Part 4: On Gangadean's "Real" Solution to the Problem of Evil.

Let's wrap up my analysis of Gangadean's "ironic solution" to the problem of evil. The more I think about it the worse it looks to me. In fact, I'll conclude with a very serious problem with his "solution" that I hadn't noticed until today. 

Gangadean writes,

Natural evil was not originally placed on the creation. This would be inconsistent with the infinite power and goodness of God the Creator. And natural evil (physical death, to be short) is not inherent in moral evil. Spiritual death, not physical death, is inherent in moral evil. Physical death therefore was imposed by God upon mankind after moral evil and because of moral evil. And it was imposed not as punishment, which is inherent, but as a call back from moral evil...Natural evil therefore is divine mercy calling man back from moral evil. Natural evil serves multiple purposes in regard to moral evil. It serves to restrain, to recall from, and to remove moral evil and accomplishes these purposes variously in different persons in different states and stages in their lives (114).

The general thing to note is how many mere assertions we have in the above passage. There's simply no justification given for any of these claims.

1) It is inconsistent with God's infinite power and goodness that natural evil would be original in creation. 

2) Natural evil is not inherent in moral evil. 

3) Natural evil is imposed because of moral evil. 

4) Natural evil is not imposed as punishment (because punishment would be inherent). 

5) Natural evil serves to restrain, to recall from, and to remove moral evil.

Now once again I think Gangadean has simply lost sight of the dialectic. He initially thinks that the problem of evil is a real problem facing Theism. The problem attempts to show that Theism is incoherent in light of the presence of evil. And as part of his response he gives us 1) through 5). But how does he know these are true? Well, there's no deductive argument anywhere in sight for them so it must not be from general revelation. My guess is that it's based on his reading of the bible. In fact, Gangadean in connection to 2), 3) and 5) will sometimes (in conversation) cite Adam and Eve being kicked out of the garden to toil as the institution of natural evil as a call back from moral evil. But as we've discussed before, insofar as the problem of evil is aimed at the coherence of Theism, it doesn't make sense to appeal to the bible which presupposes that Theism is true. That's going to be question begging at least insofar as you take the fact that it is the word of God as giving you justification for believing what it says. If that were legitimate, then the answer to the logical problem of evil would be far simpler than Gangadean has made it out to be. We could just say that the bible tells us that God exists, therefore, God exists and so there must be no logical problem of evil. If Gangadean is assuming the bible is a trustworthy source for metaphysics because it is the word of God, then his answer is really no better than this.

It's important to note that strictly speaking, any coherent (and merely possibly true) explanation for how God and evil are compatible, is going to suffice to undermine the logical problem of evil. So if the bible were to give us a coherent account of how evil and the existence of God are compatible, then that on my view would be enough to undermine the logical problem of evil. That doesn't require anybody to accept the bible as the word of God, or anything. The source is utterly irrelevant. What matters for giving a theodicy against the logical problem is just that it shows how the existence of God and evil are not logical contradictions like a circle-square. This is essentially what the free-will defense of Plantinga aims to do--he's not saying that significant free will must entail evil, he's just saying it's at least logically possible that this is so, and therefore there is no logical contradiction facing the Theist. But Gangadean rejects such approaches showing that they face problems. Of course, every theory faces problems, but remember Gangadean is after epistemic certainty and so a problem-less theodicy he himself must give. He can't just show how it's possible that God and evil coexist, but rather must give us the actual story. This is what gets him into trouble. So it's important to keep in mind that what I have to say doesn't necessarily generalize to other Theists that are attempting to answer the logical problem of evil, but who are not interested in showing that it's clear that God exists (which describes the vast majority of Theists).

So for Gangadean's project to work, what we need from him is some independent reason to accept 1) through 5) rather than presupposing that the this is what the bible says and more importantly that the bible is trustworthy as it concerns 1) through 5) in virtue of divine inspiration. But how is it that Gangadean manages to neglect giving any justification for these crucial theses in presenting his theodicy? I'm puzzled. I mentioned before that I worry that when Christians read or learn about Gangdean's theodicy, they might be inclined to miss this circular reasoning because they already accept the bible as containing divine truths. I suspect this is why his followers haven't thought to wonder about the scripture-independent justifications for 1) through 5). Maybe Gangadean has got them, but how strange for him to leave it out of a book that purports to show that God's existence is clear to reason.

Now maybe you're thinking that at least 1) is somewhat argued for independently. Gangadean thinks that there is something incompatible between God's perfect attributes and natural evil being inherent in creation. It seems intuitive enough, but I can't say we've got anything like clarity, here. He certainly hasn't done anything like provide a sound proof to this end. But what's lurking in the background is the idea that in comparison, natural evil being imposed by God for certain purposes, is compatible with God's perfect attributes. But I see no reason why we should think that natural evil which is inherent in creation is any more incompatible with God's divine perfection, than imposed natural evil. Or alternatively, I see no reason to think that imposed natural evil is any more compatible with God's attributes than natural evil that is inherent in creation.

Natural evil is natural evil. It's the countless instances of creature suffering that occur on a moment to moment basis. All the instances of physical pain, torment, and death in the world. It's just hard to see how whether or not such evil is imposed rather than inherent is in any way germane to the issue of its compatibility with God's attributes. I just don't see on what basis Gangadean makes such a substantive distinction. Much of it depends on precisely why he thinks that God's attributes are incompatible with inherent natural evil, but he says nothing about this in his book. Again I'm puzzled. Ganagdean might respond at this point that the difference lies in the fact that imposed natural evil is purposive--it brings about good which counterbalances the heinousness of all the evils. But neither will this do. Recall, that in my last post I pointed out that we also have no reason to think that natural evil is necessary (in the strongest sense) for the restraining, removal or recalling from moral evil. And insofar as it isn't necessary (i.e., God could achieve these ends some other way), the presence or imposition of natural evil seems to be in tension with God's perfect goodness and power. If God could achieve the good of restraining, removing, and recalling "the chosen ones" back from moral evil without imposing natural evil (or even less natural evil), then he must. But the world is overflowing with natural evil and so we've got the the problem of evil all over again. So Gangadean needs to show that its logically impossible (not merely nomologically so) for God to achieve his ends (of reforming, recalling from and removing moral evil) without imposing natural evil. That is, he needs to show that the only logically possible way for the regenerated humans to be called back from sin is for the world to have exactly the amount of natural evil that it does. How could anyone ever verify a thing like that? It's a tall order to be sure. So it seems to me that it simply doesn't matter that natural evil is imposed rather than inherent on his view. He's silent on all of this, but shouldn't be.

Another related worry is what we should say about the status of moral evil. Again we talked about this last time. Gangadean claims that natural evil is not inherent in creation. But what are we to say about moral evil? Is it inherent in the creation of persons? Well, it all depends on how we define 'inherent'. As we've discussed before, according Gangadean's worldview, God created the world in such a way that Adam and Eve, and the rest of humanity would inevitably sin. The Gangadeanians can play around with words in any number of ways so as to avoid this unpalatable consequence, but in the end, on their view (i.e., their commitment to determinism and the fall), it's in accordance with God's divine justice and mercy that some are saved and some perish and you're not gonna have any of that without having people sin. Indeed that's what Gangadeanians admit---that moral evil exists because it reveals God's divine justice. That is to say, they explain the presence of moral evil ultimately via God's very nature. When we connect the presence of moral evil to one of God's divine attributes, and we also accept that God's attributes are not contingent, then we've got an incredibly strong kind of necessity connected to the presence of moral evil. So for Gangadean, there are simply no possible worlds where God exists, in which moral evil does not exist also. I'm very tempted to say that this makes moral evil inherent, but I suspect Gangadean would just fudge around with the meaning of 'inherent' and at this point my intuitions about what counts as 'inherent' get fuzzy.

What's important is whether we should think that perfect, divine justice is compatible with the necessary presence of moral evil in the creation of humans. In particular when (on Gangadean's view) this moral evil or sin is by definition, that which is contrary to the very nature or essence of human creatures. Can God create beings that are destined to go contrary to their very essences? Not only that, but it should have been no surprise to an all-knowing God that creating the world in this way would necessitate the imposition of all the heinous suffering that is part and parcel of natural evil. And it gets worse. Recall that for Gangadean, moral evil leads to spiritual death that is unending for some persons. So on his worldview, you've got moral evil, the inherent consequences of it (i.e., spiritual death) and the imposition of natural evil all as a necessary consequence of creating the world. Is this all supposed to be compatible with the divine attributes of God? That's the question to ask.

Now in order to address it we've got to have a sufficient grasp of "divine justice" since Gangadean employs the notion in partially developing his theodicy. Just what does it mean for God to be perfectly just? Again, Gangadean can't appeal to the bible for any substantial help because this discussion should be taking place when the very existence of God is under question. We can all of course take suggestions from the bible, but they've got to stand on their own merits and their truth can't simply be presupposed because they come from the bible. I don't know how we go about settling the question about what 'perfect justice' consists in. It depends on a theory of 'justice' and again how we know when we've got the right theory of 'justice'. All of this is true at least if we're after absolute certainty like Gangadean purports to be. We can't just rest on intuitions or presumptive grasps of these important concepts. We need proof.

Once again I'm at a loss about what to say concerning the rest of the 5 claims enumerated above. I have no idea how one could know (with certainty) that for example, natural evil serves to remove, restrain and call people back from moral evil or even that punishment must be inherent or that spiritual death was inherent in moral evil. They seem to me like a posteriori claims not claims that can be known a priori. How does Gangadean know so much about very substantive metaphysical issues? At the very least he's got a lot of explaining to do. Oh and for good measure there's one more contentious and unproven claim that he makes. He writes, "After death there is no more natural evil and no more call back" (114). Again, how on earth does he know so much about the afterlife from reason alone? The only sense I can make of it is that again, he's slipped into presupposing the bible as special revelation even when he shouldn't have against the logical problem of evil.

Finally, Gangadean claims that the problem of evil dissolves, hence why he calls his "solution" the "ironic solution". Here it is.

i) Because of all the evil in the world, I cannot see how it can be said that God is all good and powerful.  

ii) Because of all the unbelief in the world, I cannot see how it can be said that God is all good and powerful.   

iii) Because of all the unbelief in me I cannot see how it can be said that God is all good and all powerful.  

iv) Because I have neglected and avoided the use of reason I cannot see what is clear about God. 

Of course, if we grant him his big 5 claims which precede this argument, then the argument may seem initially plausible. But we've noted how Gangadean is essentially presupposing that the bible is the word of God to argue that God exists in the face of the problem of evil (or else he must have sound deductive arguments for each which he neglected to include in his book). But as it stands, we've just got no reason to grant Gangadean the big 5. Further, we have to buy into Gangadean's claims about the clarity of God's existence, and that good and evil are to be thought of in terms of belief and unbelief of what is clear to reason. I've challenged these ideas often in this blog and in the earlier parts of this series. What I've argued is that Gangadean hasn't succeeded in showing these claims are true in accordance with his own standards for knowledge and rational belief. Since each subsequent premise is something like a substitution instance of key terms starting in the first premise, the legitimacy of each step is questionable if the terms Gangadean claims are essentially interchangeable or synonymous, are not proven to be. And that's what I did when I pointed out that Gangadean merely asserts that 'good' for a thing is according to its nature, and 'human nature' consists in using reason to the fullest. He needs to prove these very substantial and contentious claims rather than merely state them. So the argument is no good on this front either.

Apart from that what else should we say about it? It's not by coincidence that it employs the same questionable move that Anderson makes in his book in connection to inexcusability and "giving an excuse." The above argument is supposed to get you to see that accepting the first premise ultimately leads deductively to an absurd conclusion. It's kind of a reductio. But what is supposed to be absurd about the conclusion and what can we draw about the larger question if there is an absurdity? The idea seems to be that a person who complains about the problem of evil is not going to be able to say, coherently, and from her own perspective, "I have neglected to avoid the use of reason so I cannot see what is clear about God" since that person would have to believe that God exists in order to say such a thing, it seems incoherent. But as I said with Anderson's similar move, this incoherence is utterly irrelevant to the problem of evil. Gangadean has artificially given the problem of evil a particular gloss, involving statements presented from the vantage point of a through and through nonbeliever. But the problem of evil isn't about what a nonbeliever can or cannot coherently express from her own perspective. We don't want to make the problem of evil so subjective. If it's a logical problem, then the question is whether God's existence is compatible with the presence of evil not merely from some imagined non-believer's vantage point, but in terms of logical consistency. So here's how we should describe the logical problem of evil in an impersonal way.

i) If Theism is true, then God is all powerful and perfectly good.
ii) If i), then God is able to prevent all evil and desires that there is no evil in the world.
iii) If ii), then there should be no evil in the world.
iv) But there is evil in the world.
v) Hence, Theism is false. 

Why did Gangadean change the description of the problem of evil to such a restricted gloss? I'm not sure, but it certainly serves his purposes. In fact, at the start of his discussion (pg. 108) he articulated the problem in essentially the same way I have just done, because it's the standard approach. At any rate, the important point is that even if there is some absurdity with the conclusion of his second self-serving articulation, it simply doesn't apply to the standard description of the problem of evil which I have presented above. That means his "ironic solution" at best solves only his gloss of the problem of evil, and does nothing to answer the standard one. In other words, even if we grant Gangadean the absurdity in the conclusion of his second articulation, it doesn't give the Theist anything like a general solution to the problem of evil.

Now, I'll close with noting what I think is the most important problem with Gangadean's discussion. It is it blatantly question-begging. To be honest, I'm embarrassed at myself for not having caught this before. In his discussion, Gangadean says that his theodicy presupposes a number of things, one of them being the clarity of God's existence. Here it is in his own words.

The solution to the problem of evil has certain assumptions...that there is a clear general revelation that only some is eternal, that God the creator exists. It assumes clarity and inexcusability (113). 

If the logical problem of evil is supposed to call the existence of God into question (on pain of inconsistency between divine attributes and the presence of evil), then how can a "solution" to the problem presuppose the clarity of God's existence? Whether it is clear that God the creator exists, is the very thing that is being called into question by the problem of evil (because if there's something logically incoherent about God's existence, then it's clear that God does not exist). But if it's clear or, epistemically certain, that God exists, then there is no problem of evil to begin with. Remember a proposition like, 'God exists', is "clear" according to Gangadean just in case the opposite of 'God exists' is not even possible. So Gangadean actually begs the question in giving his theodicy. As I said, I'm surprised that I haven't caught this before. The theodicy was seriously doomed from the start.

This concludes my discussion of Gangadean's "real solution" to the problem of evil, at least for now. It's badly circular and in more than one way. It turns out that it's no solution at all and a serious problem for Gangadean and his followers.

Is the logical problem of evil a real problem for Theists outside of the Gangdeanian camp? I don't think so. As I've noted before theistic and non-theistic philosophers working on this area tend not to take it seriously and opt to discuss the weaker (yet still serious issue) called the evidential problem of evil. But Gangadean has painted himself in a corner. He demands clarity or epistemic certainty that God exists which requires proof that evil is not incompatible with God. And he's faulted other theodicies for failing to do so which is how he's carved himself a place at the table to introduce his "real" solution. But his theodicy is question-begging. This means he can't appeal to other theodicies nor can he appeal to his own. The logical problem of evil then remains a serious problem for Gangadean.