More on Gangadean's Theodicy

Previously I wrote about Gangadean's take on the problem of evil.  Gangadean thinks that the presence of both moral and natural evil presents a problem for the theist. In particular, in his book, he focuses on the logical problem of evil, but as I've said before, it isn't really a logical problem. There is no strict contradiction between the proposition that God exists and the proposition that evil exists.  At best, the reality of evil and suffering is an evidential problem (the presence of evil seems to be some evidence against the proposition that an all-good, all-powerful God exists). But since Gangadean is after ruling out all possibilities of God's failing to exist, he has to take, even the evidential problem, seriously. He's got to answer it given his own epistemological standards. In the previous article, I noted that Gangadean's approach to the problem, his purported theodicy is a non-starter. It badly begs the question against the one raising the problem of evil as a challenge against theism.

Here's something else that is problematic having to do with an unproven assumption upon which his theodicy seems to rest.  In his book (see Philosophical Foundation pp. 111-114) Gangadean first addresses the question of why there is moral evil even despite the fact that an all-good and all-powerful God exists. He then shifts to talking about natural evil. Importantly, his explanation of natural evil depends on his explanation of moral evil. Roughly, moral evil is the kind of evil that is agent driven i.e., results somewhat directly and in some way from moral agents like us. While natural evil is not (e.g., famine, old age, sickness, "natural" death, and the like). So here's what it means that Gangadean's explanation of natural evil depends on his explanation of moral evil: In some way, Gangadean presupposes that moral evil is more basic than natural evil. He never justifies this claim. He never even bothers to question whether it's actually true that moral evil is more basic than natural evil. This is strange. In other words, his explanation of why there is natural evil (on a theistic picture) depends crucially on what his explanation is for the reason that there is moral evil. Natural evil is imposed by God, according to Gangadean, in order to remove moral evil. But why should anyone grant Gangadean this relationship between the two types of evil? Is he claiming that it is clear to reason that natural evil ought to be explained in terms of moral evil, and so moral evil is somehow more basic than natural evil? If he is claiming this, then I'd like to see an argument. If not, then again his whole theodicy fails before it begins. Since as he sees it, the problem of evil threatens the clarity of God's existence, if it isn't clear that natural evil ought to be explained in terms of moral evil (such that the latter is more basic), then his theodicy for natural evil will merely be speculative. It won't be clearly, true. In which case, the challenges to theism, that come with the problem of evil, will not clearly have been answered. In which case, it isn't clear that God exists. So Gangadean has no choice. He needs a deductively sound argument that has as its conclusion that natural evil should be (rationally) understood in light of moral evil. And he can't presuppose that the bible is special revelation to begin with, in doing so (since that would be question begging).

On pg. 114, Gangadean states that natural evil must be imposed rather than original in creation. So maybe he's thinking that it can't be more basic than moral evil because moral evil came first. But this won't do. First of all, temporal priority (priority in time) doesn't entail explanatory priority. Just because X happens prior to Y in time, doesn't entail that X should be explained in terms of Y. For all we know X and Y are entirely independent events (see the fallacy called, post hoc ergo propter hoc) having no explanatory relationship whatsoever. And anyway, how could Gangadean possibly know that moral evil came before natural evil, in time from reason alone? Again, he can't just appeal to scripture since the problem of evil is raised as a challenge against belief in God. Secondly, moral evil doesn't seem "original in creation" or at least to say this would be a bad result for Gangadean. So if neither moral evil or natural evil are "original in creation" then we can't use that notion to derive our explanatory order.