Since I've put up a few posts, I thought it might be important to mention one of my fundamental disagreements with Gangadean, Anderson and WF which might remind the reader of why I raising some of the objections that I am raising.
If you will look at my posts, you will see that I try to show how their proofs fail. I might bring up remote possibilities against some of their arguments/premises. Of course, it is undoubtedly going to make me seem like a skeptic in general. In fact, I am a fallibilist about knowledge, that is to say, I think we can know propositions even if we are not maximally justified regarding them and so skepticism doesn't actually suit me that well.
However, Gangadean and company are infallibilists about knowledge. They maintain that S knows that p if and only if, S has a justified true belief about p. However, they have an extreme view on what counts as justification. Roughly, S is justified in believing that p if and only if, S has ruled out all not-p possibilities. So you're only justified in believing something like, "God exists" if you have been able to rule out every other possibility that is mutually inconsistent with the proposition (that God exists). Sometimes the proponents speak about being able to "show" a proof--- but I think this brings about difficulties --for instance, what does it precisely mean to be able to show a proof? Nevertheless, I have heard the followers of WF speak of being able to show that God exists---this is part and parcel of knowing that God exists. And what it means to show that God exists is to be able to (at least) rehearse a sound argument which demonstrates that it is simply metaphysically impossible that God does not exist.
I think that such a view invariably leads to skepticism about knowledge. It would mean we know very little, if anything. We don't know things like, "I have hands," "I have a body," "I was born in July," "My wife is a conscious being," etc.
So when Gangadean and company claim that to know things like that God exists, Jesus is the son of God, the bible is the word of God, etc, then they are claiming that they have absolute proof of the veracity of these claims. Moreover, they believe that if a person is unable to rule out any and all alternative possibilities to, for instance, the proposition that God exists, then such a person does not know that God exists. This is why, in my posts, I may be extra-scrutinizing. I hope to speak at more length (and hopefully depth) about my epistemological issues, in future posts, so stay tuned.
Saturday, July 26, 2014
Proper Function vs. Proper Desire
Part I
I've been thinking about Owen Anderson's article found here, where he raises some objections against Plantinga. He rehearses much of these considerations in his book, The Clarity of God's Existence.
Briefly, Plantinga's view is that unbelief in God might be due to improper functioning of one's belief forming apparatuses which are the result of the fall. We don't see what we otherwise might (including God's glory) because we are negatively affected (in particular, with respect to our cognition) by our sin. Anderson's main focus in the article is to show that if the Plantingan picture is correct (i.e., unbelief in God is the result of improper functioning), then the unbeliever cannot be held inexcusable/responsible for their unbelief. That is to say, the unbeliever, who lacks belief in God on the basis of improper functioning, has an excuse.
There is something initially plausible about this picture. I mean how can a just God condemn persons for failing to do something that they cannot possibly do? Now I have my doubts about understanding notions of divine justice, but I will table those and related concerns for the moment. Anderson's main objections to Plantinga trade centrally on the old "ought-implies-can" principle of responsibility. Stated simply, if I ought to do something, then it must be the case that I can, call this OIC.
Now many philosophers have rejected OIC despite it's initially, intuitive appeal. Indeed there are a number of counterexamples to the principle both in the realm of morality and in epistemology. I won't have time to speak of those here.
So grant (for the purposes of discussion) that OIC is true in all cases. What I want to focus on is how even Anderson's view seems to violate the principle at one level. This is because Anderson is also a compatibilist about free will and determinism. Moreover he is reformed in his theology and accepts the calvinistic notion of total depravity which is the view that man cannot possibly seek God save a change in his mind/heart. This change is not self-caused but rather must come from without and so is external to the agent. That is to say, the nonbeliever on this view simply will not (and cannot) seek God left to herself.
Now suppose all of this is correct, again, for the sake of discussion. One might ask how the unbeliever can be thought to be without excuse? After all, if ought implies can, but man is born totally depraved such that they cannot seek God (save a change instituted from without), then in what sense ought man to know God?
Perhaps aware of this problem Anderson takes liberties to revise the OIC principle in the following way:
OIC-R: if person S wants to seek the Lord, then S can.
So on this picture, the problem with the unbeliever is that he desires not to seek God and if and only if he wanted to seek God, then he could. This is meant to preserve the ought-implies-can principle of seeking/knowing God, but again, it is a revised form of OIC so we''ll refer to Anderson's principle as OIC-R from here on out.
The first problem is a question about philosophical motivation. Why should we accept this as a legitimate move? He is basically coming up with a principle that serves his thesis, but that excludes Plantinga's. Indeed Plantinga cannot use the same exact maneuver since even if person P wanted to know, if person P had a jacked up belief forming apparatus, he still couldn't know God.
But now Anderson's principle (the revision of the original OIC) seems self-serving and ad hoc and Just because it helps his theory doesn't mean that it is the correct theory.
Relatedly, why can't Plantinga make a similar manuever? In light of Anderson's criticisms Plantinga could come up with his own revision of the ought-implies-can principle. He might for example argue that while it's true that man in sin has their belief forming apparatuses all messed up (so as not to believe in God), the following conditional is true:
"If God delivers person X and restores their apparatus then they can know God".
So on this revision, it's consistent to insist that all men should know God, even though man knowing God depends on some act of God.
Of course, one might think there is still an important difference between Anderson's and the proposed Plantingan revision of the ought-implies-can. Anderson's seems not to deal with the unbelievers reasoning faculties, but rather the unbelievers desire to seek/know God while Plantinga's involves the belief forming processes. But the crucial question is whether we should think this is a relevant difference to the matter of the inexcusability of unbelief. I don't see how it could be. I mean, what should it matter of the precise mechanism that keeps an unbeliever from seeking/knowing God? Whether it's because unbeliever A lacks the desire to seek God, or whether A doesn't have the properly functioning abilities to know God, if both necessarily keep person A from knowing/seeking what is clear (and both are ultimately up to God not A), then why think this difference is salient to the matter at hand? This gives rise to a further issue with Anderson's account.
We can criticize Anderson's account as not making sense of OIC regarding the desire to seek the Lord. That is to contend that Anderson's account actually violates OIC (just at a different level).
Just as Anderson faults Plantinga's view for not respecting the OIC regarding belief in God, we can, by parity, fault Anderson's view for failing to maintain OIC regarding man's fundamental desire to seek.
For example, consider the following, "If I ought to desire to seek God, then it must be the case that I can".
Anderson's reformed theological views and compatibilism violate this principle. Since man is born into total depravity, the nonbeliever fundamentally desires not to seek God save an act of God. So the unbeliever cannot know God, because the unbeliever cannot make it so that the necessary requisite states of affairs (e.g., desiring to seek) obtain.
If OIC is categorically true (as Anderson wants to insist), then how can it be true of the unbeliever that she ought to know God and thus that unbelief is inexcusable? Notice, if the unbeliever can be excused for her failing to have the desire to seek, then this also would get her off the hook for her unbelief.
The point is, it seems to me that whatever move is open to Anderson, a parallel manuever will be available to Plantinga. What is more, we can revise the OIC regarding inexcusability of unbelief with all kinds of antecedent clauses. For instance, one might insist that God can only be known via special revelation and then adjust the OIC accordingly: "Look, God can be known by anyone and all that that means is, 'if one has special revelation, then one can know him.' The question is whether this move or Anderson's move is a legitimate one.
---------------------------------
Part II
Anderson, in his article, also considers how it must be clear to reason that God exists, if man is to be held responsible for unbelief. But now suppose that it is knowable to reason as Anderson wants to argue (that is, suppose that "if person A wants to know then they can"), but add that it is not up to the unbeliever whether she will desire to know or not. As noted previously, desiring to know is thought to be at least necessary in order to know on Anderson's view.
But then what good is it that it is clear to reason (as he conceives it) if people are still prevented from knowing God due to reasons beyond their ultimate control? Perhaps to Anderson this is perfectly consistent with the inexcusability of unbelief, but I just don't see it. That is, the nonbeliever despite not being able to determine whether they have one of the necessary conditions for knowing God, is still inexcusable in their unbelief. In fact in conversations Anderson often cites that you will never find a case where a person in unbelief will sincerely say, "well I want to know God, but I can't." I've never been sure what this is meant to show. Nevermind what these persons can legitimately say. We as appraisers of the situation can on their behalf say that they never had a shot at knowing God (in fact, they were necessarily prevented from belief) and think that this is unfair or isn't consistent with the legitimacy of the inexcusability thesis.
On the other hand, Anderson seems to find the inexcusability of unbelief to be obviously inconsistent with the thesis that God's existence is "unclear." But why does he find this inconsistent but not the above? Perhaps it's just intuitive to him. Say it's not clear to person B that God exists because despite there being evidence for God's existence, B does not cognitively function properly. But then it also seems true that we would never find such a person who can properly assert, "I want to know God, but I can't". Why? Because they wouldn't know what they were missing (namely, knowing God) since they don't have a proper function to get that far. So again it appears that Anderson's view and Plantinga's view merely differ on certain details of mechanics but I don't see the philosophical importance of these differences. I contend that whatever can be a form of criticism for Plantinga's view can with little work be construed as one for Owen's.
I've been thinking about Owen Anderson's article found here, where he raises some objections against Plantinga. He rehearses much of these considerations in his book, The Clarity of God's Existence.
Briefly, Plantinga's view is that unbelief in God might be due to improper functioning of one's belief forming apparatuses which are the result of the fall. We don't see what we otherwise might (including God's glory) because we are negatively affected (in particular, with respect to our cognition) by our sin. Anderson's main focus in the article is to show that if the Plantingan picture is correct (i.e., unbelief in God is the result of improper functioning), then the unbeliever cannot be held inexcusable/responsible for their unbelief. That is to say, the unbeliever, who lacks belief in God on the basis of improper functioning, has an excuse.
There is something initially plausible about this picture. I mean how can a just God condemn persons for failing to do something that they cannot possibly do? Now I have my doubts about understanding notions of divine justice, but I will table those and related concerns for the moment. Anderson's main objections to Plantinga trade centrally on the old "ought-implies-can" principle of responsibility. Stated simply, if I ought to do something, then it must be the case that I can, call this OIC.
Now many philosophers have rejected OIC despite it's initially, intuitive appeal. Indeed there are a number of counterexamples to the principle both in the realm of morality and in epistemology. I won't have time to speak of those here.
So grant (for the purposes of discussion) that OIC is true in all cases. What I want to focus on is how even Anderson's view seems to violate the principle at one level. This is because Anderson is also a compatibilist about free will and determinism. Moreover he is reformed in his theology and accepts the calvinistic notion of total depravity which is the view that man cannot possibly seek God save a change in his mind/heart. This change is not self-caused but rather must come from without and so is external to the agent. That is to say, the nonbeliever on this view simply will not (and cannot) seek God left to herself.
Now suppose all of this is correct, again, for the sake of discussion. One might ask how the unbeliever can be thought to be without excuse? After all, if ought implies can, but man is born totally depraved such that they cannot seek God (save a change instituted from without), then in what sense ought man to know God?
Perhaps aware of this problem Anderson takes liberties to revise the OIC principle in the following way:
OIC-R: if person S wants to seek the Lord, then S can.
So on this picture, the problem with the unbeliever is that he desires not to seek God and if and only if he wanted to seek God, then he could. This is meant to preserve the ought-implies-can principle of seeking/knowing God, but again, it is a revised form of OIC so we''ll refer to Anderson's principle as OIC-R from here on out.
The first problem is a question about philosophical motivation. Why should we accept this as a legitimate move? He is basically coming up with a principle that serves his thesis, but that excludes Plantinga's. Indeed Plantinga cannot use the same exact maneuver since even if person P wanted to know, if person P had a jacked up belief forming apparatus, he still couldn't know God.
But now Anderson's principle (the revision of the original OIC) seems self-serving and ad hoc and Just because it helps his theory doesn't mean that it is the correct theory.
Relatedly, why can't Plantinga make a similar manuever? In light of Anderson's criticisms Plantinga could come up with his own revision of the ought-implies-can principle. He might for example argue that while it's true that man in sin has their belief forming apparatuses all messed up (so as not to believe in God), the following conditional is true:
"If God delivers person X and restores their apparatus then they can know God".
So on this revision, it's consistent to insist that all men should know God, even though man knowing God depends on some act of God.
Of course, one might think there is still an important difference between Anderson's and the proposed Plantingan revision of the ought-implies-can. Anderson's seems not to deal with the unbelievers reasoning faculties, but rather the unbelievers desire to seek/know God while Plantinga's involves the belief forming processes. But the crucial question is whether we should think this is a relevant difference to the matter of the inexcusability of unbelief. I don't see how it could be. I mean, what should it matter of the precise mechanism that keeps an unbeliever from seeking/knowing God? Whether it's because unbeliever A lacks the desire to seek God, or whether A doesn't have the properly functioning abilities to know God, if both necessarily keep person A from knowing/seeking what is clear (and both are ultimately up to God not A), then why think this difference is salient to the matter at hand? This gives rise to a further issue with Anderson's account.
We can criticize Anderson's account as not making sense of OIC regarding the desire to seek the Lord. That is to contend that Anderson's account actually violates OIC (just at a different level).
Just as Anderson faults Plantinga's view for not respecting the OIC regarding belief in God, we can, by parity, fault Anderson's view for failing to maintain OIC regarding man's fundamental desire to seek.
For example, consider the following, "If I ought to desire to seek God, then it must be the case that I can".
Anderson's reformed theological views and compatibilism violate this principle. Since man is born into total depravity, the nonbeliever fundamentally desires not to seek God save an act of God. So the unbeliever cannot know God, because the unbeliever cannot make it so that the necessary requisite states of affairs (e.g., desiring to seek) obtain.
If OIC is categorically true (as Anderson wants to insist), then how can it be true of the unbeliever that she ought to know God and thus that unbelief is inexcusable? Notice, if the unbeliever can be excused for her failing to have the desire to seek, then this also would get her off the hook for her unbelief.
The point is, it seems to me that whatever move is open to Anderson, a parallel manuever will be available to Plantinga. What is more, we can revise the OIC regarding inexcusability of unbelief with all kinds of antecedent clauses. For instance, one might insist that God can only be known via special revelation and then adjust the OIC accordingly: "Look, God can be known by anyone and all that that means is, 'if one has special revelation, then one can know him.' The question is whether this move or Anderson's move is a legitimate one.
---------------------------------
Part II
Anderson, in his article, also considers how it must be clear to reason that God exists, if man is to be held responsible for unbelief. But now suppose that it is knowable to reason as Anderson wants to argue (that is, suppose that "if person A wants to know then they can"), but add that it is not up to the unbeliever whether she will desire to know or not. As noted previously, desiring to know is thought to be at least necessary in order to know on Anderson's view.
But then what good is it that it is clear to reason (as he conceives it) if people are still prevented from knowing God due to reasons beyond their ultimate control? Perhaps to Anderson this is perfectly consistent with the inexcusability of unbelief, but I just don't see it. That is, the nonbeliever despite not being able to determine whether they have one of the necessary conditions for knowing God, is still inexcusable in their unbelief. In fact in conversations Anderson often cites that you will never find a case where a person in unbelief will sincerely say, "well I want to know God, but I can't." I've never been sure what this is meant to show. Nevermind what these persons can legitimately say. We as appraisers of the situation can on their behalf say that they never had a shot at knowing God (in fact, they were necessarily prevented from belief) and think that this is unfair or isn't consistent with the legitimacy of the inexcusability thesis.
On the other hand, Anderson seems to find the inexcusability of unbelief to be obviously inconsistent with the thesis that God's existence is "unclear." But why does he find this inconsistent but not the above? Perhaps it's just intuitive to him. Say it's not clear to person B that God exists because despite there being evidence for God's existence, B does not cognitively function properly. But then it also seems true that we would never find such a person who can properly assert, "I want to know God, but I can't". Why? Because they wouldn't know what they were missing (namely, knowing God) since they don't have a proper function to get that far. So again it appears that Anderson's view and Plantinga's view merely differ on certain details of mechanics but I don't see the philosophical importance of these differences. I contend that whatever can be a form of criticism for Plantinga's view can with little work be construed as one for Owen's.
Maximal Consequences and Maximal Clarity: Between a Rock and a Hard Place.
Shifting gears a bit, I want to raise, what I think is a serious issue that arises from the dictum often presented by Gangadean and Anderson and company. The line is, "maximal consequences requires maximal clarity."
Anderson and Gangadean are two theists who argue that the God of Christianity is knowable with absolute certainty. They argue that it is central to Christianity that unbelief in this God is inexcusable and if so, God's existence must be "maximally clear." Why must it be maximally clear? Because Anderson asserts (but doesn't argue) that maximal consequences imply maximal clarity.
First off, it isn't obvious that inexcusability is central to Christianity at least in the way that they have in mind. Anderson for instance will cite Romans 1:20 as a sort of proof text for this notion. Paul does say that man (in unbelief) is without excuse because God's eternal power and divine nature are clearly seen by what is made. As a side note, it seems that unbelief, not the lack of knowledge is inexcusable, but I think that Andreson and Surrendra require of the believer and unbeliever, knowledge of God (further they take knowledge to entail Cartesian certainty).
Anyway, as I've mentioned before, there are various intelligible meanings to "clear" and "without excuse." Indeed we use "clear" or "clarity" often in our expressions without intending to mean absolute certainty. For instance, it's clear that I am in Arizona at the moment (this is in fact, true). It's evident by everything I see. And you might say there is no excuse for me believing that I was in Canada dreaming that I am in Arizona. Suppose that it is somehow a crime for me to be in Arizona at the moment (maybe I am an illegal immigrant from Canada). Now it's remotely possible, that I only think I am in Arizona right now (that is, my evidence doesn't perfectly rule out the possibility that I'm in Canada right now, but subject to an extremely convincing hallucination that I am in Arizona at the moment). So suppose I actually believe that I am not in Arizona right now. Now suppose that I am arrested and charged with being in Arizona illegally. It's no excuse for me to cite the fact that I wasn't absolutely certain that I was in Arizona. If I told the authorities that I thought it a possible that I was actually in Canada right now, but merely hallucinating that I was in Arizona, they wouldn't (with good reason) excuse my illegal residence. So I have no excuse for failing to believe that I am in Arizona right now, even though it isn't absolutely clear or certain that I am in Arizona. These seem to be perfectly accessible ways of using the words 'clear' and 'inexcusable' that depart from the way that Anderson wants to privilege. So it seems to me that Anderson, if he depends on Paul's writing to support his intentions of the terms "clear" and "inexcusable" needs to give us an indubitable reason to accept that Paul was using the words in the way that he, (Anderson) is using them. Otherwise, it's just a case of semantic bullying.
As we noted above, Anderson and Gangadean argue that God's existence must be maximally clear. But why? Because unbelief (either according to scripture or reason) in God leads to maximal consequences i.e., spiritual death. One of the corollaries of this line of thinking is that whenever failure to know a proposition leads to maximal consequences (spiritual death), that proposition must be maximally clear. More formally:
Now supposing that belief in God is requisite for one to avoid the maximal consequences, the question to ask is whether there are other beliefs that are also necessary to avoid the them? In other words, given the above MCRME, we should be asking whether are there any other beliefs that per Christianity (or even Surrendra and Owen's favored theology) that failing to have leads to maximal consequences?
Take the belief in the life, death and the resurrection of Jesus (as a means of atonement for our sins). We'll call this "the set of beliefs about Jesus." I think a Christian would be hard pressed to deny the fact that belief in Jesus of this sort is required in order to avoid maximal consequences (eternal separation from God, hell, spiritual death, or whatever). So combining this with MCRME, we can conclude that the set of beliefs associated with Jesus' redemptive work must be maximally clear.
That is, if maximal consequences implies maximal clarity, and unbelief in Jesus implies maximal consequences, then it must be maximally clear that Jesus lived and died, was the messiah, and also actually took the sins of the world. But this causes problems for Gangadean.
As I see it, Gangadean et al. are now faced with 3 unsavory options.
1) Agree that there must be (and is) maximal clarity of the set of beliefs associated with Jesus' redemptive work.
2) Deny that such beliefs are required for (or part of realizing) spiritual life/salvation.
3) Deny that maximal consequences requires maximal clarity.
Unfortunately, I find none of these options palatable for Gangadean and Anderson and discuss why below.
1) The set of beliefs about Jesus are maximally clear: The problem here is that we can't even in principle have absolute certainty about such matters. Don't we, today, believe in the life and work of Jesus based on testimonial evidence (e.g., the scriptures, purported historical records)? Moreover, at best, the early believers had empirical evidence (i.e., they observed the life, teaching, death of the risen Christ). How can one have absolute certainty of any of this since one's senses or how one interprets one's sense experiences may fail to correspond to reality.
A second difficulty of this route is that one needs to demarcate those propositions about Jesus that are necessary for avoiding the maximal consequences from those that are not-- of course it shouldn't be an arbitrary matter.
2) The set of beliefs about Jesus are not required for spiritual life: If having certain beliefs about Jesus is not necessary to avoid the maximal consequences (spiritual death), then even granting MCRME, those beliefs need not be maximally clear. Unfortunately, this is to allow that Theists that do not accept any beliefs about Jesus (indeed they may even believe that Jesus never existed) are avoiding the maximal consequences. I take this to be hardly inviting for reformed believers like Gangadean and Anderson.
3) Maximal Consequences do not imply Maximal Clarity: Perhaps maximal consequences does not require maximal clarity (MCRME is false). But then, why are Gangadean and Anderson pressing this point about the maximal clarity of God's existence as requisite for maximal consequences as it pertains to unbelief about God?
Anderson and Gangadean are two theists who argue that the God of Christianity is knowable with absolute certainty. They argue that it is central to Christianity that unbelief in this God is inexcusable and if so, God's existence must be "maximally clear." Why must it be maximally clear? Because Anderson asserts (but doesn't argue) that maximal consequences imply maximal clarity.
First off, it isn't obvious that inexcusability is central to Christianity at least in the way that they have in mind. Anderson for instance will cite Romans 1:20 as a sort of proof text for this notion. Paul does say that man (in unbelief) is without excuse because God's eternal power and divine nature are clearly seen by what is made. As a side note, it seems that unbelief, not the lack of knowledge is inexcusable, but I think that Andreson and Surrendra require of the believer and unbeliever, knowledge of God (further they take knowledge to entail Cartesian certainty).
Anyway, as I've mentioned before, there are various intelligible meanings to "clear" and "without excuse." Indeed we use "clear" or "clarity" often in our expressions without intending to mean absolute certainty. For instance, it's clear that I am in Arizona at the moment (this is in fact, true). It's evident by everything I see. And you might say there is no excuse for me believing that I was in Canada dreaming that I am in Arizona. Suppose that it is somehow a crime for me to be in Arizona at the moment (maybe I am an illegal immigrant from Canada). Now it's remotely possible, that I only think I am in Arizona right now (that is, my evidence doesn't perfectly rule out the possibility that I'm in Canada right now, but subject to an extremely convincing hallucination that I am in Arizona at the moment). So suppose I actually believe that I am not in Arizona right now. Now suppose that I am arrested and charged with being in Arizona illegally. It's no excuse for me to cite the fact that I wasn't absolutely certain that I was in Arizona. If I told the authorities that I thought it a possible that I was actually in Canada right now, but merely hallucinating that I was in Arizona, they wouldn't (with good reason) excuse my illegal residence. So I have no excuse for failing to believe that I am in Arizona right now, even though it isn't absolutely clear or certain that I am in Arizona. These seem to be perfectly accessible ways of using the words 'clear' and 'inexcusable' that depart from the way that Anderson wants to privilege. So it seems to me that Anderson, if he depends on Paul's writing to support his intentions of the terms "clear" and "inexcusable" needs to give us an indubitable reason to accept that Paul was using the words in the way that he, (Anderson) is using them. Otherwise, it's just a case of semantic bullying.
As we noted above, Anderson and Gangadean argue that God's existence must be maximally clear. But why? Because unbelief (either according to scripture or reason) in God leads to maximal consequences i.e., spiritual death. One of the corollaries of this line of thinking is that whenever failure to know a proposition leads to maximal consequences (spiritual death), that proposition must be maximally clear. More formally:
Max Consequences Requires Max Clarity Equivalence (MCRME):
Where P = any proposition and S = any subject (potential knower).
If unbelief in P entails maximal consequences for S, then P must be maximally clear to S.
Now supposing that belief in God is requisite for one to avoid the maximal consequences, the question to ask is whether there are other beliefs that are also necessary to avoid the them? In other words, given the above MCRME, we should be asking whether are there any other beliefs that per Christianity (or even Surrendra and Owen's favored theology) that failing to have leads to maximal consequences?
Take the belief in the life, death and the resurrection of Jesus (as a means of atonement for our sins). We'll call this "the set of beliefs about Jesus." I think a Christian would be hard pressed to deny the fact that belief in Jesus of this sort is required in order to avoid maximal consequences (eternal separation from God, hell, spiritual death, or whatever). So combining this with MCRME, we can conclude that the set of beliefs associated with Jesus' redemptive work must be maximally clear.
That is, if maximal consequences implies maximal clarity, and unbelief in Jesus implies maximal consequences, then it must be maximally clear that Jesus lived and died, was the messiah, and also actually took the sins of the world. But this causes problems for Gangadean.
As I see it, Gangadean et al. are now faced with 3 unsavory options.
1) Agree that there must be (and is) maximal clarity of the set of beliefs associated with Jesus' redemptive work.
2) Deny that such beliefs are required for (or part of realizing) spiritual life/salvation.
3) Deny that maximal consequences requires maximal clarity.
Unfortunately, I find none of these options palatable for Gangadean and Anderson and discuss why below.
1) The set of beliefs about Jesus are maximally clear: The problem here is that we can't even in principle have absolute certainty about such matters. Don't we, today, believe in the life and work of Jesus based on testimonial evidence (e.g., the scriptures, purported historical records)? Moreover, at best, the early believers had empirical evidence (i.e., they observed the life, teaching, death of the risen Christ). How can one have absolute certainty of any of this since one's senses or how one interprets one's sense experiences may fail to correspond to reality.
A second difficulty of this route is that one needs to demarcate those propositions about Jesus that are necessary for avoiding the maximal consequences from those that are not-- of course it shouldn't be an arbitrary matter.
2) The set of beliefs about Jesus are not required for spiritual life: If having certain beliefs about Jesus is not necessary to avoid the maximal consequences (spiritual death), then even granting MCRME, those beliefs need not be maximally clear. Unfortunately, this is to allow that Theists that do not accept any beliefs about Jesus (indeed they may even believe that Jesus never existed) are avoiding the maximal consequences. I take this to be hardly inviting for reformed believers like Gangadean and Anderson.
3) Maximal Consequences do not imply Maximal Clarity: Perhaps maximal consequences does not require maximal clarity (MCRME is false). But then, why are Gangadean and Anderson pressing this point about the maximal clarity of God's existence as requisite for maximal consequences as it pertains to unbelief about God?
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