This is a part of the argument that is given by Gangadean and company.
(1) Something must be eternal
(2) Matter is not eternal
(3) Therefore, (some) spirit is eternal.
The first and second premises are argued for in prior arguments and I shall have something to say about them in due time. But once these are thought "established," the above reasoning is crucial to getting to something like the God of theism.
But notice that this argument, presupposes that fundamental reality is composed solely of two kinds of substances, matter (extended and non-conscious) and spirit (non extended and conscious). If this conclusion is to serve as a premise for a demonstration of God's existence, then we need to be able to rule out any and every possibility (not just the possibilities we think of at the moment, but any and all) that might defeat it. This is a tall order, for sure. For starters, I would simply press Gangadean et al. to give me the justification for the assumption that all existence falls into either 1) Matter or 2) Spirit. I would like to see the argument---remember it should be an airtight proof. In other words, Gangadean owes us a deductively sound argument which shows that it's not even possible that a third kind of substance that is non- spiritual and immaterial exists.
If this possibility is not ruled out a priori, then the syllogism presented at the outset (a crucial part of the argument for Gangadean) doesn't follow. After all, if it's possible that such a substance exists, then it may be eternal and the cause of all else (both material and spiritual). Which would mean we can't straightforwardly argue to spirit being eternal on the basis of ruling out the eternality of matter.
Let's consider a couple unhelpful responses that I anticipate:
If this possibility is not ruled out a priori, then the syllogism presented at the outset (a crucial part of the argument for Gangadean) doesn't follow. After all, if it's possible that such a substance exists, then it may be eternal and the cause of all else (both material and spiritual). Which would mean we can't straightforwardly argue to spirit being eternal on the basis of ruling out the eternality of matter.
Let's consider a couple unhelpful responses that I anticipate:
Response 1: An immaterial, non-conscious being is like a circle square. By definition, things that exist must either be extended, or conscious, or else both extended and conscious. What you're asking us to imagine can't be thought.
This begs the question against my contention. If you defined reality as being fundamentally composed of only two substances to begin with, in order to argue against the possibility of a third substance, then you've just assumed what you need to prove.
One might then try to take the position that such a third substance which is non extended, non conscious, yet causally efficacious is simply inconceivable, just as a married bachelor is. But this move has limitations in a dialetical situation such as this. When I say that a circle-square is not possible, it's just immediately obvious and when persons disagree, you find that they do so because they equivocate terms, that is to say, we can just clarify what we mean by 'square' and what we mean by a 'circle' and fix these meanings so that an object can only be one and not the other (at the same time and respect).
What we want to avoid is the misuse of the 'inconceivability move'; you can (in a very broad sense of the word) of course, state that any claim that you don't agree with is simply inconceivable, but we want the move to be only properly utilized. So in a way, I'm asking for the inconceivability move wielder to show me where I might be equivocating or making a similar mistake, to show me where I have misunderstood the meaning of 'non-conscious', or 'non-extendend' or 'causally efficacious.' Otherwise, I'm not sure what reason I have for suspecting that I am proposing an inherent contradiction. It seems conceivable to me. I think if you're being really honest, you can't say with full confidence that "a non-extended, non-conscious, but causally efficacious being is simply inconceivable." Furthermore, what is conceivable (can be thought of) vs. non conceivable (can't be thought of) is tricky territory. There can be disagreements about what is conceivable and not--and both parties of such a debate might be entirely sincere. It's not like we have access to some objective measure (that goes beyond all of us) of what is conceivable or not. So when there is disagreement, there is no argument that can be given. So for the Gangadean to claim that a third substance (non conscious, non extended) is simply inconceivable is not to have proven anything. They've merely appealed to what they believe is inconceivable or perhaps what is inconceivable to them. So before they make use of this move, they owe us a theory about how we determine, with objectivity, what is conceivable and what is not.
Response 2: What positive evidence can you provide for believing that there is such a thing?
This is simply burden-shifting. If you approach someone with the pronouncement that you are going to prove, beyond all rational doubt, that God exists, then you need to be able to likewise demonstrate to your interlocutor that alternatives are impossible. This is part and parcel of what it means to present a proof. Secondly, it's conceivable to me that a non-conscious, non-extended, eternal, being is causally efficacious. And if I grant the deductions of prior arguments (which end with the conclusions that something must be eternal and matter is not eternal), then I have reason to suspect that what is eternal is either spirit or this third option that I am raising. Thus, it isn't actually true that I have no positive evidence for the claim that it is at least possible that such a being is eternal.
Response 3: Historically, philosophers have held as common ground that there are at most 2 fundamental substances, namely, matter and spirit.
They may have simply been wrong in presupposing so. This provides no rational justification (at least not the kind that will get you to a demonstrative proof).So I think that even if Gangadean has been successful at establishing that something must be eternal, and that matter (in parts and as a whole) cannot be eternal, he cannot with felicity claim to have proven the existence of God--who is an eternal, immaterial, spirit. At least not until he has proven that an immaterial, non-spiritual, yet causally efficacious, eternal being is a metaphysical impossibility.
When Gangadean references spirit being eternal isnt all that is being said simply that a being that is non-material is being called spirit? If the material is not eternal, then the eternal must be non-material, right? At this point, it does not seem that any particular characteristic is being asserted or begged against any other particular viewpoint of what an immaterial eternal being is like.
ReplyDeleteHi ChristianTrader,
ReplyDeleteGangadean (as I understand him) is arguing that matter in principle cannot be eternal. However, there is a further step which is that in virtue of matter not being eternal, it must be spirit that is eternal. You understand his notion of "spirit" as simply, immaterial. This is just where I think his argument is problematic in making this very assumption.
On the contrary, his notion of spirit is a rather (philosophically) substantive one (no pun intended)-- it is conscious and rational for instance. Consider how if he has just argued that matter is not eternal, there would be a logical gap to close before he could get to the God of Theism. The God of Theism after all is more than non-extendend, non-spatial. God is supposed to be conscious among other things. So this is where I am contending that he has to further rule out the possibility of a immaterial, non-spiritual being as a candidate of that which is eternal.
J,
ReplyDeleteDo you think that Gangadean simply goes from matter is not eternal to the God of Theism? He instead goes over other options before concluding Theism.
Also as I have read a few other works on this page, it seems that at bottom, there is a disagreement about causality and if everything non eternal needs one a cause.
CT,
ReplyDeleteI am not saying (simply) that Gangadean goes from "matter is not eternal" to "ergo the, God of theism exists." What I am saying is that he argues from "matter is not eternal" to "ergo, spirit is eternal (where by spirit he means it is at least conscious/minded)." It is the latter parenthetical clause that I am calling into question. As to your point about causality, I'm not sure I'm following---could you try explaining it another way/elaborating?
Does everything that is not eternal need a cause? I am not sure how to restate that in an simpler way.
ReplyDeleteCT,
ReplyDeleteSo do you see what my issue is with Gangadean's argument regarding this move: "matter is not eternal"--> "spirit (as conscious being) is eternal?" As far as the causality point, I'm fine with tenatively accepting that everything that isn't eternal has a cause. I say tenatively because analyzing "causality" has been terrible difficult for philosophers (for generations). Do you have a analysis of causality? That is, do you know what the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for X being the cause of Y are?
I see your issue, but my question is directly related to it. Whether or not it is coherent to say that something comes from nothing is a more basic question than asking in any particular case, did X cause Y. Whether or not the latter question is hard or not, has no bearing on the ease with which the first question is answered.
ReplyDeleteDo you have some sort of counter to what Gangadean or Anderson have put forward on the issue of something coming from nothing?
If something cannot come from nothing, then the next question is whether or not it is even coherent to say that God picked up/caused himself to have rationality etc at some point in time.
CT,
ReplyDeleteYou asked me if I believed the claim that whatever is not eternal needs a cause. So either "X comes from Y" is different from "Y is the caused of X" (in which case I'll leave it to you to explain) or you're just rewording one and the same question.
In my last post, I said that I tentatively agreed that whatever is not eternal needs a cause. Insofar as you are replacing "cause" with "comes from" my answer to your second inquiry should be apparent. However, the problem still persists for you if you want more than a tentative agreement from me. You need to clearly spell out what you mean by "causality" (or what is the nature of causality) and likewise, what you mean by "comes from" or the nature of the "comes from" relation. I'm guessing you are going to take these notions as primitive (unanalyzable) since no successful analysis is forthcoming, but I'm open to hearing your suggestions.
As for your last paragraph, it makes me think you have misunderstood my argument in the original post. I didn't say anything about God causing himself to have rationality at some point in time. Perhaps a more careful read of the original post would be helpful.
The second line should read: "Y is caused 'by' X"
ReplyDeleteJ,
ReplyDeleteMy distinction is that there is a difference between say X is caused by some Y (or no Y at all, if that is ones beliefs) and saying that X is caused by this or that Y. The former is more basic than the latter. I am not simply rewording the situation.
Next, as far as your question as to how causation is analysed goes, it still seems that you are attempting to place the cart in front of the horse. It seems that you are asking a question equivalent to how did God do/cause X (if there is a God in the first place) and until one comes up with an answer then one can question the need for a cause for all non eternal items. This seems analogous to questioning how a car is able to do what it does, and saying that until you get the answer, you have the right to doubt that it does what it does. That doesnt seem very helpful.
If such is a fair characterization of the situation, then you have to deal with the defense of causation given by Anderson and/or Gangadean.
I'll let you have the last word on this post, and move to the next post/will come back later.
I do appreciate your site and it seems that you have put some work into the thoughts here. I plan on working through your site thoroughly and fairly.
CT,
ReplyDeleteThanks for the elaboration. I'm glad to hear you will read on. I do want to address your response, not to try and get in the last word, but because this blog is about critically analyzing the philosophical issues as it pertains to Gangadean's views. And based on your comments, I still think you are not quite getting my main points.
When I ask you for an analysis of causation, I am simply asking you for what the nature of causation is. Or in semantic terms, what you mean by 'cause.' I have an intuitive grasp of what the meaning of 'cause' might be, but nothing more. The nature of causality is rather elusive to philosophers, but when you ask me to affirm that "if X is not eternal then it must have a cause" you appeal to this elusive relation and yet want me to affirm it. Isn't meaning more basic than truth on Gangadean's view? So I'm simply pressing you on what you mean by 'cause' or 'causality.' Notice this issue is conceptually more basic than the issue of whether 'X needs to have a cause (in virtue of being not-eternal)'. So I don't see how I am placing the cart in front of the horse. On the contrary, I would charge you of doing so. To be clear, I am not asking you how God causes X, because that would assume we know what the nature of cause is to begin with. I am asking you what cause is in-itself. Or again to put it in semantic terms, what you mean by the word 'cause.'
Your analogy doesn't work for a variety of reasons. Firstly, 'a car does what it does' is trivially true (or true by definition). It's like saying, "a horse is a horse." On the other hand, a claim that something that is not eternal needs to have a cause is a metaphysically substantive statement (which is not just true in virtue of the definition of the terms) hence, why Gangadean attempts to provide an argument for it (you don't and can't give arguments for trivially true claims). Relatedly, the first part of the sentence, ' a car does' already presupposes the second part of the sentence (hence the analyticity of the statement). Finally, and more importantly, this is how I see the current dialectic using the analogy:
You asked me if I affirm that a car can "go the distance". I responded, well, tentatively, yes, I affirm that a car can "go the distance," but my answer is tentative because I don't know precisely what counts as "going the distance" (though I have something of an intuitive grasp of it). I then added, that if you want more than a tentative affirmation, then you're going to have to tell me exactly what you mean by "going the distance" that is, give me an analysis of "going the distance." I hope this clarifies matters and appreciate the discussion.
J,
DeleteThe most basis position in Gangadean's system is that being can be distinguished from non being. If such is not true then knowledge collapses. An implication of distinguishing being from non being is that every non eternal item has a cause.
To say that one only tentatively accepts causation is to say that one only tentatively accepts that we can distinguish between being and non being and only tentatively accept that knowledge is in fact possible.
The question before us is not what does causation mean but simply can we distinguish being from non being and is an implication of such a distinction, that all non eternal items have a cause.
On further thought, the distinction between a and non a is even more basic and implies the other distinctions. So just replace being from non being with a from non a above.
DeleteCT,
ReplyDeleteYou wrote, "an implication of distinguishing being from non being is that every non eternal item [being] has a cause."
First of all, rather than merely asserting this, you need to give me an argument. How does it logically follow from, "being is distinct from non being" that every non eternal being has a cause?
More importantly though, you're still using the notion of cause. When you say, "an implication of distinguishing being from non being is that every non eternal item [being] has a cause" you employ 'cause' in your statement! Again, I'm asking you for what you mean by "cause" in that statement (or in any other statement for that matter). I'm merely asking you to explain the terms you are using (and the concepts behind them). To provide an informative, non circular analysis of the concepts you are using (and philosophically depending on).
First,
ReplyDeleteYou agree with the distinction between a and non a and between being and non being is essential for knowledge and we are now simply asking about the implication for such beliefs, right?
Also to go even further, it is not simply that knowledge collapses when this distinction is denied but meaning as well (which is more basic than knowledge).
ReplyDeleteI'm merely asking you to define your terms. You asked if I agreed that whatever is not eternal needs a cause. I'm asking you, "what do you mean by cause?"
ReplyDeleteOh I understand that part (and have no problem proceeding to do so), my issue is to make sure that you agree that distinguishing between a and non a is the foundation of meaning and therefore the foundation of knowledge. If you dont, then going to less basic things doesnt seem to make much sense.
ReplyDeleteCT,
ReplyDeleteCan you provide a sound argument for the claim, "distinguishing between a and non a is the foundation of meaning and therefore the foundation of knowledge" ? You wouldn't want me to be a fideist and accept this merely at your word, right?
To ask for a sound argument for such, seems to imply that there are no transcendentals of argumentation/knowledge etc. Or to put another way, there is nothing that knowledge and meaning assumes as necessary for discussion.
DeleteIs not asking for a sound argument simply begging the question against my position. If that distinction is the foundation of meaning etc, then wouldnt a sound argument simply have to assume that it is not the foundation of such or simply beg the question that it is the foundation of such?
Like Aristotle and the LNC, I would say that if one disagreed with it, then one would simply have to attempt to make a meaningful statement as far as they deny the distinction between a and non a.
CT,
DeleteYou are helping yourself to a lot of notions here. For instance, what makes you so sure that your claim, "distinguishing between a and non a is the foundation of meaning and therefore the foundation of knowledge" is a transcendental? In other words, how do you know what is a transcendental vs. not? Of course, anyone can help themselves to this move--that is, in the face of a request for an argument, respond that the claim in question is a transcendental. As such, we need a way to verify when we actually have are dealing with a transcendental or not. Can you offer such a theory? Otherwise, it's seems like you're depending on intuitions (which is perfectly consistent with my views on matters, but not so for Gangadean who is after epistemic certainty).
I don't understand your statement about begging the question. I asked you for an argument to prove a claim that you made. I don't see how it would be question begging to ask for proof of a claim. Begging the question is to give an argument where one of the premises is also the conclusion. But I wasn't giving an argument. Instead I was asking you for one.
Further, you seem to be confusing things. I'm not denying that 'a is a' or denying the LNC as such. But the claim I asked proof for isn't simply that 'a is a.' Instead you stated, "distinguishing between a and non a is the foundation of meaning and therefore the foundation of knowledge." In other words, your claim is that 'a is a' bears a particular relation to meaning and knowledge. This is a substantive claim that you need to prove with argument.
Also, I'm curious how you think about Gangadean's claim that "fideism is belief without proof."
ReplyDeleteDo you believe the claim, "distinguishing between a and non a is the foundation of meaning and therefore the foundation of knowledge?" If so, do you believe it on the basis of proof? Or are you a fideist regarding it? If you believe it on the basis of a proof, then I am asking for this proof.
J,
ReplyDeleteI am not helping myself to anything. I am simply objection to be asked to do something that contradicts my claim.
My counter is simply this, "Give me a sound proof for anything you like that doesnt assume the distinction between a and non a." If you fail to be able to do such, then it would seem to be on you to give a reason to doubt that we are dealing with a transcendental.
The problem is this - Without assuming such a distinction one could not distinguish between the various premises or between the premises and the conclusion. It gets even worse because you could not even distinguish between the words in the premises or even the letters of the words without assuming the distinction between a and non a.
Next, if we are dealing with a true transcendental, then all arguments would assume the item in question. So to give an argument for it, one would either have to beg the question or argue in a circle.
CT,
DeleteYou are, in fact, refusing to prove your claims--that much we agree on. But this seems to be problem if you're in the Gangadean fold, since you are after absolute certainty (moreover, Gangadean is always pointing out how others cannot prove their views). This seems all too convenient of a move. That is, to criticize the views of others based on falling short of proof, but then to call something "transcendental" so that you don't have to provide a proof for your most basic claims all the while maintaining that you have absolute certainty about your views.
I have no idea what to make of your "counter." I can't seem to make any sense of it. Why would I feel compelled to provide a sound proof "for...something that doesn't assume the distinction between a and non-a"? This is puzzling and I fear you are not tracking the discussion carefully enough. Do you understand the difference between 1) denying that 'a is a' and 2) questioning this claim: "distinguishing between a and non a is the foundation of meaning and therefore the foundation of knowledge" ? I've been asking you for a proof of 2) but you keep insisting something about 1)
As far as your theory of transcendentals, it simply doesn't work. Your account is: something is a transcendental just in case, all arguments would assume the item in question. But have you actually considered EVERY argument (note there are an infinite number of arguments)? I find that hard to believe. So there is no way to verify whether a particular claim is a transcendental. Secondly, how do you know when one argument assumes something? Is this just intuitive? Or do you have a decision procedure to determine when this has occurred?
Next,
ReplyDeleteGangadean qualified his claim that "fideism is belief without proof"
For example on p. 47 - "That something exists is not being argued for since it is common ground. No one has ventured past soliphism. It would be self-refuting to say that nothing exists."
Do you agree with this position or do you consider it fideism to make such a claim without given a sound argument for it?
What does "common ground" mean? That it is something that people agree on? Who are the pertinent people? Everyone? Certainly not everyone agrees. The majority? More importantly, why suppose that what is common ground is rationally justified? People can agree on things for the purpose of discussion without this indicating that what is agreed upon is true.
DeleteI don't understand why you're brining up what Gangadean says about the claim that "something exists." I haven't been denying that something exists.
I've merely been asking you 1) to give an account of causation, 2) to prove this: "distinguishing between a and non a is the foundation of meaning and therefore the foundation of knowledge," and 3) Give me a theory of what counts as a transcendental (and now, I'm asking you to give me a theory about how you know when something is assumed by another).
JSeptember 27, 2014 at 6:47 PM
DeleteTo answer your last two questions: I think that Gangadean's notion of fideism is bizarre. Fideism for me is belief without evidence (rather than without proof). But since Gangadean is after belief with proof, it seems suspicious to me that he seems to pick and choose which beliefs need to be proven (to be rationally believed) and which beliefs do not (in the name of "transcendentals" or "common ground claims"). At least I need a better theory of both "transcendentals" and "common ground."
J,
DeleteIs it not self refuting to state that nothing exists? If you dont believe that it is, then why do you think that it is not self refuting?
Next,
DeleteCommon ground simply means that which has to be accepted for argumentation to be meaningful. Whether someone does accept it or not, is irrelevant for the claim to hold.
Lastly,
The point of my line of questioning here is to build a foundation of agreement to then answer other questions, if we disagree about the basics, then why move on to the less basic?
You're confused. I didn't deny that something exists.
DeleteAs to your point about common ground-- why think that there is anything like this?
Lastly, regarding your point about "why should we move on to the less basic unless we agree on the most basic" what are you talking about?! When did I question this? You're clearly having trouble here.
J,
DeleteI never said that you denied that something exists, I am asking if you believe that such is self refuting. If it is self refuting then, no further argument would be necessary in order to avoid fideism.
Lastly, if you disagree that the distinction between a and non is part of the basis for meaning and knowledge then we disagree about something basic.
JSeptember 28, 2014 at 5:44 AM
DeleteI'm glad you don't think I am denying existence, I misunderstood where you were going with that point, my apologies.
I believe that denying any and all existence is self refuting, but I wouldn't pretend I am absolutely certain that it is. That is to say, it SEEMS to me the denial of "something exists" is self-refuting. But I can't be sure until I'm certain about what you mean by 'self-refuting.' Please give me your theory of self-refuting.
You wrote, "if you disagree that the distinction between a and non a is part of the basis for meaning and knowledge then we disagree about something basic" but I'm not sure how this is not just another assertion. How do you know this?
J,
ReplyDeleteMy claim is that every proof (every sentence/proposition etc.) assumes such a distinction. You asked me to give you a proof for such. But to give a valid proof for such would necessarily be question begging.
So all you have to do with write a proof or sentence (whatever you like that does not assume such). If you can't then on what basis do you doubt that we are dealing with a transcendental?
Next, it seems that you believe that doubt is free. Doubt is always saying that I doubt X because it contradicts with what Y says. It seems that you are begging the question for empiricism, but until you lay down your cards on the table, it would be hard for me to say for sure.
Lastly, I know that an argument assumes something when the argument loses meaning when that assumption is not made.
CT,
DeleteYou wrote, "My claim is that every proof (every sentence/proposition etc.) assumes such a distinction." What distinction are you talking about?!?
Secondly, how could you possibly know that EVERY proof/sentence/proposition assumes something? Have you considered every proof/sentence/proposition?
Your tactic seems to be, "well you can't show me a proof/sentence" that does not assume "the distinction." But my inability to provide such a case doesn't prove your point.
Where on earth did you get that I was arguing for empiricism?!?
You wrote, "Lastly, I know that an argument assumes something when the argument loses meaning when that assumption is not made." Wait, but how do you know the meaning of an argument?
The distinction between a and non a is the distinction in question.
DeleteNext, why would I need to see or know about every possible sentence in order to have certainty about the claim? Do sentences and/or proofs have rules that they must follow in order to be a sentence or proof etc.? If they do, then if the rules require such, anything that must conform to such rules must also require it. For your skepticism to go through, you must believe that one cannot know the rules of a sentence or a proof etc. Why do you believe such to the case?
Next, my counter to you is simply to show that you have no basis for your objection.
Next, I didnt say that you were arguing for empiricism. My point on that section is that it seems that you are assuming some form of empiricism in your objection (if someone is not an empiricist, why would they claim that someone has to see all arguments before a claim concerning all arguments is made)?
Lastly,
I dont have to see a particular argument to know that it will lose meaning under certain conditions. To assert otherwise, is to simply assume some form of empiricism.
Are you claiming that the rules of syntax or rules of arguments/logic require the metaphysical distinction that a is not non-a? Which rule or rules of sentence structure? Which rules of arguments?
DeleteRegarding your last statement, you take yourself as knowing a lot about what is required for meaning but how do you know you're right?
J,
DeleteI would say that all rules assume the ability to make distinctions, and the most basic distinction is between a and non a. If you cant make distinctions then all your rules would collapse into 1. Which would really collapse into none because you couldnt make the distinction between the words in the rule or the letters in the words in the rule. The same would hold if you wanted to turn symbolic instead of using words.
Next, my theory of meaning is simply that distinctions are necessary for meaning.
Next, I am not claiming to know much at all. It is more the case, that you have bought into a great deal of skepticism and you seem to be in shock when you run into someone who has not.
Lastly, as far as how I can know such things...I would say that the alternative is absurd or self refuting. To deny the position, you would have to deny that change occurs. To deny the distinction between a and non a, you have to assert that change does not occur because for change to occur, there must be a and then not a at a different point.
At the end of the day, one simply has to become a global skeptic and move to silence if one rejects the distinction between a and non a.
CT,
DeleteHow do you know that all the rules assume the ability to make distinctions?
Your theory is an incomplete theory since it provides only a necessary condition (but doesn't provide what is sufficient for meaning). More importantly, can you explain why your theory is correct? What makes it the right theory?
I'm not in shock that you are not a skeptic nor am I a skeptic. I'm trying to get you to see how eventually, your view must bottom out but not because you've run into "transcendentals." For instance, I can just ask you how you know that something is absurd. Or how you know that you've got a self-refuting claim on your hands. You'll likely assert more things, and I'll ask you how you know those things. At some point you're going to have to say that you just know. In a non inferential, immediate way. This is what I want you and Gangadean followers to admit---the role of intuitions in your philosophy. (In fact, I've been working on a blog post to this effect).
Can you justify your assertion that "one needs to become a global skeptic and move to silence if one rejects the distinction between a and non a?"
J,
DeleteMy view is correct can be seen if you simply look at the question like this: Let us imagine that you dont use the distinction between a and non a and yet believe that your description of the world is correct. Then simply you are asserting that all differences in the world are not real/dont exist. If there are no differences then what does one mean by saying that they know something or that something is meaningful?
So instead of looking at the situation as simply my saying that you cannot know anything or believe that meaning remains if you refuse to make distinctions, but instead that there would simply be nothing to know or to even assert that it is meaningful.
J,
DeleteIf you believe that the distinction between a and non a is not essential, then do you believe the distinction between truth and falsehood is essential?
CT,
DeleteYou didn't actually give me an argument here that defends your theory of meaning. On the contrary, you are in effect asserting that by trying to deny the distinction between a and non-a while making a truth claim, I would not be saying something meaningful. This is question begging. You said that your theory of meaning is the following, "meaning requires the basic distinctions." It is to argue in a circle if you try and justify this view by saying, "without the distinction, I could not say something meaningful."
J,
DeleteYou can use whatever theory of meaning you wish (That is part of the power of the argument - It does not rest on sectarian claims). Can your theory maintain meaning in a world where there are no differences.
So you are conceding that the meaning you speak of is not necessarily the right account of meaning?
DeleteBy the way, I never said that the distinction between a and non-a is not important to theorizing. I just asked you to define your terms and provide justifications for your assertions. This is not the same as denying your views.
DeleteThe power of your question begging argument?
DeleteAlso, where is your analysis of causation??????
DeleteJ,
DeleteWhy would I need to concede anything in order to say that my argument works whether or not you have the same or a different theory of meaning. A transcendental would work as the foundation of any assertion.
Next, why would my argument be question begging if you can use which ever theory of meaning that you like?
Lastly, we can talk about causation when we finish this part (which is more basic than causation).
CT,
DeleteWould you be willing to spell out your argument in the form of a syllogism?
Before we go forward, does your theory of meaning maintain meaning in a world with no differences?
DeleteCT,
DeleteYour line was that meaning essentially requires the distinction between a and non-a. Your "argument" was that meaning requires the distinction. This is going to be question begging even if one uses a different notion of meaning. But this is not a virtue of the argument--it just shows a serious structural problem. It's like arguing:
(1) P
(2) Therefore, P
and then telling me that I can plug in anything for 'P' and it will follow that 'P.'
"Before we go forward, does your theory of meaning maintain meaning in a world with no differences?"
DeleteOnce you answer this, then we can go forward.
I don't have a well worked out theory of meaning. But I am also not telling others that they have to be absolutely certain of "basic things" including that "meaning is more basic than truth" and "without basic distinctions, one cannot have meaning." Since you ARE making such claims, shouldn't you have an impeccable theory of meaning to begin with? Otherwise, it's like trying to convince others of something you don't even really understand.
DeleteJ,
DeleteMy position is that it does not matter what theory of meaning one has. If a and non a is transcendental, it would be necessary for any theory of meaning. Demanding that I have an impeccable theory of meaning does not get you anywhere given my position.
Notice that the term 'meaning' refers to various things. There is this sense of 'meaning' which denotes something like, subjectively defined life-purpose, as well as something like objectively life-defined purpose but these uses of the term having nothing to do with statements. Sometimes people say that a painting or piece of music has meaning (and this seems to refer to the notion that there is something of value).
DeleteNow 'meaning' in terms of statements is even trickier. On one view, the meaning of a statement is in part, the semantic value of the sentence-which may determine a set of truth conditions of the statements in question (the meaning will yield an ordered set of the truth values for every possible world)...but no philosopher thinks these matters are settled. In effect, philosophers think we have some vague notion of "meaning" but there's a lot of guessing going on.
CT,
DeleteThat's fine. But all I need you to admit is that you don't have such a theory of meaning. Are you admitting this?
J,
DeleteHow do you maintain distinctions between the various forms of meaning without holding to the distinction between a and non a?
So your assertion that there are different senses of the 'meaning' relies on the distinction between a and non a, right?
CT,
DeleteHow do you know that my assertion that there are different sense of 'meaning' relies on the distinction between 'a' and 'non-a'?
Let us assume that I am wrong. Does your assertion maintain meaning if you reject the distinction between a and non a? If it doesnt, then I am correct, right?
DeleteCT,
DeleteI'm curious what method you use to determine whether meaning is being maintained or not (without a correct theory of meaning)?
J,
DeleteDo you have certainty that the sentences that you have used thus far in this conversation have been meaningful?
CT,
DeleteNo I don't claim to be certain that my statements are meaningful, but I presume that they are and even take myself to know that they are. I'm not even sure what certainty of the sort you are asking about means. Perhaps you could explain?
CT,
ReplyDeleteSince we have more than one thread going here, it may be confusing for other readers to follow (indeed it's getting a bit hard for me to follow). As such I want to provide what I take to be a summary of the general direction of our discussion.
You asked me whether I affirm a number of claims (and I take you to be asking whether I affirm them with absolute certainty). Each of these claims refers to and involves different notions. For instance, you started by asking me if I affirm that everything that is not eternal, needs a cause. I said that I tentatively agree, but wasn't absolutely sure (because I didn't know all that you meant by 'cause'--since there are different theories of causation out there). In response you appealed to this claim: "distinguishing between a and non a is the foundation of meaning and therefore the foundation of knowledge." In so doing, you have only introduced more notions such as "foundation," "knowledge," and "meaning." But because there are various conceptions and theories of "knowledge" and "meaning" for instance, I need you to spell out your take on these concepts before I can figure out if I agree with you or not.
Of course, I can provide tentative agreements such as, "yeah, insofar as I get what you are saying, it seems right to me" but anything more will require you to continually try to spell out what you are saying. This in turn will probably have you introduce additional notions, and we'll have the same problem again. When you give an account of say "self-refuting" by referring to other notions, these other notions appear in need of accounting, also.
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDelete(Please note that I have not read the entirety of the prior exchanges in the combox so this is not an answer to anything prior to my comment)
ReplyDeleteJ, You touch on something which I find to be a fundamental weakness in RP, as it is presented.
Gangadean, who admittedly is not alone in doing so, seems to postulate that the only logical alternative to reductive physicalism is some sort of Kantian spirit/matter dualism. Aside from this being assumed uncritically, (which admittedly most if not all modern philosophers after Descart do in one way or another)it is completely unnecessary and unjustified.
IOW while it is strictly unnecessary to conceive of the world in terms of reductive-physicalism (monism), it is also unnecessary and uncritical to conceive of it in Kantian-dualist terms! Such is done when automatically describing the world in terms of 2 elements: Matter (extended+non-conscious) and Spirit: (non-extended+conscious). This has Plato/Descart/Kant and post-Cartesian metaphysics written all over it. Questions can be asked: Why is that these are the only defining characteristics of matter and spirit? Are these to the exclusion of a third element? Do these two elements, as concieved, suffice to give a competent explanation of reality even if monism is not coherent? Can or has matter and it's opposite be conceived of in different terms? etc...
Understandably, the Kantian and post-Kantian tradition may be the tradition of thinking that Gangadean was schooled within and is ultimately responding to. This seems to me to be a reason why such emphasis is placed on a proof of the external world; a problem that makes sense when you assume Platonic/Cartesian/Kantian points-of-departure. Admittedly, It has been the point-of-departure, for a wide variety of thinkers. But... Why accept it to be the default to monism? This, to me, seems to be a major problem and unnecessary hindrance to RP. This limitation also leaves much to be desired when it comes to what may be the implications/impact for other questions related to epistemology and ontology.
I say all of that, with appreciation of much of what RP aims to do and find the structure of its argumentation to be a step-forward from other forms of P'ism. I'm not here to "NARD" or attack it wholesale. I just think that this, among other things, warrants that its proponents think critically about the assumptions of their system. There is a need to engage in the task of working towards a critically and dialectically constructed metaphysics while taking into account the implications that it may have on other aspects of inquiry.
In a nut-shell: Uncritically accepting enlightenment assumptions about metaphysics is not a critical use of reason.
I appreciate your remarks. I'm glad to see that we agree about the false dilemma upon which Gangadean's argument begins.
DeleteI can also appreciate someone who wants to consider any virtues of Rational Presuppositionalism in addition to its faults and would be interested in hearing what you like about the worldview.
As for my take, I think all of Gangadean's arguments have problems--but that's just a feature of philosophical arguments which is why I insist that Gangadean would do well to unmoor his worldview from the requirements of certainty (or clarity) which he places at the center of it. Once there, we can evaluate his arguments like we would any other philosophical arguments in terms of balancing the strengths against the weaknesses. That won't get us to certainty of course, but so what?
We can form rational beliefs nonetheless. Of course, the cost to Gangadean (and I think he knows this) is that once we remove the requirement of clarity/certainty, there's nothing particularly special about his worldview. As Anderson once noted in a talk, rational presuppositionalism is really just thinking about things in terms of their assumptions--which is nothing more than thinking critically. Every philosopher I know engages in trying to uncover assumptions and considering whether they are good or not---though of course nobody does this with perfect consistency--nonetheless it's something we all strive towards.
J
To be clear, I wouldn't consider RP a worldview. I understand it to be a useful method. Stuart Hackett once proposed something almost identical to it as "Logical/Analytical and Categorical Presuppositionalism" (The Resurrection of Theism, p.155-157). He did so in order to distinguish it from and to critically analyze VanTil and Clark's Presuppositionalism.To better answer your question; I do think that Gangadean's elaboration of the method entails a worldview. That worldview I find inadequate to the demands of a truly robust worldview that serves to make as much sense of the world. My earlier criticism of the uncritical assumption of Kantian metaphysics speaks to that point. Also, in case I may be misunderstood, I am not making the claim that Hackett and Gangadean agree or disagree on much else besides the structure of their presuppositionalim or that they historically depend on each other. I see a common method and find them to be developing something along the same lines. The structure of the method I find appealing and useful.
DeleteAt its best, and these are just some things that come to mind...
- RP is a useful method to engage in worldview analysis insofar as it emphasizes the role of first principles in philosophical inquiry. To put my cards on the table, I stand in the wider Aristotelian tradition. As such, I'm all about recognizing the importance, power & limits of starting from the same first principles within and among the various branches of philosophy, especially while considering opposing views. So RP, as I see it, is very useful to test the coherence and consistency of a positively stated worldview. In a more limited way, it can assist in the work of worldview "construction". The latter is of course limited to the fact that worldview "construction" is only as good as the insight one has into the world itself.
- The value of Gangadean's elaboration of the method is, in my opinion, found in his chiseling out the contours of a framework - through use of the method - which can be developed. Hackett did much of the same work but never structured it out as concisely. Gangadean should be recognized for that.
There is more that can be said but I think that would be what I appreciate the most about it.
I agree that RP is really a method, which is what I intended to flag when I (following Anderson's remarks) equated it with "critical thinking" but nice catch on my slippage. There's the Gangadeanian worldview, which professes to use RP. That's the precise way to state things. And I like that you've compared it to the presuppositionalism of Van Til and Clark--that tells us what is "special" about RP.
DeleteI also like what you've said about using critical thought to get at first principles. But it's at this point where I think there's nothing particularly special about RP. Philosophy has a long tradition of this very thing as you note, Aristotelians are a prime example. Maybe the thought is that contemporary philosophers are more skeptical of first principles than say Aristotle. That might be right so far as it goes, but you wouldn't know it by the way that so much philosophy actually happens. There's a whole lot of presenting arguments, considering assumptions and trying to explain things in terms of more primitive principles or concepts. What contemporary philosophers perceive as the ontological status of these primitives might differ from more classical ways of thinking about them--but honestly, it's hard to feel a real difference when we've gotten to that level of discourse.
I'm still not sure what it is that Gangadean has done in terms of "chiseling out the contours of a framework" vis-a-vis RP. So I suppose I'll have to take your word for it for now. I'm certainly not opposed to thinking that he can have done at least some things correctly. Thanks for your reply!
Now...before I'm understood to be showering uncritical praises upon G's RP a couple of things must be clarified...
ReplyDeleteG's RP at it's not-so-best...and these are only a few topics that come to mind...
- Commitment to a maximalist version JTB theory of knowledge without rigorously considering if it's alternatives necessarily entail skepticism, nihilism or fideism.
- Uncritical assumption of Kantian metaphysical and epistemological points-of-departure and taking for granted that related questions and implications are properly posed and resolved in light of the assumptions: matter vs non-matter, essences/natures, change, causation, contingency vs necessity, etc.
- Taking coherent/consistent implications as necessary consequences and elaborating on them as deductive-like proofs among less-basic beliefs. All fully justified in relation to a broad application of consistency with the Principle of Clarity
- Failure to attend to the analogical use and predication of language in general and in relation to concepts such as "Good" and "Evil"
More can be said but I'll leave it at that for now.
Ultimately, I would argue that the insufficiency (perceived or not) of the G's particular arguments are rooted in foundational epistemological and metaphysical assumptions. Commitment to consistent rational inquiry (reason and reason-applied) is a necessary condition to resolving issues in those domains, but it doesn't inherently prove the stated assumptions actually correspond to reality because they are consistent. At best it may show a set of epistemological and metaphysical postulates are coherent (meaningful) but does not prove them to be inescapably true. For that we need insight into the actual structure of reality; coherence is something but it's not everything. This is the basic problem with the Rationalist tradition. I think he needs a more robust metaphysics and epistemology than the one he lays out.
As I see it, the task of metaphysics at best culminates in determining "what is eternal?" BUT it begins by asking about the particular aspects of the world and attempts to arrive at general and meaningful principles which are necessary to make sense of it. Notions and questions regarding infinitude, eternity, and changeless-ness becoming meaningful in light of such principles.
This is just a rattling-off of some points and not meant to be an exhaustively ordered refutation. I may be wrong and am willing to be corrected. But more is needed than the scripted answers that most get.
It looks like we agree on much about where Gangadean's arguments go wrong.
DeleteAlso, would you be willing to shoot me an email? I'd like to speak with you further, if possible.
Deletereasoniidoubt@gmail.com
I would keep your identity anonymous as I have for everyone else that has contacted me.
Best,
J