> 10,000 Pageviews!

I noticed today that this blog has reached over 10,000 pageviews (10,021 to be exact). Thanks for reading.

It's Not "Clear" that Matter is NOT Eternal.

Gangadean purports to demonstrably prove that matter cannot be eternal. I've noted before how even if he were successful at this, it's not enough to get him to the conclusion that therefore some spirit/mind must be eternal. This is because he helps himself to an unsupported dichotomy in the process.  I suspect when pressed on it, he will try to support it merely on dialectical-historical grounds: "most everyone believes that there are at most two substances in the world". But that's no good. In my mind, this issue alone blocks his purported deduction to the existence of God and undermines his view that it is clear to reason that God exists. It's enough to show that Gangadean fails at what he takes to be so central to life--to show that God's existence is clear to reason.

I've also pointed out before that Gangadean appeals to empirical findings, and the testimony of "expert" scientists in his appeals to entropy to argue that matter cannot be eternal. Sure entropy is often taken for granted by cosmologists, but it's ultimately based on empirical observations, and inductive reasoning. The point is, it is at least possible (in the strict logical sense) that we're actually mistaken that it's an exceptionless law. In fact, physicists say that entropy very probably increases in a closed system and so while Gangadean needs it to be certainly exceptionless, scientists tend not to express such certainty in it (I'm told that the probability that entropy increases in a closed system is only very close to 1). Hence any argument that depends on the entropic principle as something entirely generalizable, and exceptionless is problematic. That is to say, Gangadean can't claim to have proven that matter is not eternal insofar as his argument appeals to entropy as a premise. At best what he could say is that, given our current science, or given what purported experts currently tell us, matter is very likely not eternal. What he should do if he's being consistent is to prove that our current science is correct about entropy, and further that all material systems conform to it (without even the possibility of exception), or that the cosmologists and physicists can't possibly be wrong or lying about their deliberations. Hence some of what I say will touch on what I've already written, but I wanted to further develop my previous thoughts.

Here's the big picture of what is to follow. On numerous occasions, I've charged that Gangadean's worldview is internally inconsistent. One way that he is inconsistent is that he claims that knowledge requires certainty/clarity and you can only arrive at such knowledge in one of two ways: 1) via a sound deductive argument, or 2) by "grasping" (I say, intuiting) a "self-attesting principle". But on occasion, Gangadean loses sight of this--and claims to know things that are neither proven by deductive inference from only indubitable premises, nor "self-attesting". The view that matter is not-self-maintaining and thus can't be eternal, is one such claim. And that's a very serious problem for his worldview.

Starting on pg 53 of his book, Gangadean states that for a thing to be eternal, it must be self-maintaining. But he claims the material world, and universe aren't self-maintaining. Therefore, neither are they eternal. He breaks the argument into three parts, but I must say I'm a little confused. He argues for the following:

1) The material world as a whole is not self-maintaining.
2) The material world in its parts is not self-maintaining.
3) The material universe as a whole is not self-maintaining.

I'm not sure what the material world in contradistinction to the universe is. Maybe the material world = earth? Or our solar system? Galaxy? In philosophy, its common to talk about a world as the entirety of reality. So I'm not quite sure what he's up to. In fact it would seem to make more sense for him to have argued that the material universe as a whole and in its parts is not self-maintaining, since that would cover everything material. In any case, I try to keep his terminology in mind, but it gets a bit confusing.

1) Against the idea that the "material world as a whole" is self-maintaining, he notes that the world is highly differentiated (between hot and cold, wet and dry, etc). I won't press him on this even though one wonders how on his worldview a person could be certain of such empirical facts. Further, he presupposes that the material world (and the physical universe?) follows the exceptionless propensity towards reaching sameness (the second law of thermodynamics). According to Gangadean, that's enough to determine that the material world as a whole is not self-maintaining. And this is where things get bad. He gives us examples from common experience: for instance, a hot coffee cup sitting in room temperature for long enough will instantiate a kind of equilibrium or "sameness". Apart from some of the other epistemological issues I've raised above (and in previous posts), a careful read of the text reveals just how far from "clarity" Gangadean has gotten in trying to argue that the material world is not eternal. Here's a quote.

In general, therefore, there is no reason to believe that the material world is self-maintaining. There is every reason to believe that the material world, governed by the law of entropy, is not self-maintaining (55, italics mine). 

Now Gangadean is full aware that he's resting on scientific theories. They are fallible. They depend on inductive generalizations which are very different things from deductions or Gangadean's purported "self-attesting principles". So instead of saying that he's just proven that the material world is not self-maintaining and instead of saying that he's just proven that the material world is governed uniformly by the law of entropy, he talks about "reasons" for and against the pertinent claims. I hope you see this vital difference. To talk about the presence or absence of reasons, in the current context, is to talk about the currently available evidence. It allows for the possibility that we don't have all the evidence or even the majority of the possible evidence. And if it's at least possible that you don't have all the pertinent evidence, if it's possible that new evidence might come along some day, it means that whatever conclusions you draw on the basis of your current evidence, could be mistaken! What this means is that on Gangadean's conception of clarity (a proposition P is clear to reason if and only if you have determined that the opposite of P is not even possible), it's simply not clear to reason that the world as a whole is not self-maintaining. So at least as this argument is concerned, it's not clear to reason that the world as a whole is not eternal.

2) Gangadean goes on to talk about the universe in it's parts. He talks about the sun for instance presumably as a paradigm part of the universe from which he can generalize (that's an issue I'll talk about later). Here's what he says about the sun.

We can know the sun will burn out without learning this from science. The sun is finite in size, and so are the stars. This is obvious to any casual observer. Anyone who wants to can see this...The sun is giving off heat. Anyone with ordinary sense experience can see this. If the sun is limited in size and giving off heat it cannot do so forever...The sun could not therefore have been burning forever. (53). 

I don't quite get this. I mean, he's skeptical of sense impressions when he criticizes empiricism as a way of knowing things. But now he's suddenly very trustful of ordinary sense impressions (even those of the "abused child in Ubangi Bangi"). I get that he's originally arguing against something like pure-empiricism, the view that all we can know is via our perceptual faculties. You need reason, too. I get that. But then what role is reason playing here? This is where he runs into a Cartesian puzzle. If our senses are not always reliable, if they are fallible, then how can we distinguish between those times when they are trustworthy and when they are not? How can we ever trust our senses without being arbitrary? Again, what role is "reason" playing here to solve the troubles that plague empiricism? He had better answer this before he takes for granted that we could know (with certainty) that the sun is finite in size and giving off heat via mere sense impressions. Plus, there's something odd going on here. It's one thing for us modern folk who purport to know all kinds of things about the sun and about thermodynamics. I say "purport to know" because on Gangadean's definition of knowledge, I doubt that such empirical knowledge is possible. But ignoring that for the moment, I just don't see how Gangadean can claim that "anyone with ordinary sense experience" can know that the sun can't give off heat forever.

You see, Gangadean is resting his case on a generalization that he thinks any thinking person should make. Now, suppose he's right that anybody at any time in history could know with certainty that the sun cannot have been burning forever. Since Gangadean is using this claim to argue that anybody "with ordinary sense impressions" could know the further claim that every part of the material world is not self-maintaining, he's got to think that all rational persons should make the generalization from things like the sun to all parts of the universe. He's got to think that this generalization is truth-conducive. But it's not. It's fallacious. It's a hasty generalization because the material universe is a vast thing comprised of a wide array of things we call "matter". Is it obvious to all thinking persons (at all times) that elementary particles behave like the sun in the relevant respects? Hardly. People at one time didn't even know that fundamental particles existed. Not everything that is true about objects of ordinary experience (medium sized objects) applies to everything in the universe. For instance, things like a table, a house, the sun, an apple all have the property of being visible to the naked eye. It doesn't follow that therefore everything that exists in the universe is visible to the naked eye--consider elementary particles, atoms, cells, and the like. So Gangadean is basically saying that all persons at all times should have made or should make a hasty generalization--but that's no way of coming to know about reality and certainly not a means to achieving certainty. It wasn't in the past, and it isn't now, and it isn't a way of knowing in Ubangi Bangi or anywhere else for that matter.

The other problem is that, even if it weren't a hasty generalization, it's still a generalization which is a form of inductive inference. Inductive generalizations don't provide deductive proof--that's a definitional point. Nor do they provide a "self-attesting" principle (another definitional point). In other words, what we have is that it's simply not clear to reason the universe in all it's parts is not self-maintaining (and hence we can't know with certainty that the universe is not eternal). In sum, it's not clear to reason that the universe in all its parts is not self-maintaining. It wasn't clear to reason in the past, and it isn't currently.

3) Finally, Gangadean attempts to argue that the universe as a whole is not self-maintaining and therefore can't be eternal. He speaks of big bang cosmology as the current view and then discusses problems for a couple of models that maintain both the big bang and the eternality of the universe. The first he refers to as "the Big Bang Oscillating Universe theory" and the second, "the Inflationary theory of the Big Bang". He says that the problems are both empirical and logical. The empirical ones have very limited application--they are problems facing these particular models or at most, particular kinds of models. For instance, of the first kind of theory he writes:

given our current understanding of the cosmos there is not enough mass in the known physical universe to allow gravity to pull the expanding universe back in order for the Big Bang to occur again. This is the problem of dark matter, which has been proposed to be present and yet not detected...No proposal has received general acceptance and the problem persists (54).

Ok, so it's "given our current understanding of the cosmos" that his criticism is supposed to apply. Further, there is not widely accepted theory of dark matter. I must say I don't understand this last bit. Assuming he's right (notice he provides no citation), what does it matter that there isn't a consensus on a particular theory of dark matter? After all, there is hardly any consensus on most philosophical matters like the thesis that God exists, and yet nevertheless he thinks it's true and clear to reason. He goes on to add,

On the face of it, there is no warrant, except the requirement of assumption, for saying the Big Bang will be repeated. Left to itself the universe will come to sameness and die a heat death. It is not self-maintaining. But claims regarding missing mass, like all empirical claims, are technically falsifiable. There is warrant for saying the physical universe as a whole is not self-maintaining. But this warrant based on missing mass, falls short of proof (ibid, italics mine).

Again, Gangadean assumes entropy as exceptionless and we've already discussed why that is not going to help him in his project of proving anything. What I appreciate about this bit though is that Gangadean is finally self-aware. He realizes that this empirically based objection, assuming it's all correct, at best gives one evidence for the claim that the universe is not self-maintaining. He realizes he needs something much stronger. Still, this is only partially correct because once again he's generalizing with haste. That a particular model, namely what he calls the Big Bang Oscillating Universe theory, faces a problem of dark matter doesn't mean that all current and future models of the universe will.

Further, Gangadean writes

Suppose the missing mass were found, and in just the right amounts, there would be a second problem of a different kind which logically encounters the problem of entropy. Since the force pulling the universe in is said to generate the force that will push the universe out again rather than the universe ending as a black hole, at some point the force pulling in would have to equal the force pushing out. At that point equilibrium would be reached and the process of expansion and contraction would come to an end. The universe would reach sameness in entropy. It would not be self-maintaining and therefore it could not be eternal (54). 

At this point, he's making some substantive empirical predictions about cosmology (does he take himself to be a cosmologist now?). For instance, just how does he know with certainty that equilibrium would be reached as a result of expansion and contraction? He's just asserted as much, but why should we believe him? In fact, in principle it isn't the sort of thing that can be proven in the deductive sense. Again it's a prediction made from a particular cosmological model which itself is informed by certain empirically based assumptions. That's no way to proving that the universe cannot even in principle be self-maintaining. So while at the end of the previous quote, he made the self-conscious admission that his problem for a particular model didn't do enough to prove that the universe is not self-maintaing, his second purported problem does no better.

Gangadean closes this bit with the following.

At this point we are beyond empirical claims, on either side of the issue...Logical objections to non-empirical claims must be logically met (ibid). 

Ok, but what are the logical objections? He's given us two empirically loaded objections which do nothing to prove that the universe is not self-maintaing. That's it, so I'm confused.

So much for that, onto the next model that he raises problems for i.e., the Inflationary theory of the Big Bang. This discussion was no less disappointing to me and no more informative. He speaks of Alan Guth's model involving a distinction between a true vacuum and a false vacuum. The details aren't important for our purposes at this point. Suffice it to say, there are problems with the model and Gangadean insists that such a model, despite the window-dressing, ultimately depends on the idea that being (energy) can come from non-being (the true vacuum). He concludes then with the following.

These three reasons--not enough mass, force in would equal force out, and true vacuum to false vacuum as being from non-being--refute the claim that as a whole the physical universe is self maintaining. Neither in general nor in its parts, nor as a whole is it self-maintaining...And it is clear. One has to give up reason to believe that being can come from non-being in the inflationary view of the Big Bang (55).  

Now this is sloppy. Remember at this point he's considered two particular cosmological models and pointed out potential problems for them. Two problems face the first model, but they aren't logical problems that undermine the very coherence of the models. On the contrary, Gangadean has to assume some empirical assumptions (which he just can't know with certainty) in order to raise those very purported problems. So at best they provide Gangadean with some warrant to believe that a particular model (to wit, the Big Bang Oscillating Universe theory) is incorrect. Then he moves on to talk about Guth's model and claims that it posits being from non-being. Suppose Gangadean is right. What has he shown? Well, at best, he's shown that Guth's model doesn't work. That's it. Importantly, that's not the same as proving that the universe is not self-maintaining.

The trouble is Gangadean needs to prove a far more general point for his purposes. He's got to show that it's a logical impossibility that the material universe is self-maintaining. That is to say, that no coherent model of any kind which "represents" a material yet eternal universe could even in principle be discovered or articulated. I don't know how he, or anyone for that matter, could prove a thing like that. Pointing out some problems with a couple very specific models, which depend on certain assumptions (e.g., classical space-time as opposed to quantum mechanics), doesn't show that a self-maintaining universe is an impossibility. That's just a bad inference. Nor does it show that an eternal universe is an impossibility.

Nor is my point an "appeal to unknown" as the Gangadeanian might be tempted to say. As best as I can understand such a "fallacy", it simply doesn't apply when dealing with Gangadean. This is because it's Gangadean that claims that it is clear to reason that matter is not eternal, and that means he has to be able to demonstrate that it's not even in principle possible that matter is eternal--which means it's not even possible that a coherent model of an eternal or self-maintaining material cosmos could ever be developed. I'm just asking him to make good on his own project. That's not an appeal to unknown or if it is, I can't see why it would be a bad thing.

Nor is my point to adjudicate between particular models in cosmology. I doubt that most of us are qualified to do so since they are sophisticated mathematical models that make predictions of phenomena that the layman generally don't have access to (which presents a problem for Gangadean itself). Instead, Gangadean makes my job way easier because he holds everyone to such a ludicrous standard of knowledge. Hence, for our purposes, it's enough to point out that Gangadean has no way of proving that all and every model of the cosmos where the universe is self-maintaining or eternal, is incorrect.

Importantly, my main point is that Gangadean hasn't shown that it is "clear to reason" that material universe is not self-maintaining (neither in general, nor in its parts, nor as a whole). That means he hasn't proven that the material universe is not eternal. This means it's not clear to reason that material monism is false and so it's not clear to reason that God exists.


Postscript:

It just occurred to me that the kind of clarity that Gangadean is arguing for (that matter can't possibly be eternal) is also something that's supposed to be knowable to all persons and at all times. Assume for the sake of discussion that 2nd law of thermodynamics is infallible grounds for believing that the universe cannot be self-maintaining. Still, could a person living long before the discovery and articulation of the second law of thermodynamics (prior to the late 1800's) have known that entropy uniformly increases in a closed system? Of course not. It took a particular kind of development in the sophistication of science and empirical testing for us to get to that point. Insofar as knowing that God exists requires that one rule out the possibility of an eternal material cosmos (which is what Gangadean claims), I can't see how God's existence is clear or knowable to persons that couldn't know (with certainty) about entropy. This too seems to be a serious problem for Gangadean's clarity thesis.

Gangadeanian Instructors: A Conflict of Interest?

Gangadeanians are found throughout the valley in the capacity of instructors in various public and private institutions (at both secondary and post-secondary levels). It is primarily how most members and attendees of the church ended up at Westminster Fellowship (hereafter WF). I'm no exception. Along with a couple of friends, I took a number of classes taught by a Gangadeanian and this played a significant role in our eventual introduction to Gangadean's church. Inspired by some recent events, I've started wondering what happens when students, who attend Gangadean's church continue to take classes under a Gangadeanian. Are there any potential worries about relationship dynamics and conflicts of interest? That's what I want to explore.

Not only is a large portion of the congregation comprised of those that took classes with a Gangadeanian, but also current members of the church are encouraged to continue taking a set of classes taught by other Gangadeanians in the name of "laying a foundation". This set of courses, comprised something like a core introduction to philosophy as Gangadean saw things.

Now as I mentioned, some friends and I, had taken classes with a Gangadeanian and this played a role in our eventually attending the church. This same instructor eventually became our "small group leader" at the church and also a personal friend. But what's interesting is that my peers and I continued to take classes under this person even after our relationship with the instructor had changed to be of a more personal nature. It wasn't only that, but a number of other members of the church also enrolled in these classes and for a while, Gangadeanians were everywhere. Now to be clear, I'm not suggesting any foul play in our particular situation. I have no reason to think that this instructor "took it easy on us" in anyway. As far as I can tell, he held us to the very same standards to which he held others students.

But now that I'm an instructor, I've come to appreciate the complexities of the dynamics between students and teachers in a new way. And I think and worry about potential abuses of relationship dynamics. It hadn't occurred to me at the time that there was any issue. Partly, this is to the credit of the instructor I have in mind because again there was no discernible preferential treatment given to those he knew personally. Still a general worry comes to mind. The question is this: is it appropriate for say a professor to have friends take the very classes that they teach? Or what about members of their church? What about members of their church over which they exercise a certain amount of authority? I'm not worried about cases of auditing. Or of "sitting in" on lectures. But when grades are being assigned and when degrees are being pursued and when on occasion, the professor has a stake in filling up their roster (say in order to teach a summer or winter section for supplemental income, which needs sufficient enrollment for fear of cancellation). I think things have at least the potential to go awry. There are complex relationship dynamics at play.

I don't know whether universities have official policies concerning these matters. Often policies are geared towards dealing with romantic relationships and these vary from school to school. But I would think that some of the same worries which encourage schools to have policies against faculty dating their students, would apply to various other personal relationships.

Current social science tells us that implicit bias is real. We act in accordance with biases without even knowing that we are, without even knowing we've got those biases. It's for this reason that many instructors employ safeguards like having students write ID numbers instead of names on their assignments to keep them somewhat anonymous. Lately, I've been trying to remain well fed throughout the grading process as well as take frequent breaks, because blood sugar levels and fatigue are thought to affect our moods and our moods affect grading even when we aren't aware of it. I'm not sure what would happen if I were grading my friend's assignments and I have no intention of every putting myself in that position. Even anonymous grading has it's limitations because at some point you've got to enter grades into a roster which no longer ensures the anonymity of your students. I've never actually taught my friends or people that I know outside of school, so I don't know what it is like, but I try to keep a certain amount of distance from my students due to concerns like these at least while they are my students.

I suspect things get even trickier when a church like WF is involved, where the leaders of the church are also professors. Not only we dealing with friendships between instructor and student, but in some cases the instructor also exercises a kind of authority over the student in a different domain.

Nor are my worries simply about grades. Students review their professors via course evaluations which play a role in job promotions (e.g., renewed contracts and tenure). When some of your students are members of your church (wherein you exercise a particular degree of authority), when some of your students are your friends, then they have a vested interested in your vocational success whether it is merited or not. Again there are worries of at least implicit bias. I'd be lying if I said that at the time, I didn't want my professor who had become my friend a sort of spiritual mentor, to succeed in his profession. Of course I did.

Earlier, I hinted at another worry about how congregants of WF might feel pressured to take classes taught by other Gangadeanians. In some cases, instructors have a financial and vocational interest in filling up their rosters (e.g. classes are cancelled if there is insufficient enrollment). But a related worry has to do with potential influence in the other direction. I wonder to what extent at least some students might feel pressured to pursue attendance at Gangadean's church so as to remain in the instructor's good graces relative to their coursework. The long and short of it is that some students suck up in rather peculiar ways. Some of them suck up without even knowing that they are. I want to tread carefully here. Again, the instructor that I encountered never used class time to invite students to church. Even if the content that he taught was essentially the core of what was taught at his church. In fact, Gangadeanians tend to be quite secretive about their church affiliation. By the same token, most of the congregation is made up of people that once took classes taught by a Gangadeanian. There's a causal link, but that in an of itself isn't enough to worry about. Reflecting on my own experience, I realize that I had heard about the church and the Gangadeanian instructor's affiliation with it ahead of time. I enrolled in his class because I was curious. I noticed that there were a handful of students that the instructor seemed familiar with--they would crowd his desk after each lecture (I would later learn that they were all congregants of the church). I became friendly with them and eventually friendly with the instructor. At some point, I asked about the church and the rest is history. Again I don't suspect any foul play on behalf of the instructor in my own story. I just think there was real potential for things going badly and for motives getting mixed up. But so what if a non-negligible number of students end up going to WF and the classes play a causal role? Instructors advertise various student clubs, conferences, talks and the like in the classroom, all of the time. And presumably some students feel some pressure to attend them or do so in order to butter the teachers up. In these cases, perhaps the (adult) students bear the blame. By the same token, there are disanalogies. The stakes and potential costs of attending a church like WF are quite high. The social practices of the congregation are controversial and I dare say potentially harmful to people, while I suspect that attending a student club meeting or a one-off colloquium is normally not like this. More importantly, these potential costs aren't limited to the domain of personal relationships. That brings me to my last point.

What happens when a student of a Gangadeanian that is also attending the church leaves the congregation for one reason or another? A congregant might leave voluntarily, or leave because they are forced to as in my case or they might even be excommunicated by the congregation. In the rare case of excommunication (which is instituted in cases of certain forms of unrepentant sin), church congregants are prohibited from having any contact with the subject of excommunication. In my case though, since our differences were merely intellectual, I was asked to no longer attend the church and my contact with congregants was severely restricted. Leaving the congregation in any form is a tricky matter as it concerns your relationships with other members and that's going to include the ones that are instructors. Few persons have successfully exited while maintaing friendships with current attendees. At least if you're excommunicated, no such relationship maintenance is possible. If you're simply asked to leave as in my case, its exceeding difficult though not impossible (provided you don't start a blog like mine).

Now suppose a student has been working closely with a Gangadeanian instructor say in writing a thesis or what have you. Or they hope for a letter of recommendation for a job or graduate school from this instructor because they have worked closely with them in the past. Now if the student were to leave the congregation, I would think this would pose some difficult terrain to navigate. The issues would obviously be more pronounced if the student was asked to leave the congregation or worse, excommunicated. I don't see how the instructor and student relationship would be very hospitable particularly in the latter two cases. Further, if the instructor is playing a significant role in their project, and it's late enough in the game, then switching to another advisor is not going to be a live option. More importantly, it seems like this is just something a student shouldn't have to deal with. The student shouldn't feel worried about having to look for another advisor or a different professor for a letter of recommendation for instance, because they have some intellectual disagreements at church.

This is not my story. It's just that it very well could have been. I was completing my M.A. and applying to Ph.D programs, when I was asked to leave the congregation. Admission into doctorate programs in philosophy are incredible hard to come by. Among the many elements that constitute your application, your writing sample and letters of recommendation from faculty are what matter the most. Normally, your letter writers are just those professors that you have worked closely with on your writing sample and research. This is because the letters that matter have to be incredibly specific about not only what you are like as a student (and how you compare to other students), but also delve into your actual research project and why it's an important contribution to the field. In other words, they have to be personally vested in your project and know it well, otherwise those letters won't be doing you any favors and will probably hurt your already slim chances.

Now if, at the time of my intellectual conflict with Gangadean, I had a Gangadeanian as an advisor on my thesis/writing sample, and also a letter writer (in fact, I knew of students that did on both counts), things might have been quite difficult for me. If the instructor's church holds the official position that you "deny reason" so much so that you have to leave the congregation, would you have much confidence in a member of that very church, writing a letter for you as you try to get into a graduate program in philosophy? Keeping in mind that the instructor agrees with the church's evaluation of you. Again, advisors and letter writers are not interchangeable. Nor are they bound by any sort of contract with you. You work closely with only a few professors throughout your career. If things get awkward, or hostile between you, or if the professor chooses to no longer work with you for whatever reason, you're out of luck. You can't simply ask some professor that you've taken a class or two with, for a letter at the last minute. It doesn't work that way. I was lucky that this wasn't my situation in that I didn't have a Gangadeanian on my committee. But again, it easily could have happened. In fact, early on during my Masters I had considered it (it was sort of a norm at the church) and a Ganagdeanian was my primary advisor for my undergraduate thesis. Further as I mentioned, a number of students at the church had a Gangadeanian as part of their thesis committee even at the graduate level. My point is, there's a real potential for a conflict of interest and ultimately harm being done to a student given the dynamics that Gangadean's church introduces in particular.

I'm not suggesting that the Gangadeanian instructors would knowingly "have it out" for such students who leave their congregation. I think they are generally good natured people despite their erroneous views and they take their vocations quite seriously. But again there are worries of at least implicit bias. In my experience, Gangadeanians have a very difficult time separating attacks against their worldview with attacks against them as people. Philosophical disagreement or criticism is someimtes perceived by them as "antagonistic". And my guess is they are no better than anyone else at dealing with perceived personal attacks. So if I had been working closely with a Gangadeanian when our conflict emerged, as a student, I honestly would have felt stuck between a rock and a hard place. I would have felt like everything that I worked so hard for was being threatened because I disagreed with Gangadean about some philosophical issues (at church) and that I was damned if I sought a new recommender and advisor, and I was damned if I didn't.

There are a number of issues that arise when you consider the complicated dynamics of a relationship between a student and instructor where the two share a personal relationship outside of school. To be fair, at least in graduate school, such outside-of classroom interactions are fairly common. The line between professional and personal relationships gets blurry. However, I wonder to what extent a common church affiliation in general adds further complexities to the dynamic. Or what about when the instructor has some extra-academic authority over the student as is sometimes the case in a church setting. To be fair, these worries seem to generalize. They aren't merely about situations where an instructor and student belong to the same religious organization. It could be that a student and instructor belong to the same country club, Beyonce fan club, or even a chapter of the Secular Free Thought Society since power dynamics and hierarchies are also found there. Consequently, some of the same dynamics that are cause for pause in the church context might very well apply to those cases too. They are still worries, but not merely those concerning Gangadeanian instructors.

At the same time, I don't want to ignore some of the peculiarities of the Gangadeanian instructor and student relationship either. As I said before, Westminster Fellowship encourages its congregants to take classes taught by other congregants. And many congregants are former or current students of a Gangadeanian instructor. This is because the core doctrines of the church are philosophical theories and so there's considerable overlap between church and school. Sometimes the congregants work closely with other congregants in an academic advisor-mentee setting. Furthermore, church members that are also students can be asked to leave the church due to intellectual differences. In other cases, they may even be excommunicated where any substantive interaction with the excommunicated party is prohibited for current congregants. These dynamics add unique worries in my mind. Shouldn't a school, at the very least, a public institution worry about these issues and take precautions to protect their students? What might those precautions look like?

None of this is meant to be an attack on anybody. I think they are legitimate albeit complicated issues that it would be good to open a dialogue about. I'm curious what my readers think.

A Maverick on the proof of God's Existence.

On occasion, I visit Maverick Philosopher a blog by a philosopher named Bill Vallicella. Though I've never met him or interacted with him personally, we have a mutual friend and as a result I've known about his blog for a number of years. While I don't agree with everything he says, in particular, as it concerns politics, he always gets me thinking and his philosophical posts are legit.

Anyway, he has a few recent articles about why he thinks God's existence can't be proven (just as God's existence can't be disproven). Here is the latest. We seem to share some of the same convictions in that neither of us find this problematic for the Theist in terms of the rationality of being a Theist (and the same goes for a nontheist in their nontheism). Now when Vallicella speaks of 'demonstrative knowledge' to say that we can't have that kind of knowledge as it pertains to God's existence, he seems to mean what Gangadean means by 'knowledge' and 'clear to reason'. His posts might be a bit less accessible to those that aren't used to reading academic philosophy. But if you're up for the challenge, I think it might be worth a look.

Interestingly, it seems he's engaged with a Gangadeanian on the matter of the proof of God's existence here and in the comments section of this one. As one would expect, it didn't take long for the Gangadeanian to pull the standard, "can we prove that something must be eternal?" card. To which Vallicella responded, "What you are saying is too vague to evaluate."

Finally, I like what he adds towards the end of this one.

"those who hanker after proofs of God...or the opposite are insufficiently mature to live with doxastic insecurity."

('doxastic' = pertaining to beliefs). 

What the FAQ?

This isn't a true FAQ because I don't often get these questions from my readers. Still, I continue to hear a small set of mistaken objections from team-Gangadean which indicates to me that they haven't taken much care to understand my views and as a result they keep punching at a scarecrow. I've dedicated entire articles to many of these points, but this is sort of a quick point of reference. I also think it's helpful to see all of these points together within the context of an imagined conversation. It's also just a start. I imagine that I will continue adding to it. If you have any specific questions of this sort, feel free to comment or email me.

1. Are you a skeptic? 

If we understand a skeptic as one that denies the very possibility of knowledge, then my simple answer is No, I'm not a skeptic. But some nuancing at this point is warranted. I find that Gangadeanians often equivocate on the word 'knowledge' (and cognates) in order to strawman my position. Remember, between Gangadean and me, there are at least two notions of knowledge at play, but his camp tends to speak as if everyone uses the word in the way that Gangadean does. So when they say that I am a skeptic because I deny the very possibility of knowledge, they've got in mind Gangadean's account of knowledge. Roughly, Gangadean thinks that knowledge entails epistemic certainty. He's an infallibilist (and an internalist) about knowledge which means that knowing P requires (among other things) that it's impossible for you to be wrong about P (or that you've determined that it's impossible for P to be false). So as it concerns his account of 'knowledge', I lean towards skepticism. I'm still not a full-blown skeptic even on his definition of knowledge because I think it's at least possible that such certainty could be achieved, but importantly, Gangadean hasn't shown us a consistent way of achieving it. Notice on Gangadean's account of knowledge, most philosophers and probably most people, count as skeptics or at least lean towards skepticism like me. So when they apply that label to me, it's no cause for worry once we've made explicit what it means from the mouth of a Gangadeanian. On the other hand, if we think that knowledge doesn't require infallibility and certainty (even if it requires justification, truth and belief), then I'm far from a skeptic. In fact, I take myself and everyone else to know all kinds of things. In short, it largely depends on what you mean by knowledge and thus what you mean by a skeptic. One thing I do argue is that if Gangadean is being honest and consistent, he ought to be a skeptic by his own lights.

2. Given that you guys disagree about the definition of knowledge, isn't it just your word against his?

Well, if so, then that alone would undermine his project since he demands that his most basic beliefs are such that they can't possibly be false and that they be determined to be so (given his internalism). If we actually have no way of determining for instance, which theory of knowledge is preferable, then that would do considerable damage to Gangadean's project of showing that basic things are "clear to reason." Furthermore, I think there is much more to say in favor of my fallibilist view (actually it's the standard view in philosophy) than there is as it concerns his view. Of course, if the best we can do at this point is compare the pro's and con's of each theory against one another (no doubt a fallible process), then that too threatens Gangadean's project to show that basic things are clear to reason. Either way, it's a problem for him and not me (because I don't care about certainty) which is why the burden of proof rests squarely on his shoulders.

3. Wait so are you certain that certainty is not possible and isn't that self-undermining or self-referentially absurd?

That would (intuitively) be a self-referentially absurd position. Fortunately, I don't claim to be certain that certainty is not possible. To harbor and express doubts about Gangadean's claims to certainty doesn't mean that I am certain that certainty is not possible or even that I doubt in the possibility of certainty per se. You've got to be careful to resist the false dichotomy that the Gangadeanians are often guilty of. Now it turns out that I'm very doubtful, but at least open to the possibility that humans can achieve something like epistemic certainty. But the point is, even if such certainty is in fact possible, it doesn't follow that Gangadean's "rational presuppositionalism" is the way to it and indeed I argue that it's not.

4. Do you deny reason? 

Well, according to Gangadean, I do, but that's just because Gangadean has basically stipulated a theory of reason so that anybody that disagrees with his views counts as denying reason. I'm always curious how so much of his book is dedicated to telling all of us just what reason (in itself, in it's use and in us) is, without ever explaining to us how he knows so much about reason and why we should take his word for it. It's very easy to come up with taxonomies of this sort because they amount to nothing more than mere assertions. The more difficult question which he doesn't ever bother to tackle is why we should think he's correct.

Now as far as I'm concerned, his worldview at its core is internally inconsistent or based on poor reasoning. For instance, he appeals to a false dichotomy in his argument for God's existence, he appeals to scientific findings and induction to "deductively prove" that matter is not eternal all the while arguing for a skepticism about empirical knowledge, he begs the question against the atheist in giving his theodicy, he decries the use of unjustified presumptions, common sense and intuitions while using them himself and he has one of the worst arguments I've seen for the existence of an external world. To me, intuitively, using reason minimally requires avoiding inconsistencies and poor argumentation. The difference between me and Gangadean is that I don't pretend to have some special access to the very nature of reason so my claims about reason are tentative and open to revision. I'm guessing most of my readers (including Gangadeanians) will agree that inconsistency and poor reasoning are contrary to reason and that's enough for my point. Thus on that sort of minimal picture of reason, Gangadean seems to be the one denying reason. Remember, I don't just assert this, I show it throughout this blog.

5. Do you deny the Aristotelian "laws of thought"? 

No, at least if by 'denying' you mean that I believe them to be false. I sometimes don't know what to think of the law of excluded middle to be honest due to the problem of vague predicates, but at least as it concerns the law of identity and the law of non-contradiction, I am quite sure that they are true and exceptionless. By the same token, I wouldn't bet my life on that either, which indicates that my subjective confidence in them is something less than absolute. This is because to the best of my self-knowledge, they are the sorts of propositions which I believe on the basis of an intellectual seeming that is to say, I think about them and they just strike me as true (note, I don't really know what Gangadean means when he claims they are "self-attesting" so I won't go there). This best describes what I take to be why I believe in them i.e., my epistemic relation to the laws of thought. It isn't anything like proof. It's intuition.

So to be clear, I believe them, am fairly confident in them, but I don't take myself to have epistemic certainty with respect to them which is why my subjective confidence is less than absolute. In practice, if I ever encounter a theory or argument that in some way suggests that these laws are false or with exception, then I'm going to be skeptical of the theory or argument. By the same token, if some magic genie were to offer me a wager so that if these "laws of thought" are categorically true, I win 100 bucks, and if there is at least one exception, then I die an agonizing death, I would turn down that bet, even though I'd like 100 bucks as much as the next person. Of course, the crucial point here isn't merely about my betting dispositions, or of my subjective confidence in the laws of thought. As far as I can tell, Gangadean conflates subjective certainty with epistemic certainty as if the former entails the latter, but the two are distinct (you can for instance accept a deductive argument for a conclusion as sound, and nevertheless not feel sure about the conclusion). To reiterate, my point is that the reason I don't feel subjectively certain is at least in part, because I believe or affirm the laws of thought on the basis of intuition or because they "strike" me as true rather than because I've got anything like proof. Sure I can't imagine how they might turn out false, but it's at least possible that this is merely a limitation of my imagination. So it's straight up false that I deny the laws of thought. Gangadeanians are rather sloppy when they accuse me of denying the laws of thought. They sometimes get away with this because according to them you either wholeheartedly, with epistemic and subjective certainty, affirm the laws of thought or else you deny them and there's no more to the story. But what I'm suggesting is that this is a false dichotomy. See next question.

6. So it seems like you affirm the laws of thought after all.  

Well, 'affirm' is another loaded expression for Gangadean. I agree or believe that the laws of thought are true (again a bit less with the law of excluded middle even though I tend to think it's right). I even take myself to know that they are, but again I wouldn't bet my life on them. The way I see it, there are many ways to affirm a proposition. The way Gangadean sets things up you either affirm something or you don't where affirming amounts to knowing it infallibly and/or with epistemic certainty. And he get's a lot of mileage out of this false dichotomy against his critics. But I think affirming a proposition is a much more complicated mental state or attitude. For instance, I affirm the proposition that I exist, differently than I do the proposition that I won't be hit by a meteor in the next hour. I affirm them both and I believe both of them. But I believe and affirm them for different reasons or via difference processes for example, the former I know via intuition and the second I know via induction. As a result, if I were forced to gamble on either of them, I'd wager much more (and at worse odds) with the former than the latter. In other words, I believe and affirm one more than the other or I am more confident in one than the other. But make no mistake, I affirm them both.

Now for Gangadean, affirming P = being fully certain that P and you should be wiling to bet the farm on P (at least if you're being rational). So on that fleshing out of 'affirm', I don't affirm the laws of thought. But on a more reasonable and common understanding of 'affirm' where one can affirm P by believing it (and to varying degrees), I do affirm them. In fact, I affirm them with a significant degree of confidence, and take myself to know that they are true, even if I wouldn't bet my life on them and even if I don't claim that they are clear in the sense that I've somehow determined that it is simply impossible for them to be false.

***But some of this is besides the point. On this blog, I rarely talk about my own views on the matter. I'm not here to build a systematic worldview like Gangadean purports to. Instead, for the time being, I'm interested in whether or not Gangadean's system is internally consistent. For instance, has he shown us that the "basic things" are "clear to reason" or does he cheat by relying on intuitions and presumptive principles all the while failing to acknowledge that he is doing so? And is his account ultimately informative or does it trade on unclear notions? Thought of in these terms, it simply doesn't matter what my actual view is about the laws of thought. This is because I don't ever use their denial as a premise in anything that I say. Nor do I ever use as a premise, the possibility that they are false. This is an important point. Think about a person that raises the problem of evil against the coherence of Theism. It really doesn't matter one lick whether such a person is actually a theist or an atheist. What matters is that they assume for the purposes of discussion that God exists and then considers what we would expect to follow from that. In much the same way my arguments often proceed by granting Gangadean key assumptions which include the laws of thought.

What's primarily at issue is how it is that Gangadean claims to know basic things with the sort of certainty he demands. He offers us a proposal, or tells a story about reason and "transcendental" or "self-attesting" principles. In response, one can question the legitimacy and/or coherence of this story without questioning the truth of the principles themselves (e.g., the laws of thought). I can question whether an empiricist has a coherent story about how we know that an external world exists, without actually questioning whether the external world exists. If you're starting to think to yourself, "oh so you do admit that we have to assume the laws of thought to engage in discussion" then you're missing much of what I'm saying and should probably re-read this document from the beginning.

There's a subtle yet significant distinction here. The way that Gangadean has set things up, either his method or approach ultimately succeeds or else we're all doomed to be skeptics. Hence, according to Gangadean if you question his proposed method of inquiry, you automatically question the conclusions. Stated another way, when you question the coherence and informativeness of his proposed method of how we know the laws of thought, you thereby question the laws of thought themselves. But this is a serious mistake and much of the Gangdeanians' characterization of my views rests on this error.


7. What about Gangadean's claim that the laws of thought don't need to be proven because they make thought possible?

Yeah I hear this on occasion. At least two problems arise. First, how does Gangadean (or anyone for that matter) come to know when something makes thought possible? Take for instance, the law of identity (a is a). What's the process by which one can come to know (with certainty) that it makes thought possible? Secondly, how can we determine that such a process is veridical? To the first of these questions: well, we've already ruled out that it's some sort of deduction. And it wouldn't help Gangadean if it was some empirical process or inductive generalization because that would preclude certainty. So I guess it's got to be that you just sit and reflect from your arm-chair and think about the thoughts you're having. But the problem remains: by what means does he ascertain that all thoughts share this feature namely, that they all assume or require the assumption of the law of identity? Now it seems to me that the correct answer is that "you just do." It's immediate. You just "see" it as such. It's a bit like recognizing that two distinct notes have just been played on a piano. Or the means by which you know that you're currently having at least one thought. Or how you know when you're hungry or that your arm itches rather than tickles. If this is right, then Gangadean must himself employ intuitions to get his system off the ground (I say more about why this is problematic for him below). Oddly, Gangadean just never bothers to address this question. Now suppose it's intuition or some sort of immediate process. The second question is how we can know that such a process is veridical. If you're like me, then you just take it as a presumption that is to say, it's assumed veridical until proven otherwise. Importantly though that allows for the possibility that it could be unreliable and that precludes certainty/clarity so I don't see how Gangadean could consistently adopt such a view even though I actually think he does.

The second problem is this: how does one go about supporting the claim that whatever makes thought possible cannot be questioned? There's really no supporting such a principle. It's merely asserted and again it just supposed to strike you as somehow obvious. Here too, I think intuitions or immediate non-inferential assent is at play, but Gangadean won't admit as much.

8. You sometimes accuse Gangadean of employing intuitions. But don't you do the same and isn't there something self-undermining about that?

Yes, I think that Gangadean must accept immediately known, non inferential, claims. And yes by all means, I do too. I suspect philosophy or any inquiry for that matter couldn't begin or continue without certain claims that we ascertain on the basis of intuition. Now it would be inconsistent if I faulted someone simply for employing intuitions while I do the same, but that's not quite the situation with Gangadean. I'm faulting someone who, on the one hand, denies the reliability of intuition and then on the other actually depends on his intuitions to do so. He insists that appealing to our intuitions is a questionable practice and is opposed to the use of reason (see pg. 18 of his book). I think this is an extreme and mistaken view. But then to see that Gangadean actually depends on intuitions (e.g., his apprehending when a proposition is self-attesting, or his apprehending when a statement violates the law of non-contradiction, or his apprehending his own existence) to get his whole worldview off the ground. On pain of inconsistency, he's got to allow that intuitions are actually acceptable (which opens up the possibility that we can know all kinds of things on the basis of intuition) or else he's got to show he doesn't use intuitions. A third option might be for him to distinguish between different types of intuitions (he attempted this once with me in conversation), but he's got to provide a means of distinguishing between the various kinds as well as independently motivate the distinction. Of course, there's more to the story. He also helps himself to plenty of presumptions (basically assumptions that are taken as innocent until proven guilty) like for instance, that he's got a sufficient grasp of the meanings of the words he employs, that whenever he evaluates an argument, his memory is being faithful in preserving content and the like. So intuitions and presumptions pervade his worldview which threatens its overall coherence.

9. So let's say that Gangadean uses intuitions after all, what other problem follows? 

Again that would be in tension with what he explicitly says about the unreliability of intuitions in his book. But more specifically, one further worry is that his criticisms of say people who believe in God on the basis of intuition (those he refers to as "popular Christians"), are not going to have any bite. If Gangadean in fact employs intuitions to know things, even very basic things, then it's hard to see why others can't rationally do the same with other beliefs. To be sure, I'm not suggesting that we should favor mere intuition mongering, I'm just saying that since Gangadean actually employs intuitions, he can't condemn others for doing the same.

10. Do you think that we can only know things on the basis of deductive proof? 

Not at all. I think we can know things on the basis of perception, intuition, memory, testimony, induction (and abduction). Deduction is just another way to come to know things. I sometimes press the point that we can prove very few substantive claims via deduction alone, as a criticism against Gangadean only because deduction plays such a central role in his worldview. For example, he claims that a theist must deductively prove that God exists in order to rationally believe that God exists and he even thinks we have to prove the existence of an external world against the skeptic! Sometimes it seems like he wants to include intuitions as a way of coming to know basic things. For instance, in his book (pg. 36-38) he talks about knowing by way of the "first and second acts of reason" and distinguishes this from coming to know things by way of argument (the "third act of reason"). Ignoring for a moment the thorny question about the legitimacy of this seemingly arbitrary taxonomy, I think he's really just talking about intuition. However, instead he introduces rather opaque notions like "transcendental" or "self-evident" principles (those which don't require deductive arguments) as a way of avoiding the admission that he uses intuitions like the rest of us.

11. So, on your view, is nothing clear to reason? 

Again, I don't claim to be certain of this, but I suspect that there is nothing that is clear to reason in the sense that Gangadean claims. 'Clear to reason' is yet another loaded expression used by Gangadean. He means by it something like, "knowable with absolute epistemic certainty via pure thought." Importantly my denial of this doesn't make me a skeptic. Remember, I think we can know all kinds of things, even "basic" things. I'm just much more laxed about what it takes to know things. Moreover, I'm not opposed to the idea that we can know things from the arm-chair or a priori. I think we can know (even if this doesn't mean we're absolutely certain) that Vixens are female foxes, that there are no squaure-circles and that all bachelors are unmarried. As long as we've got a sufficient grasp of the relevant words or concepts we can know each of those claims to be true just by thinking. Hence, if we construe "being clear to reason" as that which can be known via thinking alone (where knowledge doesn't require certainty), then I agree that some claims are clear to reason. But that's just not enough for Gangadean because he disagrees with my account of knowledge and as a result about what it means for something to be "clear to reason". So in a sense I think some things are clear to reason, but just not in the sense that Gangadean demands.

12. But do your views undermine the intelligibility and possibility of thought, talk, and philosophical discourse?

I honestly have no idea why Gangadean and/or his followers insists that this is so. I've repeatedly responded to this both on this blog and in conversations with his followers. As I've said before, Gangadean presupposes that meaningful thought, talk and discourse requires absolute certainty concerning "basic things". But he never gives anybody a single reason to accept this assumption. As far as I can tell, it's just because he says so. Hence, my answer is no--my views don't undermine the possibility or intelligibility of any and all thought and talk. There's just no basis for that conclusion.

13. But Gangadean and his followers often speak as if the denial of clarity at the basic level will yield disastrous consequences like skepticism, meaninglessness or nihilism. What do you think?

Gangadeanians accept this line of reasoning as gospel, but I've never heard one of them questioning it. I think it just strikes them as intuitive or obvious. But what I was hinting at above is that there's no reason given for us to accept this and there should be because it's just an assertion or proposal. Now suppose that we can't have the kind of certainty that Gangadean says we need and can have. What is supposed to follow from that? As I mentioned earlier, on my view of knowledge, we can still know things because knowledge doesn't require certainty in the first place. We can also form rational beliefs because forming rational beliefs doesn't require certainty. Insofar as philosophy and inquiry in general is about coming to form rational beliefs about the world and to gain knowledge, the lack of clarity at the basic level does absolutely nothing to undermine the intelligibility and even fruitfulness of any of those pursuits.

14. Sometimes you question whether we can be certain of the very definition of even the words we use. But isn't it a contradiction to question the definition of words all the while hoping to communicate something to your readers using words. 

This is also a misconstrual of my views. I submit that it doesn't look like we can have the kind of certainty that Gangadean demands about the very meaning of the words we use because he thinks we can only have that kind of certainty via deduction or "self-attesting" principles. But ascertaining the meanings of words in a given language isn't a matter of thinking through deductive arguments and there are no self-attesting principles to consider, here. It's an a posteriori process that provides nothing like infallible beliefs. Importantly though, this fact shouldn't bother anybody but Gangadean and his followers. As I noted before, Gangadean merely assumes that we need certainty about basic things (including the meaning of words in a given language). But he gives us no reason to accept this assumption. On my view, we are rational to adopt presumptive meanings of words. Further, we can have rational beliefs about the meaning of words, and we can even know the meanings of words we use. So there's no problem with my reliance on my understanding the meanings of lexical items, in my expressing my thoughts to others. If you and I can have rational beliefs and even knowledge about what words mean (even if we can't have certainty), then why would it be problematic for us to use words in discourse? Problems only arise if we demand certainty in the way that Gangadean does.

15. Gangadeanians often talk about the need for common ground. Without it, they insist that all conversation will be pointless or meaningless. What do you think?

Again we've got another loaded expression (are you starting to see a pattern?). On one reading of "common ground" (Gangadean's) I simply disagree and on another, which I think is the more widely accepted notion, I agree. Gangadean seems to think that a set of propositions will count as common ground between two parties if and only if both parties are epistemically certain about (i.e., know infallibly) each proposition. That is, both parties must affirm or know each of the common ground propositions with certainty, presumably the "basic things". But I see no reason ever given in support of this view. It seems like Gangadean has a list of various activities that only make sense if there is clarity or certainty at the basic level. Unfortunately, he never cares to justify the connection. Just why do we need clarity at the basic level to think, talk, form rational beliefs, know, and have discussions?

On another (more common) reading of "common ground" I agree that conversations will be pointless or at least incredibly frustrating and near fruitless without it. On this interpretation, for two people to share a common ground just requires that they agree to not call into serious question a certain set of propositions for the time being. So suppose I present you with an argument. Further suppose you disbelieve the premises and I know that. Being fully aware of your incredulity concerning the premises, I ask you simply if the argument is valid by your lights. At this point, I've just set up a context where it'll be in someway inappropriate for you to keep harping on the truth or falsity of the premises. This is because validity has nothing to do with the truth of the premises. In fact, at least insofar as you want to engage with my project, what you'd probably do is imagine that the premises are true (i.e., grant me the truth of the premises) and then consider whether the conclusion must follow. In that case, we've got common ground (the premises among other things). Of course, you are free to shift the context just as I am free to cooperate or resist. You might say, "ok, we've determined that the argument is valid, but what you should really be worried about is whether the premises are true." In which case, now the premises are not part of the "common ground" between us. At this point our conversation will only be fruitful so long as there are other common ground propositions that we at least both assume to be true for the sake of discussion.

Notice that none of this requires that you and I both know with certainty a set of propositions. It doesn't even require that we believe them. All that's needed is an agreement (often tacit) that we'll grant each other a certain set of background beliefs, vocabulary, and premises if you will, so that we can successfully navigate towards a conversational goal. On this account of "common ground" I think discourse would be pointless without it.

Now one thing to note is that Gangadean and I have at least this second kind of common ground so that discussions between us can in fact be fruitful. This is instanced when I grant him certain premises or claims and then show that they ultimately lead to bad results or inconsistencies. But Gangadean discontinued discussions with me only because he demanded the first kind of common ground (his very high standard). For whatever reason, he thinks that we have to both know, infallibly, a set of propositions in order for any further discussion to be meaningful. Again, I see no reason to accept this. In fact, I've even pointed out before that there's room for skepticism regarding one's self-knowledge, given Gangadean's standards (how does Gangadean know that he knows basic things?) and this certainly extends to determining what your conversation partner knows (how does Gangadean know what I know or don't know?). I suspect he and his people have ended many discussions of this sort on such a faulty assumption. Of course, they are free to choose their conversation partners, that's not at issue. What is at issue is the rationality of refusing to answer their critics for lacking only the first kind of common ground (Gangadean's) at least insofar as they claim to lead the examined life. But again I see no reason to accept his account of common ground as the important one in relation to philosophical discourse. Frankly, it's strikes me as bizarre and unmotivated and a bit like a child throwing a temper tantrum for not getting his way.

16. So you're not certain that certainty is not possible. But are you at least certain that you're not certain that certainty is not possible? Or are you certain that you're not certain that you're not certain that certainty is not possible? 

Nope and Nope. Regardless of how many iterations, my answer will be the same. But so what? Why do we need certainty? And how can you be certain that we need certainty?

Update on Anderson's "Stalker".

In my last post, I spoke about Owen Anderson's recent blurb regarding some harassment that he claimed he was experiencing. Taking for granted Anderson's claims, I worried that one of my readers might be the one doing the harassing and so I tried what I could to discourage it. A couple of days ago, I was contacted by ASU police. Apparently, Anderson reported to them and university officials that he felt threatened by me, citing the recent tragic shooting at UCLA. Now the police and ASU administrators are pursuing an official threat assessment, which includes, but is not limited to reviewing this blog. Given the heightened sensitivity, following the recent shooting between a student and professor (that incident apparently involved a blog), they have to take Anderson's claims seriously. It's likely that even my current institution has been contacted as Anderson threatened to do so on his blog.

Truth be told, I'm having a hard time believing that Anderson genuinely feels threatened by me on the basis of this blog alone. Now Anderson's recent posts about internet trolling, cyber-bullying and harassment paint a vague picture of a harasser-- of someone that has been incessantly contacting him and someone that refuses to leave him alone despite his requests. However, none of this applies to me which is why this whole situation seems incredible to me.

As I've said before, I've had zero contact with Anderson save for responding to his unsolicited emails to me last year. I don't email him, I don't call him, I don't text him, and I don't comment on his site. I just have this blog which is about the views of his mentor and pastor Surrendra Gangadean and the doctrines and practices of their church, Westminster Fellowship (I also use a facebook and twitter page to promote the blog, but that's standard practice for bloggers). Only on rare occasion, is Anderson mentioned and again only in connection to his philosophical or theological views, which are found in his published works. So this blog is purely academic. It's not slanderous, there are never any personal attacks, or any malicious content or intent. I've taken reasonable efforts to ensure that. What is more, I'm not even asking Anderson to read it, in fact, I'd much prefer that he stop visiting my site. Given that Anderson is the one that instigated the only "recent" contact we've had and he apparently keeps visiting my blog (and referencing it and me frequently on his site as of late), some might be tempted to think he's the one that we should worry about. In fact, given what has just transpired, I'd be lying if I said I wasn't a bit scared. Maybe I should be the one contacting the authorities. I'll let you decide whether or not this blog constitutes a real threat (that is, beyond a threat to his ideas) and reasonably merits a formal complaint to the police and university officials.

The most charitable reading of this situation that I can give to Anderson is that he has in fact experienced some real harassment, but has in turn mistakenly accused me of being behind it because I keep this blog. If this is so, then Anderson has made a rather serious mistake and I would hope that he would offer up an apology for jumping to conclusions. Importantly, I never once heard from Owen about any of this despite the fact that he has all of my personal contact info (remember he emailed me last summer and he has my phone number, too). Instead, I got a surprising call from the police out of the blue. At any rate, if such a harasser exists, I again encourage them to stop what they are doing and the authorities have my full cooperation to aid in any future investigations. On the other hand, if it's not a case of mistaken identity, and it's just this blog that is being perceived as a threat, then I'm truly at a loss.

There is so much more that I want to say about the matter, but I've been well advised by a number of people to show restraint so as not to undermine the integrity of this blog. I will say that a part of me feels like all of this has been an effort towards censorship. Some might even wonder if it ironically constitutes a kind of bullying. We can only speculate at this point. I had originally written a longer version of this article, which got into specifically what Anderson had told the police about me in trying to pin a motive for my alleged obsession with him. However, in trying to explain all of that, I found myself having to divulge some personal information about Anderson to provide ample background, which ultimately seemed incompatible with the values of this blog. Suffice it to say, he brought up nothing about Westminster Fellowship and something very strange about his personal history with me and I'm still having a hard time connecting the pieces. One more weird thing is that the police had gotten the impression that this blog is all about Anderson (at least from talking with him about it), which is far from the truth. It's primarily about Surrendra Gangadean's philosophical views, the doctrines and practices of his church and only on rare occasion, do engage directly with Anderson's material. This site is, and has always been, simply a resource for people wanting to think about and discuss a particular kind of philosophical worldview. And it will remain that way.

To reiterate, I maintain this blog for just the following reasons.

1) I enjoy thinking about and raising objections against Gangadean's philosophical worldview--which is basically raising objections against a form of Neo-Cartesianism. It's because I'm a philosopher with particular interests in the philosophy of religion.

2) I have a continually growing audience that appreciates the blog for a variety of reasons.

3) I think there's a real need to inform people about Gangadean's church. At the very least to offer up a different perspective than what is advertised by Gangadean and his followers on various campuses throughout the valley.

Again I'll let the reader decide whether any of this constitutes obsessive behavior, cyber-stalking, internet bullying or even trolling as Anderson claims.

Also to be clear, I've made no efforts whatsoever to interact with or contact Anderson in anyway for the past 3 years (save for cordially responding to his emails to me last year). I'm confident that further investigations will only authenticate my claims.

I don't know what further ramifications will follow from all of this. It's not been fun to deal with, and I suspect there will be some more phone calls and possibly meetings with my university in the coming days (and possibly an attorney). But I'll roll with the punches and I'm sure this too will pass.

Anderson's Stalker.

On occasion, I visit Anderson's blog to see if he's written anything new that I might want to chew on and explore here. Recently, he's put up a rather cryptic blurb about some internet stalking that he's experienced. I don't know what's going on beyond what he's written, but I'm hoping that none of my readers are involved.

Obviously, I haven't got anything like control or even much influence over what my readers do. However, if by a slim chance, you are a reader of this blog, care at all about what I have to say, and are among those bothering Anderson (he talks about incessant emails, comments to his blog as well as an anonymous blog), I encourage you to stop doing what you're doing, at least if what he's described is an accurate portrayal of your actions. Don't be a stalker. You can't force someone to have a conversation with you. Trying to do so is creepy and a bit frightening. If he doesn't want to talk to you, then accept it and move on. Live your life, dude. You're likely just making him into a martyr.

I also worry that some might get the false impression that I am the one behind the stalking or in someway involved. I don't think I'm being paranoid--To my chagrin, I had a friend recently confuse my blog with the "debunking Gangadean" site which predates mine by several years and also approaches things in a very different way (I noted before that I'm not affiliated with it). Further, I do maintain some amount of anonymity in my blog and I don't know of any other blogs of this nature. Does anybody know of other Gangadean/Anderson related blogs that Anderson might be referencing? If so, would you please let me know? Additionally, I recently posted articles about Anderson's book as well as an old conversation we had about the bible. Admittedly, this is unfortunate timing, but I didn't know at the time that all of this was going on in Anderson's world otherwise, I would probably have prefaced those.

So let me be explicit. It's not me. I know nothing about the situation beyond what I read on Anderson's blog. I have no interest in such antics. In fact, I haven't been in contact with Anderson for sometime now since he requested radio silence about 3 years ago. We've interacted exactly once since that time and that was about a year ago when Anderson emailed me out of the blue in hopes of having a conversation. I responded to his emails and that was the end of it.

Anyway, I hope the situation resolves itself for Anderson. We disagree about a lot, but I certainly don't harbor any ill will towards him. Fortunately, I haven't encountered anything of the sort so far, but if Anderson is accurately describing the situation, it's a bit scary given the current climate.

From GR to SR: A Conversation with Anderson

A number of years ago, while I was still a member of Westminster Fellowship, I had written a paper which I sent to Gangadean, Anderson and a few others in the congregation which challenged the idea that we could use reason alone to determine that the bible was special revelation (with anything like certainty). You can find the essence of that paper summed up in this post. It was this paper that essentially got the ball rolling for my eventual dismissal from the congregation.

To this day, I have yet to hear Gangadean's response to it because he refused to engage with me about it until I had come to affirm what he deemed to be "more basic things". Mind you, I soon learned that harboring any amount of sincere doubt with respect to these "basic things" was incompatible with "affirming" them in Gangadean's mind. That was grounds for dismissal from his congregation as well ending our conversations. Though this is speculative, I suspect that this move might be a strategy that Gangadean employs when he encounters questions for which he's got no answers. That is, by finding a way (in my eyes, illegitimately) to peg his interlocutor as a "reason-denier" or as denying the "more basic" he can forever avoid addressing trenchant objections. Of course, he presupposes that any amount of doubt in relation to what he thinks are the "most basic" things, makes conversation useless, which is a presupposition he never bothers to defend. So while he would say that he had sufficient answers to my objections about how we could know with deductive certainty that the bible was special revelation, he managed never to tell me what those were.

Additionally, I discussed my paper with a few others at the church during that time and they for the most part had no clue how to address it. There was one long-time member (who I took to be very knowledgeable of the church's positions) who, in response to my worries, stated that certainty wasn't possible or necessary when it came to determining the bible as special revelation, which was essentially to concede my point. What this person failed to see was that such a concession raised serious issues for the need for clarity as it concerns "more basic" things. I've discussed this before. The basic idea is that according to most formulations of Christianity, belief in God is necessary, but insufficient for avoiding spiritual death (after all the bible claims that even the demons in hell believe that God exists; see James 2:19). The non believer isn't merely held responsible for unbelief in God, but also must accept the work that Christ has done on the cross for the atonement of their sins. Further, Gangadean accepts that maximal consequences (spiritual death) requires maximal clarity. That means that everything that is required for spiritual life should be maximally clear. And it's hard for me to think that on Gangadeanianism, the belief that a person named Jesus lived without sin, was crucified for our sins, before rising again is unnecessary for spiritual life. But you don't get to such claims from reason alone (else, the bible or special revelation would be unnecessary for salvation).

Anderson on the other hand attempted to engage with the issue more directly and seems to have a different view than the previously mentioned Gangadeanian. I mention these differences because I think his people are pretty unsure of what the official view of the church is (i.e., what Gangadean's view is) or at least this was the case at the time. Given how cagey Gangadean was with me regarding the issue, this is what you might expect. At any rate, I've included my conversation with Anderson below in its entirety. As you'll see, Anderson admits that perhaps much of the contents of the bible cannot be deduced from general revelation. His claim though is that this isn't actually a problem for coming to know (with certainty) that the bible, in its entirety, is special revelation (i.e., the word of God). What he seems to be doing is taking the canon as a whole--which is to presuppose that it's a singular book to begin with. But that won't do because he doesn't deny the canonization process. Indeed he believes that the canonizers used at least something like the test of consistency in order to do so. We don't get into this in the featured conversation, but Anderson includes it in his book, The Clarity of God's Existence. He writes,

A book that claims divine origin, or a prophet who claims to have special revelation, and yet communicates a message that contradicts what is known of God from general revelation, cannot actually be special revelation from God (6).  

Note that logical consistency with general revelation provides us only with a necessary condition for a claim or text counting as genuine special revelation. But we don't yet have the sufficient conditions. In other words, consistency with known truths, is a minimal kind of test for veracity. At best, when something is consistent with what we already know, we can only determine that it's possibly true (or not necessarily false), but we don't know yet whether it's actually true. I've noted all of this before in this post. So there must be additional criteria (i.e., the jointly sufficient conditions for something to be special revelation), but Anderson seemed to have trouble articulating what that is in our conversation. I certainly could have done a better job and pressing this point more precisely, but Anderson is a smart guy, and I suspect he knew exactly what was at issue. At the very end, Anderson seems to get defensive and then merely reassert the very thing in question, so I didn't pursue it any further. In my paper that Anderson and I are discussing, I talked about Abraham and how he could ascertain (via reason alone and with certainty) that God was truly speaking to him when he commanded him to leave Ur, and to take Isaac to the mountain to sacrifice him, and then again not sacrifice him and to sacrifice the ram instead. I then suggested that we are in no better epistemic position than he is as it concerns many of the claims in the bible.

============

OA: I think a lot of the issue about GR to SR will be in the meaning of words like "consistent with" and "follows from" and "inferred from". Could it have been inferred ahead of time that God would call Abraham to go West and not East? I don't think the requirement is that each such fact or command is to be determined to be consistent and derived somehow from Gen 1-3. The claim is that humans, in sin, could not originate a theistic document at all, nor one that gets it right about God's justice and mercy. So the important things to test, for Abraham, are the recognition of Ur as in sin and idolatry, that the call is from God the Creator, and that redemption comes through sacrifice. The same is true of the comments you made about David. The origin of scripture is divine due to the total depravity of humans in sin, so that the content of scripture cannot be mimicked by the idolaters in Ur. Nor is the content of scripture completely derivable from GR in that Abraham could not derive that he would be called to go West and not East, North, or South.

J: I appreciate your thoughts and for your taking the time to read my paper. It seems to me that determining the bible as SR requires much more than it being a theistic document since it includes all sorts of claims about the world (and beyond) including but not limited to purportedly historical facts. As I address in my paper, we could presuppose the bible as a single unit and so conclude the entire thing to be genuine SR on the basis of it getting some things right, but that would be an unwarranted presupposition. Further, I raise the issue that there is something like the problem of criteria regarding how it is that we would recognize a genuine case of divine justice and mercy being reconciled. Could we know it when we saw it without having previous knowledge of what it must be like? Further, even if the bible has the "right" account of how God's justice is satisfied by his mercy, again we cannot simply affirm all of the bible as SR this is because the bible contains more claims than simply that God the creator exists and that he provides the sacrifice (his incarnated son) to atone for our sins. And even if the rest of the bible is consistent with the two above themes, it need not necessarily follow, (i.e., the details aren't the only possible ones consistent with these themes) which means we fall short of certainty.

Interestingly, you said that what was important for Abraham "is to recognize that the call was from God" but this is a point that I take issue with in the paper. I am arguing that I don't see how Abraham or anyone for that matter could ever recognize that God is speaking or giving SR to them. That the contents are "consistent with" what is known in GR is not a strong enough relation to provide epistemic certainty.

OA: I did see those claims in your paper but I didn't think you'd established anything with them. Theism is enough. That's the point of 'origin'. In the unregenerate state humans could not produce a theistic text. There are no theistic texts besides sr and those influenced by it. Abraham would have the account coming down to him of creation, fall, redemption, the flood, and babel. He could rely on these because of their affirmation of God, and the relation of moral and natural evil, his own call fits into that context. The details are reliable in that the message is from God and could not be otherwise given the fallen condition. So we put together what is known from gr, plus origin, content, and context and there isn't a problem. There is no problem of the criterion because we know what justice and mercy are so we know if each is satisfied.

J: You seem to presuppose or rather assume that the text (the bible) should be taken as a whole in all of its details. If so, then what grounds have you for that? If not, then the fact that it contains theistic details (that may be in line with what is known in GR) would not be enough. You wrote, "The details are reliable in that the message is from God..." But again we can't simply assume all of the bible is God's message in the first place.

Secondly, if we know apart from SR, how justice and mercy can be reconciled in virtue of knowing the nature of each, then what need have we for SR? Aren't we in a position to deduce it ourselves based on our understanding of each?

OA: I'm speaking of Abraham not our situation since you focus on him in your paper. When you shift to us your basically asking about how we can know the original text compared to existent texts. But the point I made still holds in that unregenerate man cannot produce a book like exodus or Isaiah. The details are given and preserved by God, unless you want to say given but not preserved.

We can know what both j and m are, but not that God would offer his only son.

J: I use Abraham as one particular instance of the more general problem of knowing with certainty, what is genuine SR (provided it isn't entailed by GR). Abraham is granted with what is purportedly SR, and so are we. In both cases a test is required to determine whether the message is really SR. I am not sensing the shift that you refer to or at least the weight of it.

Abraham knows some things from GR, but then is given commands that go beyond GR (I take this 'going beyond GR' to be entailed by the very notion of SR). But then how does he know he can trust what he hears or is "commanded" especially given the very particular nature of the purported revelation? You seem to think that a "generally theistic document" is enough, but this doesn't address non theistic parts of the text as a whole. I take this to be an issue for Abraham, any prophet of old, and us so long as the SR goes beyond claims that are clearly known or entailed by GR.

Also I don't really understand your point about what it would take to produce a book like Exodus or Isaiah. In the first place, what does regenerated or unregenerated have to do with it since if SR is "given by God" even the regenerate couldn't produce it. More importantly, again from where I stand those books cannot simply be presupposed to be SR and any part that is not merely Theistic or entailed by what is known from GR cannot be. If so, then I do not feel the weight of your point of the origin of them as a whole.

Per your note about j and m: how do we know that God's providing his only son is a sufficient means for justice satisfying mercy?

OA: There's a number of directions developing so I'm going to focus on one. What goes beyond gr is the redemptive content. He knows this is divinely inspired in that no human could give the theistic content. Maybe we don't agree on total depravity? The author is and must be God in that humans in sin couldn't get gr right in order to then add false additional content. The only examples are people who were influenced by sr like joseph smith.

J: What reasons do you have to believe that persons in total depravity "couldn't get gr right in order to then add false additional content" ? If you think it follows trivially from the very notion of "total depravity" that one cannot come to at least believe what is clear GR, then perhaps we do disagree about total depravity, at least as to what it means.

On that note, my first question is this: why can't a person be totally depraved and still come to at least believe true things, even a great many true things as a matter of epistemic luck? Secondly, it seems to me that one doesn't even need to believe (let a lone know in the strong sense) what is clear GR in order to be the explanation of a theistic document. Both may be remote possibilities (per our common sensibilities), but I see nothing incoherent about them.

OA: This reminds me of intelligent design. There is an irreducible complexity to information such that one does not get it right by luck. To believe many less basic things and in some sense be correct is not the same as understanding basic things. In total depravity a person starts out with the belief that all is eternal, the rest of ones beliefs follow from this. So such a person will not be able to write a redemptive theistic text.

J: Hmmm... Well, such a person need not 'understand' basic things in order to write a redemptive text. Also how can we be sure the analogy works? I don't see anything incoherent with the idea that a person gets lucky forming n true beliefs and then n+1, n+2...

OA: Interestingly, there is a sense in which the human author may not understand fully, but the actual author is God. That God will give redemptive revelation is seen in natural evil as a call back. So it does exist. What you'd need to show is that there are other competitors, and there aren't.

J: I'm not sure I agree that I would need to show actual competitors, since to demonstrably know per your view requires that it isn't even possible that there are other options out there.

OA: Your message reads antagonistic in that I thought we were sharing the burden of proof. I don't think its possible that there are other texts given the condition of man and the purpose of God.

JA: I'm sorry that you feel my message is antagonistic. We are in opposition with one another about some of these important views so perhaps it necessarily seems that way. I don't know how to share the burden of proof, perhaps you can suggest for me how. The thing is, you seem to be arguing for a position which involves categorical claims about the origin, and nature of SR. You said that you think it not "possible that there are other texts given the condition of man and the purpose of God" but I feel like I've presented coherent counter possibilities to your view that keep these presuppositions in mind. Taking for granted that man is totally depraved, and God has a particular nature such that he is both divinely just and merciful and even that he wants to redeem man, it still remains a possibility (despite how remote) that persons happen on true beliefs and pen a theistic document which may be right about some things, but not about others. When you asked me to provide you a viable alternative to the bible, I responded in the way that I did because even if I (or anyone else for that matter) cannot come up with one, it doesn't prove your position. All we may conclude is that I (and anyone else looking for an alternative and coming up short) lack awareness of such a text. Your view has an implicit modal component which consist of denying the very possibility of another theistic text existing. I am simply asking you to show me how you or anyone can know this?

OA: We know this BC humans cannot provide one even on accident, and God will provide one. So what we have isn't from humans and in error and is from God. Humans cannot accidently write one any more than one can form in the sand due to the wind. This is due to the human condition, the nature of meaningful texts, and the purpose of God.