More from Anderson on Youtube

There's been a bit more action on youtube between Spencer and Anderson. But as I suspected, Anderson has again managed to avoid presenting an answer to the original objection.

To set the stage a bit: Anderson recently asked Spencer if he affirmed that "reason is ontological" that is to say, that our thinking at least sometimes tells us about the world as it were (as opposed to just our thoughts). And Spencer made some remarks that made Anderson (and me) think he didn't affirm that reason was ontological. To that, Anderson claimed they had no basis for further dialogue, because Spencer wouldn't be in a position to make basic distinctions and so he wouldn't be in a position to evaluate any arguments. Since that time Spencer has responded quite unequivocally. He wrote,

@Owen Anderson But we do agree that the laws of thought are ontological. I've said in this thread that I "believe" and "agree" that 'a is a' applies to reality and is universal. So you're just wrong to say that "we don't agree on whether the laws of thought are also laws of being (ontological)." 

Our difference seems to be on the epistemic status of our belief that reason is ontological. I think it's a presupposition of experience, or perhaps a non-inferential intuition. You think it's "clear to reason", meaning, you can show, without relying on intuition or a mere brute starting point, that reason is ontological. I'm asking what that demonstration looks like. Do you have an argument? 

If you insist that the only coherent "common ground" is one where we can demonstrate that reason is ontological, it would seem that you shoulder the burden to show why that's necessary. You haven't done that. Thus, it's a loaded assumption on your part to maintain that we "know" (it's "clear to reason") or that we must "know" that reason is ontological, without showing it first. 

To be clear, my asking you to show how it is that you know reason is ontological without appealing to intuition or common sense is not the same as me denying that reason is ontological.

So it's quite obvious from this passage that he agrees with my position in that he affirms that reason is ontological even though he doesn't necessarily buy the other Gangadeanian baggage of thinking we can or even must have certainty about such matters (i.e,. the principle of clarity and the need for clarity).

Anderson has just responded with:

Spencer Hawkins No I don't think I'm wrong that we disagree. Here's what you said above:"To answer your question, I do, in a sense, "affirm" or "know" that 'a is a' beyond my own experience, but not in the way that you're assuming. I don't claim to be deductively certain when I claim to "affirm" or "know" the meaning of terms, the consistency that the world takes, and so on. I think human knowledge is fallible and the quest for a foundationalist (internalist) basis in incorrigible or infallible certainty is a lost cause." (Emphasis mine). 

We can't know whether "eternal" is "non-eternal" so we can't assess the argument together.

This comment doesn't reflect the attitude of someone that is engaged in an honest dialogue. He quotes something Spencer said several comments back without paying attention to Spencer's explicit remarks in the latest comment. If there is a tension between what Spencer has just said and what he said before, someone who was pursuing a philosophical conversation in good faith would ask their interlocutor to clarify their position as opposed to assuming the most self serving and uncharitable reading. He should have asked Spencer which of the two comments in tension really represents his view and also allow him to revise his positions. What matters is what Spencer believes not whether he's perfectly clear or consistent in what he says. Again it's not hard and Anderson should know better. What this looks like to me is someone who is trying to avoid answering a challenge and trying to save face in the process because he's been called out.

In fact it's worse than all of that. In the older comment that Anderson cites, Spencer clearly states that there is a sense in which he affirms or knows that 'a is a'. So there isn't even a tension between that comment and his latest remarks. But he adds that it isn't "knowledge" according to Anderson and Gangadean (which entails certainty). As I've noted before, the Gangadeanians have a quirky definition or analysis of 'knowledge' which they merely stipulate. I say it's quirky because the rest of us philosophers simply disagree. And they don't ever bother to justify their definition which is to say they never answer the question, "how are you certain that your definition or analysis of 'knowledge' is correct?" So when Anderson ends with, "We can't know whether "eternal" is "non-eternal" so we can't assess the argument together" he's using the verb 'know' to track the Gangadeanian definition which requires certainty. And by Spencer's own admission, he doesn't agree to that. But what Anderson needs to explain now is why we need that kind of knowledge (certainty) in order to assess an argument. 

Anderson is right that if we can't know with Gangadeanian certainty whether eternal is non-eternal, then we can't know with Gangadeanian certainty whether an argument employing those notions is sound or not. Nobody is doubting that. But this triviality is simply of no consequence.

In contrast, if we can have knowledge without Gangadeanian certainty (which the VAST majority of philosophers accept) then we can know without Gangadeanian certainty whether eternal is non-eternal and we can assess arguments which employ those concepts just fine. So what the Gangadeanians owe us is an argument for why we need Gangadeanian certainty or Gangadeanian-Knowledge in the first place. If you're thinking this relates closely with some of my other recent posts, you're right. It's all connected to the idea of clarity. As I've been stressing for some time, the Gangadeanians have simply failed to demonstrate the principle of clarity (that some things are clear) and the need for clarity (that some things must be clear), which is to say they've fail to show that the core principles at the center of their entire worldview are clear to reason.