Anderson and Gangadean are two theists who argue that the God of Christianity is knowable with absolute certainty. They argue that it is central to Christianity that unbelief in this God is inexcusable and if so, God's existence must be "maximally clear." Why must it be maximally clear? Because Anderson asserts (but doesn't argue) that maximal consequences imply maximal clarity.
First off, it isn't obvious that inexcusability is central to Christianity at least in the way that they have in mind. Anderson for instance will cite Romans 1:20 as a sort of proof text for this notion. Paul does say that man (in unbelief) is without excuse because God's eternal power and divine nature are clearly seen by what is made. As a side note, it seems that unbelief, not the lack of knowledge is inexcusable, but I think that Andreson and Surrendra require of the believer and unbeliever, knowledge of God (further they take knowledge to entail Cartesian certainty).
Anyway, as I've mentioned before, there are various intelligible meanings to "clear" and "without excuse." Indeed we use "clear" or "clarity" often in our expressions without intending to mean absolute certainty. For instance, it's clear that I am in Arizona at the moment (this is in fact, true). It's evident by everything I see. And you might say there is no excuse for me believing that I was in Canada dreaming that I am in Arizona. Suppose that it is somehow a crime for me to be in Arizona at the moment (maybe I am an illegal immigrant from Canada). Now it's remotely possible, that I only think I am in Arizona right now (that is, my evidence doesn't perfectly rule out the possibility that I'm in Canada right now, but subject to an extremely convincing hallucination that I am in Arizona at the moment). So suppose I actually believe that I am not in Arizona right now. Now suppose that I am arrested and charged with being in Arizona illegally. It's no excuse for me to cite the fact that I wasn't absolutely certain that I was in Arizona. If I told the authorities that I thought it a possible that I was actually in Canada right now, but merely hallucinating that I was in Arizona, they wouldn't (with good reason) excuse my illegal residence. So I have no excuse for failing to believe that I am in Arizona right now, even though it isn't absolutely clear or certain that I am in Arizona. These seem to be perfectly accessible ways of using the words 'clear' and 'inexcusable' that depart from the way that Anderson wants to privilege. So it seems to me that Anderson, if he depends on Paul's writing to support his intentions of the terms "clear" and "inexcusable" needs to give us an indubitable reason to accept that Paul was using the words in the way that he, (Anderson) is using them. Otherwise, it's just a case of semantic bullying.
As we noted above, Anderson and Gangadean argue that God's existence must be maximally clear. But why? Because unbelief (either according to scripture or reason) in God leads to maximal consequences i.e., spiritual death. One of the corollaries of this line of thinking is that whenever failure to know a proposition leads to maximal consequences (spiritual death), that proposition must be maximally clear. More formally:
Max Consequences Requires Max Clarity Equivalence (MCRME):
Where P = any proposition and S = any subject (potential knower).
If unbelief in P entails maximal consequences for S, then P must be maximally clear to S.
Now supposing that belief in God is requisite for one to avoid the maximal consequences, the question to ask is whether there are other beliefs that are also necessary to avoid the them? In other words, given the above MCRME, we should be asking whether are there any other beliefs that per Christianity (or even Surrendra and Owen's favored theology) that failing to have leads to maximal consequences?
Take the belief in the life, death and the resurrection of Jesus (as a means of atonement for our sins). We'll call this "the set of beliefs about Jesus." I think a Christian would be hard pressed to deny the fact that belief in Jesus of this sort is required in order to avoid maximal consequences (eternal separation from God, hell, spiritual death, or whatever). So combining this with MCRME, we can conclude that the set of beliefs associated with Jesus' redemptive work must be maximally clear.
That is, if maximal consequences implies maximal clarity, and unbelief in Jesus implies maximal consequences, then it must be maximally clear that Jesus lived and died, was the messiah, and also actually took the sins of the world. But this causes problems for Gangadean.
As I see it, Gangadean et al. are now faced with 3 unsavory options.
1) Agree that there must be (and is) maximal clarity of the set of beliefs associated with Jesus' redemptive work.
2) Deny that such beliefs are required for (or part of realizing) spiritual life/salvation.
3) Deny that maximal consequences requires maximal clarity.
Unfortunately, I find none of these options palatable for Gangadean and Anderson and discuss why below.
1) The set of beliefs about Jesus are maximally clear: The problem here is that we can't even in principle have absolute certainty about such matters. Don't we, today, believe in the life and work of Jesus based on testimonial evidence (e.g., the scriptures, purported historical records)? Moreover, at best, the early believers had empirical evidence (i.e., they observed the life, teaching, death of the risen Christ). How can one have absolute certainty of any of this since one's senses or how one interprets one's sense experiences may fail to correspond to reality.
A second difficulty of this route is that one needs to demarcate those propositions about Jesus that are necessary for avoiding the maximal consequences from those that are not-- of course it shouldn't be an arbitrary matter.
2) The set of beliefs about Jesus are not required for spiritual life: If having certain beliefs about Jesus is not necessary to avoid the maximal consequences (spiritual death), then even granting MCRME, those beliefs need not be maximally clear. Unfortunately, this is to allow that Theists that do not accept any beliefs about Jesus (indeed they may even believe that Jesus never existed) are avoiding the maximal consequences. I take this to be hardly inviting for reformed believers like Gangadean and Anderson.
3) Maximal Consequences do not imply Maximal Clarity: Perhaps maximal consequences does not require maximal clarity (MCRME is false). But then, why are Gangadean and Anderson pressing this point about the maximal clarity of God's existence as requisite for maximal consequences as it pertains to unbelief about God?
No comments:
Post a Comment