The Last Word on Anderson's Youtube Debate.

It looks like the youtube conversation has dried up. It went like I thought it would. A specific challenge was brought up and Anderson found a way to avoid answering it and he did so on the basis of a fundamental assumption which he merely asserts rather than shows to be true. Somehow he thinks he's proven his point so that he has updated his blog with the following. 

Final update: The conversation ended with Spencer in self-referential absurdity.  I post the dialogue here so that I and others can use it as an illustration in teaching.  It is an example similar to a Socratic dialogue with sophists.  Here, Spencer denies that we can be certain about reality while asking for answers about reality.  On the pretense of evaluating an original argument about what is eternal, it is quickly evident that the main point of contention is that some basic things are clear to reason.  In Socratic dialogues, the sophists try to point out contradictions in others but don’t see their own self-contradiction.  This is where they are without excuse. (Emphasis mine). 

I'm starting to sound like a broken record here, but again, to say that a set of views is self-referentially absurd, is not the same as having shown that it is. And nothing that Anderson has done throughout the conversation has shown so much. He keeps insisting and presupposing the very thing that he needs to prove. What exactly is self-referentially absurd about doubting that we can have certainty about basic distinctions, while asking someone for arguments for their view that certainty over such matters is possible? (Note Anderson has slipped into talk here about denying basic distinctions again which is not the same as doubting that we can have certainty regarding them). He doesn't say. He just says that it is self-referentially absurd and we have to take his word for it.

Now here's a relative of my position (as well as Spencer's) that does seem self-referentially absurd: If a person maintains that they are certain that no certainty is possible. That seems problematic. But that's not my position nor does it represent Spencer's. As I've pointed out before we should keep some important distinctions in mind. Among them: Doubting that P is not the same as being certain that not-P. (i.e., Doubting that some things are clear is not the same as saying that it is clear that some things are not clear).

In other words, Anderson needs my position or Spencer's position to be stronger than it actually is to get something self-referentially absurd. He needs me or Spencer to be claiming that we know with certainty that no certainty is possible or something of the sort. But we hold no such view. Perhaps that's why he continues to conflate things. It seems he's got a huge blindspot here.

He goes on to add:

By way of contrast, I maintain that some things must be clear to avoid meaninglessness.  If nothing is clear then this includes anything we think or say.  Such thoughts aren’t clear, or, such thoughts are meaningless.  We can’t ask for “clarification” because nothing is clear.  Any claim to the contrary isn’t clearly different than its opposite.  The immediate subject is about what is eternal and presupposes that we can distinguish “eternal” from “non-eternal.” (Emphasis mine).

Again, Anderson just casually glosses over the very heart of the matter. We all get it. You believe that "if the basic things are not clear, then it leads to meaninglessness." But the challenge is to explain why we should think this to be true.

I agree that if nothing is clear, it follows that any claim isn't "clearly different than its opposite." Again, that's not being debated here. What I'm wondering is why anybody should care to have clarity in the first place. In other words, consistency demands that if one doubts clarity/certainty concerning basic distinctions, then they should doubt clarity/certainty about the difference between eternal and non-eternal and other such distinctions. But that's not the same thing as denying basic distinctions simpliciter. So what if consistency demands that I merely believe to a high degree that eternal is distinct from non-eternal as opposed to claiming that I am certain of it? This is the question that the Gangadeanians seem unwilling and unable to answer. Neither skepticism nor nihilism follow from the view that we can't be absolutely certain of basic distinctions (unless you define knowledge and meaning as requiring certainty in the first place). What the Gangadeanians have failed to show is that there is anything self-referentially absurd or problematic about a person that thinks we lack certainty (in the Gangadeanian sense) all the way down, but knowledge and meaning don't require certainty to begin with. 

Anderson writes:

Spencer asks why we must begin thought with the laws of thought instead of a shared intuition or common sense (he doesn’t define these).  I point out that the laws of thought, for instance the law of identity (a is a), are inescapable.  When we use intuition we are using intuition and not non-intuition.  For thought, the laws of thought are the highest and self-attesting authority.  They cannot be questioned because they make questioning possible.  In this they are different than all other authorities.  Whatever else we appeal to in thought, we are making use of the laws of thought.  Any argument we give relies on the laws of thought.  As an experiment to see if this is the case you can try to think a thought that isn’t a thought.  Try to escape reason and give an explanation about doing so (an explanation that is a non-explanation).  This is the self-referential absurdity. (Emphasis mine). 

I've already pointed out how this is simply restating, in different ways, the thing in question. Anderson can keep insisting that there are these "laws of thought" and that they are exactly as he views them so that they "make questioning possible." But what he hasn't shown us is that any of this is accurate or true.

Why should we grant him that his definition of "the laws of thought" is correct in the first place? Perhaps there are laws of thought, but he's got them all wrong. How does he know what constitutes a law of thought to begin with? How does he know what makes questioning possible? Why should we think that the law of identity is "inescapable" or "authoritative" in the the relevant sense?  These are all the very things under question just under different guises. In other words, he just continues to argue in a little circle by assuming the very thing he needs to prove all the while acting like he's shown something. The utter lack of self-awareness is surprising.

It's also important to point out that one can raise the very initial challenge to Gangadean's argument which spawned this entire conversation without doubting (let alone denying) that some things are clear. Remember, the conversation broke out because I pointed out that Gangadean gave a poor argument for why the self cannot possibly be eternal. That challenge was quite simple really. I wanted to know what reasons Gangadean could give for thinking that, "X is eternal in time" entails "X is all knowing". But nothing about raising this objection required of me to doubt (let alone deny) that reason was ontological, or that somethings (like the law of identity) are clear to reason. I was granting all of that and still the objection remained. We shouldn't lose sight of this despite Anderson's best efforts to make us forget. You can grant Anderson and other Gangadeanians all of their most basic claims concerning the principle of clarity and still find lots of missteps in their arguments for God's existence (among others).

It's hard to believe... part 2

Last time, I didn't directly address all of Anderson's last response. Instead, I merely noted how his general technique was to shift the burden of proof and essentially to argue again in a circular manner. This time, I want to be a bit more comprehensive.

One of the things Anderson accuses Spencer of is getting side-tracked. He offered us a list of things that he alleges Spencer has said or questioned throughout the conversation. Anderson goes so far as to say that he's answered all of them through the course of the conversation--he's done no such thing. Here they are.

11. I can’t understand, why won’t you give a non-circular proof that we need proof? 

12. I can’t understand, why isn’t there an infinite regress of proofs? 

13. I can’t understand, why do we begin thinking with the laws of thought? 

14. I can’t understand, why must we begin affirming some things are clear to avoid nihilism (the claim that nothing is clear)? 

15. Why can’t our ultimate source of authority in thought set aside the laws of thought? 

16. It isn’t clear to me what it means for something to be clear. 

 I'll take each on in turn.

11. I can’t understand, why won’t you give a non-circular proof that we need proof?

I don't see where Spencer said this, but suppose he did. Is that supposed to be a problem? If the Gangadeanian view is that belief without proof (for any belief) is fideistic and that we ought to avoid fideism, then it would be their own view that commits them to the requirement of proof even over the claim that we need proofs for all claims in the first place. That's just being consistent.

Now, it turns out that Gangadean and Anderson conveniently allow that some claims can justify themselves, or are "self-evident" or "immediately known" or "make questioning possible." So not all "belief without proof" is bad. But as I've argued before, that only opens them up to a new set of challenges. How are we supposed to determine (or know) when a claim has any of these properties or enjoys these statuses? What if there's disagreement about them? How are we to settle such disputes using "reason"? Another worry is this: Gangadeanians are going to be motivated to say that some claims are self-justifying (i.e., they justify themselves) because they want to avoid infinite regresses. But can they present an argument for why the idea that some claims don't need justification or can justify themselves is any better (rationally) than an infinite regress, or even circularity? I have no idea what that kind of argument would look like.

12. I can’t understand, why isn’t there an infinite regress of proofs?

Again, not sure how this represents Spencer's remarks. As we've just seen, Anderson is committed to either proving everything he purports to be clear to reason or else to claim that it is self-evident, self-certifying, immediately known, or "makes thought possible." These are the only two ways according to Gangadean on how we can know things with certainty. There's no third option. All else is fideism (belief without proof). And the issue at this point in the conversation is whether or not the following of Anderson's claims is true:

"It would be inconsistent for any person to evaluate an argument, unless they are certain that 'a is a' ".  

So it could be that Anderson is telling us, in a very roundabout way that there is no proof for such a principle. But then, insofar as he claims to know that it is true, he must think it's somehow self-evident, immediately known, or makes thought/questioning possible. But again, how are we to determine that it is in fact, self-evident, immediately knowable, or "makes thought/questioning possible?" Do we just have to take Anderson's word for it?

13. I can’t understand, why do we begin thinking with the laws of thought?

What Anderson intends with this representation of Spencer's comments is, I think, to point out some sort of obvious absurdity. But there is only such an absurdity if we grant Anderson the very thing that is the object of dispute at this point in the conversation.

Remember we're wondering if Anderson can prove the principle that we must have certainty regarding the laws of thought if we are to have intelligible discussions, evaluate arguments and the like. Here he seems to be suggesting that Spencer inasmuch as he raises question 13, is contradicting himself in some way so as to state something absurd. We should ask what would make 13 absurd.

Well, if it was already proven that thinking by its very nature required what Anderson refers to as "the laws of thought" to be exceptionlessly true, then asking (in the same breathe) why we need to begin thinking with the "laws of thought" would be weird. But again, that's the very thing at issue. We should think of Spencer's challenge (and mine) at this point as asking Anderson to prove that the law of identity, is without exception true. That is to say, we're asking Anderson to prove that 'a is a' is a law of thought in the relevant sense. Just because Gangadean and Anderson call it a law of thought, doesn't make it so. In other words, it's begging the question for Anderson to assume from the start that 'a is a' is a "law of thought" because what he means in labeling it a "law of thought" is that it is the sort of thing that makes thinking possible and so must of necessity be true! This is just a very sly way to assume the very thing you need to prove.

Can Anderson show us that thinking requires the law of identity? While it's obvious that he can find different ways of repeating the same thing (e.g., that 'a is a' is necessarily true, or that we must be certain that 'a is a' or that we must be certain that "reason is ontological" or that 'a is a' is a "law of thought") that's not to have shown anything besides how many different ways he can beg the question against his opponent.

14. I can’t understand, why must we begin affirming some things are clear to avoid nihilism (the claim that nothing is clear)?

Notice that this is supposed to be some obvious contradiction because "nihilism" is apparently, according to Anderson, the view that "nothing is clear." And it's crazy to question why we need clarity to avoid the lack of clarity. But this is really bad. It's this sort of thing that makes me question either Anderson's abilities as a critical thinker or his honesty. Nihilism isn't the view that nothing is clear to reason. Not even according to Gangdaean's lexicon. Nihilism is the view that there is no meaning or intelligibility. And according to Gangadean it's supposed to follow from Skepticism, which is the view that knowledge is not possible. As I've pointed out, the Gangadeanians haven't shown that we need clarity for knowledge, and so they haven't shown that we need clarity for meaning. So contrary to what Anderson would like us to believe, there's nothing incoherent about asking 14.

Now you might think that what Anderson intends here is that if basic distinctions are not clear, then Nihilism follows and he's just skipping at step. But as I've pointed out before, we need a proof for why "if we can't be certain of basic distinctions, we can't have meaning or knowledge" is true.

Once we remove the parenthetical which suggests a false identity claim between "possibly, nothing is clear" and "there is no meaning" (nihilism) 14 is a reasonable question to pose. It's something I have called into question often. The point being, the Gangadeanians owe us an argument about why we need certainty or clarity if we are to have knowledge, or meaning/intelligibility. And we've already seen one such argument from Kelly Fitzsimmons Burton and it's bad.

15. Why can’t our ultimate source of authority in thought set aside the laws of thought?

Again this question is supposed to be absurd to ask. How might it be absurd? Well, if it was already obvious or established that 'a is a' (among others) are in fact, the "ultimate source of authority" regarding thought. If Anderson had proven to us that for example, the law of identity was "the ultimate source of authority regarding thought," then it would be weird to in turn, "set it aside" in thinking. But again, that's assuming what needs to be shown. Spencer is wondering what reasons Anderson has for believing that the law of identity (for example) is the "ultimate source of authority" in the first place.

16. It isn’t clear to me what it means for something to be clear.

Well, as I've pointed out before, the manner in which Anderson and Gangadean use the word 'clear' is not the ordinary, everyday notion. It's a Gangadeanian term of art, a technical notion with a stipulated definition. That's why both of them in their respective books provides a definition. So there's nothing absurd about someone asking what they mean by 'clear'--perhaps Spencer hasn't read their books.

It's hard to believe...

Since my last update, Spencer raised the very issue of which I took note. Anderson at some point claims that if someone is not certain that 'a is a' (or that reason is ontological), then they can't consistently evaluate an argument and so there's no point in further dialogue. The principle that Anderson is assuming is this.

(A) A person can consistently evaluate an argument, only if they are certain that 'a is a'. 

Spencer and I have wondered what on earth could justify (A) in the first place. Why should anybody think it's true? Anderson's reply was to simply restate it. And that's to argue in a very tight circle. In fact, it's no argument at all. The closest thing that approaches an argument is Anderson's claim that if we aren't certain that 'a is a' then "perhaps" eternal is non-eternal.  But as I pointed out last time, that doesn't help in the least. 'Perhaps', here is the operative term. It marks a mere possibility. So maybe he's arguing for (A) by way of the following principle.

(B) If a person believes that it's even remotely possible that 'a is not a', then s/he cannot consistently evaluate an argument. 

But then what makes (B) true? Why should we buy it? Because Anderson says so? In fact, (B) is just a rewording of (A).

Spencer then pointed some of this out to Anderson. He asked Anderson to rationally justify the truth of (A) as opposed to merely restating it. And that's simply holding Anderson to the Gangadeanian standard. Remember they oppose "belief without proof." That's fideism. So we need some reason to accept (A) or (B).

That brings us to Anderson's response. 

@Spencer Hawkins And here I thought you were the one begging the question! Your post helps illustrate why you had a hard time correctly stating the original argument and making any progress since then. Your last few replies have been ignoring my responses and now you’ve officially ended the conversation in self-referential absurdity.

Earlier I was listing the many sidetracks you were bringing up. We can add: 

11. I can’t understand, why won’t you give a non-circular proof that we need proof? 12. I can’t understand, why isn’t there an infinite regress of proofs? 13. I can’t understand, why do we begin thinking with the laws of thought? 14. I can’t understand, why must we begin affirming some things are clear to avoid nihilism (the claim that nothing is clear)? 15. Why can’t our ultimate source of authority in thought set aside the laws of thought? 16. It isn’t clear to me what it means for something to be clear. 

I’ve already given sufficient answers above to address these. Go back and try to work it out. Do we even agree on the meaning of the terms we are using? What does it mean for something to be “clear”? What does it mean for something to be “eternal”? Can we distinguish “eternal” from “non-eternal”? How? How can this be known outside of experience and epistemic horizons? 

Your replies show that you haven’t given any thought to my answers. This disregard is inconsistent with your asking me for answers and arguments, and you have lost this one chance to work through it with me. See my last reply about why you can’t continue the discussion if nothing is clear. Try to figure out the argument and how it addresses your concerns. Figure out why your not being able to be sure about the law of identity affects each of your replies and ends the conversation. 

After all, perhaps discussions aren’t really discussions!

The first thing to note is that Anderson claims to think that Spencer is begging the question. But of course he doesn't say how. Both Spencer and I have pointed out explicitly where Anderson is assuming the thing he's been asked to prove. And he claims that Spencer's objection is somehow self-referentially absurd, but again he doesn't bother to explain where the contradiction lies.

More importantly, ask yourself: does this tell us why (A) or (B) is true? Does this prove (A) or (B)? Of course not.  Anderson is again simply assuming (A) or (B) and then shifting the burden of proof to Spencer. Basically, Anderson has been caught either arguing in a circle or taking (A) or (B) on faith and his response is simply to try and wiggle out of the conversation. Of course, it's not Spencer's job to "Try to figure out the argument and how it addresses" the charge of circularity. Anderson and company are the ones insisting that we need clarity at the basic level if we are to be able to evaluate arguments and make dialogue intelligible. That is they are claiming that (A) and (B) are true. They are also the ones that demand proof or rational justification for our beliefs. It's not Spencer's job to explain or "figure out" why that must be so.

That Anderson avoids answering the current challenge is par for the course. It's a pattern. I suspected this would be the result from the start. At least this time, it's been done in public for all to see. This latest comment is nothing more than presupposing the thing in question (namely, (A) or (B) above). All this stuff about not being able to "agree on the meaning of terms" or to determine the meaning of "clear" or "eternal" or distinguishing between eternal and not-eternal without clarity at the basic level, presupposes that we need clarity at the basic level to do all these things. And that's the very challenge at hand. That's the very thing we're asking Anderson to rationally justify!

I have a hard time believing that the other Gangadeanians can't see the glaring problem here. How can people that are intent on knowing the truth and critically examining their basic beliefs, fail to see how Anderson has illegitimately shifted the burden of proof after arguing in a tight circle? How can they fail to see that (A) or (B) is being presupposed rather than rationally defended? How can they not see that their very own worldview demands more than that? And how can Anderson take his own remarks seriously? I'm baffled at this point.