The need for Renewing Philosophy? Retrieving Knowledge?

On his blog, Anderson is promoting Kelly Fitzsimmons-Burton's new book entitled Retrieving Knowledge: A Socratic Response to Skepticism. I'll try to get a copy and provided there is any new content, will aim to present a review. The brief remarks provided by Anderson are interesting and helpful in understanding where I anticipate the book will go wrong. He writes,

...In this book she looks at the idea of knowledge in early Greek philosophy and its connection to the logos.  Contemporary philosophers have attempted to get around problems in defining knowledge by weakening the definition to something that does not include certainty.  Dr. Burton begins her study by picking up with the Socratic problem of distinguishing between true opinion and knowledge.  Weaker contemporary definitions of knowledge still fall under “true belief.”

Anderson's claim here is strange. He says that contemporary philosophers have "attempted to get around problems in defining knowledge by weakening the definition to something that does not include certainty." He's acting as if knowledge in its "truest definition" entails certainty and that the rest of us philosophers have fudged on that definition in an unmotivated way. (I add the bit about "unmotivated way" because philosophers indeed have tried out various definitions, but only because thinking carefully about knowledge has moved them to do so.) What's missing in Anderson's remarks is an argument for why anybody should grant Anderson his claim that he's got the right definition to begin with. I've called the Gangadeanians Semantic Chauvinists before and I hope you can see why. They purport to have got the right definitions basically out of thin air without ever defending their definitions against those that disagree, nor the method by which they purport to come by them. 

I'm also not quite sure what to make of Anderson's further claim that "weaker contemporary definitions of knowledge" fall under "true belief." It's supposed to be a criticism of contemporary (non Gangadeanian accounts) of knowledge. But since on nearly all accounts of knowledge, including Gangadean's, knowledge entails belief, I don't think he's saying that "weaker contemporary definitions of knowledge entail true beliefs." (That is to say, he doesn't seem to be saying that on contemporary accounts, 'S knows that P', entails that 'S believes P and P is true'). So what I think he means here is that on weaker contemporary definitions of knowledge, knowledge turns out no different than a mere true belief. That is, they aren't distinguishable. But if that's what he's saying, then he's just plain wrong. On every contemporary account of knowledge that I've ever encountered, and all of the ones that have gained any currency, 'knowledge' is not co-extensive with 'true belief.' For instance, take reliabilist accounts: on such views, knowledge is a special kind of true belief--one that is the result of a reliable faculty (e.g. perception). The very fact that it's a special kind of true belief rather than any old true belief means that on such a theory, knowledge is not the same as mere true belief. Or consider the many conditions which are intended to get around Gettier counterexamples like sensitivity or safety accounts. We don't need to get into the technical details here. What each kind of theory aims to do is provide the extra ingredient, which when combined with a justified true belief turns it into a bit of knowledge. If knowledge was just a true belief on such accounts, that wouldn't make a lick of sense. There has also been considerable interest lately in virtue epistemology accounts like responsibilism--again, knowledge is a special kind of true belief (those gained by epistemically responsible agents) on such views rather than mere true belief. Even on Williamson's knowledge-first epistemology which treats knowledge as a primitive notion (unanalyzable), it isn't equivalent to true beliefs. After all, Williamson isn't arguing that mere true-beliefs should be treated as primitives in epistemology. So what Anderson has said about contemporary theories of knowledge is just plain, wrong. 

He goes on to add,  

Socrates asks us to consider what is necessary to have knowledge.  When we know we have a belief, it is true, and we can show or give an account (a logos) of why it is true.  In this way, Socrates tells us that knowledge is permanent where true opinion is not.  When we have a true opinion and are questioned on it we are unable to explain why it is true and it slips away from us.  But when we actually have knowledge we are able to give this account and it is still with us, it is permanent and unmoving.

What Anderson is saying here is that Fitzsimmon-Burton's Socrates proposes an account of knowledge and we should just assume he's got it right. This feels like an appeal to authority or perhaps something worse since Socrates might not even count as an authority in the pertinent sense. I mean, isn't it possible that Socrates has got it wrong? He doesn't own the domain of concepts or language. And you have lots of philosophers disagreeing with Socrates. Despite what Anderson would like to do, he can't rationally just wave his hands around and take it for granted that the rest of us have got it wrong. That would be to fail his own epistemic standards of proof which he's quick to hold the rest of us to. 

And why shouldn't we think it's Gangadean, Anderson and Burton's Socrates who are "redefining knowledge" in an incorrect manner? As I've pointed out, their way, consistently held, leads to skepticism. It's a great irony that the Gangadeanians purport to be renewing philosophy (i.e., saving it from the mess that the rest of us philosophers have made of it) all the while failing to avoid very basic mistakes in reasoning. I say there's no need to retrieve knowledge--let's just ignore bad theories of knowledge, regardless of who they come from.