'Knowledge' Again

Gangadeanians claim that without certainty at the basic level, we're doomed. I've often noted that they merely assert that meaninglessness and the like follow without clarity/certainty at the basic level. Which is not the same as having shown that it's true.

Often they cling to talk about clarity of basic distinctions which is to say we can be certain of basic distinctions or in other words, that we can't possibly doubt things like 'a is a' and 'eternal is not non-eternal'. Many times I've mentioned that they need to prove other things. For instance, Gangadean presents a theory of knowledge. It's a theory about the nature of knowledge--or a theory about the truth conditions of a sentence with the following schema, 'S knows that P'. What could make the sentence true? Well, they think that among other things, S must be epistemically certain that P such that it's impossible for S to be wrong about P given whatever process or reasons she has for believing P. We call this infallibilism about knowledge. It's a proposal. It's not a truism even though Gangadeanians treat it like it is.

The trouble is, Gangadeanians never defend their theory of knowledge, probably because they assume it is a truism. But let's "get more basic" here as the Gangadeanians say and critically analyze their most basic assumptions in order to test them for meaning. Consider the following argument which appeals to only premises that the Gangadean already accepts (note I don't accept them).

1. We must have clarity/certainty at the basic level or else knowledge and therefore intelligible dialogue and meaning are not possible.

2. The nature of knowledge (i.e., the answer to the question "which theory of knowledge is the right theory?") is at a basic level.

3. Therefore, one must have clarity/certainty about the nature of knowledge, if one is to have knowledge and therefore intelligible dialogue and meaning.

This is precisely why I have often pressed the Gangadeanians to defend their theory of knowledge. In their little bubble, they can get away with not defending it because Gangadean talks about his theory of knowledge as if it's true by definition (recall my discussion about vocab indoctrination). Consistency demands that they provide a defense or rational justification of their theory of knowledge (infallibilism) as the correct one. But I see no reason to think that knowledge requires certainty in the first place.

In fact, if knowledge doesn't require certainty, then this would be detrimental to Gangadean's worldview because he depends on this very assumption in order to argue that without certainty at the basic level, skepticism wins. That's supposed to be the cost of not affirming (notice not affirming is not the same as denying) certainty about basic things. For some reason, Gangadeanians have a hard time grasping the possibility that a person could fail to affirm clarity at the basic level, and not be a skeptic, because they adopt a different theory of knowledge (e.g. fallibilism). I don't know what to make of such an elementary mistake other than that it's revealing about the lack of careful thinking exemplified by team Gangadean.

For further reading:

Here and here I press the Gangadeanians to defend their theory of knowledge (beyond appealing to their own intuitions).

Here is an article where I press the Gangadeanians to defend the inference from, "not clarity/certainty" --> no point in further discussion, and ultimately meaninglessness."

Here is an article where I argue that figuring out the meaning of a word, or unpacking a concept (like 'knowledge' or KNOWLEDGE) isn't just an a prior process at least in the face of disagreements.

Anderson's piece for the Washington Times

Here is a recent article that Anderson has written on the First Amendment. I couldn't help but laugh a bit at the disproportionately large picture of Anderson. I'm also not sure why there are single quotes around 'first in importance'. Single quotes signal to the reader that you're talking about or mentioning the expression in question rather than using it. In effect, the title as it is presented would lead the reader to think that he is writing about why the first amendment = the expression 'first in importance'. But now I'm just being pedantic.

I think it's interesting that this article is about the importance of allowing free public dialogue because it encourages free thinking.  But if you know Anderson and company, you know that they'll talk to you only insofar as you agree with their basic beliefs. Only it turns out there are lots of them and many of them are controversial with lots of assumptions not the least of which have to do with philosophical methodology and special definitions of key terms. And even if you're being sincere in not seeing eye-to-eye with them, because for instance, you just don't share their intuitions (or what they call "immediately known" propositions) they haven't gotten enough humility and self-reflection to consider the possibility that their arguments aren't as good as they thought. Instead, disagreement with them about their basic beliefs as they see it just means that you deny reason and are being irrational (in other words, a bad person given their view about what it means to be a good human). Hence, there is no room for dialogue.

[Note, if you're thinking to yourself that I myself, exemplify some of the vices I accuse Anderson and company of then I think you're missing an important point. Yes, I'm confident that I am right about my critiques of their worldview. I believe that they are gravely mistaken. The difference of course is that I am open to continuing dialogue because I think the possibility always exists that I am in fact mistaken. The same cannot be said of their camp].

That's hardly a disposition that lends itself to finding common ground in any interesting sense. The oddest part of this idea of finding common ground is what they seem to require for agreement. Anderson and Gangadean will not speak to you if you don't agree with them, but they don't explicitly give anything like an analysis of 'agreement' (here their appeals to something like common sense are obvious). One might think for instance, that two people can agree to grant certain propositions for the purposes of a particular discussion. This happens all the time in philosophy. It's indicated by expressions like 'let's assume' or 'suppose that P'. The two parties are accepting a proposition even if they don't both believe it. Another manner in which two individuals might agree is when they both believe the proposition in question, but have different degrees of confidence in them (yes, beliefs seem to come in degrees). Suppose I have a stomach ache and I tell you that this is so. I probably have more confidence in the proposition that I have a stomach ache than you do, even if we both believe it. This suggests a different kind of agreement than the first, one that requires some degree of mutual belief.  Yet another plausible reading of 'agreement' is when two people believe the same thing but for very different reasons (note this might account for varying degrees of belief). You might believe that it is raining outside on the basis of reliable testimony while I might be outside experiencing the rain.

Interestingly, Anderson and Gangadean both seem to think that agreement (at least as it concerns what they arbitrarily demarcate as "basic beliefs") requires believing the same things, to the same degree (namely, certainty), and for the same reasons (namely, Gangadean's proofs). But why should anybody accept such a strong account of 'agreement'? After all, this notion of agreement does some heavy lifting within their worldview. They think that without agreement of more basic things, there can be no agreement over less basic things. Without this kind of agreement, they think things will be really bleak and societies will inevitably crumble. Without this kind of agreement, they find grounds to kick people out of their church and to treat them as non-believers. Without this kind of agreement, they think that there is no common ground and thus no basis for pursuing discussion. Given that they have essentially stipulated what they mean by 'agreement' the question is whether any of these further inferences make any sense. Just why can't two people have a meaningful discussion either by agreeing to keep them fixed for the purposes of that particular discussion (and possibly future ones)? Why can't two people believe the same proposition or set of propositions for differing reasons and have a meaningful dialogue about what follows? Why can't two people believe the same proposition or set of propositions to different degrees and have a meaningful discussion about what follows? I'll leave it to the Gangadeanians to answer that.

The other response I had to the article was that I remembered how seductive the material can be. It is in a certain way very accessible to the layman and that's to Anderson's credit. This is true I think of a lot of the arguments on which his worldview (Gangadean's worldview) is based. The arguments are simple. The words used, tend to be non-technical. By the same token what is being said has got the appearance of being deep and interesting. This combination is partially what attracts young college students (in particular, conservative Christian students with little to no background in philosophy) to the teachings. It suggests to them that they can have sure answers to their big questions and it's not particularly difficult. It doesn't require special philosophical training beyond a few classes taught by Gangadean and his followers (which consists largely in memorizing and parroting Gangadean's arguments, his vocabulary and his conclusions). Moreover, much of what they learn is deconstructive of what they call "popular Christianity". Young people tend to be drawn to that. It makes them feel special and as if they have got the inside edge or some special insight that others are lacking. It's seductive and it certainly worked on me at one point.

Whenever I teach my students each term, most of whom have no background in philosophy, they initially feel like the answers to the questions that philosophers have been wrestling with for 2500 years, are rather obvious. Teach them a little bit about logic, and present some theories of rightness, or of knowledge, and they think they've got it all figured out. I think this because they have initially been presented with a cliff's notes version of philosophy. It's presented with fairly vague terms and without any of the nuances or complexities that lie below the surface. But it's also stuff that they haven't ever thought about before and have a feel or ring of truth to (probably because it appeals to their common sense), and so it draws them in. However, it's also imprecise. They are generally not used to asking the probing questions yet.

As a result much of my task throughout the rest of the semester is to point out problems with the proposals and their answers--problems that aren't so obvious and are easily overlooked. This is where philosophy gets difficult. It's the point at which it tries to make good on the initial claim that it has got answers to the fundamental questions of life. And things get messy and complicated, and if one is hell bent on getting certainty, to settle any and all doubt, then frustration and discouragement are sure to follow. This is the post-honeymoon stage.

My take is that Gangadeanians in general are not unlike my students--it's just that they haven't gotten to the point of truly critically analyzing their most basic beliefs. They get stuck at the initial stage of a kind of false-enlightenment and all the confidence that comes with it. To add insult to injury, they belong to a church culture that adds pressure to conform which implicitly discourages this kind of self-criticism. Sure they are taught to be critical of their beliefs whenever they might present a challenge to Gangadean's or Anderson's views. That is, when it threatens conformity. But the buck stops there. It never gets to really wrestling honestly with the doctrines of their leaders.

Reading Anderson's article reminded me of this. It, like much of his other published works as well as Gangadean's, presents the cliff's notes version of philosophy. It leaves things at the initial stage.

p.s. It's interesting to consider the culture of Westminster Fellowship in light of Anderson's article on the importance of the freedom of speech. For instance, it is an official doctrine of the church that women are to be silent in the church and to primarily be taught by their husbands "at home". There's also a common practice that if someone starts to call into question the doctrines of the church, their conversation partners are limited. The congregation is told not to speak to that person, and Gangadean steps in and determines that the questioner can speak with a few select individuals (usually including himself). But yeah, free speech.

Gangadean, Descartes, and the Ontological Argument.

I've been reading some Descartes lately. He's always a fun read. As I've said before, Gangadeanians are Cartesians at heart. It was Descartes after all that sought an indubitable foundation upon which to build an entire worldview. Throughout his meditations, he seeks to find that which he can't possibly doubt. And if you've ever taken a philosophy course with a Gangadeanian, it's likely that you'll hear the cogito argument. I know of no other philosopher either in the past or present that seeks certainty in the way that Descartes does with the exception of Gangadean of course.

There are other similarities which is what prompted this post. For instance, Descartes believed that by simply unpacking the content of an idea, we could come to know about the world beyond our concepts. For instance, Descartes begins with his idea of a triangle and says the he perceives that the nature of triangle is to be (among other things) a three-sided figure. And importantly he could ascertain this nature simply by reflecting on his idea of a triangle. Indeed since he doesn't believe that triangles actually exist (he believes they are merely imperfectly instantiated in the concrete world), there is no other way he could come to know about them except via the reason.

Gangadean similarly takes it that "in a concept, one grasps the essence of a thing". That is to say, we can know at least some things about substantial reality in virtue of reflecting on our concepts of things. For example, as Gangadean sees it, you can just sit and reflect on the concept/word 'knowledge' or the concept/word 'eternal' and certain indubitable truths will come to mind. For instance, 'eternal' just means without beginning and end. 'Knowledge' just is a justified true belief. 'Evil' just is that which is contrary to one's nature. 'God' just is a spirit, that is infinite, eternal and unchanging in his being... 'Friendship' just is a relationship with a mutual aim towards the good...I'm only scratching the surface. As I've noted before Gangadeanians have their own vocabulary and it is in virtue of this vocabulary that many of their deductions turn out valid (although far from sound). So the similarity with Descartes is hard to deny. Descartes speaks of ideas, and Gangadean speaks of concepts, but they are functionally the same thing. Descartes speaks of the natures of things, and other times the essences of things, and Gangadean does the same. More importantly, both thinkers are committed to this idea that we could learn about the nature of things just by unpacking our concepts or ideas of those things. To be clear, neither Descartes or Gangadean are saying that you can know the nature of an idea by unpacking the idea (that would merely get one to idealism). Instead, they are both saying that by simply reflecting sufficiently on our ideas, we can know about things "out there" beyond our minds (that's what Gangadean means by "grasping the essence of things").

In his Fifth Meditation, Descartes, after speaking about triangles, seems to realize that if he can know (with certainty) about the very nature/essences of triangles simply by thinking about his idea of a triangle, then he should be able to extend this method to prove that God exists. After all, he's got a "clear and distinct" idea of God. Just like he has a "clear and distinct" idea of a triangle. So in the manner by which he could come to know about the nature of triangles by thinking about his idea of triangles, he argues that he can do the same as it concerns God.

Now for Descartes and many other theists that he was following, the very idea of God contains (necessary) existence. That is to say, just like one cannot really have an idea of a triangle that doesn't contain the idea of a three-sided figure, according to Descartes, to think of God is necessarily to think of a being that exists. On the other hand he says his ideas of other things like that of a lion or a mountain, do not have this feature. He can think of a lion that doesn't exist and he can think of a mountain that doesn't exist without committing anything like a contradiction or conceptual confusion. And insofar as his idea of God contains within it the further idea of existence, he concludes that this proves that God really does exist. Just like he can prove that a triangle has three sides by thinking about his concept of a triangle and realizing that he can't separate (in his mind) three sides from a triangle, he can prove that God exists by merely reflecting on his concept of God. He can't by his intellect separate his idea of God from his idea of existence, so he concludes that it is the very nature/essence of God to exist.

It's an ontological argument which are fascinating beasts even though they are largely rejected. However, the merits or faults of the argument itself are not what I'm interested in. What I'm wondering is how or on what grounds a Gangadeanian would reject such an argument. That is, how does it differ structurally from Gangadean's argument that "something must be eternal"? Recall, that that argument depends on the conceptual analysis that 'eternal' just means without beginning, and that 'none is eternal' entails that 'all began to exist'. If you ask a Gangadeanian how s/he knows that 'if none is eternal, then all is temporal and all began to exist' they will say that it's a matter of definition--that is to say, it's a matter of conceptual truth. One can just sit and reflect on the concept/idea of 'eternal' to realize what it entails about beginning to exist and temporality. Well, this is just what Descartes thinks is happening in his ontological argument for God's existence. It's perfectly plain to him that the very concept of God contains within it necessary existence. Thus it is in virtue of his definition of God, and his commitment to the idea that (in Gangadeanian terms) "reason is ontological" that the conclusion that God really exists, follows.

As I recall, Gangadean rejects this kind of ontological argument. What I'm currently interested in is whether he's got good grounds for rejecting it. Does he reject Descartes claim that it is part of the very concept of God that he exists? That is, does Gangadean believe one can have the idea of God and at the same time imagine God as not existing? I doubt it. Isn't God according to Gangadean, by definition, a being that is infinite, eternal and unchanging? And doesn't Gangadean believe that 'eternal' just means always existing? If so, it seems he must agree with Descartes' definition of God in an important sense. That is, to have a concept of God is to have a concept of an eternal (or always existing) being.

So if Gangadean wants to legitimately reject the Cartesian argument, he must looks elsewhere. As I see it there are only two more exit points. Gangadean must either reject the claim that we can know the nature of God by reflecting on our concept of God (i.e., he must say that one can have the concept of God without grasping the essence of God), or else he must deny the final inference that Descartes makes namely, "if it is part of the very essence of God to exist, then he does exist." But I don't see how he could deny either of these. To reject the first is to admit to a counterexample to his foundational claim about concepts. Remember, he says that "in a concept we grasp the essence of a thing". But if we can have a concept of God without thereby grasping the nature of God, then his thesis about concepts is falsified. To reject the latter of Cartesian moves is to admit that it is in God's nature to exist and yet God can somehow fail to exist. But again, if Gangadean accepts that by reflecting on his concept of God, he grasps the essence of God which includes eternal existence, then it's hard to see how Gangadean could reject the Cartesian inference unless of course something can have as its very nature existence while failing to exist.

Where this leaves us is that regardless of whether or not Gangadean actually rejects the ontological argument, there's a question about whether on pain of inconsistency, he should. I think we have reason to think his views actually force him to accept Descartes Ontological argument for God's existence and so much worse for his view. This is the cost of his commitment to the claim that we can know the essences of things just by a priori, analysis of our concepts in conjunction with his definition of 'God'.

Contact

Since I've been getting some requests for my email address lately, here it is.

reasoniidoubt@gmail.com

Gangadeanian Cognitive Dissonance

Cognitive dissonance refers to the psychological phenomena wherein, a person holding(either tacitly or occurently) two or more beliefs that are in tension experiences a kind of mental discomfort. In crude terms, we sometimes have beliefs that are mutually incompatible or in some real tension, and the result is a kind of internal struggle. There are four options when we have such beliefs. 1) Let go of or otherwise revise one belief, 2) let go of or otherwise revise the other belief, 3) abandon or otherwise revise both, or 4) adopt another belief which entails that there is actually no tension between the two. I assume that Gangadeanians like the rest of us face cognitive dissonance regularly and in this post I want to talk about one particular juncture at which I experienced an episode when I was a Gangadeanian. My intent is not necessarily to be critical in this post, but rather provide an exploration for those wanting to understand Gangadeanian psychology a little bit more. I can't promise what I have to say generalizes to all or even most Gangadeanians, but I'd be quite surprised if it didn't apply to at least many of his followers. What will result is a partial account of why people who are defriended from Gangadeanians due to philosophical/theological disagreements might feel the extent of hurt that they often report.

Early on in my career as a philosopher, when I was still on team-Gangadean, and I had only taken a few undergrad courses in philosophy (mostly from Anderson) there was a time where things seemed rather straightforward to me. By 'things' I mean philosophical issues or problems. As a result, when in the presence of other students and philosophers not affiliated with Gangadean, I was often dismissive of analytic philosophy as well as the "problems" they found to be vexing and thus worth discussing. I often thought to myself, "they just aren't using the proper method--i.e., rational presuppositionalism, those well-educated fools!" "If only they would think of the less basic in light of the more basic!"  It wasn't until I entered grad school and had the opportunity to take a closer look at things, that I realized that I was seriously mistaken. It turns out philosophy really is that complicated. Deriving satisfying answers to fundamental problems is that tricky. Many philosophers are quite serious about answering them, but there's a reason why some foundational problems continue to be discussed at great length and this for thousands of years! Now I'm of the view that philosophy is not for the faint of heart or mind---you have to be okay with uncertainty.

I recall at one point, I finally began to entertain what I had to that point not really entertained seriously. Could I be wrong? Could Gangadean or Anderson, those that I had placed on the pedestal, actually be wrong? Maybe basic things are just not clear in the way that I had accepted. The cognitive dissonance arose in the following way. I believed Gangadean's doctrines concerning clarity. But I also noticed that people who appeared thoughtful, reflective, and otherwise quite rational didn't agree with me. Moreover, they raised problems for the Gangadeanian worldview (also my worldview at the time) that I didn't have ready answers for. I would often try to use the rhetoric that I was taught, although now that I reflect on it, I must report that it frequently felt insincere as if I were trying to trick my interlocutors to win the discussions and save face. So discomfort came to me in increasing degrees from one pair of beliefs in connection to a third. First, the clarity theses: i) basic things are clear to reason, and ii) one knows whatever is clear just in case one sincerely seeks. The clarity theses were in tension with my belief i) many philosophers that I knew didn't agree with me about the basic things (and so didn't know them), and ii) these philosophers were sincere, rational and intent on knowing the truth. This was the source of my cognitive dissonance. The two pairs were at odds with one another. I suspect, that if there are still any Gangadeanian lurkers at this blog (which I doubt) they can certainly relate to this feeling.

What is the Gangadeanian response to alleviate such dissonance?  Well, they are so committed to clarity (indeed there would be no Gangadeanian worldview without it), that the clarity theses are beyond revision or denial. So what gives is the other pair of beliefs. They adopt the following narrative: anyone that doesn't agree about basic things contrary to appearances, doesn't actually want to know or seek sincerely. This eventually leads to their making pejorative remarks about the field of philosophy--that it's a bunch of really smart people that don't really want to know the truth, but pretend that they do or are self-deceived into thinking they do. This is the sort of narrative that they tell themselves about persons like me. Adopting such narratives enables them to resolve the cognitive dissonance while maintaing that basic things are clear to reason + anyone at anytime that wants to know and seeks to know, will know all that is clear. 

Of course, there are lots of ways to resolve the dissonance--as I've said there are four general ways to resolve a tension between two views that one holds. But they opt for holding fast to one belief and denying the other. This approach is then further buttressed by a theological view about original sin and its noetic effects. "No one seeks not one", even if they appear to be seeking. So of course, we as Christians should expect people by in large to not seek to know and hence fail to know--so goes the thinking. (Yes, Gangadeanians make the exception of course--they manage to escape the scope of the quantifier "no one").

So in interacting with others outside their own, they have a fundamental view about the other. At least anybody that disagrees with them about foundational issues (and sometimes not so foundational) is someone that doesn't seek or at least doesn't seek consistently enough. The Gangadeanian commitment to the clarity theses are deep. Many of them probably feel like I did at one time before I decided to abandon ship. As if their entire lives would be in disarray, meaningless and the like if Gangadean were to turn out wrong. In fact, Anderson once in conversation told me that he wouldn't know anything at all, if the basic tenets of the church (including the clarity theses) turned out false. So as the Gangadeanians see it, there are significant psychological and practical costs associated the denial of clarity. We don't have to look far to see how they ever came under that spell. It's explicitly taught by Gangadean that without clarity all is meaningless (since meaning presupposes clarity)! It is no wonder that they adopt the narrative that any and all dissenters don't agree because they don't want to know the truth and thus don't seek sincerely. It is this background that you're going up against when you express disagreement with their foundational views.

Now if you've known any Gangadeanians previous to their becoming Gangadeanians, and try as you might, you just can't see eye-to-eye with them, or if you're like me and you once broke bread with them, before being kicked out and viewed as the enemy, then you know just what follows (for your relationships) from such a hardline position. Sometimes Gangadeanians act as if you can just make yourself believe what they believe (although I highly doubt they accept belief-voluntarism i.e., the view that believing is a matter of the will). Sometimes Gangadeanians forget that they are determinists and Calvinists and so believe that God has given them unmerited grace which was necessary for their seeking to know what is clear, and that God hasn't (on their view) extended this same grace to others which is what ultimately explains why people disagree with them. I suspect they haven't thought much about the appropriateness conditions of negative reactive attitudes, but there's a rather rich literature on that they might do well to consider.

Now as I've said, the commitment to the clarity theses and others is non-negotiable for them and this is what forces them to accept the view that anybody that disagrees with them about basic things doesn't actually want to know the truth. But to adopt such a view (which is radical in my eyes) in certain circumstances means overlooking lots of evidence to the contrary. When I reflect on my own experience, I find that reflecting on these considerations brings to the surface a plausible explanation for why people who are either kicked out of the church, or otherwise excluded by family members, friends (who are Gangadeanians) might feel hurt by members of the group.

I'm not particularly keen on sharing my own experience in this regard, but I think it might be instructive since I have particular insight into my own case. There were friends I had known for years who ultimately cut me out of their lives upon my exodus from the church and in keeping this here blog. Now it's quite likely that the justification they present to themselves for their choosing to sever our relationship is found in their adopting the position that I don't actually want to know the truth and as a result I've set up this blog to attack them, which is on their view likely to be the work of the devil. If I did want to know the truth, on their view, I would know and I certainly wouldn't keep a blog of this sort or continue to speak out against Gangadean. But to adopt such a position, they have to overlook or ignore any and all evidence to the contrary. And sometimes I wonder about that. Sometimes I wonder, if after years of close friendship, they didn't gather enough evidence to believe confidently that I am someone that wants to know the truth---that I work tirelessly (though of course, imperfectly) to know and that I care deeply about fundamental questions because I recognize how much they matter. After all, it's become my life's work. I'm certainly not in it for the "money" or "fame"!

Of course, you might wonder about some of the same things about me and my view of them. But our situations are far from symmetrical. The friendships I speak of, were ended entirely by the Gangadeanians. The purity of my motives constantly called into question and so little effort spent on trying to really understand my views. Of course, I have to adopt a narrative about how they, despite being good-natured and otherwise rational people, don't see what I take to be rather obvious truths (that Gangadeanism is gravely mistaken). However, I alleviate the cognitive dissonance in a different way and a way that I find far more plausible and far less uncharitable about the character of the others. I maintain that they are sincere in their pursuit of truth or at least no less sincere than most (nobody is perfect in this respect of course). I can maintain the evidence supporting this view which I gathered over the years of our friendships--I don't have to throw that out. But the reason they don't see the truth is that they are ill-informed and stuck in a seductive way of thinking that they can't see beyond. It's understandable. Philosophy is really difficult. It takes years of specialized training, just like anything else. And the people in power have a way of spinning sophistries, of indoctrinating persons with certain kinds of vulnerabilities and controlling them in subtle ways. It happened to me and I suspect under the right circumstances, it can happen to anyone.

What all of this suggests to me is a part of an explanation for why people who have either left the Gangadean fold and been unfriended by the group, or else people who have experienced strains on their relationships with Gangadeanians because of core disagreements, feel the extent of hurt that they feel. The Gangadeanians essentially have to adopt a view that you're fundamentally flawed. You don't care to know the truth and so you don't actually seek to know. You're in it for the lolz or for self-aggrandizement, or for some other nefarious purpose. This wipes away whatever evidence they have gathered to the contrary. Perhaps it tosses out years of loyal friendship. On their view, you're basically a terrible human being (at least on their notion of what it means to be human!).

Followup

I added a couple of paragraphs to my last post so be sure and check them out!

On the possibility that matter is eternal.

As of 9/6/16, I've added a couple of paragraphs to draw out the implications a bit more. I've placed '***' next to them for your convenience.

I've been deep in my own research and so have been too preoccupied lately to attend to the blog. Anyway, I ran into an article while reading up on modern cosmology that I thought was relevant to a recent post of mine. There, I argued that Gangadean has failed to prove that the material universe can't be eternal (or more generally, that matter can't be eternal which would entail the former). In fact, I think it's a terrible argument.

Gangadean (at times) must be aware that he hasn't proven as much because as I pointed out, he shifts to talk about there being "no reasons" to believe that matter is self-maintaining and hence this supposedly gives him reason to believe that it can't be eternal (see pg. 55 of Philosophical Foundations). And I think Gangadean is simply confused at this point. Stating some positive evidence for p is by no means proof of p, but rather inclines one to present an inductive argument for p. Moreover, there's the issue of whether the absence of evidence is evidence of absence. In other words, even if it were true that there's no current evidence that the universe is self-maintaining/eternal, or that matter is, we need to ask whether that fact in turn is positive evidence that it isn't self-maintaining/eternal. And it's far from clear that this is so. Our body of evidence is in flux, and there's much we don't know or have access to. But beyond that, Gangadean needs more than mere positive evidence for his conclusion (that matter is not eternal) anyway because his project is to provide a deductive, knock-down, drag out, proof for Theism.

The other point I mentioned before is that Gangadean and his camp must rest their philosophical claims on what the "experts" of modern science tell them--because his main arguments as it concerns matter not being eternal, depend on empirical (a posteriori) claims (indeed they must, because the very existence of matter is an empirical issue). Let's ignore the thorny, but real epistemological problem that arises here--how do you know when someone is an expert or trustworthy source about some topic X, when you yourself are not qualified as an expert or trustworthy source about X? Indeed, Gangadean or the bulk of us for that matter are simply in no place to conduct the necessary experiments or work through the complicated mathematics involved. So there are serious issues for Gangadean's worldview. If he fails to prove that matter cannot even possibly be eternal, and he must rest even one of his premises on the testimony of "experts" concerning empirical matters, then any demonstrative proof is simply beyond reach and proclamations of the clarity of God's existence are beyond the pale--Gangadean's worldview is in serious danger.

Here's an article by a cosmologist Don Page who also happens to be a Christian. And here's the relevant passage. (Don Page was weighing in on the debate between Sean Carroll and William Lane Craig).

On the issue of whether our universe had a beginning, besides not believing that this is at all relevant to the issue of whether or not God exists, I agreed almost entirely with Sean’s points rather than yours, Bill, on this issue. We simply do not know whether or not our universe had a beginning, but there are certainly models, such as Sean’s with Jennifer Chen (hep-th/0410270 and gr-qc/0505037), that do not have a beginning. I myself have also favored a bounce model in which there is something like a quantum superposition of semiclassical spacetimes (though I don’t really think quantum theory gives probabilities for histories, just for sentient experiences), in most of which the universe contracts from past infinite time and then has a bounce to expand forever. In as much as these spacetimes are approximately classical throughout, there is a time in each that goes from minus infinity to plus infinity (emphasis mine). 

So here's an "expert" telling us that we simply don't know whether or not the universe had a beginning (and no doubt other "experts" like Sean Carroll and Jennifer Chen agree). That is, there are theories according to which, the universe didn't have a beginning. This roughly translates to it being at least possible that the universe didn't have a beginning--models have to be self-contained, internally consistent, and make empirical predictions, among other things to pass as models. Remember a proposition p is clear according to Gangadean if and only if the opposite of p is not possible. So plug in 'matter is not eternal' for p and you see that Gangadean must show that the proposition 'matter is not eternal' is not even possibly true. But here you have cosmologists telling us that it's at least possible that the universe is eternal because there might be mechanisms which enable it to be so. Given something like a correspondance theory of truth, that means the proposition "matter is eternal" is possibly true. Note, this isn't arguing that being comes from non-being (which is what the Gangadeanians might be inclined to try and force out).

Recall that in his book, Gangadean mentions philosophical problems with particular models (like that of Stephen Hawking) which suggest an eternal universe. This is part of his main argument for the claim that matter is not eternal. So he does in fact take the testimony of such "experts" seriously and he should (otherwise he couldn't accept the principle that entropy increases in a closed system--although many such experts speak of this as probabilistic rather than categorical as I've mentioned before). But as I've said, his criticisms are going to be limited to just those models (and those relevantly like them) that he has considered. More generally, to point out problems in current models is to do just that--point out that given our current evidence, it doesn't look probable that the universe/matter is eternal (or that it doesn't look probable that it's possible that the universe is eternal). That's the upper limit of what Gangdean can do. If he want's proof, or clarity or whatever, he's got to rule out even the logical possibility that matter is eternal. In order to do that, he's got to consider every last model--past, present, and even future (those models that haven't even yet been developed), and then show that all of them have (or at least will have) irreconcilable problems. We have an example of a cosmologist mentioning a couple of such models and there are many more (see multiverse theories). We also have to consider those that are in the process of being developed and those that will in the future be developed as we learn more and more about the cosmos.

***It's important to keep in mind just how principled this objection is and so how serious a problem it is for Gangadean. You see, substantive claims about matter are by their very nature empirically got (i.e., we have to observe the way that matter behaves to know things about it). This involves our fallible perceptual faculties, our fallible inductive and abductive reasoning, as well as our fallible practice of making generalizations from a sample. You can observe how a flamingo behaves, or even a great many of them at one point in time, but you can't be certain how the next flamingo will behave. So it is with the universe. So it is with bits of matter. You can make probabilistic claims or generalizations based on prior observations that are for all intents and purposes quite rational, but if you're after certainty,  you're going to be disappointed. Moving up a level of abstraction, we can apply the same inductive problem as it concerns cosmological models--even if some fail, it doesn't follow that all will fail. In other words, Gangadean must depend on what are observation-induction-based premises to support the claim that necessarily, matter is not eternal. But that reeks havoc for his project because such claims will ever be at the mercy of empirical fortune--it will depend on how the science turns out on the final reckoning. And science as well as common sense observation, if anything, has faced radical revisions throughout history (think about quantum mechanics vs. classical physics vs. Aristotelian physics or the Copernican revolution for instance). So even in principle, we can't have clarity or certainty regarding substantive claims about things like whether matter is eternal or not. Notice this is true even if I grant team-Gangadean the laws of thought and the "intuitive grasping of concepts" so that we can be certain of trivialities like "matter is matter" and "matter is not non-matter". Obviously, his argument against the possibility of matter being eternal depends on the substantive claims rather than on mere trivialities-- he's got to prove beyond any possible doubt that matter is not "self-maintaining" and that "if it's eternal, then it's self-maintaining" and the like. That means we can't have certainty that God exists. Again to reiterate, models featuring an eternal universe, aren't necessarily making the claim that "being comes from non-being". Instead the strategy is to suggest that we don't know all that much about the nature of the cosmos, or matter and thus we can't (rationally), from the armchair, rule out the possibility that we might learn surprising things about it in the future.

Now my point is not that any of these theories represents what's actual or even what's probably actual. If you're thinking to yourself, "well, yeah there are these theories, but we don't know that they are true or they seem unlikely to be true" then you're barking up the wrong tree. In fact, I find multi-verse theories (i.e., the view that our observable universe is among an ensemble of universes to be unlikely or fanciful--although I'm by no means even close to being certain). But if you think this is somehow an objection against what I've said earlier, then you're not distinguishing between actuality and possibility and that's a crucial distinction when talking about clarity. This is because Gangadean has set the epistemological bar so high and he falls on his own sword. Again according to Gangadean, for some claim to be clear, the opposite of that claim must be impossible. He doesn't say that p is clear if and only if the opposite of the claim is merely non-actual, untrue or probably untrue or even probably impossible. If p is clear to reason, then ~p must be impossible, full-stop. That's what's at stake here and that's where all the problems arise.

On such a standard (Gangadean's own standard) he fails. This is because at least one of the premises upon which his argument rests could be false i.e., it's possible that the universe is "self-maintaining". Moreover, it's possible that his first premise is false. That is, it might be false that "if the universe is eternal, then it is self-maintaining" (I'm also inclined to wonder at this point exactly what Gangadean means by 'self-maintaining' in the first place and see whether cosmologists find it even intelligible). The point is, we just don't know with certainty one way or another. In order to succeed, he's got to show that no consistent model of an eternal universe has or ever will be developed--and I haven't a clue how he or anyone could achieve a thing like that. Pointing out problems with a few dated models is no good (note even his criticisms against Hawking's model doesn't show us that these problems are theoretically irreconcilable. Gangadean's criticisms actually depend on "current" understandings of the cosmos and such knowledge changes with new findings). This means that proof that matter is not eternal, and thus that God must exist is simply beyond reach at least insofar as Gangadean is concerned. This is because his argument for God's existence depends on his first proving that matter is not eternal. So it's not clear that God exists. Importantly, this is so even if we grant Gangadean that the "laws of thought" are clear to reason.

p.s. Alternatively, he could fuss over the meaning of 'possibility' so that the standards for model building in cosmology don't represent what is possible or possibly true. In other words, he could insist that cosmologists have built self-contained models where matter is eternal, but this doesn't represent what is possible in the relevant sense. But this approach would be unpromising for Gangadean. The natural question to ask would be why we should trust Gangadean's dictionary--what makes it the authority on semantic matters? Of course, he could merely presuppose that his definition is the correct one as he often does (I've called this "semantic chauvinism" in the past), but that's rationally unacceptable in the current dispute (that would be the very thing at issue!). Thus he'd have to tell us how he's certain that his definition is the correct one in light of the lexical disagreement with cosmologists and I've said more than enough about why that is problematic for his worldview before.

***Nor will it help one bit to claim that what I'm doing is "appealing to ignorance/unknown" which is a common move that Gangadeanians make at such a juncture. That's rubbish. Remember Gangadean is the one making the claim that God's existence is clear to reason so that you're basically closing your mind to reason if you aren't absolutely certain that God exists. That is to say, his main project and the foundation of his entire ministry and life's work is to demonstrate to all of us that God exists and that denying God's existence is tantamount to denying that a circle is not a square. It's supposed to be that obvious if only you'll use reason consistently! To get there, he needs to show that it's patently obvious that matter/the cosmos isn't even possibly eternal (and that this is knowable at all times to all persons). So all I'm doing is holding him to this. I'm suggesting that he arbitrarily and self-servingly helps himself to the following restriction: he thinks that proof of a hypothesis H, consists in showing that a few of the current alternatives to H are not true. But why should anybody accept this restriction? No, if you want certainty or clarity so that no persons ever are with excuse for unbelief, you need a far less restricted domain--Gangadean needs to show that all alternatives are not possibly true and it seems simply impossible for him to make good on that.

Anderson on Intuitions vs. Immediately Known Truths (edited)

(I made some substantial edits particularly in the latter half of this article, so I'm reposting this).

Anderson has recently written about what he perceives to be the problem of depending on intuitions here. I have mentioned on many occasions that we all depend on intuitions including Gangadean. But Gangadean also speaks out against the use of intuitions and so finds himself in a pickle of inconsistency. The reason that the hypocrisy isn't immediately apparent is because he throws around expressions like "reason is authoritative" and "the laws of thought are self-evident".  This is nothing more than a smokescreen. Anderson's recent post illustrates this nicely. He writes:

Not all that is immediate is an intuition. The important piece is to determine what is the highest authority and can be used to critically examine intuitions. For instance, the law of non-contradiction is not an intuition. Intuitions, and any thought at all, presuppose it. Something might seem to be true but not actually be true. The skeptic says we cannot know because all we have are intuitions. The fideist agrees we cannot know but says we must choose to believe something. 

I appreciate this comment because it does a great job of showing how the rational presuppositionalism that Gangadean develops is about critically examining assumptions only to an arbitrary set point. Here are the main points from Anderson's post.

1) There is immediate knowledge that is not intuition.  

2) The laws of thought are not (known via) intuitions, but are immediately known.  

3) Intuitions presuppose the laws of thought.  

We should treat each of these claims like any other claims. We should ask whether they are true and what reasons we have for accepting them. So is it true that there is immediate knowledge that is not intuition? Are the laws of thought instances of such? Now, as I understand intuitions, they are by definition those things that are known immediately or non-inferentially. So definitionally, 1) and 2) are false by my lights. Anderson seems to have a different and more narrow definition associated with 'intuition' (although he doesn't say what that is) and I've already talked about the dispute over definitions at length here. Suffice it to say, since Anderson views the inability of a worldview to rationally settle any and all disputes as a serious weakness for that worldview, he had better show us how rational presuppositionalism can settle our lexical dispute at this point or else his system is bust and this from his own perspective.

And it seems to me that 1) simply presupposes his unspecified theory or definition of 'intuition' (or else how could he make a distinction?). So in addition to wondering how Anderson knows that his account of 'intuition' is correct, we need also ask, how does Anderson know with certainty that 1) is true? What reasons can he give us to think there's a difference? We shouldn't agree with every proposal for a distinction--some purported distinctions are unmotivated. In fact, I suspect Anderson is going to have to say that he just knows 1) immediately. But again, why think that this is anything other than an intuition? Because he says so? Hardly.

Similarly, how does one know 2)? How does he know that the laws of thought are not known via intuitions? Likewise, with 3). How does he know that all intuitions presuppose the laws of thought? Indeed, there's a more general question in relation to 3): how does anybody know when one proposition presupposes another? Again, no reason is given for such substantive and foundational claims. All Anderson has done is asserted them.

This is what I think is going on. Anderson realizes that he's got to start with claims that aren't proven (Gangadean speaks of "the first act of reason" as that of "grasping" concepts). You can't have deductive arguments for everything because deductive arguments need premises. You've got to start somewhere. But he also criticizes appeals to intuitions as unreliable. So he can't say that we know the laws of thought, our own existence, or anything for that matter, on the basis of intuition. His solution is to invent fancy labels that have the appearance of intellectual rigor. He tries to force a new distinction between "immediately known" claims on the one hand and intuitions on the other. It's his way of having his cake and eating it too. But that only brings us back to one of my questions about 1). Why should we accept such a distinction as reflective of reality?

As far as I can tell it's entirely unmotivated excepting for the fact that it helps the Gangadeanian worldview avoid certain criticisms. Philosophers refer to such illegitimate moves as ad hoccery. In fact, this is not a new move. Gangadean once tried to make the distinction between "rational intuitions" and "non-rational intuitions" with me before. Anderson is essentially trying to do the same but with different words. Both Anderson's and Gangadean's attempts rise and fall together. Just as both are unmotivated distinctions, they also face a problem of criteria. That is, even if we assume that there is a real distinction here, the problem then becomes how it is that Anderson (or anybody for that matter) can determine when a proposition is "immediately known" or the result of a "rational intuition" on the one hand, and "mere-intuition" on the other.  Surely, we don't want to say that everything that anybody ever refers to as "immediately-known" is thereby immediately known. That would make such knowledge too cheap. At this point it's quite easy to give unhelpful and question-begging responses, and that's all I've heard from the Gangadeanian camp. But I would hope that they could provide responses that don't already assume certain things as "rational intuitions" or "immediately known".

I've had a number of conversations with Gangdeanians about many of these points and it's as if they can't even begin appreciating the questions or perhaps they are to some extent unwilling. They just don't ask about the truth of 1), 2) and 3). They don't ask how they know such things. It's as if it just doesn't occur to them. Hence, they take Gangadean or Anderson's assertions on these matters as articles of faith. This is perhaps why I get some version of 1), 2), and 3) simply reiterated to me in response to my questions about how we can know 1), 2) and 3).

In fact, there's another way we can approach the matter as it concerns Anderson's three claims. For instance, suppose we want to evaluate Anderson's claim that knowing something via an intuition presupposes the law of non-contradiction (i.e., his claim 3). The question on hand is how he knows with certainty that intuitions depend on the law of non-contradiction. I suspect he will claim that such things are known 'immediately, but not via intuition' and it's just the sort of thing I want to say is known via intuition. But we can adopt a neutral vocabulary at this point so as not to prejudge the issue. Let's call whatever process or means by which he knows the likes of 3), 'X'.

We can then raise the question in the following manner. How does Anderson know that X is a perfectly reliable means of knowing 3)? He might try to say something like, "well X is that which makes thinking possible and so it must be reliable." But that only introduces another proposition which he presumes to know and so pushes the question back a level. This new proposition, we'll call it '4)', is the following (I'll omit the second conjunct for the sake of simplicity).

4) X makes thinking possible.  

But how does Anderson know 4)? That is, how does he know that X is that which makes thinking possible? Well, either this involves another process call it Y, or else it depends on the very process by which he knows 3) namely, X. If the former, then we can generate a new question about how he knows that Y is a reliable means of knowing and we approach an infinite regress. If the latter, then his account is circular--it presupposes that X is reliable in order to argue that X is reliable. Alternatively, we can just take the reliability of X on faith. To be clear, my point is not to say that these latter two options are bad in fact, many philosophers (myself included) take certain claims as basic--namely, those which are known via intuitions. Instead what I'm saying is that Anderson's distinction does no better. It too must take certain claims on faith. And then the question is how this is really different from trusting one's intuition. 

Anderson and Gangadean have a rather Cartesian approach. They want to find that which can't possibly be questioned as the foundation for all knowledge. In these terms I can drive my point of criticism home. In effect, what I am asking is how one can know when something can't be questioned. That is, what is the process by which you determine that some proposition can't be doubted or questioned? Gangadeanians say if something makes questioning possible, it can't be questioned. But that only pushes the line of inquiry back a step. How does one know that? Or how does one know when something makes questioning possible? At some point, the Gangadeanian will say that somethings are immediately known, and I will say that it's via an intuition. What I'm proposing now is that we call this process 'X'. Doing so not only keeps both sides honest, it starts to reveal how useless the distinction that Anderson introduced actually is. Even if it's motivated (which it isn't), it just doesn't do the work that Anderson or any Gangdaeanian needs for their worldview. This is because however X differs from intuition, it has this in common by Anderson's own admission: it's an immediate process. And what 'immediate' means in the current context is that it isn't mediated via anything like logical inferences or arguments. You either come to accept immediately apprehended claims or you don't. If one does and another doesn't, there's no public or "objective" process to evaluate. You haven't got anything like a deductive argument with logical inferences to consider. So Anderson can call the process by which he knows the most basic of his beliefs whatever he likes. It's of no consequence. It simply doesn't help insulate him against my criticisms of inconsistency because all the purported problems he raises against intuitions apply to his favored "immediately known truths" solely in virtue of them being immediate. We can't independently determine either as reliable (we take their reliability on faith) and we have no "objective measure" by which to settle disputes should they arise.

The upshot is this: Anderson wants to crap on intuitions (qua the starting points of philosophy). He tries to offer an alternative by distinguishing between intuitions and "immediately known truths". But we have no good reason to accept this distinction as reflective of reality or even if we did, it utterly fails to guard the Gangadeanian worldview from charges of inconsistency anyway.

> 10,000 Pageviews!

I noticed today that this blog has reached over 10,000 pageviews (10,021 to be exact). Thanks for reading.

It's Not "Clear" that Matter is NOT Eternal.

Gangadean purports to demonstrably prove that matter cannot be eternal. I've noted before how even if he were successful at this, it's not enough to get him to the conclusion that therefore some spirit/mind must be eternal. This is because he helps himself to an unsupported dichotomy in the process.  I suspect when pressed on it, he will try to support it merely on dialectical-historical grounds: "most everyone believes that there are at most two substances in the world". But that's no good. In my mind, this issue alone blocks his purported deduction to the existence of God and undermines his view that it is clear to reason that God exists. It's enough to show that Gangadean fails at what he takes to be so central to life--to show that God's existence is clear to reason.

I've also pointed out before that Gangadean appeals to empirical findings, and the testimony of "expert" scientists in his appeals to entropy to argue that matter cannot be eternal. Sure entropy is often taken for granted by cosmologists, but it's ultimately based on empirical observations, and inductive reasoning. The point is, it is at least possible (in the strict logical sense) that we're actually mistaken that it's an exceptionless law. In fact, physicists say that entropy very probably increases in a closed system and so while Gangadean needs it to be certainly exceptionless, scientists tend not to express such certainty in it (I'm told that the probability that entropy increases in a closed system is only very close to 1). Hence any argument that depends on the entropic principle as something entirely generalizable, and exceptionless is problematic. That is to say, Gangadean can't claim to have proven that matter is not eternal insofar as his argument appeals to entropy as a premise. At best what he could say is that, given our current science, or given what purported experts currently tell us, matter is very likely not eternal. What he should do if he's being consistent is to prove that our current science is correct about entropy, and further that all material systems conform to it (without even the possibility of exception), or that the cosmologists and physicists can't possibly be wrong or lying about their deliberations. Hence some of what I say will touch on what I've already written, but I wanted to further develop my previous thoughts.

Here's the big picture of what is to follow. On numerous occasions, I've charged that Gangadean's worldview is internally inconsistent. One way that he is inconsistent is that he claims that knowledge requires certainty/clarity and you can only arrive at such knowledge in one of two ways: 1) via a sound deductive argument, or 2) by "grasping" (I say, intuiting) a "self-attesting principle". But on occasion, Gangadean loses sight of this--and claims to know things that are neither proven by deductive inference from only indubitable premises, nor "self-attesting". The view that matter is not-self-maintaining and thus can't be eternal, is one such claim. And that's a very serious problem for his worldview.

Starting on pg 53 of his book, Gangadean states that for a thing to be eternal, it must be self-maintaining. But he claims the material world, and universe aren't self-maintaining. Therefore, neither are they eternal. He breaks the argument into three parts, but I must say I'm a little confused. He argues for the following:

1) The material world as a whole is not self-maintaining.
2) The material world in its parts is not self-maintaining.
3) The material universe as a whole is not self-maintaining.

I'm not sure what the material world in contradistinction to the universe is. Maybe the material world = earth? Or our solar system? Galaxy? In philosophy, its common to talk about a world as the entirety of reality. So I'm not quite sure what he's up to. In fact it would seem to make more sense for him to have argued that the material universe as a whole and in its parts is not self-maintaining, since that would cover everything material. In any case, I try to keep his terminology in mind, but it gets a bit confusing.

1) Against the idea that the "material world as a whole" is self-maintaining, he notes that the world is highly differentiated (between hot and cold, wet and dry, etc). I won't press him on this even though one wonders how on his worldview a person could be certain of such empirical facts. Further, he presupposes that the material world (and the physical universe?) follows the exceptionless propensity towards reaching sameness (the second law of thermodynamics). According to Gangadean, that's enough to determine that the material world as a whole is not self-maintaining. And this is where things get bad. He gives us examples from common experience: for instance, a hot coffee cup sitting in room temperature for long enough will instantiate a kind of equilibrium or "sameness". Apart from some of the other epistemological issues I've raised above (and in previous posts), a careful read of the text reveals just how far from "clarity" Gangadean has gotten in trying to argue that the material world is not eternal. Here's a quote.

In general, therefore, there is no reason to believe that the material world is self-maintaining. There is every reason to believe that the material world, governed by the law of entropy, is not self-maintaining (55, italics mine). 

Now Gangadean is full aware that he's resting on scientific theories. They are fallible. They depend on inductive generalizations which are very different things from deductions or Gangadean's purported "self-attesting principles". So instead of saying that he's just proven that the material world is not self-maintaining and instead of saying that he's just proven that the material world is governed uniformly by the law of entropy, he talks about "reasons" for and against the pertinent claims. I hope you see this vital difference. To talk about the presence or absence of reasons, in the current context, is to talk about the currently available evidence. It allows for the possibility that we don't have all the evidence or even the majority of the possible evidence. And if it's at least possible that you don't have all the pertinent evidence, if it's possible that new evidence might come along some day, it means that whatever conclusions you draw on the basis of your current evidence, could be mistaken! What this means is that on Gangadean's conception of clarity (a proposition P is clear to reason if and only if you have determined that the opposite of P is not even possible), it's simply not clear to reason that the world as a whole is not self-maintaining. So at least as this argument is concerned, it's not clear to reason that the world as a whole is not eternal.

2) Gangadean goes on to talk about the universe in it's parts. He talks about the sun for instance presumably as a paradigm part of the universe from which he can generalize (that's an issue I'll talk about later). Here's what he says about the sun.

We can know the sun will burn out without learning this from science. The sun is finite in size, and so are the stars. This is obvious to any casual observer. Anyone who wants to can see this...The sun is giving off heat. Anyone with ordinary sense experience can see this. If the sun is limited in size and giving off heat it cannot do so forever...The sun could not therefore have been burning forever. (53). 

I don't quite get this. I mean, he's skeptical of sense impressions when he criticizes empiricism as a way of knowing things. But now he's suddenly very trustful of ordinary sense impressions (even those of the "abused child in Ubangi Bangi"). I get that he's originally arguing against something like pure-empiricism, the view that all we can know is via our perceptual faculties. You need reason, too. I get that. But then what role is reason playing here? This is where he runs into a Cartesian puzzle. If our senses are not always reliable, if they are fallible, then how can we distinguish between those times when they are trustworthy and when they are not? How can we ever trust our senses without being arbitrary? Again, what role is "reason" playing here to solve the troubles that plague empiricism? He had better answer this before he takes for granted that we could know (with certainty) that the sun is finite in size and giving off heat via mere sense impressions. Plus, there's something odd going on here. It's one thing for us modern folk who purport to know all kinds of things about the sun and about thermodynamics. I say "purport to know" because on Gangadean's definition of knowledge, I doubt that such empirical knowledge is possible. But ignoring that for the moment, I just don't see how Gangadean can claim that "anyone with ordinary sense experience" can know that the sun can't give off heat forever.

You see, Gangadean is resting his case on a generalization that he thinks any thinking person should make. Now, suppose he's right that anybody at any time in history could know with certainty that the sun cannot have been burning forever. Since Gangadean is using this claim to argue that anybody "with ordinary sense impressions" could know the further claim that every part of the material world is not self-maintaining, he's got to think that all rational persons should make the generalization from things like the sun to all parts of the universe. He's got to think that this generalization is truth-conducive. But it's not. It's fallacious. It's a hasty generalization because the material universe is a vast thing comprised of a wide array of things we call "matter". Is it obvious to all thinking persons (at all times) that elementary particles behave like the sun in the relevant respects? Hardly. People at one time didn't even know that fundamental particles existed. Not everything that is true about objects of ordinary experience (medium sized objects) applies to everything in the universe. For instance, things like a table, a house, the sun, an apple all have the property of being visible to the naked eye. It doesn't follow that therefore everything that exists in the universe is visible to the naked eye--consider elementary particles, atoms, cells, and the like. So Gangadean is basically saying that all persons at all times should have made or should make a hasty generalization--but that's no way of coming to know about reality and certainly not a means to achieving certainty. It wasn't in the past, and it isn't now, and it isn't a way of knowing in Ubangi Bangi or anywhere else for that matter.

The other problem is that, even if it weren't a hasty generalization, it's still a generalization which is a form of inductive inference. Inductive generalizations don't provide deductive proof--that's a definitional point. Nor do they provide a "self-attesting" principle (another definitional point). In other words, what we have is that it's simply not clear to reason the universe in all it's parts is not self-maintaining (and hence we can't know with certainty that the universe is not eternal). In sum, it's not clear to reason that the universe in all its parts is not self-maintaining. It wasn't clear to reason in the past, and it isn't currently.

3) Finally, Gangadean attempts to argue that the universe as a whole is not self-maintaining and therefore can't be eternal. He speaks of big bang cosmology as the current view and then discusses problems for a couple of models that maintain both the big bang and the eternality of the universe. The first he refers to as "the Big Bang Oscillating Universe theory" and the second, "the Inflationary theory of the Big Bang". He says that the problems are both empirical and logical. The empirical ones have very limited application--they are problems facing these particular models or at most, particular kinds of models. For instance, of the first kind of theory he writes:

given our current understanding of the cosmos there is not enough mass in the known physical universe to allow gravity to pull the expanding universe back in order for the Big Bang to occur again. This is the problem of dark matter, which has been proposed to be present and yet not detected...No proposal has received general acceptance and the problem persists (54).

Ok, so it's "given our current understanding of the cosmos" that his criticism is supposed to apply. Further, there is not widely accepted theory of dark matter. I must say I don't understand this last bit. Assuming he's right (notice he provides no citation), what does it matter that there isn't a consensus on a particular theory of dark matter? After all, there is hardly any consensus on most philosophical matters like the thesis that God exists, and yet nevertheless he thinks it's true and clear to reason. He goes on to add,

On the face of it, there is no warrant, except the requirement of assumption, for saying the Big Bang will be repeated. Left to itself the universe will come to sameness and die a heat death. It is not self-maintaining. But claims regarding missing mass, like all empirical claims, are technically falsifiable. There is warrant for saying the physical universe as a whole is not self-maintaining. But this warrant based on missing mass, falls short of proof (ibid, italics mine).

Again, Gangadean assumes entropy as exceptionless and we've already discussed why that is not going to help him in his project of proving anything. What I appreciate about this bit though is that Gangadean is finally self-aware. He realizes that this empirically based objection, assuming it's all correct, at best gives one evidence for the claim that the universe is not self-maintaining. He realizes he needs something much stronger. Still, this is only partially correct because once again he's generalizing with haste. That a particular model, namely what he calls the Big Bang Oscillating Universe theory, faces a problem of dark matter doesn't mean that all current and future models of the universe will.

Further, Gangadean writes

Suppose the missing mass were found, and in just the right amounts, there would be a second problem of a different kind which logically encounters the problem of entropy. Since the force pulling the universe in is said to generate the force that will push the universe out again rather than the universe ending as a black hole, at some point the force pulling in would have to equal the force pushing out. At that point equilibrium would be reached and the process of expansion and contraction would come to an end. The universe would reach sameness in entropy. It would not be self-maintaining and therefore it could not be eternal (54). 

At this point, he's making some substantive empirical predictions about cosmology (does he take himself to be a cosmologist now?). For instance, just how does he know with certainty that equilibrium would be reached as a result of expansion and contraction? He's just asserted as much, but why should we believe him? In fact, in principle it isn't the sort of thing that can be proven in the deductive sense. Again it's a prediction made from a particular cosmological model which itself is informed by certain empirically based assumptions. That's no way to proving that the universe cannot even in principle be self-maintaining. So while at the end of the previous quote, he made the self-conscious admission that his problem for a particular model didn't do enough to prove that the universe is not self-maintaing, his second purported problem does no better.

Gangadean closes this bit with the following.

At this point we are beyond empirical claims, on either side of the issue...Logical objections to non-empirical claims must be logically met (ibid). 

Ok, but what are the logical objections? He's given us two empirically loaded objections which do nothing to prove that the universe is not self-maintaing. That's it, so I'm confused.

So much for that, onto the next model that he raises problems for i.e., the Inflationary theory of the Big Bang. This discussion was no less disappointing to me and no more informative. He speaks of Alan Guth's model involving a distinction between a true vacuum and a false vacuum. The details aren't important for our purposes at this point. Suffice it to say, there are problems with the model and Gangadean insists that such a model, despite the window-dressing, ultimately depends on the idea that being (energy) can come from non-being (the true vacuum). He concludes then with the following.

These three reasons--not enough mass, force in would equal force out, and true vacuum to false vacuum as being from non-being--refute the claim that as a whole the physical universe is self maintaining. Neither in general nor in its parts, nor as a whole is it self-maintaining...And it is clear. One has to give up reason to believe that being can come from non-being in the inflationary view of the Big Bang (55).  

Now this is sloppy. Remember at this point he's considered two particular cosmological models and pointed out potential problems for them. Two problems face the first model, but they aren't logical problems that undermine the very coherence of the models. On the contrary, Gangadean has to assume some empirical assumptions (which he just can't know with certainty) in order to raise those very purported problems. So at best they provide Gangadean with some warrant to believe that a particular model (to wit, the Big Bang Oscillating Universe theory) is incorrect. Then he moves on to talk about Guth's model and claims that it posits being from non-being. Suppose Gangadean is right. What has he shown? Well, at best, he's shown that Guth's model doesn't work. That's it. Importantly, that's not the same as proving that the universe is not self-maintaining.

The trouble is Gangadean needs to prove a far more general point for his purposes. He's got to show that it's a logical impossibility that the material universe is self-maintaining. That is to say, that no coherent model of any kind which "represents" a material yet eternal universe could even in principle be discovered or articulated. I don't know how he, or anyone for that matter, could prove a thing like that. Pointing out some problems with a couple very specific models, which depend on certain assumptions (e.g., classical space-time as opposed to quantum mechanics), doesn't show that a self-maintaining universe is an impossibility. That's just a bad inference. Nor does it show that an eternal universe is an impossibility.

Nor is my point an "appeal to unknown" as the Gangadeanian might be tempted to say. As best as I can understand such a "fallacy", it simply doesn't apply when dealing with Gangadean. This is because it's Gangadean that claims that it is clear to reason that matter is not eternal, and that means he has to be able to demonstrate that it's not even in principle possible that matter is eternal--which means it's not even possible that a coherent model of an eternal or self-maintaining material cosmos could ever be developed. I'm just asking him to make good on his own project. That's not an appeal to unknown or if it is, I can't see why it would be a bad thing.

Nor is my point to adjudicate between particular models in cosmology. I doubt that most of us are qualified to do so since they are sophisticated mathematical models that make predictions of phenomena that the layman generally don't have access to (which presents a problem for Gangadean itself). Instead, Gangadean makes my job way easier because he holds everyone to such a ludicrous standard of knowledge. Hence, for our purposes, it's enough to point out that Gangadean has no way of proving that all and every model of the cosmos where the universe is self-maintaining or eternal, is incorrect.

Importantly, my main point is that Gangadean hasn't shown that it is "clear to reason" that material universe is not self-maintaining (neither in general, nor in its parts, nor as a whole). That means he hasn't proven that the material universe is not eternal. This means it's not clear to reason that material monism is false and so it's not clear to reason that God exists.


Postscript:

It just occurred to me that the kind of clarity that Gangadean is arguing for (that matter can't possibly be eternal) is also something that's supposed to be knowable to all persons and at all times. Assume for the sake of discussion that 2nd law of thermodynamics is infallible grounds for believing that the universe cannot be self-maintaining. Still, could a person living long before the discovery and articulation of the second law of thermodynamics (prior to the late 1800's) have known that entropy uniformly increases in a closed system? Of course not. It took a particular kind of development in the sophistication of science and empirical testing for us to get to that point. Insofar as knowing that God exists requires that one rule out the possibility of an eternal material cosmos (which is what Gangadean claims), I can't see how God's existence is clear or knowable to persons that couldn't know (with certainty) about entropy. This too seems to be a serious problem for Gangadean's clarity thesis.

Gangadeanian Instructors: A Conflict of Interest?

Gangadeanians are found throughout the valley in the capacity of instructors in various public and private institutions (at both secondary and post-secondary levels). It is primarily how most members and attendees of the church ended up at Westminster Fellowship (hereafter WF). I'm no exception. Along with a couple of friends, I took a number of classes taught by a Gangadeanian and this played a significant role in our eventual introduction to Gangadean's church. Inspired by some recent events, I've started wondering what happens when students, who attend Gangadean's church continue to take classes under a Gangadeanian. Are there any potential worries about relationship dynamics and conflicts of interest? That's what I want to explore.

Not only is a large portion of the congregation comprised of those that took classes with a Gangadeanian, but also current members of the church are encouraged to continue taking a set of classes taught by other Gangadeanians in the name of "laying a foundation". This set of courses, comprised something like a core introduction to philosophy as Gangadean saw things.

Now as I mentioned, some friends and I, had taken classes with a Gangadeanian and this played a role in our eventually attending the church. This same instructor eventually became our "small group leader" at the church and also a personal friend. But what's interesting is that my peers and I continued to take classes under this person even after our relationship with the instructor had changed to be of a more personal nature. It wasn't only that, but a number of other members of the church also enrolled in these classes and for a while, Gangadeanians were everywhere. Now to be clear, I'm not suggesting any foul play in our particular situation. I have no reason to think that this instructor "took it easy on us" in anyway. As far as I can tell, he held us to the very same standards to which he held others students.

But now that I'm an instructor, I've come to appreciate the complexities of the dynamics between students and teachers in a new way. And I think and worry about potential abuses of relationship dynamics. It hadn't occurred to me at the time that there was any issue. Partly, this is to the credit of the instructor I have in mind because again there was no discernible preferential treatment given to those he knew personally. Still a general worry comes to mind. The question is this: is it appropriate for say a professor to have friends take the very classes that they teach? Or what about members of their church? What about members of their church over which they exercise a certain amount of authority? I'm not worried about cases of auditing. Or of "sitting in" on lectures. But when grades are being assigned and when degrees are being pursued and when on occasion, the professor has a stake in filling up their roster (say in order to teach a summer or winter section for supplemental income, which needs sufficient enrollment for fear of cancellation). I think things have at least the potential to go awry. There are complex relationship dynamics at play.

I don't know whether universities have official policies concerning these matters. Often policies are geared towards dealing with romantic relationships and these vary from school to school. But I would think that some of the same worries which encourage schools to have policies against faculty dating their students, would apply to various other personal relationships.

Current social science tells us that implicit bias is real. We act in accordance with biases without even knowing that we are, without even knowing we've got those biases. It's for this reason that many instructors employ safeguards like having students write ID numbers instead of names on their assignments to keep them somewhat anonymous. Lately, I've been trying to remain well fed throughout the grading process as well as take frequent breaks, because blood sugar levels and fatigue are thought to affect our moods and our moods affect grading even when we aren't aware of it. I'm not sure what would happen if I were grading my friend's assignments and I have no intention of every putting myself in that position. Even anonymous grading has it's limitations because at some point you've got to enter grades into a roster which no longer ensures the anonymity of your students. I've never actually taught my friends or people that I know outside of school, so I don't know what it is like, but I try to keep a certain amount of distance from my students due to concerns like these at least while they are my students.

I suspect things get even trickier when a church like WF is involved, where the leaders of the church are also professors. Not only we dealing with friendships between instructor and student, but in some cases the instructor also exercises a kind of authority over the student in a different domain.

Nor are my worries simply about grades. Students review their professors via course evaluations which play a role in job promotions (e.g., renewed contracts and tenure). When some of your students are members of your church (wherein you exercise a particular degree of authority), when some of your students are your friends, then they have a vested interested in your vocational success whether it is merited or not. Again there are worries of at least implicit bias. I'd be lying if I said that at the time, I didn't want my professor who had become my friend a sort of spiritual mentor, to succeed in his profession. Of course I did.

Earlier, I hinted at another worry about how congregants of WF might feel pressured to take classes taught by other Gangadeanians. In some cases, instructors have a financial and vocational interest in filling up their rosters (e.g. classes are cancelled if there is insufficient enrollment). But a related worry has to do with potential influence in the other direction. I wonder to what extent at least some students might feel pressured to pursue attendance at Gangadean's church so as to remain in the instructor's good graces relative to their coursework. The long and short of it is that some students suck up in rather peculiar ways. Some of them suck up without even knowing that they are. I want to tread carefully here. Again, the instructor that I encountered never used class time to invite students to church. Even if the content that he taught was essentially the core of what was taught at his church. In fact, Gangadeanians tend to be quite secretive about their church affiliation. By the same token, most of the congregation is made up of people that once took classes taught by a Gangadeanian. There's a causal link, but that in an of itself isn't enough to worry about. Reflecting on my own experience, I realize that I had heard about the church and the Gangadeanian instructor's affiliation with it ahead of time. I enrolled in his class because I was curious. I noticed that there were a handful of students that the instructor seemed familiar with--they would crowd his desk after each lecture (I would later learn that they were all congregants of the church). I became friendly with them and eventually friendly with the instructor. At some point, I asked about the church and the rest is history. Again I don't suspect any foul play on behalf of the instructor in my own story. I just think there was real potential for things going badly and for motives getting mixed up. But so what if a non-negligible number of students end up going to WF and the classes play a causal role? Instructors advertise various student clubs, conferences, talks and the like in the classroom, all of the time. And presumably some students feel some pressure to attend them or do so in order to butter the teachers up. In these cases, perhaps the (adult) students bear the blame. By the same token, there are disanalogies. The stakes and potential costs of attending a church like WF are quite high. The social practices of the congregation are controversial and I dare say potentially harmful to people, while I suspect that attending a student club meeting or a one-off colloquium is normally not like this. More importantly, these potential costs aren't limited to the domain of personal relationships. That brings me to my last point.

What happens when a student of a Gangadeanian that is also attending the church leaves the congregation for one reason or another? A congregant might leave voluntarily, or leave because they are forced to as in my case or they might even be excommunicated by the congregation. In the rare case of excommunication (which is instituted in cases of certain forms of unrepentant sin), church congregants are prohibited from having any contact with the subject of excommunication. In my case though, since our differences were merely intellectual, I was asked to no longer attend the church and my contact with congregants was severely restricted. Leaving the congregation in any form is a tricky matter as it concerns your relationships with other members and that's going to include the ones that are instructors. Few persons have successfully exited while maintaing friendships with current attendees. At least if you're excommunicated, no such relationship maintenance is possible. If you're simply asked to leave as in my case, its exceeding difficult though not impossible (provided you don't start a blog like mine).

Now suppose a student has been working closely with a Gangadeanian instructor say in writing a thesis or what have you. Or they hope for a letter of recommendation for a job or graduate school from this instructor because they have worked closely with them in the past. Now if the student were to leave the congregation, I would think this would pose some difficult terrain to navigate. The issues would obviously be more pronounced if the student was asked to leave the congregation or worse, excommunicated. I don't see how the instructor and student relationship would be very hospitable particularly in the latter two cases. Further, if the instructor is playing a significant role in their project, and it's late enough in the game, then switching to another advisor is not going to be a live option. More importantly, it seems like this is just something a student shouldn't have to deal with. The student shouldn't feel worried about having to look for another advisor or a different professor for a letter of recommendation for instance, because they have some intellectual disagreements at church.

This is not my story. It's just that it very well could have been. I was completing my M.A. and applying to Ph.D programs, when I was asked to leave the congregation. Admission into doctorate programs in philosophy are incredible hard to come by. Among the many elements that constitute your application, your writing sample and letters of recommendation from faculty are what matter the most. Normally, your letter writers are just those professors that you have worked closely with on your writing sample and research. This is because the letters that matter have to be incredibly specific about not only what you are like as a student (and how you compare to other students), but also delve into your actual research project and why it's an important contribution to the field. In other words, they have to be personally vested in your project and know it well, otherwise those letters won't be doing you any favors and will probably hurt your already slim chances.

Now if, at the time of my intellectual conflict with Gangadean, I had a Gangadeanian as an advisor on my thesis/writing sample, and also a letter writer (in fact, I knew of students that did on both counts), things might have been quite difficult for me. If the instructor's church holds the official position that you "deny reason" so much so that you have to leave the congregation, would you have much confidence in a member of that very church, writing a letter for you as you try to get into a graduate program in philosophy? Keeping in mind that the instructor agrees with the church's evaluation of you. Again, advisors and letter writers are not interchangeable. Nor are they bound by any sort of contract with you. You work closely with only a few professors throughout your career. If things get awkward, or hostile between you, or if the professor chooses to no longer work with you for whatever reason, you're out of luck. You can't simply ask some professor that you've taken a class or two with, for a letter at the last minute. It doesn't work that way. I was lucky that this wasn't my situation in that I didn't have a Gangadeanian on my committee. But again, it easily could have happened. In fact, early on during my Masters I had considered it (it was sort of a norm at the church) and a Ganagdeanian was my primary advisor for my undergraduate thesis. Further as I mentioned, a number of students at the church had a Gangadeanian as part of their thesis committee even at the graduate level. My point is, there's a real potential for a conflict of interest and ultimately harm being done to a student given the dynamics that Gangadean's church introduces in particular.

I'm not suggesting that the Gangadeanian instructors would knowingly "have it out" for such students who leave their congregation. I think they are generally good natured people despite their erroneous views and they take their vocations quite seriously. But again there are worries of at least implicit bias. In my experience, Gangadeanians have a very difficult time separating attacks against their worldview with attacks against them as people. Philosophical disagreement or criticism is someimtes perceived by them as "antagonistic". And my guess is they are no better than anyone else at dealing with perceived personal attacks. So if I had been working closely with a Gangadeanian when our conflict emerged, as a student, I honestly would have felt stuck between a rock and a hard place. I would have felt like everything that I worked so hard for was being threatened because I disagreed with Gangadean about some philosophical issues (at church) and that I was damned if I sought a new recommender and advisor, and I was damned if I didn't.

There are a number of issues that arise when you consider the complicated dynamics of a relationship between a student and instructor where the two share a personal relationship outside of school. To be fair, at least in graduate school, such outside-of classroom interactions are fairly common. The line between professional and personal relationships gets blurry. However, I wonder to what extent a common church affiliation in general adds further complexities to the dynamic. Or what about when the instructor has some extra-academic authority over the student as is sometimes the case in a church setting. To be fair, these worries seem to generalize. They aren't merely about situations where an instructor and student belong to the same religious organization. It could be that a student and instructor belong to the same country club, Beyonce fan club, or even a chapter of the Secular Free Thought Society since power dynamics and hierarchies are also found there. Consequently, some of the same dynamics that are cause for pause in the church context might very well apply to those cases too. They are still worries, but not merely those concerning Gangadeanian instructors.

At the same time, I don't want to ignore some of the peculiarities of the Gangadeanian instructor and student relationship either. As I said before, Westminster Fellowship encourages its congregants to take classes taught by other congregants. And many congregants are former or current students of a Gangadeanian instructor. This is because the core doctrines of the church are philosophical theories and so there's considerable overlap between church and school. Sometimes the congregants work closely with other congregants in an academic advisor-mentee setting. Furthermore, church members that are also students can be asked to leave the church due to intellectual differences. In other cases, they may even be excommunicated where any substantive interaction with the excommunicated party is prohibited for current congregants. These dynamics add unique worries in my mind. Shouldn't a school, at the very least, a public institution worry about these issues and take precautions to protect their students? What might those precautions look like?

None of this is meant to be an attack on anybody. I think they are legitimate albeit complicated issues that it would be good to open a dialogue about. I'm curious what my readers think.