Is reason exclusive to humans (as far as beings that have a physical presence in the world)? Gangadean, like Aristotle, Descartes and a number of others before him in an attempt to get to the essence of humankind have argued that the presence of reason or mental life (that instantiates reason) is found only in man. But what about dolphins, dogs, cats, apes, chimpanzees? We seem so naturally to attribute to them thoughts, feelings, desires, and beliefs. A dog seems to run after a bone because it has a particular belief that there is something rather than nothing to go after and also because it wants the bone. If such attributions are warranted then it seems likewise appropriate to attribute mentality and even reason. This would mean that reason, or mindedness isn't unique to humanity in fact, it may be in a great number of species. If so, then this threatens, to some extent, the idea that reason or the capacity to reason is what sets humans apart from other beings. This doesn't of course mean that humans aren't reasoning or essentially reasoning beings (nor does it prove that reason is essential to humans either)--it just extends the set of reasoning beings to include other animals. Importantly however, it does block any straightforward argument that seeks to figure out the good of man based on man's capacity to reason at least if the argument sets out to distinguish man from other animate beings such as dogs, penguins and crows in virtue of the essential capacity of humans to have mental life or reason. Moreover, for Gangadean, consciousness, or mindedness makes up a substance distinct from corporeal existence--- the soul is what accounts for the mindedness of humans (and God). So there is much at stake for Gangadeanians in this current debate. They believe that other animals are not rational, fail to have mentality because they believe non human animals do not have souls and are merely material (or the explanatory direction might go the other way). If there is reason to believe that non human animals have mentality, rationality and the like, then this requires a pretty significant revision of Gangadean's views.
Now it seems to me that there is good reason to believe that other animals are minded. They exhibit behaviors consistent with having a rich mental life. I take this to be an obvious point. Just observe how animals live. They seem to communicate with one another, exhibit behavior as if they are sometimes depressed, bored, happy or scared. Some animals even exhibit rather advanced problem solving skills, the making of tools (see Primates and Crows) to get at rewards. It's really an incredible claim to say that animals do not have mentality.
In response, Gangadean et al. will argue that our attributions of mentality to animals are at best inductive or abductive. Behavior of mentality doesn't indubitably indicate mentality. Just like acting as if one is in pain doesn't actually mean one is experiencing pain. So while animals appear to act in ways that would make sense if they were minded beings, it doesn't necessarily follow that they in fact instantiate reason, or mentality. Similarly, though computers can act as if they are minded, we wouldn't grant that they are reasoning beings (so the argument goes). This is the main argument I have heard repeatedly from Gangadean and his followers. I want to start by saying they are impeccably correct. To be sure, concluding that a being is minded just because it acts as if it is, is to commit a formal fallacy (affirming the consequent). Now this doesn't mean that there isn't good reason to believe that non human animals are minded---it just means that we don't have definitive proof. In fact, abductive arguments (common to science and philosophy) are just that, affirming the consequent. I've spoken often about how this requirement of proof for belief or knowledge is a bad one that actually causes major issues for Gangadean. So here's another instance of the kind. Suppose that Gangadean is right that we need to have proof that animals are minded in order to rationally belief (or know) that animals are minded. The problem is that I don't have definitive proof that Gangadean, or anyone else for that matter is minded. This is but a token of a type of problem traditionally called the problem of other minds.
How do I know that I am minded? Well, I have a kind of first-person access to my own mental life, and the occurrent mental states that constitue my mentality. I know it like I know that I have perceptions; I know it immediately or non-inferentially. The problem of other minds arises because I don't have this same epistemic status vis-a -vis other presumed human persons. Other bodies that look a lot like mine (though also different in important ways no doubt) communicate with me and exhibit behaviors that are consistent with having minds, but these are mere indications or evidences, rather than proof of mindedness. But this is just what was the objection presented by Gangadean to deny mentality to "lower" animals (or at least to argue that we shouldn't believe that animals have mentality). So if this lack of first-person access is thought to show that we aren't rationally entitled to attribute minds to animals, then it also follows that we lack that entitlement to attribute minds to other (presumed people).
Recognizing this problem, Gangadean's response is that we can know other humans qua humans in virtue of a shared language which consists of the communication involving concepts, judgements and arguments. Two humans from distinctly different backgrounds (the argument goes), without a common language would over time develop a way to communicate that is, develop a shared language. But though we have coexisted with other animals (presumably since the beginning of human history) we have no such language in common with them. But notice this appeal to the phenomena of language (which can be found in both Descartes and Locke) is appealing to merely one more behavioral/observational phenomena. That is to say, it is merely one more indication that a purported human does indeed have a special kind of mentality such that they rightfully belong to the set of all humans (as defined by reasoning and physically embodied beings), but it certainly doesn't prove it. Likewise it fails to prove that animals, and other beings lack minds too. Just as it is the case that the presence of mere behaviors consistent with having reason, fails to demonstrate genuine mentality, so it is that the absence of behaviors (including communicating concepts) consistent with mentality cannot prove the absence of mentality.
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