The Last Word on Anderson's Youtube Debate.

It looks like the youtube conversation has dried up. It went like I thought it would. A specific challenge was brought up and Anderson found a way to avoid answering it and he did so on the basis of a fundamental assumption which he merely asserts rather than shows to be true. Somehow he thinks he's proven his point so that he has updated his blog with the following. 

Final update: The conversation ended with Spencer in self-referential absurdity.  I post the dialogue here so that I and others can use it as an illustration in teaching.  It is an example similar to a Socratic dialogue with sophists.  Here, Spencer denies that we can be certain about reality while asking for answers about reality.  On the pretense of evaluating an original argument about what is eternal, it is quickly evident that the main point of contention is that some basic things are clear to reason.  In Socratic dialogues, the sophists try to point out contradictions in others but don’t see their own self-contradiction.  This is where they are without excuse. (Emphasis mine). 

I'm starting to sound like a broken record here, but again, to say that a set of views is self-referentially absurd, is not the same as having shown that it is. And nothing that Anderson has done throughout the conversation has shown so much. He keeps insisting and presupposing the very thing that he needs to prove. What exactly is self-referentially absurd about doubting that we can have certainty about basic distinctions, while asking someone for arguments for their view that certainty over such matters is possible? (Note Anderson has slipped into talk here about denying basic distinctions again which is not the same as doubting that we can have certainty regarding them). He doesn't say. He just says that it is self-referentially absurd and we have to take his word for it.

Now here's a relative of my position (as well as Spencer's) that does seem self-referentially absurd: If a person maintains that they are certain that no certainty is possible. That seems problematic. But that's not my position nor does it represent Spencer's. As I've pointed out before we should keep some important distinctions in mind. Among them: Doubting that P is not the same as being certain that not-P. (i.e., Doubting that some things are clear is not the same as saying that it is clear that some things are not clear).

In other words, Anderson needs my position or Spencer's position to be stronger than it actually is to get something self-referentially absurd. He needs me or Spencer to be claiming that we know with certainty that no certainty is possible or something of the sort. But we hold no such view. Perhaps that's why he continues to conflate things. It seems he's got a huge blindspot here.

He goes on to add:

By way of contrast, I maintain that some things must be clear to avoid meaninglessness.  If nothing is clear then this includes anything we think or say.  Such thoughts aren’t clear, or, such thoughts are meaningless.  We can’t ask for “clarification” because nothing is clear.  Any claim to the contrary isn’t clearly different than its opposite.  The immediate subject is about what is eternal and presupposes that we can distinguish “eternal” from “non-eternal.” (Emphasis mine).

Again, Anderson just casually glosses over the very heart of the matter. We all get it. You believe that "if the basic things are not clear, then it leads to meaninglessness." But the challenge is to explain why we should think this to be true.

I agree that if nothing is clear, it follows that any claim isn't "clearly different than its opposite." Again, that's not being debated here. What I'm wondering is why anybody should care to have clarity in the first place. In other words, consistency demands that if one doubts clarity/certainty concerning basic distinctions, then they should doubt clarity/certainty about the difference between eternal and non-eternal and other such distinctions. But that's not the same thing as denying basic distinctions simpliciter. So what if consistency demands that I merely believe to a high degree that eternal is distinct from non-eternal as opposed to claiming that I am certain of it? This is the question that the Gangadeanians seem unwilling and unable to answer. Neither skepticism nor nihilism follow from the view that we can't be absolutely certain of basic distinctions (unless you define knowledge and meaning as requiring certainty in the first place). What the Gangadeanians have failed to show is that there is anything self-referentially absurd or problematic about a person that thinks we lack certainty (in the Gangadeanian sense) all the way down, but knowledge and meaning don't require certainty to begin with. 

Anderson writes:

Spencer asks why we must begin thought with the laws of thought instead of a shared intuition or common sense (he doesn’t define these).  I point out that the laws of thought, for instance the law of identity (a is a), are inescapable.  When we use intuition we are using intuition and not non-intuition.  For thought, the laws of thought are the highest and self-attesting authority.  They cannot be questioned because they make questioning possible.  In this they are different than all other authorities.  Whatever else we appeal to in thought, we are making use of the laws of thought.  Any argument we give relies on the laws of thought.  As an experiment to see if this is the case you can try to think a thought that isn’t a thought.  Try to escape reason and give an explanation about doing so (an explanation that is a non-explanation).  This is the self-referential absurdity. (Emphasis mine). 

I've already pointed out how this is simply restating, in different ways, the thing in question. Anderson can keep insisting that there are these "laws of thought" and that they are exactly as he views them so that they "make questioning possible." But what he hasn't shown us is that any of this is accurate or true.

Why should we grant him that his definition of "the laws of thought" is correct in the first place? Perhaps there are laws of thought, but he's got them all wrong. How does he know what constitutes a law of thought to begin with? How does he know what makes questioning possible? Why should we think that the law of identity is "inescapable" or "authoritative" in the the relevant sense?  These are all the very things under question just under different guises. In other words, he just continues to argue in a little circle by assuming the very thing he needs to prove all the while acting like he's shown something. The utter lack of self-awareness is surprising.

It's also important to point out that one can raise the very initial challenge to Gangadean's argument which spawned this entire conversation without doubting (let alone denying) that some things are clear. Remember, the conversation broke out because I pointed out that Gangadean gave a poor argument for why the self cannot possibly be eternal. That challenge was quite simple really. I wanted to know what reasons Gangadean could give for thinking that, "X is eternal in time" entails "X is all knowing". But nothing about raising this objection required of me to doubt (let alone deny) that reason was ontological, or that somethings (like the law of identity) are clear to reason. I was granting all of that and still the objection remained. We shouldn't lose sight of this despite Anderson's best efforts to make us forget. You can grant Anderson and other Gangadeanians all of their most basic claims concerning the principle of clarity and still find lots of missteps in their arguments for God's existence (among others).