Radical Skepticism: On "Questioning" the Law of Identity

Owen Anderson has posted a new lecture in which he characterizes "radical skepticism" as a self-referentially absurd position. What is a radical skeptic on his view? It's someone that questions the very source of questioning or uses reason to question reason. Accordingly, Anderson rhetorically asks the following questions.

Can you question the very source of questioning?  

Can you use reason to question reason?  

Based on many of his recent remarks, Anderson seems think that I am one such radical skeptic. If this is so, then he's seriously mistaken based on a very basic conflation that I've pointed out repeatedly on this blog. On the off chance that he doesn't think I'm a radical skeptic and this lecture isn't aimed at challenging my view, it still brings up an important distinction worth discussing. That's because un-nuanced thinking could easily get one to think that my challenges to Gangadeanism make me out to be a "radical skeptic." But as I will explain, I'm no radical skeptic (in fact, as I've said on numerous occasions, I'm no skeptic at all).

It's interesting to note that Anderson believes that he can have "clarity" on the very "source" or "preconditions" of the activity of "questioning." Of course, he doesn't tell us how he has achieved such certainty about the very "source" or "preconditions" of questioning (hint, it's his intuition). But I'll be ignoring that for the purposes of this article even though the list of things the Gangadeanians take on intuition seems to be growing by the day.

So, what according to Anderson, are the preconditions of questioning? Well, at least the law of identity (that a is a), which on his view (in addition to the other Aristotelian laws) is "reason itself."

Thus the immediate point in posing his rhetorical questions is this: if you question the law of identity, you are questioning the very "source" or "preconditions" of the activity of questioning. Or in other words, you are using reason to question reason.

That alone won't do to drive his main upshot home because he's making the further claim that questioning the very preconditions of questioning is somehow self-referentially absurd. That's the big payoff, here. But is it in fact, self-referentially absurd to question the very source of questioning? Or to use reason to question reason? (My guess is that some of you had the intuition that there is something self-referentially absurd about it and some of you didn't).

I submit that it depends in part on what is going on when we question something and what sort of doxastic attitude you adopt (if any) in doing so. That is to say, we run into an issue of how best to model what is happening when a subject questions the truth of a proposition. This is something that Anderson simply glosses over.

For the time being I'm going to restrict my focus to whether or not my core disagreements or criticisms count as an instance of "questioning" say, the law of identity in the relevant sense. In fact, I'll argue that if you think of my views as self-referentially absurd, you've made a serious mistake. But in a future post, I'll do more to put pressure on what I think is a far too quick move on Anderson's part when he goes from, "S questions the very things that makes questioning possible" to "thus, S has a self-referentially absurd set of attitudes" (the same is true of "S uses reason to question reason" to "thus, S's attitudes are self-referentially absurd) The devil will be in the details and what exactly we mean by "uses" and "questions".

A natural place to begin then is in reviewing my position on the "principle of clarity". As I've said repeatedly, I believe that "a is a". In fact, I even take myself to know it. That means there are some things that I claim to know. That entails that on my view knowledge is possible. This fact alone should be enough to see that I shouldn't be classified as a skeptic (because a skeptic claims that knowledge is impossible). So where exactly do I disagree with the Gangadeanians? Well, I basically have no more to say on the matter.

The Gangadeanians say more and claim that I need to affirm more. By their lights, not only should I believe (or take myself to know) that the law of identity is true, I have to further affirm that it is "clear to reason" or that it is knowable to all who seek, or that it's impossible for me to be wrong about some things like the law of identity. That's precisely where our fundamental difference lies. I simply don't see any point in making these additional claims about the so-called "laws of thought." It's enough for me that I know them and that I don't need to worry about arguing for them, in any philosophical discourse. That's why I've said that I'm agnostic about whether or not for example, the law of identity (or anything for that matter), is "clear to reason". Importantly, I'm not agnostic about the law of identity itself. I'm only agnostic about whether or not the law of identity is clear to reason. And until the Gangadeanians can convince me that I'm missing out on something vital or valuable in my agnosticism about the clarity of basic things, that'll remain my position.

Now for the big question. Does my position(s) as described above, regarding the law of identity, count as "questioning" the law of identity? Not unless we allow that one can believe something all the while questioning its truth. That sounds like a bad piece of English. But that's just what Anderson's model of questioning would have to be, if he wants, with a straight face, to peg me as one who questions the law of identity or reason itself. And if he's willing to stretch the concept of questioning that far, (so that one can question in the same breathe, what one believes to be true) it becomes hard to see how he can say that there's something self-referentially absurd about my position. Apparently, on this picture that's just what the activity or stance of questioning permits!

Suppose now that we turn to a different and more plausible model of questioning. Say that "questioning" that P as Anderson is using the word precludes belief in P. That is, suppose that you count as questioning the law of identity only if you don't also believe that "a is a" within the same context. If so, then to question the law of identity, you can't believe that the law of identity is true (otherwise you won't count as questioning it). That is, you won't count as questioning whether or not it will rain, if you already believe that it will rain. The problem with this model in relation to my views should be obvious. I simply don't count as "questioning" the law of identity or reason for that matter on this account of questioning because I believe that "a is a". In which case I don't count as a radical skeptic and there's nothing self-referentially absurd about my views of which to speak.

So the upshot is this, in light of my belief that "a is a", I either I count as questioning the law of identity or I don't. The only manner in which I do count as questioning depends on a defunct and umotivated account of questioning which is actually compatible with belief. But on such a view there's no self-referential absurdity of which to speak. On the other hand, a more plausible account of questioning, which renders questioning incompatible with belief in the thing being questioned, simply fails to capture my views on the law of identity (because I believe that a is a). Either way (and there's no third option), there's nothing self-referentially absurd about my position.

One point of annoyance is that this post is entirely unnecessary.  As I've complained before, Anderson and company make very basic conflations which get them into trouble and suggests a lack of subtle thinking on their part. Despite how many times I've explained it, they can't seem to understand that I believe and take myself to know that "a is a". I just don't commit myself to the further claim that it is somehow "clear to reason" that this is so. In other words,

We don't disagree over whether or not  a is a.  (I'm not agnostic). 

We disagree over whether or not it is clear to reason that a is a. (I'm agnostic). 

The Gangadeanians are getting caught up in a false dichotomy. On their picture, either you affirm that it is clear to reason that a is a or else you believe that it's not the case that a is a. These two things aren't even contradictories!!!

What they don't consider is that someone can be agnostic about whether it is clear to reason that a is a and still believe (and even know) that a is a.