When we get into the meaning of words, things get complicated. It seems like language is conventional. Had the history of the world gone a little differently, my label for a table might have been 'chair' or any number of other words that are not in fact associated with tables. It is likely the case that someone, somewhere introduced the word 'table' to denote tables and then it got accepted (tacitly) by other language users and stayed that way. But suppose a person had tried to introduce the word 'table' to denote tables, and nobody accepted it for whatever reason. Then we'd be hard pressed to think that the word 'table' denoted or perhaps meant tables. Maybe you're thinking that it could very well have denoted or even meant table for that person, but it is far from obvious that meaning is so subjective. I might proclaim that from here on out, I will refer to dogs whenever I use the word 'table', but it isn't clear I would succeed. At least it's far from obvious what I will have meant in the given scenario in saying the following: "I want a table for a pet." Did I mean that I want a dog for a pet? If so, what makes that true? Is it because I had in mind, a dog when I was using the word 'table'? If so, then meaning seems to be subjective and sort of "in the head." Most philosopher reject this subjectivist kind of theory. Meaning is thought to be more objective in some sense, but it isn't as if anybody has got knock down arguments for it. Instead, philosophers working on these issues depend on certain intuitive reactions to scenarios like the the one I just presented. Theories are meant to accommodate such intuitions and are accepted on such grounds.
The point is, when we ask ourselves what the meaning of a word is, it's a bit tricky to figure out how we go about answering it. What methods do we employ and how do we know that those methods are veridical? It's not like we have a perceptual faculty dedicated to figuring out the meanings of words. This relates to my analysis of Gangadean's views because the word 'eternal' is of no exception. Indeed all of the many key words and expressions that Gangadean uses to make his arguments are no exception. Presumably, the word 'eternal' entered into our vocabulary at some point in history. It was in some way associated with some state of affairs that persons at least thought to reflect reality.
A side note: there's just no guarantee that the words in our language actually refer to anything that exists. 'Phlogiston' for example is a word that was thought at one time to refer to something that all combustible bodies had and which got released when burned, but we no longer believe that such a things exists (or ever existed for that matter). True, the meaning of a word is thought not to be exhausted by the thing it refers to (see Frege on Sense and Reference). But there's at least some intimate connection between meaning and reference/denotation/extension. It's standard to think that the sense or intension of a word is something like a condition which fixes the referent/extension of the word.
Now the word 'eternal' presumably gained tacit acceptance and was passed down from generation to generation like the word 'chair', 'horse' and the like. Of course, there's no way for us to know for sure that the meaning was stable with every generation nor can we know for sure that it was passed down faithfully. Relatedly, there isn't anyway for us to be sure that when I say 'eternal' I have in mind exactly what you do when you use the same word. I can't get inside your head as it were. Of course, you can start to spell off other words to try and see if we are thinking the same thing when we use the word, but that leads to a regress: if I use other words to try and tell you what I am thinking when I use the word 'eternal', then one will wonder whether we are in the same kind of mental state when we use those other words. In the case of a word like 'chair' you might think that I could via enumeration or ostention help you get to what I mean (or at least intend on meaning) when I use it. I could for instance point to a particular object (hopefully a chair) and say, 'chair!'. But notice that my pointing is anything but an infallible means of getting you to adopt or realize what I intend on meaning. After all, pointing is far from precise. In all likelihood, I can at best, point to a particular space-time chunk of the chair or perhaps in some general vicinity. Even physical contact faces this issue. You as the observer can of course make your best estimation as to what object in the world I might be referring to, but it will be anything but clear or certain (in the Gangadeanian sense). So there's a separate though related question emerging about how we determine what a person at least thinks they mean, when they use a word.
Now the main issue with what I'm calling subjectivist views of meaning, where the meaning of a word is just what the speaker intends in using the word, is that it's hard to say that anybody ever uses a word incorrectly. And again, philosophers depend on intuitive reactions to thought experiments, here. They think of cases where it just seems intuitively like a person is using a word incorrectly and take this as a datum for their theorizing. As it concerns Gangadean, I can't see how this subjectivist view would serve his purposes. If the meaning of 'eternal' is whatever each of us attaches to that word (in our heads) whenever we use it, then we could have radically different meanings, from one another and even from ourselves on any given occasion and skepticism looms. We couldn't be sure that we are following any of his arguments which depend crucially on the meaning of such words.
Maybe meaning is not subjective anyway, as most philosophers would have it. It's a public affair arising out of a language community. On such a view, a person can simply be wrong about their usage of a term insofar as it deviates sufficiently from the way other competent language users in their community use the word. This means that in order to figure out the meaning of a word, one must do a lot of surveying of how competent language users actually use the words in question. Of course, you've got to figure out what counts as a competent language user, first which is no simple task. But if this were Gangadean's view, then this seems contrary to his way of doing philosophy. As I've complained, repeatedly, Gangadean often just stipulates the meanings of words. He asserts the definitions of all sorts of things as if he's got the final say in the matter. The word 'eternal' is a prime example. Strangely he doesn't do what linguists do---searching through databases for natural occurrences of a word in published works, or by conducting sociological experiments to see how people in fact use the word. He doesn't present empirical research to support his views about what he thinks words mean--i.e., to show that the meaning he attaches to particular words is actually shared among the relevant population of interest. Moreover, even if he did, it wouldn't give him certainty---this is because such empirical work is going to be inductive at best. You've got to make lots of inferences and estimations to go from observable behavior to the meaning of an expression.
A third option is that there's something like objective meaning that is neither subjective nor determined by the practices of a language community. I'm not sure what a view like this would amount to. Maybe it's the idea that there is a dictionary according to God or something at least functionally equivalent. This flies in the face of observation (note words in a given language get introduced and removed and even seem to change meaning over time--and so such a view would have to deny that this is possible). Moreover, it suggests that words mean what they do by necessity which is to say language is not a matter of convention. That's a big bullet to bite. The most serious worry here is how one could access "God's lexicon" and furthermore, how one would ever know that one has in fact done so. I kind of think Gangadean actually acts as if this picture of language/meaning is true; whether he believes it or not is another question. He seems to think that he can just sit in his arm-chair and think about the meanings of words and then arrive at the "true definitions" as it were. This is rife with problems as it concerns certainty. The thing is, he never bothers to tell you how he knows with certainty that he's got it right. Even if there was such a mysterious lexicon of the universe, it doesn't follow that one has infallible access to it, or any access to it for that matter.
A side note: there's just no guarantee that the words in our language actually refer to anything that exists. 'Phlogiston' for example is a word that was thought at one time to refer to something that all combustible bodies had and which got released when burned, but we no longer believe that such a things exists (or ever existed for that matter). True, the meaning of a word is thought not to be exhausted by the thing it refers to (see Frege on Sense and Reference). But there's at least some intimate connection between meaning and reference/denotation/extension. It's standard to think that the sense or intension of a word is something like a condition which fixes the referent/extension of the word.
Now the word 'eternal' presumably gained tacit acceptance and was passed down from generation to generation like the word 'chair', 'horse' and the like. Of course, there's no way for us to know for sure that the meaning was stable with every generation nor can we know for sure that it was passed down faithfully. Relatedly, there isn't anyway for us to be sure that when I say 'eternal' I have in mind exactly what you do when you use the same word. I can't get inside your head as it were. Of course, you can start to spell off other words to try and see if we are thinking the same thing when we use the word, but that leads to a regress: if I use other words to try and tell you what I am thinking when I use the word 'eternal', then one will wonder whether we are in the same kind of mental state when we use those other words. In the case of a word like 'chair' you might think that I could via enumeration or ostention help you get to what I mean (or at least intend on meaning) when I use it. I could for instance point to a particular object (hopefully a chair) and say, 'chair!'. But notice that my pointing is anything but an infallible means of getting you to adopt or realize what I intend on meaning. After all, pointing is far from precise. In all likelihood, I can at best, point to a particular space-time chunk of the chair or perhaps in some general vicinity. Even physical contact faces this issue. You as the observer can of course make your best estimation as to what object in the world I might be referring to, but it will be anything but clear or certain (in the Gangadeanian sense). So there's a separate though related question emerging about how we determine what a person at least thinks they mean, when they use a word.
Now the main issue with what I'm calling subjectivist views of meaning, where the meaning of a word is just what the speaker intends in using the word, is that it's hard to say that anybody ever uses a word incorrectly. And again, philosophers depend on intuitive reactions to thought experiments, here. They think of cases where it just seems intuitively like a person is using a word incorrectly and take this as a datum for their theorizing. As it concerns Gangadean, I can't see how this subjectivist view would serve his purposes. If the meaning of 'eternal' is whatever each of us attaches to that word (in our heads) whenever we use it, then we could have radically different meanings, from one another and even from ourselves on any given occasion and skepticism looms. We couldn't be sure that we are following any of his arguments which depend crucially on the meaning of such words.
Maybe meaning is not subjective anyway, as most philosophers would have it. It's a public affair arising out of a language community. On such a view, a person can simply be wrong about their usage of a term insofar as it deviates sufficiently from the way other competent language users in their community use the word. This means that in order to figure out the meaning of a word, one must do a lot of surveying of how competent language users actually use the words in question. Of course, you've got to figure out what counts as a competent language user, first which is no simple task. But if this were Gangadean's view, then this seems contrary to his way of doing philosophy. As I've complained, repeatedly, Gangadean often just stipulates the meanings of words. He asserts the definitions of all sorts of things as if he's got the final say in the matter. The word 'eternal' is a prime example. Strangely he doesn't do what linguists do---searching through databases for natural occurrences of a word in published works, or by conducting sociological experiments to see how people in fact use the word. He doesn't present empirical research to support his views about what he thinks words mean--i.e., to show that the meaning he attaches to particular words is actually shared among the relevant population of interest. Moreover, even if he did, it wouldn't give him certainty---this is because such empirical work is going to be inductive at best. You've got to make lots of inferences and estimations to go from observable behavior to the meaning of an expression.
A third option is that there's something like objective meaning that is neither subjective nor determined by the practices of a language community. I'm not sure what a view like this would amount to. Maybe it's the idea that there is a dictionary according to God or something at least functionally equivalent. This flies in the face of observation (note words in a given language get introduced and removed and even seem to change meaning over time--and so such a view would have to deny that this is possible). Moreover, it suggests that words mean what they do by necessity which is to say language is not a matter of convention. That's a big bullet to bite. The most serious worry here is how one could access "God's lexicon" and furthermore, how one would ever know that one has in fact done so. I kind of think Gangadean actually acts as if this picture of language/meaning is true; whether he believes it or not is another question. He seems to think that he can just sit in his arm-chair and think about the meanings of words and then arrive at the "true definitions" as it were. This is rife with problems as it concerns certainty. The thing is, he never bothers to tell you how he knows with certainty that he's got it right. Even if there was such a mysterious lexicon of the universe, it doesn't follow that one has infallible access to it, or any access to it for that matter.
The complexities that we introduce when we get into talk about meaning are numerous. There's a vast sea of dense literature. Contrary to appearances, it's not that easy to say what the meaning of ordinary terms like 'chair' and 'table' are. To add insult to injury, it's not even clear how we go about determining the meaning of such words, at least if we're after certainty. How much more for a word like 'eternal' which presumably isn't something directly associated with observable phenomena (i.e., you can't point at something as say, 'eternal'). What's surprising is that Gangadean never seems to even question this stuff and you'll likely not meet a Gangadeanian who is concerned with it. Gangadean just sort of lays down the law in Aristotelian style. He tells you what a word means never once asking how he could determine a thing like that in the first place. Maybe he thinks that he speaks for everyone (at least all competent language users)---that somehow he represents all of us. But that's extremely contentious.
Now you might be wondering why am I pressing this really abstract stuff about meaning. The thing is Gangadean tries to argue for things based on the meaning of terms. For instance, there are some inferences he draws which he thinks are sure-proof because they are the sorts of things that are analytically true (or true by definition). For example, he argues that if nothing is eternal, then all is temporal. And if all is temporal, then all came into being. What might justify such inferences? Well, Gangadean thinks that they are just true by definition. It is just part of the meaning of the expression 'nothing is eternal' that all began to exist. Moreover, the very meaning of 'eternal' for Gangadean is somehow connected to the word, 'infinite'. These sorts of "true by definition" inferences that Gangadean often employs depend on him having the meanings of his terms correct. So we should care a lot about his theory of meaning and his theory about how he comes to know the meaning of his terms. Note, he might be correct concerning his meaning of 'eternal'--that's just not the point. The point is whether he would (by his own lights) count as knowing (with certainty) that it's the correct meaning of the word. After all, he doesn't think one can merely have a true belief in what is clear, but rather must know it (and knowledge is more than mere true belief) if it is to serve as the basis of other knowledge.
Now you might be wondering why am I pressing this really abstract stuff about meaning. The thing is Gangadean tries to argue for things based on the meaning of terms. For instance, there are some inferences he draws which he thinks are sure-proof because they are the sorts of things that are analytically true (or true by definition). For example, he argues that if nothing is eternal, then all is temporal. And if all is temporal, then all came into being. What might justify such inferences? Well, Gangadean thinks that they are just true by definition. It is just part of the meaning of the expression 'nothing is eternal' that all began to exist. Moreover, the very meaning of 'eternal' for Gangadean is somehow connected to the word, 'infinite'. These sorts of "true by definition" inferences that Gangadean often employs depend on him having the meanings of his terms correct. So we should care a lot about his theory of meaning and his theory about how he comes to know the meaning of his terms. Note, he might be correct concerning his meaning of 'eternal'--that's just not the point. The point is whether he would (by his own lights) count as knowing (with certainty) that it's the correct meaning of the word. After all, he doesn't think one can merely have a true belief in what is clear, but rather must know it (and knowledge is more than mere true belief) if it is to serve as the basis of other knowledge.
So according to Gangadean, a thing is eternal only if it has no beginning and no end. That is to say, the meaning of 'eternal' is 'having no beginning and no end'. And as I've said, he will use such a definition as part of his premise in arguing against the view that nothing is eternal. Again it isn't clear how we determine that Gangadean is right about the meaning of the word 'eternal' at least if we're after certainty. That a bunch of people agree with Gangadean is at best defeasible evidence that it's the right definition. But only if we help ourselves to a lot of presuppositions. We have to presuppose that meaning is determined by consensus of a language community and that the people Gangadean has spoken to about the matter are all competent language users and are telling the truth or otherwise sincere when they speak on the matter. True, common sense would deem these reasonable assumptions. It fits nicely with my way of doing philosophy which is to allow for all kinds of assumptions via common sense and intuition. But my point is, none of this should work for a person so bent on certainty that he can't stand the sight of intuitions or common sense. That's Gangadean.
In sum, I'll leave you with some pressing questions for Gangadean and his followers.
1) How does Gangadean know (with certainty) what meaning (in itself) is?
2) How does Gangadean know (with certainty) that any of his words have meaning?
3) How does Gangadean know (with certainty) that the meaning he assigns to particular words are correct (i.e., are their actual meanings)? For instance, when he says that 'eternal' = without beginning and end, how does he know with certainty that he isn't mistaken?
Now you might be tempted to think that he's not talking about the meaning of words or otherwise is simply not interested in semantics. He's doing metaphysics! But that won't do. According to Gangadean you can't say whether a statement is true, unless you know what it first means. Statements are linguistic entities: they are the stuff of semantics and linguistic study. And to give an argument, you've got to depend on statements. You've got to depend on the meanings of words. So you can't talk about the truth of statements (strings of expressions) without getting into issues of meaning or more generally semantics.
Moreover, if you think that concepts are in some way helpful to posit, we can, with little modification, run the same kind of arguments I've presented above for concepts. After all, concepts are things in our minds which purport to connect to things in reality in much the same way that words do.
Moreover, if you think that concepts are in some way helpful to posit, we can, with little modification, run the same kind of arguments I've presented above for concepts. After all, concepts are things in our minds which purport to connect to things in reality in much the same way that words do.
The philosophical payoff: If you think meaning is more basic than truth, and we need absolute certainty (clarity) for knowledge, then you need to explain how you know with certainty the very meaning of any of the words you use. After all, the legitimacy of every one of your arguments and inferences will depend crucially on the meaning of the words featured in them. And it's possible that you are mistaken. Note: if you think there's some transcendental argument to exploit, then you're mistaken. The Gangadeanian might be tempted to think in the following manner: we have to assume clarity concerning the meaning of at least some of our words in order to intelligibly raise questions concerning the meaning of ours expressions. This line falters on at least two grounds. 1) To argue in general that we must have clarity concerning the meaning of at least some of our words is not to have shown which one of those words must have clear, transparent meanings. Nor is it to show any method by which we can determine which meanings are clear. So this is of little help by itself. 2) More importantly though, there's no reason for anybody to accept the claim that in order to raise intelligible questions about meaning, there must be clarity of meaning of some of our words. What non circular, non-intuition based argument could justify such an inference?
Anyway, my point is not to drive one to skepticism about meaning and thus of determining the validity/soundness of any and all arguments. Instead, I think it's just Gangadean's commitment to clarity/certainty as it pertains to knowledge which when combined with the considerations above should lead one to a skeptical stance. Alternatively one can abandon that sinking ship and adopt the view that Gangadean was utterly mistaken that we need certainty for knowledge to begin with. After all, intuitively, we know the meanings of the words we use, we know the meanings of the words that Gangadean uses. We know these things despite not having any way of determining conclusively (by way of deductive arguments) what they are.
Anyway, my point is not to drive one to skepticism about meaning and thus of determining the validity/soundness of any and all arguments. Instead, I think it's just Gangadean's commitment to clarity/certainty as it pertains to knowledge which when combined with the considerations above should lead one to a skeptical stance. Alternatively one can abandon that sinking ship and adopt the view that Gangadean was utterly mistaken that we need certainty for knowledge to begin with. After all, intuitively, we know the meanings of the words we use, we know the meanings of the words that Gangadean uses. We know these things despite not having any way of determining conclusively (by way of deductive arguments) what they are.
I do not understand a writer criticizing the meaning of words in a blog. You cast so much doubt on the meaning of even a single word, that to pair words together and link them into sentences should be an absurd act if one were to try to glean any coherent meaning from them whatsoever. In one fell swoop you invalidate all language, and even your own point in this article. According to your logic this article could be a chicken recipe, and only you could perceive it to have any other merits. Or we can just agree that words sufficiently convey enough meaning for the exchange of ideas to occur. from which arguments may flow, and conclusions may be derived. You give that up and you might as well live you life flapping your arms like wings and squawking your meaning at people so that they might possible "intuit" it better.
ReplyDeleteHi Unknown,
DeleteYou seriously have misunderstood the main point of my article. I haven't tried to show that meaning is impossible. Nothing I've said is intended to invalidate language. I haven't attempted to show that we can't know (per se) the meaning of words or of sentences. Rather just that we can't know such things in the Gangadeanian sense of knowledge (i.e., certainty). Moreover, you seem to think you've caught me being internally inconsistent. That I've somehow cast doubt in our ability to know the meaning of any and all words so that using words with the hope of being understood is absurd. But that's just not what I'm arguing.
What I am claiming is that there is no certainty via deduction or any Gangadeanian method which ensures us of the meaning of words with anything resembling absolute certainty. There isn't anything like clarity in the sense that it's literally impossible for Gangadean or anybody for that matter to be incorrect about the meaning that they ascribe to a word or expression. Getting to the meaning of words/expressions is a complicated, a posteriori, and fallible project. It doesn't mean we never get it right, which for some reason is what you take me to be saying. Instead my point is that such certainty is elusive and that we don't need it to begin with. And there's nothing absurd about using words to say that. I'm not a skeptic about knowledge concerning semantics. I'm saying that Gangadean should be, not me or anybody else for that matter.
You say that we should "just agree that words sufficiently convey enough meaning for the exchange of ideas to occur". That's essentially what most philosophers (including myself) do. I mean we don't simply leave it there. There's much to study and theorize about, but we take it that there's a presumption, a defeasible one, that we, more or less can know what expressions in a given language mean albeit fallibly. But this defeasible presumption, is not consonant with Gangadean's requirement for clarity at the basic level. That we should, for purposes of dialogue and theorizing, merely presume to know what a word like 'eternal' means is not the same as being certain of what it means (knowledge in the Gangdeanian sense). A presumption is just that, a presumption. It isn't clarity at the basic level and I take it that the meaning of the words a person uses is pretty darn basic.
j
Did you even read the post? Here's a direct quote:
DeleteAnyway, my point is not to drive one to skepticism about meaning and thus of determining the validity/soundness of any and all arguments. Instead, I think it's just Gangadean's commitment to clarity/certainty as it pertains to knowledge which when combined with the considerations above should lead one to a skeptical stance. Alternatively one can abandon that sinking ship and adopt the view that Gangadean was utterly mistaken that we need certainty for knowledge to begin with. After all, intuitively, we know the meanings of the words we use, we know the meanings of the words that Gangadean uses. We know these things despite not having any way of determining conclusively (by way of deductive arguments) what they are.
j
DeleteOne more thing. Suppose we go along with what you've said. That is, we, "just agree that words sufficiently convey enough meaning for the exchange of ideas to occur. from which arguments may flow, and conclusions may be derived." That doesn't tell us what each word means. To say that words have a sufficiently apparent meaning is not to say anything about what words actually mean. This is particularly of interest when there are disputes concerning what words mean--and in philosophy that's fairly common. For example, Gangadean thinks that knowledge is maximally justified true belief while the vast majority of philosophers disagree. What do we do then?
j
Do you think the notion that "meaning is more basic than truth" falls prey to a vicious circularity or spiraling regress? Gangadean thinks that before we can know whether it is true that something is eternal, we must know what it means for something to be eternal. However, once one proposes a definition of 'eternal,' one must know whether that definition is true or false. Yet, in order to know whether that definition is true or false, one must know what it means for something to be a definition of eternal, etc., etc., ad infinitum. If circularity or a regress is in fact a consequence of the Gangadeanian notion, then what does that entail about meaning and truth? Should we consider neither one of them to be more basic than the other? Are they equally basic and mutually supporting concepts (Alston argues for virtuous circularity at the basic level)? Is there some third concept that is more basic than both meaning and truth? And if meaning is not more basic than truth, how would this affect the entire Gangadeanian project?
ReplyDeleteAnother comment to make is that Gangadean says that the question "what is eternal" is the most basic question that someone can ask, but how does he establish the truth of that claim? How can he be certain about which existential questions are the most basic? I take it that human beings have a plenitude of existential questions, but it's not clear how one determines which one of these questions is the most fundamental.
ReplyDeleteIt really seems like one needs to first ask the question, "Which question is the most basic question to ask?" before one can determine which question has theoretical priority. And it seems to me that there is going to be a lot of skepticism about how one can even begin to show which question has normative priority.
ReplyDeleteHi anonymous,
ReplyDeleteThese are good questions to raise against Gangadean. The idea that meaning is more basic than truth is not something that is argued for per se, but rather is thought to be "shown" via examples which are little more than intuition pumps. For instance Gangadeanians will ask you whether it is true that "all glics are grue". Your intuitive response is supposed to be, "well whaddya mean by 'glics' and 'grues'?" Of course, there's no argument there. Maybe Gangadeanians will refer to this as another one of those "immediately known truths" which are not based on intuitions. That to me is nothing more than a language game--a terminological dispute. More importantly as I've pointed out before, that move doesn't ultimately work because what makes intuitions so problematic according to Gangadean is that when two people have differing intuitions, there is no rational basis for settling such disputes. And this is going to be true of anything that is thought to be believed immediately, whatever we decide to call that process.
I think your questions point out just how absurd Gangadeanian philosophy winds up if we draw out the implications and serves as a kind of reductio against the worldview.
Best,
J