Here is another post I found from Anderson. It is a brief discussion of reliabilism and I think it's instructive in spelling out more of the Gangadeanian epistemology as well as view about the method of "proper" inquiry. I just want to take a few portions of it, but if you fear I've taken anything out of context, you can always refer to the original post which I've linked to above. This discussion overlaps nicely with some of my most recent posts.
Anderson writes,
Epistemology is not first and primarily a practical problem. It is a problem of meaning. What do I mean when I say “here is my hand” and how do I know this? What the skeptic is asking for is an authority. “By what authority do you say these things?”...
As I've said a few times before, Anderson never explains what it is that he intends by 'meaning.' He seems to think we all understand the term in exactly the same way he does. But this is sloppy. The notion plays a crucial role in his system. He is claiming here that epistemology (which is characterized by theory of knowledge) is primarily about meaning. And he asks what the meaning of a claim like "here is my hand" is, and importantly how one can know what the meaning of that statement is. He doesn't tell us which is more basic. After all, one might think that knowing the meaning of a statement, is just another instance of knowing, which makes epistemology primarily about knowing (rather than meaning). I honestly don't know what he intends when he says that epistemology is primarily about meaning. So I wish he would explain it in a way to make it more perspicuous. Moreover, I wish he would answer the questions he raises. I've been wanting the Gangadeanians to explain how it is they know what a word or statement means--i.e., the method of determining the meaning of claims like "here is my hand." But none is given.
Next, Anderson writes,
But the main point I want to draw is that Anderson thinks there is something that cannot be doubted because it makes doubting possible. Roughly, he has mentioned several ways that we might come to know things/"get meaning" (i.e., by way of common sense, intuition, science, constructive reasoning, testimony, tradition) and he thinks that all of these face problems. They can be doubted in some sense. Or perhaps they can't answer the skeptic. Again, Anderson isn't as clear about things as he should be. What does it mean that "it can be doubted?" How do we determine that something can be doubted? These are important issues that Anderson should be in a position to answer (and the answer better not be common sense or intuition given what he comes up in the next section).
He then claims that there is some other way of knowing (or "getting meaning"), call it X. X and only X is the sort of thing that cannot be doubted ( implied is that all the other ways can be doubted) and so it is the sure-fire way of knowing (and presumably the way to know the meaning of things). X of course, is reason, or the laws of thought according to Anderson. So his claim is that X (reason) qua method of getting meaning or coming to know things, cannot be doubted. Why does he say it can't be doubted? "Because it makes doubting possible." If you're not careful you will just go with your gut reaction to this and agree. It will seem obvious to you. But let's be really careful here. There are a number of issues that the skeptic might raise against Anderson. Since Anderson thinks that his views are superior to others insofar as only he can "answer" the skeptic, we should consider what the skeptic might say to him. The first is just a recap of what I mentioned above.
1) How can one know with certainty or determine infallibly when something can or cannot be doubted?
2) How do we know with certainty or determine infallibly when something makes doubting possible?
Now remember, Anderson has just poo-poo'd on intuition, common sense and the like for not being able to overcome the skeptic (although I think he's wrong about this). So whatever his answers to 1) and 2) above turn out to be, they shouldn't involve common sense or intuition. But just ask yourself how you would ever come to verify that something can/cannot be doubted. Take any statement and consider what method you employ in figuring out whether it can or cannot be doubted. Likewise just think about how you come to know or verify that the laws of thought make doubting possible. What's the method? Do you go through an argument? Or do you just see it directly, immediately, non inferentially? If so, then how does this differ from intuition?
...What we are looking for is the highest authority which ends the regress and which cannot be doubted because it makes doubting possible. People rely on authorities such as tradition, testimony, scripture, common sense, intuition, science, and constructive reasoning. However, none of these is the highest authority; all of these can be (and are) questioned.
By way of contrast, I argue that the only authority that cannot be questioned is the laws of thought. The laws of thought, called reason, explain what thought is, therefore make thought possible, and hence cannot be questioned since any question assumes the laws of thought...The regress he's talking about is the regress of justification that traditionally internalist theories of justification (i.e,. the view that justification consists in reasons or evidence that the subject is in a position to be aware of) have had to deal with. He also thinks something like it plagues the externalist as well. The idea is that if everything you know depends on other reasons or evidence of some sort, or a reliable belief forming process, then there's the issue of what reasons you have for your original reasons and this leads to an infinite regress. I think he misses the mark against the externalist, but I'll save that for another day. The way Anderson has framed it, it is the skeptic that is pushing for a theory of justification from the person claiming to know things and the idea is that infinite regresses are bad things. Note it seems to me a hard core skeptic would also question this last claim that infinite regresses are problematic in the first place.
But the main point I want to draw is that Anderson thinks there is something that cannot be doubted because it makes doubting possible. Roughly, he has mentioned several ways that we might come to know things/"get meaning" (i.e., by way of common sense, intuition, science, constructive reasoning, testimony, tradition) and he thinks that all of these face problems. They can be doubted in some sense. Or perhaps they can't answer the skeptic. Again, Anderson isn't as clear about things as he should be. What does it mean that "it can be doubted?" How do we determine that something can be doubted? These are important issues that Anderson should be in a position to answer (and the answer better not be common sense or intuition given what he comes up in the next section).
He then claims that there is some other way of knowing (or "getting meaning"), call it X. X and only X is the sort of thing that cannot be doubted ( implied is that all the other ways can be doubted) and so it is the sure-fire way of knowing (and presumably the way to know the meaning of things). X of course, is reason, or the laws of thought according to Anderson. So his claim is that X (reason) qua method of getting meaning or coming to know things, cannot be doubted. Why does he say it can't be doubted? "Because it makes doubting possible." If you're not careful you will just go with your gut reaction to this and agree. It will seem obvious to you. But let's be really careful here. There are a number of issues that the skeptic might raise against Anderson. Since Anderson thinks that his views are superior to others insofar as only he can "answer" the skeptic, we should consider what the skeptic might say to him. The first is just a recap of what I mentioned above.
1) How can one know with certainty or determine infallibly when something can or cannot be doubted?
2) How do we know with certainty or determine infallibly when something makes doubting possible?
Now remember, Anderson has just poo-poo'd on intuition, common sense and the like for not being able to overcome the skeptic (although I think he's wrong about this). So whatever his answers to 1) and 2) above turn out to be, they shouldn't involve common sense or intuition. But just ask yourself how you would ever come to verify that something can/cannot be doubted. Take any statement and consider what method you employ in figuring out whether it can or cannot be doubted. Likewise just think about how you come to know or verify that the laws of thought make doubting possible. What's the method? Do you go through an argument? Or do you just see it directly, immediately, non inferentially? If so, then how does this differ from intuition?
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