If we don't need Clarity, then Gangadeanian's worldview is bust.

If you're like me, you just don't get why we need clarity (as Gangadean defines it) at the basic level, or any level for that matter. Now here's a conditional that even Gangadeanians will agree with.

If we don't need clarity, then the Gangadeanian philosophy is a non-starter. 

What is more, Gangadeanians are the ones claiming that we need clarity to begin with, so I think it's reasonable for us to expect some sort of argument. And since Gangadean requires that we show how our most basic assumptions are clear to reason, he ought also to agree with the following stronger conditional.

If Gangadean fails to show that it is clear that we need clarity, then the Gangadeanian philosophy is a non-starter. 

Gangadean has a few boogeymen up his sleeve which he says follow from the lack of clarity--that's essentially his case for the need for clarity. On his view, if we assume that there is no clarity, then certain absurdities (intuitively) follow. So, goes the argument, our working assumption (the lack of clarity) must be false. Here are the two big alleged absurdities.

1) Skepticism: in its extreme form is the view that we can't know anything. Gangadean claims that if the basic things are not clear, then we cannot have knowledge (i.e,. skepticism follows). In fact, on the very first page of his book, he seems to identify skepticism with the denial of the proposition that some things are clear.

I've said it numerous times that there's not actually an argument where we need one most. Why should we think that knowledge requires clarity at the basic level, in the first place? So Gangadean has failed to show that we need clarity to avoid skepticism because he's failed to show that knowledge requires clarity/certainty.

Interestingly, in his book (pg. 35), he merely presupposes a particular analysis of knowledge (a version of the justified true belief theory of knowledge). After presenting the three conditions of the Justified True Belief analysis, he writes,

"These three conditions are said to be necessary and sufficient for knowledge" (35, emphasis mine). 

Of course the natural questions are: Said by whom? And more importantly: Why should we take their word for it? What I found interesting is that he adds in a footnote (1) that this is in accordance with the theory of knowledge attributed to Plato in the Theatatus and the Meno. So basically, it's Plato's theory of knowledge (on a particular interepration) and Gangadean just takes for granted that Plato was correct. That's no good especially when virtually all living philosophers disagree with the Justified True Belief analysis of knowledge! We should expect him to use reason to settle this dispute about what knowledge is between him and the rest of us. (This is why I keep pressing the Gangadeanians for an actual defense of their theory of knowledge as opposed to a statement of it).

As a side note: I was just listening to a talk given by a Gangadeanian named Kelly Fitzsimmons Burton on "What is Knowledge?"  At the 25:12 mark, she talks about the need for "certainty." Her remarks were reminiscent of my last personal conversation with Gangadean. She (undoubtedly following Gangadean) says that at some point we can't get around the need for certainty. Then she says something about an alternative--where one might propose to believe things to various degrees of confidence (i.e., assign probabilities to propositions that are less than certain). Of course, we can model certainty with probabilities, too, so this is a bit imprecise (I daresay, sloppy). But I think what she meant to say was that even someone who thinks we should only assign probabilities that are less than 1 (or more than 0) to propositions can't get around the need for certainty at some point. And then she makes the very same egregious error that Gangadean once made with me. She states that a person can only form probability judgments over propositions if there is some standard of probability of which they are certain. But I have no idea what rationally justifies that last bit. Why can't a thoroughgoing probabilist consistently assign less than 1 (or more than zero) to propositions, including propositions about which probabilities they ought to assign and the very proposition that they ought to assign probabilities instead of being certain? I've pointed out before that there is nothing inconsistent or self-referentially absurd about this. But I welcome any Gangadeanian to provide an argument showing otherwise.

2) Nihilism/meaninglessness: Gangadean also writes, on the first page of his book,

"Consistently held, skepticism leads to nihilism--the loss of all meaning." 

But as we've just seen, he hasn't shown that we need clarity in order to avoid skepticism. In which case, the lack of clarity need not lead to nihilism. But maybe there's a different way to argue from the lack of clarity to nihilism. Here's how that usually goes.

Without clarity at the basic level, basic distinctions between "being and non-being, eternal and non-eternal, good and evil," collapse. And we need such basic distinctions not to collapse in order to have meaning. 

Unfortunately, this is no better. What does it mean that basic distinctions "collapse" in the relevant sense? And why should we worry ourselves of such collapsing? Well I hardly think Gangadean is making a metaphysical point. That would make him out to be an idiot. That is, he surely isn't saying "if I see no way of telling apart an oak tree from an elm tree, then there is no difference." He doesn't buy into that kind of idealism. Hence, he must be making an epistemological claim--that's what he must mean by basic distinctions "collapsing." Something like, if we can't be certain of anything, then we can't make basic distinctions like distinguishing between being and non-being. But while this is a tad better, it still falls short. This is no different than what I pointed out about Anderson's recent mistake.

The only thing that I can see that follows about basic distinctions from "nothing is clear" is that "basic distinctions are also not clear." That follows trivially. If we cannot be absolutely certain of anything, then it follows that we likewise can't be absolutely certain that there's a distinction between being and non-being. But that's very different from saying we can't (consistently) make basic distinctions. There's a gap to close here between being absolutely certain about a distinction on the one hand, and being able to make or draw the distinction, to use the distinctions in your reasoning, to form rational beliefs based on those distinctions and even to believe that for instance, 'a is not, non-a'.

Perhaps we couldn't have meaning if we were in no rational position to make, draw, or use basic distinctions in our lives. I could see how that might affect one's ability to make decisions, form beliefs and the like which would perhaps threaten one's ability to have meaning. But I see no reason to think that we have to be certain of basic distinctions if we are to have meaning--which is Gangadean's claim.

In fact, we can be less than certain of these distinctions and rationally (and consistently) make them in thinking about the world. And the fact that I can't have certainty that being is different from non-being doesn't entail that I can't be rational in believing that there's a difference. Just like it doesn't entail that I can't draw/make them for reasoning about what to do. In fact, on many theories of knowledge, I can even know that there's a difference between being and non-being (for example) without being certain that there is. Insofar as I can (consistently) do all of these things in relation to basic distinctions, there's no threat of nihilism. So I can see no need for clarity on grounds of the threat of nihilism. Again, we are desperate need of arguments.

Either prove that we can't rationally make or draw or use or believe in basic distinctions without being absolutely certain of the distinctions or else prove that meaningless somehow follows despite our being able to make, draw, use and believe in basic distinctions.

For good measure: there's yet another way we may construe what Gangadean means when he threatens the collapsing of basic distinctions. Perhaps the claim is through and through metaphysical. Something like,

If there is not a (metaphysical) distinction between being and non-being, then no meaning is possible. 

This is a bit better, I suppose, maybe if there really is no difference between something and nothing, then nihilism follows. First, this is still shy of anything resembling an argument--it's a stand alone claim. More significantly, the problem with this reading is that it's entirely disconnected from the principle of clarity which is an epistemological thesis. Someone like me is not denying that there are no distinctions (metaphysically speaking). Instead, I'm calling into doubt that we can (rationally) be sure of/certain of such distinctions (and whether we need to be) which is an epistemological issue. So this reading of what Gangadean might be up again seems to offer no help in the current context.

I started out by presenting a conditional that even Gangadean himself would agree with (or at least consistency would require that of him).

If Gangadean fails to show that it is clear that we need clarity, then the Gangadeanian philosophy is a non-starter. 

And I've argued that the antecedent is true. He has yet to prove that either skepticism or nihilism follows from the lack of clarity. That means (by way of logical inference) that the consequent must be true. The Gangadeanian worldview is a non-starter. 

ps: I should add that in speaking with Christians, Gangadean sometimes connects the need for clarity to inexcusability, the controversial theological doctrine that all persons are held responsible by God for unbelief. But keep in mind that that approach isn't going to work in the context of the present challenges because he would need to presuppose certain parts of Christian theism (e.g., the theological doctrine of inexcusability) to argue for the need for clarity which is putting the cart in front of the horse.