More from Anderson on Youtube

There's been a bit more action on youtube between Spencer and Anderson. But as I suspected, Anderson has again managed to avoid presenting an answer to the original objection.

To set the stage a bit: Anderson recently asked Spencer if he affirmed that "reason is ontological" that is to say, that our thinking at least sometimes tells us about the world as it were (as opposed to just our thoughts). And Spencer made some remarks that made Anderson (and me) think he didn't affirm that reason was ontological. To that, Anderson claimed they had no basis for further dialogue, because Spencer wouldn't be in a position to make basic distinctions and so he wouldn't be in a position to evaluate any arguments. Since that time Spencer has responded quite unequivocally. He wrote,

@Owen Anderson But we do agree that the laws of thought are ontological. I've said in this thread that I "believe" and "agree" that 'a is a' applies to reality and is universal. So you're just wrong to say that "we don't agree on whether the laws of thought are also laws of being (ontological)." 

Our difference seems to be on the epistemic status of our belief that reason is ontological. I think it's a presupposition of experience, or perhaps a non-inferential intuition. You think it's "clear to reason", meaning, you can show, without relying on intuition or a mere brute starting point, that reason is ontological. I'm asking what that demonstration looks like. Do you have an argument? 

If you insist that the only coherent "common ground" is one where we can demonstrate that reason is ontological, it would seem that you shoulder the burden to show why that's necessary. You haven't done that. Thus, it's a loaded assumption on your part to maintain that we "know" (it's "clear to reason") or that we must "know" that reason is ontological, without showing it first. 

To be clear, my asking you to show how it is that you know reason is ontological without appealing to intuition or common sense is not the same as me denying that reason is ontological.

So it's quite obvious from this passage that he agrees with my position in that he affirms that reason is ontological even though he doesn't necessarily buy the other Gangadeanian baggage of thinking we can or even must have certainty about such matters (i.e,. the principle of clarity and the need for clarity).

Anderson has just responded with:

Spencer Hawkins No I don't think I'm wrong that we disagree. Here's what you said above:"To answer your question, I do, in a sense, "affirm" or "know" that 'a is a' beyond my own experience, but not in the way that you're assuming. I don't claim to be deductively certain when I claim to "affirm" or "know" the meaning of terms, the consistency that the world takes, and so on. I think human knowledge is fallible and the quest for a foundationalist (internalist) basis in incorrigible or infallible certainty is a lost cause." (Emphasis mine). 

We can't know whether "eternal" is "non-eternal" so we can't assess the argument together.

This comment doesn't reflect the attitude of someone that is engaged in an honest dialogue. He quotes something Spencer said several comments back without paying attention to Spencer's explicit remarks in the latest comment. If there is a tension between what Spencer has just said and what he said before, someone who was pursuing a philosophical conversation in good faith would ask their interlocutor to clarify their position as opposed to assuming the most self serving and uncharitable reading. He should have asked Spencer which of the two comments in tension really represents his view and also allow him to revise his positions. What matters is what Spencer believes not whether he's perfectly clear or consistent in what he says. Again it's not hard and Anderson should know better. What this looks like to me is someone who is trying to avoid answering a challenge and trying to save face in the process because he's been called out.

In fact it's worse than all of that. In the older comment that Anderson cites, Spencer clearly states that there is a sense in which he affirms or knows that 'a is a'. So there isn't even a tension between that comment and his latest remarks. But he adds that it isn't "knowledge" according to Anderson and Gangadean (which entails certainty). As I've noted before, the Gangadeanians have a quirky definition or analysis of 'knowledge' which they merely stipulate. I say it's quirky because the rest of us philosophers simply disagree. And they don't ever bother to justify their definition which is to say they never answer the question, "how are you certain that your definition or analysis of 'knowledge' is correct?" So when Anderson ends with, "We can't know whether "eternal" is "non-eternal" so we can't assess the argument together" he's using the verb 'know' to track the Gangadeanian definition which requires certainty. And by Spencer's own admission, he doesn't agree to that. But what Anderson needs to explain now is why we need that kind of knowledge (certainty) in order to assess an argument. 

Anderson is right that if we can't know with Gangadeanian certainty whether eternal is non-eternal, then we can't know with Gangadeanian certainty whether an argument employing those notions is sound or not. Nobody is doubting that. But this triviality is simply of no consequence.

In contrast, if we can have knowledge without Gangadeanian certainty (which the VAST majority of philosophers accept) then we can know without Gangadeanian certainty whether eternal is non-eternal and we can assess arguments which employ those concepts just fine. So what the Gangadeanians owe us is an argument for why we need Gangadeanian certainty or Gangadeanian-Knowledge in the first place. If you're thinking this relates closely with some of my other recent posts, you're right. It's all connected to the idea of clarity. As I've been stressing for some time, the Gangadeanians have simply failed to demonstrate the principle of clarity (that some things are clear) and the need for clarity (that some things must be clear), which is to say they've fail to show that the core principles at the center of their entire worldview are clear to reason.

Kelly Fitzsimmons Burton on the Principle of Clarity

A new talk has been posted on one of the Gangadean affiliated sites on the principle of clarity-- i.e., the claim that some things are clear to reason. The last time I linked a talk by Burton I noted how she claims to simply take the principle for granted and wasn't in a position to show that it was true. In this latest talk she attempts to show that it's true or to provide definitive grounds for us to accept it. Hence, confusion persists about just what is her official position--maybe she's still working things out?

The most recent talk adds to the confusion in another way in that she begins her remarks by emphasizing that the principle of clarity is a "first-principle" or "starting point." What's peculiar about that statement is that philosophers don't normally try to demonstrate that their "first principles" or "starting points" are true--they simply take them for granted (usually on the basis of intuition) much akin to the axioms of mathematical systems which you use to prove other things, but don't prove within the system itself. This would be compatible with her initial claim in the previous talk that she isn't in a position to show that the principle of clarity was true. But then again she proceeds to try and prove that it is true which is the topic of this post.

In any event, either approach works against the Gangadeanians. This is because the argument that Burton provides (which is one I've already criticized before) is a bad one. So, either they accept the principle as an article of faith, or they stand behind it on the basis of a bad argument--whichever way they go, it seems that they fail to satisfy the very standards of rigor with which they are quick to burden others.

A quick word about the structure of Burton's argument. It looks to be a reductio ad absurdum. In this sort of argument you have a claim that you want to prove say, P (in this case, P = some things are clear to reason). The manner in which you get to proving P is by starting with its denial (not-P). If you can derive, a contradiction by starting with not-P and nothing more than uncontroversially true premises and valid rules of inference, then you've just proven that not-P is false (or that P is true). As we'll see in a moment, unfortunately for Burton's argument, the premises are not all uncontroversially true.

Also keep in mind that for something to be clear according to the Gangadeanian lexicon is for the opposite to be (determined as) impossible in the strongest sense. This is the manner in which clarity relates to the burden of proof for the Gangadeanians--to show that P is clear you have to demonstrate by way of a sound argument that not-P couldn't possibly be true. So in evaluating Burton's argument you shouldn't employ the ordinary everyday notion of 'clear.' For instance, I'd say that it's perfectly clear (in the mundane sense) that I am currently typing on a computer. Here, I'm using the word like most competent English speakers to denote something like "obvious." But I have to admit that it's at least remotely possible that I'm in a matrix like scenario so that there is in fact no computer and thus no typing and instead only the experience as if I'm typing on a computer (because I'm plugged into the output of a sophisticated program). So on Gangadean's view of things, it wouldn't be clear to reason that I am currently typing on a computer even though on the more ordinary notion, it remains obvious/clear that I am so typing because remote possibilities of that sort are just intuitively too ridiculous to take seriously. That's the sense of the word to keep in mind. Note: things would be different if I could somehow prove that I'm typing on a computer (i.e., if I could show that it's literally impossible for me to be in a matrix like scenario) which is something Gangadean attempts, but fails to do in his book. Okay enough with the prelims., here's the argument presented by Burton.

(1) Nothing is clear to reason. [Assumed for Reductio]
(2) If nothing is clear, then no distinctions are clear.
(3) If we can't make clear distinctions, then (meaningful) thought and talk are impossible.
(4) But it seems like (meaningful) thought and talk are possible.
(5) Thus, some things are clear. 

The implicit contradiction is found between (3) and (4). So that's supposed to be grounds to deny premise (1) which is to prove that some things are clear to reason i.e., the principle of clarity.

To begin, premise (4) is interesting. Notice how Burton includes "it seems like" in presenting (4). We normaly call that a "hedge"--that is, it flags a lack of full confidence in what follows. Why does Burton employ it if she's after demonstrating the principle of clarity? I'm not sure. Again more confusion. What is more, I wonder if what Burton is tracking here is the fact that it isn't obvious how such a thing is to be known by the Gangadeanians given their standards of proof and knowledge. Is it somehow self-attesting or self-evident that thought and talk are possible? If so, how is it that one goes about determining that something is "self-attesting" or "self-evident"? Or does it all boil down to just another basic intuition which the Gangadeanian's refer to by a different name? And just to anticipate a mistaken response, when I ask how it is that Burton or any Gangadeanian for that matter knows that (4) is true, I'm not thereby saying that I believe (4) is false. I'm merely inquiring into whether the Gangadeanian system is internally consistent and can get the advertised results.

The real stinker in this argument is Premise (3). There's no justification given for it and it's doing all of the heavy lifting. Just why is meaningful thought and talk impossible if we can't "make clear distinctions"? Burton doesn't say. The crucial word here is 'clear' as it features in Premise (3). The claim isn't that intelligible thought and talk are impossible if we can't make distinctions per se, but rather that intelligible thought and talk are impossible if we can't make clear distinctions. So what does it mean that we can't (consistently) make clear distinctions as opposed to that we can't make distinctions simpliciter? Since epistemic certainty is the thing at issue with this argument, what the Gangadeanian means is that in doubting clarity at the basic level, one cannot be absolutely certain that the distinctions one's draws are correct or reflect reality. I agree. But this is of no help to the Gangadeanians in establishing the truth of Premise (3).

You see, I can sort of see how if one is rationally unable to make basic distinctions per se, that intelligible thought and talk might be threatened. But what I don't see why we need to make clear distinctions. Or in other words, why must we be certain that our distinctions track reality in order to have intelligible thought and talk. Why do we need certainty or clarity for meaningful thought and talk to be possible? This is the central claim that needs to be shown for the argument to work. Premise (3) needs to be proven rather than merely taken for granted.

For good measure: Can Burton just drop the word 'clear' as I have done in my discussion so that Premise (3) changes to the following:

(3)* If we can't make distinctions, then (meaningful) thought and talk are impossible.

As I've just said (3)* is intuitively more agreeable than (3). Unfortunately, that won't work either. Doing so would render Burton's argument invalid. The argument's validity depends crucially on an inference rule called "hypothetical syllogism" which requires a kind of matching up of the consequent of one premise with the antecedent of the subsequent premise. To illustrate, let's take a schematic version of Burton's argument using letters to stand for sentences.

(1)' ~P (assume)
(2)' If ~P, then Q.
(3)' If Q, then R.
(4)' ~R
(5)' Thus, P.

Notice that 'Q' occurs in the consequent of Premise (2)' and the antecedent of Premise (3)'. If it were not so, the argument wouldn't be valid.

[note, I'm glossing over the fact that Burton's presentation of the argument is actually missing a premise between (3) and (4) namely, the premise that meaningful thought and talk are not possible--or in the above schematic, 'R'. That's the only way you get a contradiction which is required for a reductio ab absurdum to be valid. The sharp reader will notice that I spoke of the contradiction as implicit--and now you know why!]

If you change the wording of Premise (3) in the way required to make it more tenable (by dropping the word 'clear') you change the meaning of it. It would then be like changing 'Q' as it occurs Premise (3)' to some other letter not yet occurring in the above schema like 'T'. In which case, it becomes invalid and there's no reductio ad absurdum to speak of.

(1)'' ~P
(2)'' If ~P, then Q.
(3)'' If T, then R.
(4)'' ~R
(5)'' Thus, P. 

So Burton's "proof" for the principle of clarity, fails. It fails not only because Burton on pain of inconsistency shouldn't help herself to Premise (4), but more importantly because she needs to prove Premise (3). That is, she needs a sufficient answer the following: why do we need to make clear/certain distinctions for meaningful thought or talk to be possible? The only other way out is to render her argument invalid.

A Gangadeanian response to one of my challenges.

Here are some remarks from a Gangadeanian that seems closely related to one of the disagreements between me and Gangadean. My point in discussing this person's comments is not intended to throw any shade on them, but rather to shed light. I've also decided not to link the conversation in an effort to keep their identity private, because I don't think this person is doing the kind of harm that Gangadean and Anderson are. Since Gangadean and Anderson refuse to respond to my objections, I use this person's remarks as representative of their positions. In fact, Anderson (in the convo in question) endorsed what this person said as a "great analysis" so I'm not taking a giant leap, here. I think it will be helpful for my readers to see how a follower of Gangadean frames things and in particular, where it goes wrong. It's a long comment, so we'll take it piecemeal.  They write,

When I shut off all my senses and just think about my thoughts and I think “what is thought?” What I first find is I have thought 1 (T1) and thought 2 (T2) (and yes, time passed between me having those, so those are in time).

The context: how do we get to Gangadeanian certainty about say, the law of identity as an exceptionless true principle i.e., as applying to all possible thought? What's interesting here is what this person is helping themselves to. Recall that in my critical response to Gangadean's talk at GCU, I noticed that one of Gangadean's premises was that human souls/minds (or the self) have one thought after another which implies that the human soul is in time. And I wondered how he could be certain (in the Gangadeanian sense) of such facts as this. My point of course is not to argue that we are not in time or to deny that our thoughts are temporally ordered. On the contrary, my question is intended to uncover the fact that Gangadean is actually appealing to intuition when it counts most--for his most basic premises/assumptions. We know these things not in virtue of an argument, nor is it the case that the claim "I have one thought after (temporally) another" "makes questioning possible" so that it's self-attesting. Instead, it's something we just know, immediately. The author of this passage just takes it for granted that they are having one thought after (temporally) another, but my question at this juncture would be how (or in virtue of what) do you know (with Gangadeanian certainty) that your thoughts are distinct and that they are temporally ordered in the first place? They will want to deny that it's on the basis of an intuition, but my claim is that they can't with integrity. They go on to say,

Where, even before my thoughts are of concepts of things out there in nature, I merely have the concepts of T1 and T2 themselves. Where, T1 is T1 and T2 is T2 (a is a); and T1 can’t be T2 in the same respects at same time (can’t be a and non-a). If this is not so, my mind just starts eating itself, because it means I can’t even distinguish between thoughts, and thus “nothing is sound” including that statement, and that statement, ad infinitum as I reach for the bottle. And that is all just me looking at my thoughts regardless of what they are of. It’s the very nature of thought, and the nature of thought offers me no other alternative. I find myself this way. I find thought this way, I discover the nature of thought, I don't determine it. Contra Descartes "I think therefore I am,” it's, "I think therefore I think." And thinking is something, it has a nature

I don't know what this person means by the mind "eating itself." That's quite the imagine, but it's too imprecise to evaluate for truth. More importantly, there are a few things to take note of, here.

First, we should be careful to distinguish between affirming the law of identity (a is a) per se on the one hand with affirming it and claiming to be absolutely certain of it, on the other. As I've said many times before, one can affirm it without claiming to be certain of it because there are various ways to "affirm" a claim (you could for example, believe that it is true and that it's at least possible that you're mistaken). The author of the comment is trying to make the standard Gangadeanian move which is to suggest that one must affirm (with certainty) the law of identity inasmuch as one wants to allow that we have a basis for distinguishing between one thought and another. Given that it seems (intuitively) obvious that we have some basis for distinguishing one thought from another, we must affirm (with certainty) the law of identity, so the thinking goes. But what the Gangadeanians fail to establish is the "with certainty" part. I see no reason for thinking that I somehow have no rational basis for making basic distinctions just because I don't affirm the law of identity with Gangadeanian certainty. I can affirm the law of identity to a lesser degree or extent and consistently draw basic distinctions. Just like you can believe (but be less than certain) that it will rain tomorrow and be entirely rational in using this claim in your reasoning about whether or not to take an umbrella.

Secondly, notice the egocentricity of the many claims in this person's remarks e.g., "I find myself..." The method here seems to be that this person sits and reflects on their own thoughts (much like Descartes) and then attempts to capture what they find (via introspection) through the use of certain words (in a public/shared language) and then proceeds to draws very general conclusions about the nature of all possible thought. They write, "I merely have the concepts of T1 and T2" and "I find thought this way". What conclusion should follow from facts about this person's own experiences at particular times? If we're being careful, not much. We shouldn't generalize to the very nature of all possible thought on the basis of this one person's self-reports of their experiences. I believe they call those "hasty generalizations." There are really two issues here.

1) How does this person know with Gangadeanian certainty that they are accurately capturing/expressing/describing their experiences?  

2) How do they know that their judgments concerning their own experiences of thought generalize to all possible thought (i.e., to the very nature or essence of thought)?

We are in need of arguments for each. Moreover, there's a more general dialectical issue. One of the main motivating reasons behind Gangadean's "rational presuppositionalism" and his express denial of appeals to common sense and use of intuition is that on his view, there must be some "objective" means by which we can settle disputes. He worries that if we are allowed to appeal to intuitions for belief in God for instance, then when two people disagree, there is nothing further that can be done to come to an agreement. So I'm contending that we should hold the Gangadeanians to the very same standards. Now ask yourself, if someone disagrees with (or more modestly, doesn't find obvious) all of what this person says above about the nature of thought, about what one finds when one reflects on their own thoughts, and the like, is there any way to "objectively" settle these issues? What would that even begin to look like? 

The reason that there is no "objective" means to settle such disputes is that there is no argument offered for the claims. All the author has done is presented a series of assertions about what they believe to be the nature of all thought, by giving words to their inner experiences and then generalizing beyond their own experiences, but what they haven't offered is an "objective" non-question begging means of determining whether or not what they say must be true. The payoff: this way of framing things does no better at settling disputes, than an appeal to intuition or common sense. And that's a serious problem for any Gangadeanian. I say more about this below.

The author goes on:

We don’t determine the laws, we discover them. We are using the laws to see the laws. Meaning, the laws of thought are not more basic assumptions behind thinking, but a way to articulate the inescapable nature of thought itself, where to think of any opposing idea rests on the very thing I am aiming to discredit. In some respects, it’s not even that the laws of thought make thinking possible, but that they are the precise features of thinking itself.

That's all fine and well, but again the natural question is, how do you know, with Gangadeanian certainty, that your judgments about the nature of thought are ultimately correct and generalizable?  How does one come to know, with  certainty, a thing like, "the laws of thought are a way to articulate the inescapable nature of thought itself?" Again, to plainly assert that we "discover" them is to presuppose that there's something to discover, which is the very thing at issue here. What the author of these comments seems to be doing is taking liberties to presuppose that their introspective judgments are veridical so much so that it yields knowledge about the nature of all and any thought. The lack of self-awareness here is troubling.

Then, if I say “I’m not sure that holds up,” that is to use the nature of thought (laws of thought) to try and debunk the nature of thought, which is clearly self-defeating. It’s like standing firmly on a high beam 100 feet in the air claiming it can’t do what it is doing. Even to say, “I’m not sure it can hold me” while it is holding me is stupid. So, I either accept (not merely assume) the nature of thought as it is (much like I accept my lungs and heart have a nature as they are) or I use reason to deny it and, to be consistent, leap off the beam—because literally every single other thing I think or say is derived from, made possible by, and rests on this nature of thinking 

There's a lot wrong with this section. At least inasmuch as it's intended to target a person like me, it's again making the same conflation that Anderson and company frequently make: there's nothing self-defeating about being less than certain that the laws of thought are true. Gangadeanians keep insisting that there is, but they don't present any reasons in favor of such a claim. Unfortunately, merely repeating a claim doesn't show that it's "clear to reason."

This person's own analogy is helpful in showing where their thinking goes wrong in relation to my disagreements with Gangadean. In short, what the analogy conflates is the metaphysical with the epistemological. There is nothing absurd about a person being supported by a beam (a metaphysical state), while being unsure (an epistemological state) that the beam is holding her up. That's because there are all sorts of facts (things that are true) of which we are not aware unless of course you're all knowing! And it's perfectly rational to doubt or call into question claims which you don't know to be facts! In contrast, there's something absurd about a person who is certain (epistemological) that there is a beam holding her up while at the same time not being sure (epistemological) that there is a beam holding her up. That's what the Ganagdeanian needs my position to be in order to say that it is self-defeating. But doing so on the basis of bad conflations is not the way. There's a failure of mesh in their comment owning to a failure to distinguish between the metaphysical and the epistemological which is where it goes wrong.

The analogy as presented is misleading because the narrator has stipulated the metaphysical fact that there is a beam that is holding the person up. But that's a poor analogy if one is trying to characterize my dispute with the Gangadeanians over whether or not we can (and need) Gangadeanian certainty about say, the laws of thought. The better analogy is that the Gangadeanian claims to know with certainty that I am in fact being held up by a beam and I'm not certain, and I'm asking them to show why I should be certain and how they are certain (while being consistent with their own standards of proof). In other words, whether or not we are in a position to be certain that there is a beam that is holding me up is the very thing in question and so to respond as this person has with, "you're standing firmly on a high beam 100 feet in the air" is clearly to assume what needs to be shown.

Remember the Gangadeanian is trying to use rational presuppositionalism as a way of settling disputes and the dispute at this juncture is over what is analogous to whether or not the beam is holding the questioner up. If the protagonist in the story is unsure (an epistemological state) that the beam is holding her up (she might for instance suspect that there is an invisible force keeping her afloat), then there's nothing absurd about her uncertainty. In such a situation, it's not self-defeating for her to doubt that the beam is holding her up. The pertinent question then is, whether she can know (and how) that she is being held up by a beam (and perhaps, that there is a beam in the first place). That's analogous to the question, how can/does the Gangadeanian know that there are these general laws of thought that hold without exception?

Let's take the analogy a step further. How might a person in the story who questions whether there is a beam that is supporting her, determine the truth of the matter?  You might just say that she can open her eyes and observe that there is a beam and perhaps she can run some relevant experiments, look for hidden wires around her person and the like. So when I challenge the Gangadeanians to explain how they know that the laws of thought hold without exception, I'm asking for two things.

1) What is the analogue of "visual observations" when it comes to determining that the laws of thought are without exception, true? (Hint: from the author's remarks, it looks to be introspection/intuition).

2) How can one come to know with certainty that this analogue of a process is veridical?

I want to know how, for example, the author of the above comments comes to know (with certainty) that "literally ever single other thin[g] I think or say is derived from, made possible by, and rests on this nature of thinking." Put in those terms, it's obviously no good for the Gangadeanian to respond with, "your very act of questioning presupposes that the laws of thought are exceptionless" because that simply doesn't answer either of 1) or 2). Additionally, remember that a person can raise 1) and 2) while herself believing that the laws of thought are in fact, exceptionless. Just like a Ganagdeanian can ask a fellow theist how they  know with certainty that God exits, while herself believing that God exists. There's simply nothing self-defeating about that. If the Gangadeanian disagrees then they don't understand what is meant by "self-defeating." He goes on with,

All things considered, this seems the most common and basic split between those who disagree: What I see as simply accepting the reality of thought as it is (and seeing no other alternative because any alternative requires thought), others call it going by intuition or common sense, or even being fideistic, which goes on to undermine any claims for clarity. That I just see it and accept it without proof. That it is a bit like, “I put my faith in reason.” Granted faith as understanding, but still, I simply accept it.   

But, I vehemently reject there is anything blind going on when I see (and accept) thought has a nature that is fixed and I cannot override. I reason to it. I see that I literally and existentially cannot not think, and literally, having thought itself, includes, shows, and inescapably declares its own existential nature. Where, much like I find myself needing air to breathe, and food to eat (because my lungs and body have a particular nature) I can do absolutely nothing to alter this nature of thought. It is what it is. So, finally my question: As opposed to just asserting "reason can't be questioned because it makes questioning possible" does it boil down for this to be the proof: that the alternative is not just inconsistent but literally and existentially unthinkable? If that works, I want to request of the skeptic, not just for a commitment to reason as the laws of thought, but because this is the nature of thought itself, "give me your arguments without using thought." Is any of that a fair way to approach it or too convoluted? Or, could it be the case that just like some want to show “something must be eternal” before showing what it is, we need to show in epistemology that "something must be self-attesting" before showing what it is?  

And now we start to approach at least this particular Gangadeanian's answer to my question about how they know about the very nature of thought and that reason is transcendental and the like. Basically, this person claims to just "see" some things as true. Now if my question is, how do you know with certainty about the very nature of all thought? To answer this with, "I just see it" is nothing more than an appeal to something like an immediate judgment or in other words an intuition. If that's the case, then Gangadean's philosophy is really mistaken in decrying appeals to intuition in others. The natural question then becomes, why can't a believer likewise "just see" that God exists? and claim that it is obvious? Of course, Gangadeanians will cite the fact that not everyone just "sees that God exists." But the same with this person's assertions about the nature of all thought! Are the Gangadanian's willing to go so far as to say that every possible person just "sees" that all thought must presuppose the laws of thought (and also that this entails that we can and must be certain of this fact)? The payoff is that the Gangadeanians can't have it both ways. Either allow for the legitimacy of immediate judgments (which will open Pandora's box for their worldview) or provide a non-question begging way to prove these claims about the nature of all thought that you're making to someone that just doesn't "see" what you claim to "see." To say, as this person has, that they "simply accept the reality of thought as it is" is clearly begging the question! It's like responding to a person who asks you for a proof of God's existence with, "I simply accept the reality that nature is as it is, which includes God's existence."

What's confusing is that the author of the remarks goes on to insist that none of this is based on intuition or blind faith, instead it's something they "reason to" adding that "I see that it literally and existentially cannot not think, and literally, having thought itself includes, shows, and inescapably declares its own existential nature." In doing so, they are using the phrase :"reason to it" incorrectly. When we reason to things, we draw inferences from say, premises to conclusions. Again, the Gangadeanian can't have it both ways. Either you "just see some things as true" or your "reason to them" but you can't just see something as true and count that as an instance of "reasoning" in the relevant sense.

This is the spot between the rock and hard place that the Gangadeanians will find themselves in if they "critically analyze their basic beliefs" far enough and with consistency. They must make room for at least some immediate, non inferential judgments or they bear such a ridiculous burden of proof that all they can do is continually run away from discussions. Whether or not they want to call these 'intuitions' really doesn't really matter. They can call them "ponies" for all I care. The point is that these basic beliefs have the very feature of intuitive judgments, which the Gangadeanians find problematic. There is no objective means to "settle disputes" regarding them. Either you just "see," as the author of the above remarks, that the laws of thought are presupposed by all of your own thoughts or you don't. There's nothing more to say about the matter. But the reason the Gangadeanians should find no solace in this result is that this it opens up the possibility that there are other (perhaps many) beliefs of just this sort. And now they need a non-arbitrary manner by which to distinguish between when these immediate beliefs are rational and when they are not.

The fact that Anderson did not see such obvious problems with this person's remarks and endorsed them as "a great analysis" is telling though I'm not sure in what direction. Either Anderson simply didn't pay close attention, or he's just that bad at thinking, or he's being dishonest so as to be quick to endorse any account that comes to the same basic conclusion. I'm not sure which of these is the most charitable.