Part I
I've been thinking about Owen Anderson's article found here, where he raises some objections against Plantinga. He rehearses much of these considerations in his book, The Clarity of God's Existence.
Briefly, Plantinga's view is that unbelief in God might be due to improper functioning of one's belief forming apparatuses which are the result of the fall. We don't see what we otherwise might (including God's glory) because we are negatively affected (in particular, with respect to our cognition) by our sin. Anderson's main focus in the article is to show that if the Plantingan picture is correct (i.e., unbelief in God is the result of improper functioning), then the unbeliever cannot be held inexcusable/responsible for their unbelief. That is to say, the unbeliever, who lacks belief in God on the basis of improper functioning, has an excuse.
There is something initially plausible about this picture. I mean how can a just God condemn persons for failing to do something that they cannot possibly do? Now I have my doubts about understanding notions of divine justice, but I will table those and related concerns for the moment. Anderson's main objections to Plantinga trade centrally on the old "ought-implies-can" principle of responsibility. Stated simply, if I ought to do something, then it must be the case that I can, call this OIC.
Now many philosophers have rejected OIC despite it's initially, intuitive appeal. Indeed there are a number of counterexamples to the principle both in the realm of morality and in epistemology. I won't have time to speak of those here.
So grant (for the purposes of discussion) that OIC is true in all cases. What I want to focus on is how even Anderson's view seems to violate the principle at one level. This is because Anderson is also a compatibilist about free will and determinism. Moreover he is reformed in his theology and accepts the calvinistic notion of total depravity which is the view that man cannot possibly seek God save a change in his mind/heart. This change is not self-caused but rather must come from without and so is external to the agent. That is to say, the nonbeliever on this view simply will not (and cannot) seek God left to herself.
Now suppose all of this is correct, again, for the sake of discussion. One might ask how the unbeliever can be thought to be without excuse? After all, if ought implies can, but man is born totally depraved such that they cannot seek God (save a change instituted from without), then in what sense ought man to know God?
Perhaps aware of this problem Anderson takes liberties to revise the OIC principle in the following way:
OIC-R: if person S wants to seek the Lord, then S can.
So on this picture, the problem with the unbeliever is that he desires not to seek God and if and only if he wanted to seek God, then he could. This is meant to preserve the ought-implies-can principle of seeking/knowing God, but again, it is a revised form of OIC so we''ll refer to Anderson's principle as OIC-R from here on out.
The first problem is a question about philosophical motivation. Why should we accept this as a legitimate move? He is basically coming up with a principle that serves his thesis, but that excludes Plantinga's. Indeed Plantinga cannot use the same exact maneuver since even if person P wanted to know, if person P had a jacked up belief forming apparatus, he still couldn't know God.
But now Anderson's principle (the revision of the original OIC) seems self-serving and ad hoc and Just because it helps his theory doesn't mean that it is the correct theory.
Relatedly, why can't Plantinga make a similar manuever? In light of Anderson's criticisms Plantinga could come up with his own revision of the ought-implies-can principle. He might for example argue that while it's true that man in sin has their belief forming apparatuses all messed up (so as not to believe in God), the following conditional is true:
"If God delivers person X and restores their apparatus then they can know God".
So on this revision, it's consistent to insist that all men should know God, even though man knowing God depends on some act of God.
Of course, one might think there is still an important difference between Anderson's and the proposed Plantingan revision of the ought-implies-can. Anderson's seems not to deal with the unbelievers reasoning faculties, but rather the unbelievers desire to seek/know God while Plantinga's involves the belief forming processes. But the crucial question is whether we should think this is a relevant difference to the matter of the inexcusability of unbelief. I don't see how it could be. I mean, what should it matter of the precise mechanism that keeps an unbeliever from seeking/knowing God? Whether it's because unbeliever A lacks the desire to seek God, or whether A doesn't have the properly functioning abilities to know God, if both necessarily keep person A from knowing/seeking what is clear (and both are ultimately up to God not A), then why think this difference is salient to the matter at hand? This gives rise to a further issue with Anderson's account.
We can criticize Anderson's account as not making sense of OIC regarding the desire to seek the Lord. That is to contend that Anderson's account actually violates OIC (just at a different level).
Just as Anderson faults Plantinga's view for not respecting the OIC regarding belief in God, we can, by parity, fault Anderson's view for failing to maintain OIC regarding man's fundamental desire to seek.
For example, consider the following, "If I ought to desire to seek God, then it must be the case that I can".
Anderson's reformed theological views and compatibilism violate this principle. Since man is born into total depravity, the nonbeliever fundamentally desires not to seek God save an act of God. So the unbeliever cannot know God, because the unbeliever cannot make it so that the necessary requisite states of affairs (e.g., desiring to seek) obtain.
If OIC is categorically true (as Anderson wants to insist), then how can it be true of the unbeliever that she ought to know God and thus that unbelief is inexcusable? Notice, if the unbeliever can be excused for her failing to have the desire to seek, then this also would get her off the hook for her unbelief.
The point is, it seems to me that whatever move is open to Anderson, a parallel manuever will be available to Plantinga. What is more, we can revise the OIC regarding inexcusability of unbelief with all kinds of antecedent clauses. For instance, one might insist that God can only be known via special revelation and then adjust the OIC accordingly: "Look, God can be known by anyone and all that that means is, 'if one has special revelation, then one can know him.' The question is whether this move or Anderson's move is a legitimate one.
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Part II
Anderson, in his article, also considers how it must be clear to reason that God exists, if man is to be held responsible for unbelief. But now suppose that it is knowable to reason as Anderson wants to argue (that is, suppose that "if person A wants to know then they can"), but add that it is not up to the unbeliever whether she will desire to know or not. As noted previously, desiring to know is thought to be at least necessary in order to know on Anderson's view.
But then what good is it that it is clear to reason (as he conceives it) if people are still prevented from knowing God due to reasons beyond their ultimate control? Perhaps to Anderson this is perfectly consistent with the inexcusability of unbelief, but I just don't see it. That is, the nonbeliever despite not being able to determine whether they have one of the necessary conditions for knowing God, is still inexcusable in their unbelief. In fact in conversations Anderson often cites that you will never find a case where a person in unbelief will sincerely say, "well I want to know God, but I can't." I've never been sure what this is meant to show. Nevermind what these persons can legitimately say. We as appraisers of the situation can on their behalf say that they never had a shot at knowing God (in fact, they were necessarily prevented from belief) and think that this is unfair or isn't consistent with the legitimacy of the inexcusability thesis.
On the other hand, Anderson seems to find the inexcusability of unbelief to be obviously inconsistent with the thesis that God's existence is "unclear." But why does he find this inconsistent but not the above? Perhaps it's just intuitive to him. Say it's not clear to person B that God exists because despite there being evidence for God's existence, B does not cognitively function properly. But then it also seems true that we would never find such a person who can properly assert, "I want to know God, but I can't". Why? Because they wouldn't know what they were missing (namely, knowing God) since they don't have a proper function to get that far. So again it appears that Anderson's view and Plantinga's view merely differ on certain details of mechanics but I don't see the philosophical importance of these differences. I contend that whatever can be a form of criticism for Plantinga's view can with little work be construed as one for Owen's.
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