1) Rational justification in ethics requires personal freedom.
2) Rational justification in ethics requires that the Good be objectively clear.
Gangadean is a soft-determinist about free will. He thinks that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism and it is this kind of freedom that is necessary for giving a rational justification for one's morally relevant actions. Even though every one of my actions at time 1, is entirely determined by the complex causal web at time t-minus 1, what I do at time 1 is still free in the morally relevant sense. It's free enough, or in the right way, such that I can rationally be held morally responsible for it. So even if I smack a person tomorrow at noon, and this is entirely the result of my beliefs and desires (and my environment cooperating) leading up to that very moment, as Gangadean sees it, I can still be held morally responsible for my smacking that person. It doesn't matter that I couldn't do otherwise at that very given moment, if we held fixed my beliefs and desires and other facts about the world leading up to that moment.
This is the picture of freedom he privileges over that of libertarianism. The problem is, he's set up a false dichotomy. Libertarian views come in various forms, just as soft-determinists. Importantly, libertarianism and soft-determinism isn't distinguished solely in virtue of where they land on the issue of whether it's essential to freedom that one could have done otherwise. But that's how Gangadean has set things up. It appears as if Gangadean is ignorant of much of the work done over the last several decades on free will and moral responsibility. But there are radical and moderate versions of libertarianism, which is a particular form of incompatibilism, and not all require that a free act is one such that the agent could have done otherwise. This is just sloppy scholarship on his part.
Now the main points I want to draw your attention to are twofold. First, Gangadean proceeds as if he's settled the matter concerning the nature of free will. But to be sure, he hasn't actually proven that his conception of freedom is correct. Again, he just tells you what freedom is, as if there's no real debate about the matter---and this couldn't be further from the truth. Since, at least, the time of Plato, the nature of free will has puzzled philosophers. Much like in the case of Gangadean's theory of knowledge, his theory of freedom is not without alternatives. So his job, according to his own impossible standards of clarity, should be to prove that his theory of freedom, vis-a-vis moral responsibility, is the right one. To be sure, this requires more than pointing out problems with alternative theories since soft-determinism(s) have their own costs. He's got to show why any notion of freedom that is not his own, is utterly incoherent or otherwise not even possibly correct. That's a tall order and not one he's succeeded at. The real problem for Gangadean is that all of this is going to at some level, require appeals to intuitions as we shall see.
This brings us to the second main issue. In arguing against libertarian views of freedom --note he only argues against one form of liberatrianism and an extreme one at that-- he states but doesn't argue that if I could do otherwise than I do at any given time (keeping fixed all the causal facts leading up to the moment of action), then this would mean my actions are uncaused events. While I tend to agree with this, I do so because I find it intuitive. Indeed these considerations are not an argument. They are statements which, once again, you just sort of have to "see" as true. And in fact, there are libertarians that simply disagree. They don't find it intuitive that the ability to do other than I want for instance, = uncaused events. The point is not whether you and I agree with them or not. The crucial point concerns the method by which we agree or disagree with such persons. Just as Gangadean doesn't actually present an argument for the claim that "if I could have done otherwise than I want to do, then my action is an uncaused event" the other side that simply denies it doesn't provide an argument either. What we have to go on are intuitions. You either share the judgment that libertarianism threatens freedom in virtue of uncaused events or you don't and at root this is going to be via direct, immediate reactions you have to statements of the above sort, or to thought experiments, and perhaps to ordinary language practices of the word 'freedom' and cognate terms. This is perfectly commonplace for philosophers at large, but as I've mentioned repeatedly throughout my blog, Gangadean shouldn't depend on intuitions in this manner, based on his own criticisms about such practices.
On to Gangadean's second point(s) and the more contentious one(s). Gangadean claims the following.
It must be objectively clear what the good is. If it is not objectively clear then we are left with skepticism, and justification for moral relativism. Clarity is necessary (and sufficient) for inexcusability, that is, for moral accountability. If what we ought to do is not clear to (that is, required by) reason then as rational beings we cannot be held accountable for doing it (119).I hope by now that what I will have to say is predictable. There are 4 sentences in the above passage and 4 blanket assertions. But what we don't have are any arguments. Gangadean, once again, is banking on the fact that you will not press him on these points because they "seem right" to you or have a feeling of obviousness. The problem is, there's just no way for him to prove any of them. There's no way for him to demonstrate via a deductive argument that these theses are themselves clear to reason even though that's constantly what he requires of others. Ask yourself, what would prove the claim that "if it is not objectively clear, then we are left with skepticism and justification for moral relativism"?
Secondly, even if we look past this glaring inconsistency on his part, the problem is that Gangadean once again has forgotten or overlooked the fact that what he labels skepticism, the view that knowledge is not possible or at least super rare, is not what most philosophers refer to when they use the word. This owns to the fact that what he calls knowledge, is not what most philosophers refer to when they use the same word. This means that it's only for Gangadean, that objective clarity (absolute deductive certainty) is required if one is to avoid skepticism about the Good and right action. I think tacit in the above passage is that one ought to know with certainty how one ought to act if rational justification is possible regarding morally relevant actions. Also tacit in the above is the claim that one must be able to know with certainty what one should do, if one is to be held morally accountable. But if we reject Gangadean's theory of knowledge or at least remain indifferent to it because he hasn't proven that it's the correct theory we have no reason to accept these further implications which is to defang his threat.
For example, if fallibilism about knowledge is true, then one can be held morally responsible for actions even if one can't be absolutely certain of the right thing to do. And indeed this is most consonant with ordinary practice in everyday life. It's not absolutely certain to the person drinking heavily before getting behind the wheel, that they are in fact drinking and thus putting themselves and others in a precarious situation. After all, it's at least remotely possible that they are having a convincing dream that they are drinking, or fill in the details however you like. But that's hardly an excuse. This person, should they drink and drive, is morally responsible for their actions. Indeed they can even know that they are drinking and thus putting themselves and others in a precarious situation as a result, according to fallibilistic theories of knowledge. So objectively clarity is only necessary on Gangadean's quirky theory of knowledge and skepticism about the Good and right actions threatens only for Gangadean given his unusual theories.
Finally, Gangadean is presupposing, but has failed to prove that there is an intimate connection between epistemology and ethics. In particular, he takes it as fiat that moral accountability and the practice of giving rational justification is connected to what one can know with certainty. But why think that moral accountability and rationally justifying one's actions is connected to what one knows or can come to know? Why can't one be held responsible for what one rationally ought to believe, or what one has the most evidence to believe? For instance, there is much debate right now among philosophers about the connection between knowledge and action. A small contingency of philosophers do think that what you know and don't know is what determines which actions are acceptable for you. Of course, they will disagree with Gangadean on what it takes to know something and this is no small difference. But there are many other philosophers who argue that rather than knowledge (or what you can know), it's your justified true beliefs (or what you can justifiably believe) which determine which actions are acceptable for you to perform and yet others who think that it's just your justified beliefs (sans truth). The point is, Gangadean has smuggled in not only his own controversial conception of knowledge and skepticism to make the claims in this section about the need for objective clarity. He's also smuggled in the claim that what you can know, rather than what you can merely believe or rationally believe or justifiably believe, or justifiably truly believe, is what determines moral accountability and rationally justification in ethics. But he's done nothing to motivate either moves.
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