The reason I don't think it's a reductio and the reason 'shown' has been placed in shudder quotes, is that his method of "showing" you as a reason-denier is questionable and rests on what I think are actually intuitions or commonsense judgments. Unfortunately, I've had little success in having Gangadean and his kin acknowledge just how much they use intuition and commonsense of this sort in their theories. Although once, Gangadean sort of admitted something of this sort---when we discussed things like how do I know (with certainty) that a statement actually violates the law of non-contradiction? Or how do I know (with certainty) that I exist (which he granted was a contingent a priori claim)? He admitted that these were non-inferential bits of knowledge; in a word, intuitive. But he said they were based on "rational intuitions." When I followed his claim up with a question about how one determines a rational intuition (and thus appropriate) vs. a non-rational intuition, he argued in a tight circle. His basis for distinguishing the two ultimately rested on just an another intuition which he took to be rational, but this is to presuppose a way of distinguishing between the two which is what he was trying to show, hence the circle. Anyway, what I want to focus on in this post is to explain why I am not a reason-denier, and how Gangadean and I have some, albeit thin patch of common ground. This will also help in explaining the dialetical context of all of my other posts as well as allude to some of the ways we differ.
Gangadean claims that some things are clear. In fact, he takes himself to have absolute certainty regarding some propositions. For instance, that the laws of thought are required for meaning. He thinks that one cannot consistently deny the distinction between being and non-being (or any instance of a and non-a). At this level of generality, there's nothing too strange about such claims. I don't have the feeling of certainty that Gangadean and his kin do about these matters (for all I know it's just a psychological/subjective state of certainty)---I've tried, but I just don't have it. But I accept that if a theory or position leads to a denial of basic distinctions or denies the Aristotelian laws of thought, then it's a serious cost to that theory. If you come to me with a belief that entails the denial of the law of identity (or an instance thereof), then I'm going to seriously question your view or else start to wonder if I heard you correctly. Also if your theory tells me that a horse is actually a non-horse (where you're not playing fast as loose with the terms) then I'm going to give you an incredulous stare.
By the same token, if some genie in a bottle came up to me and said, "look, if you're wrong about the law of non contradiction, then everyone you love and care about will die a grueling death and be sent to an eternity of suffering, but if you're right I'll give you a $100" I wouldn't take the bet even though I'm quite sure about the law, and would like $100 rather than not. I'm sure about the law of noncontradiction, but not that sure. I wouldn't risk endless suffering for everyone I care about no matter how minute the risk is by my lights. Gangadean's notion of epistemic certainty seems to require that you be sure enough to take such a bet and I just can't get myself of that disposition. But this fact doesn't take away from what I said earlier about how I would respond to theories or views that entailed the denial of what I take to be basic truths.
So I don't think I'm a reason-denier. I just don't feel as sure as they do about things. I don't think we can have the kind of certainty that Gangadean claims to have, but I believe some of the same things he does (regarding the laws of thought, basic distinctions and the like) even if not to the same extent (It is interesting to note that even if the sort of certainty that Gangadean is after, were possible, I don't know what benefit there would be in having it. What's the upshot supposed to be? Maybe I'll explore this in a future post.) Of course, we disagree about a lot, too.
Still, there's a sense in which I agree with Gangadean, that some things are clear (true, I'm hesitant about his definition of 'clear', but let's just suspend that for now). We both at least believe that some things are clear, even if we feel different levels of confidence about the claim. Now even given this "common ground", we might still fuss over exactly what method one uses to determine what is clear to reason and also relatedly, what things count as clear and which, don't. Of course, the devil is in the details.
Gangadean for instance, thinks it's clear to reason that the God of theism exists and that man has sinned and needs a savior. I don't. He thinks it's clear to reason that the bible is the word of God, but as I've suggested in a previous post, I don't. He thinks it's clear that the mind is not brain, and I don't. He thinks that it's clear that we don't have libertarian free-will and I'm not so sure. This doesn't make me a reason-denier. Nor does it make him a reason-upholder. At least that isn't the default conclusion to draw if you're trying to look at it objectively. We have to look at the arguments and assess them in terms of their rational merits. [Edit on 6/29/30: I still maintain one can rationally believe each of these things despite them not being as clear (i.e., deductively proven) as Gangadean takes them to be].
So I want to be clear. My posts in this blog assume (for the sake of discussion)** at least some basic distinctions---I take certain things as obvious or clear or whatever. I don't call everything into question. I assume that any theory is seriously problematic if it calls into question the law of identity/contradiction/excluded middle. I use valid rules of inference to argue. I present arguments, point out what I think are illegitimate moves, presuppositions, or premises that Gangadean takes for granted.
Still, in assuming these very things, it is my view that Gangadean's more substantive claims (e.g., God's existence, theory of knowledge, the bible as special revelation, the nature of good and evil for man, the existence of the external world, etc) don't follow logically from accepting just the basic distinctions and the laws of thought. What is more, he thinks he is as certain about these matters as he is about very basic truths. But I contend that there are questionable premises and or bad inferences along the way. Some disagreement between us about what counts as basic and or clear of course will crop up now and again (in part, because he has some sort of infallible method in mind about determining what things count as clear and basic). Thus sometimes we won't agree on which things are counted as clear or basic. But what my blog is intended to show is that in effect, Gangadean's more substantive claims don't pass his own test of critical examination.
**
[Note there is a lot more to be said about the topic of assuming basic things/distinctions. For instance, I suspect that Gangadeanians often front-load the term 'assume' in this context to draw all sorts of conclusions. e.g., when they point out that in questioning the law of identity one assumes the law of identity, it isn't obvious what 'assumes' means, here. Is it assumes psychologically--as in I have to think in terms of the law of identity to question it? Dialectically--as in, I have to argue in terms of it in for the sake of discussion? or something like logically? And what does 'logically' mean here? So they really ought to get clearer on what they mean by 'assume' whenever they pull this move. Notice that if it's just psychological or dialetical facts they're talking about, then the normative conclusion they want to draw doesn't seem to follow. Suppose I assume basic distinctions in my questioning of anything---where this means that I am psychologically in a state of assuming basic distinctions in order to question anything. This is just a fact about human psychology. Or suppose we read assume in terms of what must dialetically be presupposed in discussion---this just tells us facts about discourse. But what Gangadean is really after is that reason is ontological. He wants to move from, 'a is a' is assumed in all questioning and so makes questioning possible, to 'a is a' is true out there in the world. So psychological and dialetical accounts seem insufficient for what he is after. Moreover, they are empirical claims---like how do you know that whenever I assert or think about something, I must be in a certain psychological state? Do you have access to my mind?]
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