Kelly Fitzsimmons Burton on the Principle of Clarity

A new talk has been posted on one of the Gangadean affiliated sites on the principle of clarity-- i.e., the claim that some things are clear to reason. The last time I linked a talk by Burton I noted how she claims to simply take the principle for granted and wasn't in a position to show that it was true. In this latest talk she attempts to show that it's true or to provide definitive grounds for us to accept it. Hence, confusion persists about just what is her official position--maybe she's still working things out?

The most recent talk adds to the confusion in another way in that she begins her remarks by emphasizing that the principle of clarity is a "first-principle" or "starting point." What's peculiar about that statement is that philosophers don't normally try to demonstrate that their "first principles" or "starting points" are true--they simply take them for granted (usually on the basis of intuition) much akin to the axioms of mathematical systems which you use to prove other things, but don't prove within the system itself. This would be compatible with her initial claim in the previous talk that she isn't in a position to show that the principle of clarity was true. But then again she proceeds to try and prove that it is true which is the topic of this post.

In any event, either approach works against the Gangadeanians. This is because the argument that Burton provides (which is one I've already criticized before) is a bad one. So, either they accept the principle as an article of faith, or they stand behind it on the basis of a bad argument--whichever way they go, it seems that they fail to satisfy the very standards of rigor with which they are quick to burden others.

A quick word about the structure of Burton's argument. It looks to be a reductio ad absurdum. In this sort of argument you have a claim that you want to prove say, P (in this case, P = some things are clear to reason). The manner in which you get to proving P is by starting with its denial (not-P). If you can derive, a contradiction by starting with not-P and nothing more than uncontroversially true premises and valid rules of inference, then you've just proven that not-P is false (or that P is true). As we'll see in a moment, unfortunately for Burton's argument, the premises are not all uncontroversially true.

Also keep in mind that for something to be clear according to the Gangadeanian lexicon is for the opposite to be (determined as) impossible in the strongest sense. This is the manner in which clarity relates to the burden of proof for the Gangadeanians--to show that P is clear you have to demonstrate by way of a sound argument that not-P couldn't possibly be true. So in evaluating Burton's argument you shouldn't employ the ordinary everyday notion of 'clear.' For instance, I'd say that it's perfectly clear (in the mundane sense) that I am currently typing on a computer. Here, I'm using the word like most competent English speakers to denote something like "obvious." But I have to admit that it's at least remotely possible that I'm in a matrix like scenario so that there is in fact no computer and thus no typing and instead only the experience as if I'm typing on a computer (because I'm plugged into the output of a sophisticated program). So on Gangadean's view of things, it wouldn't be clear to reason that I am currently typing on a computer even though on the more ordinary notion, it remains obvious/clear that I am so typing because remote possibilities of that sort are just intuitively too ridiculous to take seriously. That's the sense of the word to keep in mind. Note: things would be different if I could somehow prove that I'm typing on a computer (i.e., if I could show that it's literally impossible for me to be in a matrix like scenario) which is something Gangadean attempts, but fails to do in his book. Okay enough with the prelims., here's the argument presented by Burton.

(1) Nothing is clear to reason. [Assumed for Reductio]
(2) If nothing is clear, then no distinctions are clear.
(3) If we can't make clear distinctions, then (meaningful) thought and talk are impossible.
(4) But it seems like (meaningful) thought and talk are possible.
(5) Thus, some things are clear. 

The implicit contradiction is found between (3) and (4). So that's supposed to be grounds to deny premise (1) which is to prove that some things are clear to reason i.e., the principle of clarity.

To begin, premise (4) is interesting. Notice how Burton includes "it seems like" in presenting (4). We normaly call that a "hedge"--that is, it flags a lack of full confidence in what follows. Why does Burton employ it if she's after demonstrating the principle of clarity? I'm not sure. Again more confusion. What is more, I wonder if what Burton is tracking here is the fact that it isn't obvious how such a thing is to be known by the Gangadeanians given their standards of proof and knowledge. Is it somehow self-attesting or self-evident that thought and talk are possible? If so, how is it that one goes about determining that something is "self-attesting" or "self-evident"? Or does it all boil down to just another basic intuition which the Gangadeanian's refer to by a different name? And just to anticipate a mistaken response, when I ask how it is that Burton or any Gangadeanian for that matter knows that (4) is true, I'm not thereby saying that I believe (4) is false. I'm merely inquiring into whether the Gangadeanian system is internally consistent and can get the advertised results.

The real stinker in this argument is Premise (3). There's no justification given for it and it's doing all of the heavy lifting. Just why is meaningful thought and talk impossible if we can't "make clear distinctions"? Burton doesn't say. The crucial word here is 'clear' as it features in Premise (3). The claim isn't that intelligible thought and talk are impossible if we can't make distinctions per se, but rather that intelligible thought and talk are impossible if we can't make clear distinctions. So what does it mean that we can't (consistently) make clear distinctions as opposed to that we can't make distinctions simpliciter? Since epistemic certainty is the thing at issue with this argument, what the Gangadeanian means is that in doubting clarity at the basic level, one cannot be absolutely certain that the distinctions one's draws are correct or reflect reality. I agree. But this is of no help to the Gangadeanians in establishing the truth of Premise (3).

You see, I can sort of see how if one is rationally unable to make basic distinctions per se, that intelligible thought and talk might be threatened. But what I don't see why we need to make clear distinctions. Or in other words, why must we be certain that our distinctions track reality in order to have intelligible thought and talk. Why do we need certainty or clarity for meaningful thought and talk to be possible? This is the central claim that needs to be shown for the argument to work. Premise (3) needs to be proven rather than merely taken for granted.

For good measure: Can Burton just drop the word 'clear' as I have done in my discussion so that Premise (3) changes to the following:

(3)* If we can't make distinctions, then (meaningful) thought and talk are impossible.

As I've just said (3)* is intuitively more agreeable than (3). Unfortunately, that won't work either. Doing so would render Burton's argument invalid. The argument's validity depends crucially on an inference rule called "hypothetical syllogism" which requires a kind of matching up of the consequent of one premise with the antecedent of the subsequent premise. To illustrate, let's take a schematic version of Burton's argument using letters to stand for sentences.

(1)' ~P (assume)
(2)' If ~P, then Q.
(3)' If Q, then R.
(4)' ~R
(5)' Thus, P.

Notice that 'Q' occurs in the consequent of Premise (2)' and the antecedent of Premise (3)'. If it were not so, the argument wouldn't be valid.

[note, I'm glossing over the fact that Burton's presentation of the argument is actually missing a premise between (3) and (4) namely, the premise that meaningful thought and talk are not possible--or in the above schematic, 'R'. That's the only way you get a contradiction which is required for a reductio ab absurdum to be valid. The sharp reader will notice that I spoke of the contradiction as implicit--and now you know why!]

If you change the wording of Premise (3) in the way required to make it more tenable (by dropping the word 'clear') you change the meaning of it. It would then be like changing 'Q' as it occurs Premise (3)' to some other letter not yet occurring in the above schema like 'T'. In which case, it becomes invalid and there's no reductio ad absurdum to speak of.

(1)'' ~P
(2)'' If ~P, then Q.
(3)'' If T, then R.
(4)'' ~R
(5)'' Thus, P. 

So Burton's "proof" for the principle of clarity, fails. It fails not only because Burton on pain of inconsistency shouldn't help herself to Premise (4), but more importantly because she needs to prove Premise (3). That is, she needs a sufficient answer the following: why do we need to make clear/certain distinctions for meaningful thought or talk to be possible? The only other way out is to render her argument invalid.