bad, intuitively. More importantly, it also causes serious problems for Gangadean's view that the vast majority of believers outside his kin (both in the past and now) don't actually know that God exists. After all, provided that they believe that God exists on the basis of any true premise or set of premises, they will believe that God exists via a deductive proof and thus by definition know that God exists.

So perhaps Gangadean needs to rethink his views about what it takes to know something or at least what it means for something to count as a proof and what it means to believe something on the basis of a proof. Here's one more example that might be a little closer to home.

(B) 

1) It seems to me that God exists.
2) Therefore, God exists. 

Again the argument is valid insofar as 'God exists' is a necessary truth (which Gangadean is certainly committed to). Moreover, as long as the premise is true, the argument becomes sound. And the premise will be true just in case, it actually seems to me that God exists. So if I happen to be a subject for which it seems to me that God exists (I'm told there are a lot of people that this is true of), and God actually exists, then I have a sound proof on my hands in (B).

In other words, Gangadean's views about what is necessary and sufficient for knowledge faces a problem in it's present form. He says you know that God exists if and only if

(i) You believe that God exists.
(ii) You are justified (maximally) in believing that God exists.
(iii) And God actually exists.

But all three of these conditions is met by the person I am describing, from the Gangadeanian point of view. For ease of exposition, say that it seems to me that God exists and that I believe that God exists.

Now since Gangadean already accepts that God exists necessarily, he is going to grant me (iii)--after all truth is truth--it isn't like it's true for Gangadean and not for me. But this means conditions (i) and (iii) are satisfied as it concerns my belief that God exists. The proposition that God exists is true, and I believe it, ex hypothesi. Finally, if I hear or rehearse argument (B) and it is on that basis that I become convinced that God exists (and moreover, I can show it), then condition (ii) is fulfilled as well. After all, I will be maximally justified in believing something on the basis of a sound argument. This means on Gangadean's theory of knowledge, I (as the epistemic subject) know (with certainty) that God exists! But this seems really bad and I wonder how the Gangadeanian should respond.

It isn't enough for the Gangadeanian to say that there's something funny about my examples. I fully grant that this is a really bad result. The trick is for the Gangadeanian to explain specifically what goes awry here. It seems to follow straightfowardly from the theory of knowledge that Gangadean provides in conjunction with the claim that any proposition entails a necessary truth. He might try and change the very definition of entailment or argument validity so as to exclude such cases, but that move will be ad hoc (used simply as a means to save Gangadean's theory of knowledge from counterexample), unless there is some independent reason for these revisions.

So here is my challenge to the Gangadeanian. Do at least one of the following.

1) Show that arguments (A) and (B) do not actually follow from Gangdean's theory of knowledge (i.e., show that a person that believes that God exists on the basis of either argument doesn't count as having a justified true belief). But don't just assert it, prove it.

2) Independently motivate a revision to the logician's notion of entailments regarding necessary truths.

3) Argue how contrary to initial appearances, arguments (A) and (B) aren't so bad as ways of knowing that God exists.

The sharp reader will realize that this sort of "knowledge" by deductive proof of necessary truths will generalize. Plug in any necessary truth for the conclusion (e.g., any theorem of mathematics no matter how complicated) and any true premise whatsoever and you can come up with a sound argument which seems to make knowledge come too easily.

3,000!

This blog has hit 3,000 pageviews, today. In the grand scheme of things, it's a tiny feat, but it does indicate that my blog has gained in readership.

Appeal to Unknown

A short note on fallacies. It turns out that it is often hard to say what is wrong with certain fallacies, or why we should endeavor to avoid them. Consider what you think is wrong with begging the question. Arguments that beg the question are by definition valid (if the premises are true the conclusion must also be true), and in some cases even sound (provided the premises are true). But still, they seem to be bad qua arguments or perhaps even as ways of reasoning. Unfortunately, it's quite difficult to get a precise handle on the nature of the badness. Some suspect that it has something to do with making knowledge or justified belief, too easy to come by--but even this is up for debate (see the problem of easy knowledge or epistemic bootstrapping which afflicts basically any theory of knowledge and justification under the sun). Similarly, it's really tricky to figure out why we ought to (rationally) follow the rules of valid inference in logic (i.e., ask yourself what it is that justifies you in accepting that modus ponens is a rule you ought to adhere to in forming/evaluating arguments?) and it's hard to figure out just why a rational person ought to avoid fallacies (even though I think we absolutely should).

For the moment, I want to focus my attention on the fallacy dubbed by Gangadeanians as an "appeal to unknown" which is also sometimes called "appeal to ignorance." Let me illustrate with an instance, which admittedly has no hint of creativity. Suppose you are arguing that God does not exist. You present me with the problem of evil as some evidence that God doesn't exist. I then respond, "yeah, but you haven't actually proven that God doesn't exist." If I then further take this fact as proof (or even support) for the proposition that God exists, then this is an appeal to ignorance or unknown.

The bad argument would look like this.

1) There is no successful proof that God doesn't exist.
2) Therefore, God exists. 

Now my point in highlighting this particular fallacy is because I've heard it used against this post of mine. In that piece, I argue that Gangadean's inference from "matter is not eternal" to "therefore, some spirit is eternal" makes a leap. He has set things up on a dichotomy that he has failed to prove (i.e., that existence consists solely of matter and spirit). And I pointed out how since Gangadean is after absolute certainty with respect to all his knowledge claims, and since he claims to know with certainty that God exists, he had better support any and all presuppositions of this inference and thus the dichotomy upon which it rests. In response, some Gangadeanians are too quick to dismiss my argument as an appeal to unknown. But this is plainly wrong. My challengers think I have presented something like the following, but only because they have misunderstood my argument (speaking of fallacies, it's a classic strawman).

1) There is no successful proof that shows that a third substance (non material, non spiritual) does not exist.  

2) Therefore, a third substance exists. 

Indeed this would be a really bad argument--the conclusion simply doesn't follow from the premise. But again this just isn't my argument! Below is what I actually have in mind (expanded in greater detail than I have presented it before).

1) Gangadean presupposes that existence is comprised solely of matter or spirit and no third substance in order to draw the inference that if matter is not eternal, then some spirit must be eternal.  

2) Gangadean hasn't proven that existence is comprised solely of matter or spirit, nor is the claim self-evident/attesting.  

3) Gangadean claims that we cannot know (certainly) things unless they are proven by way of a sound argument or they are self-evident/attesting.   

4) Therefore, we cannot know (certainly) that some spirit must be eternal on the basis of matter being non-eternal. 

Now I'm not conceding that Gangadean has given us a satisfactory account of "self-evident/attesting" or that he has shown the method by which we can determine when something is self-attesting or self-evident. Again, I think ultimately it rests on intuitions. But I'm granting for the sake of argument that there is some real content to the notions and showing how even if there are such things, it doesn't help Gangadean with his broader project. The upshot is that until Gangadean has proven that existence is comprised solely of matter and spirit to begin with, he doesn't actually know (by his own lights) anything that rests on this claim. Thus he doesn't know (again by his own lights) that God exists, even if he has shown that matter is not eternal (also see this post where I question whether he has shown that matter is not eternal).

Finally, it doesn't help the Gangadeanian one bit to respond to me that there doesn't appear to be any positive evidence for the claim that a third substance (immaterial, non spiritual) exists. This is because the lack of evidence for something doesn't prove that that thing fails to exist.

Gangadean Responds to Critics?

Here is a website that the Gangadeanians have put up.  This morning I encountered this post, which is an attempt to answer critics regarding the necessity of common ground. I was excited to see this since I have been pressing Gangadean and his people to defend some of their views about common ground. Specifically, I have been interested in the following inquiries.

1) Precisely which propositions count as common ground? 

2) How do you justify your answer to 1)? (i.e., how do you know with certainty that your answer to 1) is veridical?). 

3) What is the method or process you use to determine your answer to 1) and 2). 

4) What is the propositional attitude that two persons must have with respect to a proposition in order to have that proposition as common ground? (I.e, is it belief? knowledge? knowledge in the Gangadeanian sense?). 

5) What justifies your answer to 4)?

Unfortunately, we are without with the exception of 1). I take 2) through 5) to be questions that reveal certain assumptions that Gangadean helps himself to in drafting a document of the sort featured on their blog. In other words, there are presumably more basic issues than what he addresses there.
Still, I want to make a few remarks about the document since at least some of its contents appear to be inspired either by my blog or my personal interaction with Gangadean.

The first statement in the document is the following.

Common Ground (CG) is the set of conditions necessary for thought and discourse. To engage in discourse without CG is to engage in meaningless disputes.

This is an assertion in need of rational justification. Gangadeanians often say things of this sort as if it is just obvious (perhaps they think it's self-attesting?). And it's a little bit weird that they do so given their views about what it takes to know things (provided it isn't self-attesting). One of the quirky requirements on knowledge for Gangadean is that in order to know something you have to be able to prove that thing (show that it is true via a sound deductive argument). But then again he doesn't show you everything---the above statement is a case in point. So then how are you supposed to know it if he doesn't give you the proof for it? Also shouldn't we hold him to the same standard? If he knows that "common ground is the set of conditions necessary for thought and discourse" then he had better be in a position to prove that this is so (i.e., show it). So my first move is to ask him to justify his assertion about the necessity of common ground. In fact, I've raised these challenges here and here.

Gangadean next follows this up with more assertions.

1. Reason as the laws of thought (identity, non-contradiction and excluded middle) is the test for meaning and is self-attesting.
2. Integrity is a commitment to reason as a concern for consistency.
3. Rational Presuppositionalism (RP) affirms the necessity to address the more basic before the less basic.
4. The Principle of Clarity (PC) affirms: some things are clear; the basic things are clear; the basic things concerning metaphysics (about God and man) and ethics (about good and evil) are clear to reason— epistemology

I hope it's clear by now what you ought to say in response. You should ask him to justify or show that 1 through 4 are true. As is they are no little more than assertions. To be fair, his book, Philosphical Foundation, is an attempt to argue for point 4 (and I take issue with many of those arguments in this blog), but the first 3 principles are simply asserted rather than argued for.

Gangadean then goes on to say.

For skeptics, to deny CG is to deny any possibility of knowledge, which is self-referentially absurd. For theists, to deny clarity is to deny inexcusability (of unbelief) and the need for redemptive revelation (emphasis mine). 

First, in accordance with 4. above, we should ask do some things have to be clear if we are to avoid skepticism? What Gangadean means by 'clear' is absolutely certain. And on that understanding of the word 'clear' I just don't see why denying that some things are clear should lead one to skepticism. Of course, if we assume that knowledge requires certainty of basic things, then skepticism seems to follow rather trivially from the denial of clarity. But Gangadean has not given us any reason to assume that knowledge requires certainty. So there's no threat of skepticism with the denial of number 4 above.

Secondly why should we think that skepticism is self-referentially absurd? As I've mentioned in my previous posts, one can intelligibly doubt that the kind of knowledge Gangadean is after (i.e., absolute certainty) is possible without undermining one's own view in the process. You might even say that you believe or believe strongly or know (without certainty) that absolute certainty is not possible. But there's nothing incoherent about any such position. The only way for it to be self-referentially absurd is to say that you know with absolute certainty that absolute certainty is not possible---but who is saying that?!

As to whether a theist denying clarity of the "common ground" denies inexcusability of unbelief and the need for redemption. This too needs to be argued for and I've resisted this point in this post. There, I basically point out how even if God's existence is clear, on Gangadean's own view about the desire to know being necessary for knowledge, unbelief turns out excusable (because on Gangadean's view one's desire to know or not is determined entirely by God. So if you're not regenerated by God you will not seek to know him. Which means you can't possibly know God and it's entirely out of your control. And this sounds like a pretty good excuse for unbelief or at least no worse than "it wasn't clear").

Furthermore, there's something funny going on here. The need for redemption and inexcusability can't be used in defense of the principle of clarity--there's something circular about that. Let's remember what he's trying to do here. Gangadean is attemping to support the principle of clarity (to theists) by appealing to reason alone--i.e., what can be known apart from revealed religion. He's got to make the case to both theists and non-thesists alike that "the basic things are clear." For him to say, "well, look if you don't have clarity, then unbelievers have an excuse (i.e,. that the inexcusability of unbelief thesis is false) is not going to seem like a cost to anybody if we're ignoring revealed religion in the first place. That's because it's a theological doctrine which is informed by a particular interpretation of certain passaged in the bible (e.g., Romans 1:20), that the unbelievers are without excuse for their unbelief. Without presupposing that the Romans 1:20 is true (or at least his reading of it), he can't cite it as a reason to believe that some things must be clear.

Next we turn to some of the objections/responses Gangadean considers that have in part been inspired by my criticisms. Sadly his "responses" fall short of anything resembling an answer or anything that causes any problems for my position. Further, he seems to misunderstand the objections in the first place. I take them in turn.

First is one that is inspired by my posts on the memory objection.

Objection 2: We cannot know a is a; we may have an incorrigible memory lapse (fallibilism). Yet the claim a is a is probably true. 

Response: If there is no rational basis for certainty (re: a is a), there is no rational basis for certainty about anything, including probability.

First of all, I never say that we cannot know that a is a.  He really ought to be more careful than this. Instead, I questioned how it is that we could have the kind of certainty that Gangadean associates with knowing. See for yourself. In that post, I merely call into question how it is that we can know (with certainty) any proposition which is the conclusion of an argument given the fact that assessing an argument's soundness depends on our memorial faculties faithfully reporting information. And the moral was that we must (in some suitable sense) presume that our memorial faculties (among others) are functioning faithfully albeit, defeasibly. The fact that we rest our beliefs on presumptions of this sort calls into question the kind of worldview that Gangadean promulgates--the kind that depends on a kind of rationalistic certainty.

Now I already anticipated and addressed Gangadean's "response" here. The gist: I fully agree that if there can be no certainty per se, then one cannot be certain about probabilities--this seems to be a trivial claim. But since I don't claim to be absolutely certain about the probabilities we should assign to various propositions, Gangadean's remarks just miss the target--they don't show any problem with my view. I think that Gangadean is somehow confusing my view with his own--he assumes that we need certainty, not me.

The last objection/response also misses.

Objection 4: Nothing (including reason) is self-attesting, therefore nothing is certain.  

Response: Pure skepticism is self-referentially absurd (SRA): is it certain that nothing is certain? Or, can any degree of certainty (probability) be distinguished with certainty?

First of all, before we draw sweeping conclusions about what follows if nothing is "self-attesting", we need to know precisely what Gangadean means by "self-attesting" (after all, meaning is more basic than truth says, he). Further, as I've mentioned before, we need to know the method by which one determines whether something is self-attesting or not (argument? perception? intuition?). If you're tempted to say that when a proposition makes questioning possible, then it is self-attesting, then you have just pushed the problem back a step---we now need to know how we know when something makes questioning possible! Importantly, Gangadean also owes us a justification for his method of choice being the correct one.

Again, since I'm no skeptic that claims to be certain that certainty is not possible, if this is intended as some sort of answer to my criticisms, it misses its mark. What Gangadean hasn't shown is that there is anything inconsistent about a person, like myself, that thinks, believes or perhaps entertains the possibility that certainty of the sort that Gangadean is after, is unattainable. I am in effect saying, "I have doubts that absolute certainty is possible, but I wouldn't say I am absolutely certain that absolute certainty is impossible." I've been quite explicit about this throughout my blog.

So it turns out that these objections/responses do nothing to address my main worries nor do they show that there is anything incoherent about my views. In fact, I think they only raise more problems for Gangadean or at least make the problems plaguing his worldview more pronounced. In this case, the cure is worse than the disease.

A Clarification

It has come to my attention that some followers of Gangadean have found the manner in which I write to be offensive. In particular, there are certain phrases that I have used in my posts that have been taken as personally disparaging. I've always made a concerted effort to avoid making things personal because that's not what this blog is about.  Despite my efforts, some have taken certain phrases, or terms to be offensive in just this way.

For instance, I often refer to those that follow Gangadean's teachings as "Ganagdeanians" or "Gangadean and his kin" or "Gangadean and his ilk." To be sure, I never once intended for these to be disparaging remarks. In fact, these are just not phrases or terms that are offensive among the groups of academic philosophers I run with. 'Ilk' for instance just means "of the same type." Just as 'kin' has essentially the same denotation. And just like an Aristotelian is someone that shares certain core views of Aristotle, 'Gangadeanian' refers to the persons that agree with Ganagadean on certain core issues.  Finally, sometimes I refer to such persons as being semantically chauvinistic. But by that I just mean that they merely assert the meanings of words or analyses of concepts rather than arguing for them. But it turns out that some Gangadeanians have taken my usage of these phrases in different ways so as to find them to be personally disparaging.

Now I don't know the ins and outs of how much responsibility I have when I write and speak should people misconstrue what I have said so as to hear an offensive message. On some occasions I feel like I'm clearly in the wrong (when I've said something that I know or should have known is offensive to others but say it any way, regardless of my intent). In other situations, when what I have said was offensive to another because they misunderstood it or misconstrued it uncharitably (where they know or should have known better), it seems like the listener might be in the wrong. Perhaps there are many situations where the burden of conduct is shared between both listener and hearer. I don't really know. And I don't know where along this spectrum this particular issue stands.

At the end of the day, if it can be avoided within reasonable limits, I don't want anybody to be hurt or feel disparaged by my writing. Since my readers aren't all familiar with the sorts of conventions among the circles I run in, I can see how they might have misunderstood what I meant by some of my words. Hence, I want to offer an apologly to the Gangadeanians who may have read me as being snarky and disparaging in my usage of the terms enumerated above. I hope they understand that that was never my intent. These are just common phrases used among people I am most often around and so I didn't think to the consider the possibility that they might be taken in unintended and unconventional ways.

[Here and here are just a couple of instances of philosophers using 'ilk' in the way that I intended].

[Here and here you find instances of philosophers using 'kin' in the way that I intended].

[Here is an instance of a philosopher's usage of 'chauvinism' in the way that I intended].

Anderson on Reliabilism

Update 5/31/15: Since the writing of this post, Anderson has removed his blog from his website which means the hyperlink below no longer connects to his article. I also noticed that there's one other article that he has removed following a post/link on my blog. So my apologies to my readers that the links are dead. I don't know whether Anderson has done this in response to my posts or whether this is merely incidental. 

Here is another post I found from Anderson. It is a brief discussion of reliabilism and I think it's instructive in spelling out more of the Gangadeanian epistemology as well as view about the method of "proper" inquiry. I just want to take a few portions of it, but if you fear I've taken anything out of context, you can always refer to the original post which I've linked to above. This discussion overlaps nicely with some of my most recent posts.

Anderson writes,

Epistemology is not first and primarily a practical problem.  It is a problem of meaning. What do I mean when I say “here is my hand” and how do I know this? What the skeptic is asking for is an authority.  “By what authority do you say these things?”... 

As I've said a few times before, Anderson never explains what it is that he intends by 'meaning.' He seems to think we all understand the term in exactly the same way he does. But this is sloppy. The notion plays a crucial role in his system. He is claiming here that epistemology (which is characterized by theory of knowledge) is primarily about meaning. And he asks what the meaning of a claim like "here is my hand" is, and importantly how one can know what the meaning of that statement is. He doesn't tell us which is more basic. After all, one might think that knowing the meaning of a statement, is just another instance of knowing, which makes epistemology primarily about knowing (rather than meaning). I honestly don't know what he intends when he says that epistemology is primarily about meaning. So I wish he would explain it in a way to make it more perspicuous. Moreover, I wish he would answer the questions he raises. I've been wanting the Gangadeanians to explain how it is they know what a word or statement means--i.e., the method of determining the meaning of claims like "here is my hand." But none is given.

Next, Anderson writes,

...What we are looking for is the highest authority which ends the regress and which cannot be doubted because it makes doubting possible.  People rely on authorities such as tradition, testimony, scripture, common sense, intuition, science, and constructive reasoning.  However, none of these is the highest authority; all of these can be (and are) questioned. 

By way of contrast, I argue that the only authority that cannot be questioned is the laws of thought.  The laws of thought, called reason, explain what thought is, therefore make thought possible, and hence cannot be questioned since any question assumes the laws of thought...

The regress he's talking about is the regress of justification that traditionally internalist theories of justification (i.e,. the view that justification consists in reasons or evidence that the subject is in a position to be aware of) have had to deal with. He also thinks something like it plagues the externalist as well.  The idea is that if everything you know depends on other reasons or evidence of some sort, or a reliable belief forming process, then there's the issue of what reasons you have for your original reasons and this leads to an infinite regress. I think he misses the mark against the externalist, but I'll save that for another day. The way Anderson has framed it, it is the skeptic that is pushing for a theory of justification from the person claiming to know things and the idea is that infinite regresses are bad things. Note it seems to me a hard core skeptic would also question this last claim that infinite regresses are problematic in the first place.

But the main point I want to draw is that Anderson thinks there is something that cannot be doubted because it makes doubting possible.  Roughly, he has mentioned several ways that we might come to know things/"get meaning" (i.e., by way of common sense, intuition, science, constructive reasoning, testimony, tradition) and he thinks that all of these face problems. They can be doubted in some sense. Or perhaps they can't answer the skeptic. Again, Anderson isn't as clear about things as he should be. What does it mean that "it can be doubted?"  How do we determine that something can be doubted? These are important issues that Anderson should be in a position to answer (and the answer better not be common sense or intuition given what he comes up in the next section).

He then claims that there is some other way of knowing (or "getting meaning"), call it X. X and only X is the sort of thing that cannot be doubted ( implied is that all the other ways can be doubted) and so it is the sure-fire way of knowing (and presumably the way to know the meaning of things). X of course, is reason, or the laws of thought according to Anderson. So his claim is that X (reason) qua method of getting meaning or coming to know things, cannot be doubted. Why does he say it can't be doubted? "Because it makes doubting possible." If you're not careful you will just go with your gut reaction to this and agree. It will seem obvious to you. But let's be really careful here. There are a number of issues that the skeptic might raise against Anderson. Since Anderson thinks that his views are superior to others insofar as only he can "answer" the skeptic, we should consider what the skeptic might say to him. The first is just a recap of what I mentioned above.

1) How can one know with certainty or determine infallibly when something can or cannot be doubted?

2) How do we know with certainty or determine infallibly when something makes doubting possible?

Now remember, Anderson has just poo-poo'd on intuition, common sense and the like for not being able to overcome the skeptic (although I think he's wrong about this). So whatever his answers to 1) and 2) above turn out to be, they shouldn't involve common sense or intuition. But just ask yourself how you would ever come to verify that something can/cannot be doubted. Take any statement and consider what method you employ in figuring out whether it can or cannot be doubted. Likewise just think about how you come to know or verify that the laws of thought make doubting possible. What's the method? Do you go through an argument? Or do you just see it directly, immediately, non inferentially? If so, then how does this differ from intuition? 

What counts as having common ground?

"Common ground" happens to be one common phrase that Gangadeanians use. It certainly isn't Gangadean's concoction. It's a pretty common saying among philosophers. But the way it is used by Gangadeanians (as the basis of excluding or including people in conversations) makes me think they have a rather different notion than that of most of the philosophers ("on the outside") that I have encountered.

Gangadean often asks whether there is any common ground between his interlocutors and himself. Only if there is, will there be "room for discussion." Without "having" common ground he claims that further discussion is pointless. As with pretty much anything in philosophy, all of this might appear at first glance as a rather straightforward idea. You might be thinking, what is so tricky or unclear about "the need for common ground in advancing discussions? If we don't have enough in common, then we won't get anywhere in talking about things." But it turns out this is anything but simple and straightforward. When Gangadean asks whether there is sufficient agreement, or whether he and his conversation partners have common ground, we need to ask what it means in the relevant sense to agree on claims or what it means to have certain claims in common.

There seems to be a sense of having "common ground" as it pertains to a particular conversation. Say that you go into an ethics seminar and you pronounce that there is no point in discussing ethics and you stick with this sort of disposition. Your assertion and the sorts of objections you will raise (if you follow your disposition through and through) will no doubt prove disruptive. You have a meta ethical view that denies one of the unspoken presuppositions of the ethics class--people engaged in an ethical discussion have it as common ground (in some suitable sense) that ethics is within the realm of things worth studying.

But the crucial issue is how we should characterize the sort of propositional attitude** that two people must be in with respect to a proposition or set of propositions, in order for them to count as "having" the proposition(s) as common ground.For instance, do each of the speakers have to believe that ethics is a worthwhile field of study for that claim to count as common ground between them? If they have any doubts about the matter, at any time, does it no longer count as common ground and thus render talk about ethics pointless?

Or do they have to know (rather than merely believe) that ethical inquiry is worth pursuing in order for it to be part of the common ground between them?

Or do we require that they have to know with certainty (as Gangadeanians seem to)?

Of course there are many many gradations to take note of given the complexity of mental states like belief, doubt and the like. Some believers are just more confident in their beliefs than others. Provided that you accept that beliefs come in degrees, we would also need to consider all the different varieties of belief and again ask whether believing to each degree in the common ground proposition, counts as "having" common ground. Or we could speak of beliefs as it pertains to the various levels of support they have via the subject's evidence (which could get us a number of gradations as well). We should also consider cases of doubting and its various degrees. A person might have slight to serious doubts about whether ethics is a worthwhile study, but desire to dialogue about ethical theories in an effort to see where it might lead. They might even come convinced by seeing the fruits, that ethical inquiry is a worthy task even if they weren't at the outset. My point is, it isn't clear which of these attitudes (doubting, believing, knowing, knowing with certainty) two persons must be in with respect to some proposition(s) for it to count as a case of having that proposition(s) as common ground.

In my experience, Gangadeanians seem to think it is knowledge with certainty, which is the most stringent of the one's we've considered. This state is such that once you "accept" a proposition, you cannot intelligible call it into question, ever again. The laws of thought, basic distinctions (as Gangadean defines them), causation, that reason is ontological, and the like must be known with certainty and never doubted gain by those involved in talking with a Gangadeanian for discussions to be meaningful. My last encounter with Gangadean, in his office was basically him asking me if I agreed to certain "truths." When I said that I believed many of them, but didn't take myself to be certain of them, he found this unacceptable and grounds for ending discussion.  [The sharp reader will consider why the Gangadeanians stop at epistemic certainty. Might not there be an more stringent of common ground like diachronic certainty--such that in order to count has having common ground, two persons must know propositions with epistemic certainty and immutability. In other words, why stop where the Ganagadeanians have chosen to draw the line?]

But this not only seems entirely wrong, it is also unsupported. Again, just why should we accept where Gangadean has drawn the line (why not think that common ground regrading some proposition consists in merely acknowledging for the purpose of the discussion at hand, that the common ground propositions are assumed to be true)? Again, they have drawn a line, but it seems arbitrary. To be clear it seems like the Gangadeanians believe that common ground is necessary for worthwhile discussions. But to have common ground in some proposition or set of propositions requires that each side knows the proposition(s) in question with absolute certainty. Thus worthwhile discussion is only possible if the members of a given discussion each know with absolute certainty the common ground propositions.

Let me try to explain why I think this is a bad view. Philosophers often entertain the views or presuppositions of others in order to try and show that a view is not internally inconsistent. This is a really common practice in professional philosophy. To be sure, this doesn't mean that they actually believe, (let alone know or know with certainty) the presuppositions of their interlocutors. They just assume them for the purposes of discussion in order to show how under those very assumptions, problems arise.In the same vein, consider reductio ad absurdum arguments or proofs by contradiction. You certainly don't buy into the premises of such argument types. Instead you set out to draw out a contradiction that follows from accepting the premise(s). Sometimes you might simply be on the fence about whether a premise is true and you try to derive a contradiction which will show you that it is not true. Other times, you suspect or even know that the premise can't be right, and you just want to show someone else explicitly how it leads to a contradiction.

So these are cases that I take to be fruitful dialogues. After all, they point out inconsistencies or contradictions that may follow logically from taking certain things for granted. And there is a very weak sense in which there is common ground. The persons involved in such dialogues at least assume (for the purposes of discussion) certain claims, including the premises that one person hopes to show leads to contradictions. But none of this requires anything like knowing the common ground propositions with absolute certainty.

So why should we think Gangadean is right in thinking that in order for two or more persons to have a fruitful dialogue, the participants must all know with absolute certainty certain propositions (i.e,. common ground propositions)?


**Note a propositional attitude is often thought of as a mental state which has as its content, a proposition. You might believe that the sun is warm, just like you might remember that the sun is warm, or see that the sun is warm, or desire that the sun be warm, or even know that the sun is warm. Each of these sentences expresses the idea that you are in a kind of mental state which has a proposition as its object--the thing expressed by the clause following 'that' in each instance. That's what I roughly mean by a propositional attitude.

Transcendental Arguments.

Transcendental arguments are a favorite among Gangadeanians. Anderson once told me in conversation that he thought analytic philosophers failed to pay enough attention to them. Roughly a transcendental argument functions in the following way. Take something that is true, and then consider what else must be true in order for that original thing to be true. In other words, you pick a premise, a starting point that you believe is true, and then sort of figure out what it entails---i.e., what else must be true for the starting point to be true. So Gangadean thinks that meaning is possible. He then considers what else must be true for there to be the possibility of meaning. It's obvious to him that clarity at a basic level must obtain in order for meaning to be possible. Thus, he concludes there must be clarity at the basic level.

One can resist a transcendental argument in at least 2 ways. First, you can outright deny (or at least call into question) the starting premise or phenomena that is taken for granted. In this case it would be to deny that meaning is possible. That sounds pretty bad, though (at least the outright denial). Do you really want to deny that meaning is even possible? Isn't it seemingly self-undercutting to do so. Aren't you assuming meaning in denying meaning? I feel like that is mostly right although Gangadean again has failed to tell us what he means by 'meaning.' Maybe he takes it as a primitive (which again must introduce intuitions--after all, one needs to ask how do we come to grasp primitives, correctly?). Moreover, I think I know what 'meaning' means. But I'm not sure. Like I use the word all the time, and I suspect at least many of my usages are appropriate or correct, but it also seems to have various senses. Like if I say, "life has no meaning" by 'meaning' I intend to convey something like "objective or subjective purpose." But semanticists also talk about the meaning of sentences, which they identify at least partially with "truth conditions" (i.e, the conditions under which the sentence is true). Or perhaps we can look at ordinary language-- like often when I ask someone what a word or phrase means, I'm asking for a definition of sorts---I'm asking someone to identify the word or phrase with synonyms that I am more familiar with in some suitable sense. So when Gangadean takes for granted that meaning is possible, as his starting point, what is he actually saying? I think he's hoping that you have some sort of intuitive grasp of the word/concept and that you won't press any further. But it turns out that 'meaning' is a tricky concept in and of itself. Still, you won't get anywhere by questioning the possibility of meaning with a Gangadeanian, so this might not be the most promising push-back point. So here's a second way to resist a transcendental argument--- show that the preconditions that the arguer has presented are not actually entailed by the starting point. Remember transcendental arguments have at least two main parts. A starting point and then the purported preconditions to that starting point. I think that for some of Gangadean's transcendental arguments, the right move is to actually deny the starting point. But perhaps for the one about the possibility of meaning, it's more savvy to deny the preconditions.

In effect, my last post was along these lines. At least if we think about the conversation highlighted in that post, as an informal version of a transcendental argument (or at least I think a transcendental argument was in the background for my interlocutor). Here's what I have in mind. My interlocutor was thinking that it was common ground that intelligible discourse, assertions, thinking, and the like are possible. That's the starting point. After all, I was talking and thinking and making assertions, as was he. So we must both accept that such activity (qua intelligible activity) is possible. Note this doesn't necessarily mean that we accept the starting point in the same exact way---after all he's a Ganagdeanian and so he accepts it with absolutely certainty, whereas, I may not. Next, his move was to try and show me that the necessary precondition for the possibility of such activity was that there is clarity at the basic level. And this is just what I called into question in my last post. It is what my interlocutor thinks is entailed by the starting point. Intelligible thought, talk, assertion and the like necessarily requires the precondition of clarity at the basic level. But he failed to actually show this is true---instead he simply assumes it.

In a similar way, when Gangadean insists that clarity at the basic level or clarity of basic distinctions is requisite (or entailed by) the possibility of meaning. So if you don't find it amenable to resist the starting premise that (meaning is possible) you can always question the entailment. After all has he given you any reason to believe that meaning is possible only if there is clarity at the basic level?

In passing, I said above that there are other transcendental arguments where I suspect the right move is to actually deny the starting point or premise that is assumed rather than the preconditions (I'd imagine there will be cases where you ought to deny both). I have in mind the case of skepticism. Let me just say a few words about it.

Gangadean thinks that the skeptic is being self-referentially absurd. The skeptic as Gangadean defines it, is one that denies that knowledge is possible. But remember for Gangadean knowing that P = not possibly being wrong about P (what I sometimes refer to as epistemic certainty). Now he (rightly) shows that a skeptic (understood in these terms) is denying with absolute certainty that absolute certainty is not possible. That's self undercutting. So skepticism (as the view that it is absolutely certain that absolute certainty is not possible) is shown to be false. And on some occasions Gangadeanians will use this conclusion as a starting point for a transcendental argument. What must be the case if skepticism is false (i.e., knowledge is possible?) Clarity at the basic level for instance, might be suggested as necessary for the possibility of knowledge.

But there's a lot of equivocating under the surface that Gangadeanians exploit (I suspect they do so unawares rather than anything sinister). Again it all comes back to Gangadean's theory of knowledge. He thinks that knowledge requires absolute certainty--where you know something only if you couldn't possibly wrong about it. Skepticism is in turn defined as the denial that such knowledge is possible. After showing the self-referential nature of the skeptic (as he defines her) he will then consider what must be possible for knowledge (but remember he means absolute certainty when he refers to knowledge). So then he goes into a theory about the preconditions for the possibility of absolute certainty while calling it knowledge. Of course, you might follow with him because you are not aware about how loaded the notion of knowledge is (you should ask yourself at this point whether you agree with him that knowledge requires absolute certainty). So Gangadean says, if knowledge is possible, then this requires clarity at the most basic level (where clarity again is something like having absolute certainty) you start to buy into what he calls the necessary preconditions.  And if you're not careful you think, well then I must have absolute certainty about very basic things.

But what if knowledge doesn't require absolute certainty? That is, what if we resist or at least call into question the starting point?  In fact, the vast majority of philosophers think knowledge doesn't (they are called fallibilists about knowledge). At the very least, it isn't anything like a settled matter even though Gangadean treats it as such. So you can question/doubt whether knowledge requires certainty (without outright rejecting it). Thus we have reason to not affirm Gangadean's starting point that knowledge (as he define the word) is possible. You are not doing anything self-undermining in doing so. You're not saying that you know with absolute certainty that absolute certainty is not possible. You are merely saying that it's not obvious that absolute certainty is possible. By doing so you block the transcendental argument from getting off the ground since the starting point hasn't earned it's place at the table as such. This means there is no rational reason to accept the purported preconditions that are said to be entailed by the starting point since they rest crucially on the starting point qua starting point.

If you say P, you assume that it is clear that P is not, not-P.

Here's a common kind of discussion that you might have with a Gangadeanian (G). I've had discussions of this sort on more than one occasion and I think it's a common approach that Anderson also likes to employ. Hence, I hope it will be instructive to my readers. 

G: Do you deny that some things are clear? 

Me: I don't think we can be absolutely certain about much of anything if that's what you mean by clear. But I don't really know what you mean by clear, so can you explain the term? 

G: So is it clear that you don't know what I mean by clear? 

Me: I don't really get what you mean by clear. Could you elaborate.

G: In your statement just now, you said, 'you' so is it clear that there is a difference between 'you' and 'not-you'? Is there a difference between "I" and "not-I", "don't and "not-don't" "really" and "not-really" "get" and not-get...."  

Me: I still don't understand what you mean precisely by clear. Can you define it for me? Well since you are saying there is a clear distinction between each of those words and what you take to be their opposites, shouldn't you be able to define them for me?  

G: Is there a clear distinction between "define" and "not-define" and "me" and "not-me." See, you are lacking integrity if you claim that nothing is clear. You are assuming that some things are clear in even arguing with me. 

What is frustrating about this exchange is that my interlocutor thinks s/he has shown something. But I have no idea what that is. They shut me up for sure, but not because they offered anything like an argument or demonstration that was undeniable. I was shut up because I was confused. So let's try to get clearer on what the intent of the approach is and then I'll say why I think it's ultimately mistaken.

The intent: The point seems to be to show that everyone, always, everywhere that thinks or makes intelligible assertions assumes clarity at a basic level (note it's 'clarity' as they define it and 'basic' as they define it and also 'assumes' too). Notice that my interlocutor never defined the pertinent term 'clear' or 'clarity' for me. They just sort of went forward in showing me what denying it amounts to (which should raise eyebrows given how they also believe that meaning is more basic than truth). My guess is s/he doesn't have a very precise definition and so none was given. But let's start with a rough sketch: since clarity is linked up to inexcusability and both Gangadean and Anderson speak of clarity in terms of being absolutely sure of some proposition (in some cases a proposition about a distinction of concepts?), I guess the idea is that something is clear just in case you couldn't possibly be wrong about it insofar as you believe it. There are going to be lot's of issues in getting precise about this, but let's just run with it because I suspect the Gangadeanians have something like this in mind (i.e., I'm setting aside issues of whether it's a good account of the concept/word to begin with).

The second misstep in my interlocutor's approach is that they conflated two different positions. I didn't deny that some things are clear in any dogmatic sense. That would be not only self-refuting, but I just don't feel that strongly that clarity is not possible. I'm just on the fence about it. In other words, I'm not certain about clarity at the basic level and I want to be convinced of it before I accept it. I mean, Gangadean insists that some basic things are clear, and I just want him to support this claim in a way that is consistent with his other pronouncements. Anyway, the point is, my interlocutor mistakenly took my not affirming clarity for my denying clarity. But the two are not equivalent. I certainly have doubts that clarity of the sort that Gangadean is after and suspect that it is unlikely, but that doesn't amount to being sure that there is no clarity. (e.g., one could not be sure that God exists or even have doubts about whether God exists without being certain that God does not exist).

Now if I'm not actually dogmatically denying clarity, but am rather not sure or doubt whether things are as clear as Gangadean and his people think, then I'm not really sure what my interlocutor has accomplished by her/his line of questions. Maybe it's something like, "let's imagine that there is no clarity since you're on the fence and I'll show you how it leads to inconsistency." But I'm not sure that the line of questioning even succeeded at that. Note that there is no actual argument presented. A line of questioning does not count as an argument with valid inferences and true premises. Nor does it count as a proof by contradiction, since again we need premises (which are assertoric statements not questions) and a conclusion. Still, there's a sort of informal dialogue going on which is meant to show or represent some inconsistency, informally.

Again the main aim is to show that by making any assertion, or asking a question, or thinking or whatever, I am assuming clarity at the basic level. So if I were to deny clarity at the basic level, then I've just been inconsistent because in order to deny it, I have to assume it. So what needs to happen is that the Gangadeanian must show that I am in fact assuming clarity at the basic level anytime I think, or assert or argue or whatever. 

But I don't see how the line of questioning that my interlocutor participated in makes good on that end. I mean how do you even begin to show someone what they are assuming whenever they think or talk? Sure that's what you think is going on, because it's part of your worldview already, but you haven't shown anyone that happens not to share your belief that your take on the matter is true.

So really, what I think is happening is that my interlocutor already has in mind something like, "in order to make intelligible assertions, questions, or the like you must presuppose clarity or epistemic certainty at the basic level."  Remember this is what we just concluded that s/he must show is true. I think that it just seems or feels or appears to be trivial or obvious to them.

But have they actually given you any reason to agree with the claim that in making intelligible assertions, or raising questions, or in order to think or doubt or know anything, we have to accept or presuppose absolute certainty or clarity of some basic things? Has the Gangadeanian done anything to actually support this claim? I think it's a rather non-trivial claim about the very nature of thinking and asserting intelligibly, and so I think they need to explain how they know it or why one ought to accept it. I mean, why do I have to be absolutely certain of basic distinctions, in order to make intelligible declarations? discussions? arguments? have intelligible thoughts? Again what justifies this claim? Can't I just be somewhat sure of basic distinctions and make meaningful statements and have meaningful thoughts? I just don't understand where they get these norms of thinking, assertion and the like. At the very least they need to support their claims. The line of questioning that we enumerated above then is somehow supposed to show you that this assumption is true. But what I want to point out is that it fails to do that, or at least it isn't obvious how it achieves it. In fact, I don't think it's the sort of thing that can be shown by way of any argument. It's likely something you just have to immediately grasp, or intuit. The problem is, for some it's quite obvious and for others it is not. So the Gangadeanian hasn't made any actual progress as I see it.

Now the Gangadeanian is likely to respond to this challenge in this manner:

"Look, in order for you to say all the things you just said, aren't you assuming clarity of basic distinctions?" In other words, they are likely to respond with just another iteration of the same line of questioning. They might say, "see, you're using all these words and concepts in disagreeing about my approach, which means you're assuming basic distinctions!" And again whatever you say in response, will be met with, "is there a distinction between, whatever words you used and their negation?"

But this is just a reiteration of the same reasoning which depends on this background assumption that they haven't actually shown you is true. So in response to your worry, they have in effect just repeated what they said before. I think this is nothing more than a flat-footed response to your inquiry. It's table pounding or maybe it's intuition pumping with the illusion of real movement. But it doesn't show anything. Perhaps your response should be equally flat-footed. When they ask you whether you assume certainty about basic distinctions (or clarity) whenever you think or make assertions, perhaps the best response is, that it isn't obvious that you do. If they introduce epicycles of the same question, you will always be able to respond in the same way---ad infinitum.

Commonsense, Intuition, Rational Presuppositionalism.

I know that I exist. I think you know you exist, too. I know that I just typed a series of words. I know that the sentence, "A horse is not a horse" if taken literally, expresses a contradiction. As alluded to in my previous post, Gangadean also takes himself to know these things (even though he has a much more stringent conception of what counts as knowing). The question is, how do we know them?

Again as I mentioned in my last post, Gangadean must navigate a fine line between accepting things on intuitions, and not. The tension arises because he thinks one can't know that God exists on the basis of intuition. Just like one can't know that the external world exists on the basis of intuition. You need deductively sound arguments which have as their conclusion those propositions, in order to know them. There are plenty of other things that, for Gangadean, fall into the category of things you can't know immediately, but a curious number of things that don't.

The issue is, what is the basis of the distinction? Why does he think that you can know (for instance) that you exist in an immediate and non-inferential way, but you can't know that God exists in this way? The necessary vs. contingent truth distinction is of no help, here. That is, just in case you were tempted to think that we can know things on the basis of intuition just in case, it couldn't have been otherwise. That won't help for at least two reasons. 1) Water = H20 is a necessary truth, but I can't know it immediately--in fact, nobody knew that claim until it was discovered. 2) That I exist, is a contingent truth (I may not have existed). Perhaps by a stretch you can insist that it's necessary in a hypothetical way---insofar as I exist, I must necessarily exist. But that goes for anything---insofar as a unicorn exists, it exists necessarily. That would make any claim necessarily true (albeit in this hypothetical way). That can't be right. Another way you might try to go is to suggest that insofar as I question my existence, I exist (Descartes). But that assumes that you know that you are questioning, which presupposes you exist and so it's question begging (I think Russell pointed this out).

So I wonder why Gangadean thinks that you can know with certainty that you exist by way of intuition, but not know other things by way of intuition. So here are two questions that you might raise for the Gangadeanian: 1) What is the basis of the distinction between things you can know (with certainty) via intuition and those that you cannot? 2) What legitimizes whatever theory you have about the basis of the distinction.

Clearing the air

The most common Gangadeanian philosophical move is to paint you in a corner as a reason-denier. It's sort of like a reductio argument, though not quite. Assume something you believe or deny and "show" that it leads to an inconsistency. If you don't give up the assumed premise in light of the inconsistency that has purportedly been "shown", then you are lacking in integrity and there is no more room for discussion. No doubt some of you have or at least know people that have been labeled in this way which usually means other people at the congregation no longer talk to you until you agree to reject the purported inconsistency.

The reason I don't think it's a reductio and the reason 'shown' has been placed in shudder quotes, is that his method of "showing" you as a reason-denier is questionable and rests on what I think are actually intuitions or commonsense judgments. Unfortunately, I've had little success in having Gangadean and his kin acknowledge just how much they use intuition and commonsense of this sort in their theories. Although once, Gangadean sort of admitted something of this sort---when we discussed things like how do I know (with certainty) that a statement actually violates the law of non-contradiction? Or how do I know (with certainty) that I exist (which he granted was a contingent a priori claim)? He admitted that these were non-inferential bits of knowledge; in a word, intuitive. But he said they were based on "rational intuitions." When I followed his claim up with a question about how one determines a rational intuition (and thus appropriate) vs. a non-rational intuition, he argued in a tight circle. His basis for distinguishing the two ultimately rested on just an another intuition which he took to be rational, but this is to presuppose a way of distinguishing between the two which is what he was trying to show, hence the circle. Anyway, what I want to focus on in this post is to explain why I am not a reason-denier, and how Gangadean and I have some, albeit thin patch of common ground. This will also help in explaining the dialetical context of all of my other posts as well as allude to some of the ways we differ.

Gangadean claims that some things are clear. In fact, he takes himself to have absolute certainty regarding some propositions. For instance, that the laws of thought are required for meaning. He thinks that one cannot consistently deny the distinction between being and non-being (or any instance of a and non-a). At this level of generality, there's nothing too strange about such claims. I don't have the feeling of certainty that Gangadean and his kin do about these matters (for all I know it's just a psychological/subjective state of certainty)---I've tried, but I just don't have it. But I accept that if a theory or position leads to a denial of basic distinctions or denies the Aristotelian laws of thought, then it's a serious cost to that theory. If you come to me with a belief that entails the denial of the law of identity (or an instance thereof), then I'm going to seriously question your view or else start to wonder if I heard you correctly. Also if your theory tells me that a horse is actually a non-horse (where you're not playing fast as loose with the terms) then I'm going to give you an incredulous stare.

By the same token, if some genie in a bottle came up to me and said, "look, if you're wrong about the law of non contradiction, then everyone you love and care about will die a grueling death and be sent to an eternity of suffering, but if you're right I'll give you a $100" I wouldn't take the bet even though I'm quite sure about the law, and would like $100 rather than not. I'm sure about the law of noncontradiction, but not that sure. I wouldn't risk endless suffering for everyone I care about no matter how minute the risk is by my lights. Gangadean's notion of epistemic certainty seems to require that you be sure enough to take such a bet and I just can't get myself of that disposition. But this fact doesn't take away from what I said earlier about how I would respond to theories or views that entailed the denial of what I take to be basic truths.

So I don't think I'm a reason-denier. I just don't feel as sure as they do about things. I don't think we can have the kind of certainty that Gangadean claims to have, but I believe some of the same things he does (regarding the laws of thought, basic distinctions and the like) even if not to the same extent (It is interesting to note that even if the sort of certainty that Gangadean is after, were possible, I don't know what benefit there would be in having it. What's the upshot supposed to be? Maybe I'll explore this in a future post.) Of course, we disagree about a lot, too.

Still, there's a sense in which I agree with Gangadean, that some things are clear (true, I'm hesitant about his definition of 'clear', but let's just suspend that for now). We both at least believe that some things are clear, even if we feel different levels of confidence about the claim. Now even given this "common ground", we might still fuss over exactly what method one uses to determine what is clear to reason and also relatedly, what things count as clear and which, don't. Of course, the devil is in the details.

Gangadean for instance, thinks it's clear to reason that the God of theism exists and that man has sinned and needs a savior. I don't. He thinks it's clear to reason that the bible is the word of God, but as I've suggested in a previous post, I don't. He thinks it's clear that the mind is not brain, and I don't. He thinks that it's clear that we don't have libertarian free-will and I'm not so sure. This doesn't make me a reason-denier. Nor does it make him a reason-upholder. At least that isn't the default conclusion to draw if you're trying to look at it objectively. We have to look at the arguments and assess them in terms of their rational merits. [Edit on 6/29/30: I still maintain one can rationally believe each of these things despite them not being as clear (i.e., deductively proven) as Gangadean takes them to be].

So I want to be clear. My posts in this blog assume (for the sake of discussion)** at least some basic distinctions---I take certain things as obvious or clear or whatever. I don't call everything into question. I assume that any theory is seriously problematic if it calls into question the law of identity/contradiction/excluded middle. I use valid rules of inference to argue. I present arguments, point out what I think are illegitimate moves, presuppositions, or premises that Gangadean takes for granted.

Still, in assuming these very things, it is my view that Gangadean's more substantive claims (e.g., God's existence, theory of knowledge, the bible as special revelation, the nature of good and evil for man, the existence of the external world, etc) don't follow logically from accepting just the basic distinctions and the laws of thought. What is more, he thinks he is as certain about these matters as he is about very basic truths. But I contend that there are questionable premises and or bad inferences along the way. Some disagreement between us about what counts as basic and or clear of course will crop up now and again (in part, because he has some sort of infallible method in mind about determining what things count as clear and basic). Thus sometimes we won't agree on which things are counted as clear or basic. But what my blog is intended to show is that in effect, Gangadean's more substantive claims don't pass his own test of critical examination.


**
[Note there is a lot more to be said about the topic of assuming basic things/distinctions. For instance, I suspect that Gangadeanians often front-load the term 'assume' in this context to draw all sorts of conclusions. e.g., when they point out that in questioning the law of identity one assumes the law of identity, it isn't obvious what 'assumes' means, here. Is it assumes psychologically--as in I have to think in terms of the law of identity to question it? Dialectically--as in, I have to argue in terms of it in for the sake of discussion? or something like logically? And what does 'logically' mean here? So they really ought to get clearer on what they mean by 'assume' whenever they pull this move. Notice that if it's just psychological or dialetical facts they're talking about, then the normative conclusion they want to draw doesn't seem to follow. Suppose I assume basic distinctions in my questioning of anything---where this means that I am psychologically in a state of assuming basic distinctions in order to question anything. This is just a fact about human psychology. Or suppose we read assume in terms of what must dialetically be presupposed in discussion---this just tells us facts about discourse. But what Gangadean is really after is that reason is ontological. He wants to move from, 'a is a' is assumed in all questioning and so makes questioning possible, to 'a is a' is true out there in the world. So psychological and dialetical accounts seem insufficient for what he is after. Moreover, they are empirical claims---like how do you know that whenever I assert or think about something, I must be in a certain psychological state? Do you have access to my mind?]