One of the things Anderson accuses Spencer of is getting side-tracked. He offered us a list of things that he alleges Spencer has said or questioned throughout the conversation. Anderson goes so far as to say that he's answered all of them through the course of the conversation--he's done no such thing. Here they are.
11. I can’t understand, why won’t you give a non-circular proof that we need proof?
12. I can’t understand, why isn’t there an infinite regress of proofs?
13. I can’t understand, why do we begin thinking with the laws of thought?
14. I can’t understand, why must we begin affirming some things are clear to avoid nihilism (the claim that nothing is clear)?
15. Why can’t our ultimate source of authority in thought set aside the laws of thought?
16. It isn’t clear to me what it means for something to be clear.
I'll take each on in turn.
11. I can’t understand, why won’t you give a non-circular proof that we need proof?
I don't see where Spencer said this, but suppose he did. Is that supposed to be a problem? If the Gangadeanian view is that belief without proof (for any belief) is fideistic and that we ought to avoid fideism, then it would be their own view that commits them to the requirement of proof even over the claim that we need proofs for all claims in the first place. That's just being consistent.
Now, it turns out that Gangadean and Anderson conveniently allow that some claims can justify themselves, or are "self-evident" or "immediately known" or "make questioning possible." So not all "belief without proof" is bad. But as I've argued before, that only opens them up to a new set of challenges. How are we supposed to determine (or know) when a claim has any of these properties or enjoys these statuses? What if there's disagreement about them? How are we to settle such disputes using "reason"? Another worry is this: Gangadeanians are going to be motivated to say that some claims are self-justifying (i.e., they justify themselves) because they want to avoid infinite regresses. But can they present an argument for why the idea that some claims don't need justification or can justify themselves is any better (rationally) than an infinite regress, or even circularity? I have no idea what that kind of argument would look like.
12. I can’t understand, why isn’t there an infinite regress of proofs?
Again, not sure how this represents Spencer's remarks. As we've just seen, Anderson is committed to either proving everything he purports to be clear to reason or else to claim that it is self-evident, self-certifying, immediately known, or "makes thought possible." These are the only two ways according to Gangadean on how we can know things with certainty. There's no third option. All else is fideism (belief without proof). And the issue at this point in the conversation is whether or not the following of Anderson's claims is true:
"It would be inconsistent for any person to evaluate an argument, unless they are certain that 'a is a' ".So it could be that Anderson is telling us, in a very roundabout way that there is no proof for such a principle. But then, insofar as he claims to know that it is true, he must think it's somehow self-evident, immediately known, or makes thought/questioning possible. But again, how are we to determine that it is in fact, self-evident, immediately knowable, or "makes thought/questioning possible?" Do we just have to take Anderson's word for it?
13. I can’t understand, why do we begin thinking with the laws of thought?
What Anderson intends with this representation of Spencer's comments is, I think, to point out some sort of obvious absurdity. But there is only such an absurdity if we grant Anderson the very thing that is the object of dispute at this point in the conversation.
Remember we're wondering if Anderson can prove the principle that we must have certainty regarding the laws of thought if we are to have intelligible discussions, evaluate arguments and the like. Here he seems to be suggesting that Spencer inasmuch as he raises question 13, is contradicting himself in some way so as to state something absurd. We should ask what would make 13 absurd.
Well, if it was already proven that thinking by its very nature required what Anderson refers to as "the laws of thought" to be exceptionlessly true, then asking (in the same breathe) why we need to begin thinking with the "laws of thought" would be weird. But again, that's the very thing at issue. We should think of Spencer's challenge (and mine) at this point as asking Anderson to prove that the law of identity, is without exception true. That is to say, we're asking Anderson to prove that 'a is a' is a law of thought in the relevant sense. Just because Gangadean and Anderson call it a law of thought, doesn't make it so. In other words, it's begging the question for Anderson to assume from the start that 'a is a' is a "law of thought" because what he means in labeling it a "law of thought" is that it is the sort of thing that makes thinking possible and so must of necessity be true! This is just a very sly way to assume the very thing you need to prove.
Can Anderson show us that thinking requires the law of identity? While it's obvious that he can find different ways of repeating the same thing (e.g., that 'a is a' is necessarily true, or that we must be certain that 'a is a' or that we must be certain that "reason is ontological" or that 'a is a' is a "law of thought") that's not to have shown anything besides how many different ways he can beg the question against his opponent.
14. I can’t understand, why must we begin affirming some things are clear to avoid nihilism (the claim that nothing is clear)?
Notice that this is supposed to be some obvious contradiction because "nihilism" is apparently, according to Anderson, the view that "nothing is clear." And it's crazy to question why we need clarity to avoid the lack of clarity. But this is really bad. It's this sort of thing that makes me question either Anderson's abilities as a critical thinker or his honesty. Nihilism isn't the view that nothing is clear to reason. Not even according to Gangdaean's lexicon. Nihilism is the view that there is no meaning or intelligibility. And according to Gangadean it's supposed to follow from Skepticism, which is the view that knowledge is not possible. As I've pointed out, the Gangadeanians haven't shown that we need clarity for knowledge, and so they haven't shown that we need clarity for meaning. So contrary to what Anderson would like us to believe, there's nothing incoherent about asking 14.
Now you might think that what Anderson intends here is that if basic distinctions are not clear, then Nihilism follows and he's just skipping at step. But as I've pointed out before, we need a proof for why "if we can't be certain of basic distinctions, we can't have meaning or knowledge" is true.
Once we remove the parenthetical which suggests a false identity claim between "possibly, nothing is clear" and "there is no meaning" (nihilism) 14 is a reasonable question to pose. It's something I have called into question often. The point being, the Gangadeanians owe us an argument about why we need certainty or clarity if we are to have knowledge, or meaning/intelligibility. And we've already seen one such argument from Kelly Fitzsimmons Burton and it's bad.
15. Why can’t our ultimate source of authority in thought set aside the laws of thought?
Again this question is supposed to be absurd to ask. How might it be absurd? Well, if it was already obvious or established that 'a is a' (among others) are in fact, the "ultimate source of authority" regarding thought. If Anderson had proven to us that for example, the law of identity was "the ultimate source of authority regarding thought," then it would be weird to in turn, "set it aside" in thinking. But again, that's assuming what needs to be shown. Spencer is wondering what reasons Anderson has for believing that the law of identity (for example) is the "ultimate source of authority" in the first place.
16. It isn’t clear to me what it means for something to be clear.
Well, as I've pointed out before, the manner in which Anderson and Gangadean use the word 'clear' is not the ordinary, everyday notion. It's a Gangadeanian term of art, a technical notion with a stipulated definition. That's why both of them in their respective books provides a definition. So there's nothing absurd about someone asking what they mean by 'clear'--perhaps Spencer hasn't read their books.
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