Starting on pg 112 of Philosophical Foundation, Gangadean says his definition of 'good' and 'evil' as it relates to the problem of evil can be illustrated in the parable of the prodigal son. I won't include it here and assume my readers are familiar with it, or at least are able to find it easily (see Luke 15:11). Now it's very important to note what it is he is up to and what he isn't doing. What does it mean to "illustrate a definition" and its relation to the problem of evil? Well, at most what Gangadean is doing is assuming his framing of the problem of evil and his definitions, and seeing how it accords with the parable. Importantly, this isn't anything like giving a proof of concept. And remember he hasn't actually defended his definitions or his framing of the problem of evil. Earlier he claimed that his definition of 'good' was known a priori, but curiously failed to give any rational justification for that claim. And I raised issues at this very juncture last time. So the parable is an illustration of the definitions and his way of thinking about the problem of evil, but not anything like proof or independent support that Gangadean's analysis is correct.
Now my fear at this point is, at least for Christians, who already have a commitment to the bible as divinely inspired (and thus consisting of only truths) that they will not be careful in properly restricting the extent of Gangadean's move here. If you already think the parable of the prodigal son is special revelation, or God's word, then you may be inclined to think that any theory of 'good' and 'evil' and way of framing the problem of evil that accords well with parts of scripture, like the parable of the prodigal son, is going to be correct. But that's no good for Gangadean's worldview. Remember, he thinks the problem of evil is a problem against the very coherence of Theism. Thus, to presuppose the bible is divinely inspired in the current context is question-begging, because to presuppose that there is a divinely inspired text is to presuppose that God exists in the first place. You can't respond to the problem of evil, by helping yourself to any claim that assumes that God exists.
So the illustration given by the prodigal son parable shouldn't be taken as anything like proof of concept for his way of thinking of the problem of evil nor his definitions of 'good' and 'evil'. Nothing we draw from the parable can be taken as a premise in giving an answer to the problem of evil (i.e., a theodicy). All you we should do is conclude is that there's a passage in this book, which purports to be the word of God, which on a particular reading, accords with Gangadean's theory. But Gangadean isn't very careful here. It seems to me that he actually does exactly what I suggested he shouldn't (in terms of rationality) do. He follows his quote of the parable with the following.
How does this illustrate the problem of evil? Why is there evil? The younger son was in a state of unbelief with regard to his father's teaching. Day and night, for all his life, his father, by word and deed, lived out the way of life before his sons. Yet the younger son did not see or hear or understand what was clearly laid out before him...His unbelief was inexcusable and therefore evil. Evil as unbelief serves to obscure the clear revelation to the person in unbelief. The condition of unbelief is allowed to work itself out in the prodigal's life. As a result, the revelation of justice (his way came to naught in the pig-sty) and of love (his father forgives and receives him back) are deepened. If he had second thoughts about possible dangers and hardships of his way the first night away from home he could have reconsidered and returned with his fortune intact. He could have returned all to his father, simply acknowledging gratefulness to know that he had the freedom to leave if he wanted. In that case there would be no deepened revelation of justice and mercy. Evil as unbelief serves therefore to deepen the revelation of justice and mercy (112).For the time being, let's ignore that Gangadean is taking for granted his own interpretation of scripture as if it's the only proper one. But that's a weighty assumption and something he needs to independently support (at least insofar as he's after certainty/clarity). Now Gangadean presents the problem of evil as a question about why there is evil and seems to think that the parable (i.e., the bible) has got the answer. Recall, Gangadean is intent on answering the logical problem of evil and faults other theodicies (and thus carves a place for himself at the table) for failing to answer it. The logical problem of evil is a demand for an account of how God's perfect goodness and omnipotence can be logically compatible with the presence of evil in the world. Gangadean's strategy at this point is to try and give an account of a rationally justifiable reason that God would permit evil despite his great power and perfect goodness. In this regard, it's similar to theodicies which he has just criticized. The soul-making theodicy (that God permits evils to build in us virtues) and the free-will defense (God permits evil so that we can be free to perform morally significant actions) both try to give different reasons why God might permit evil. On Ganagdean's theory, in very general terms, God permits moral evil to deepen revelation about himself (his justice and mercy) to his human creatures. Importantly moral evil for Gangadean is fundamentally intellectual--not using reason to the fullest and thus not knowing basic things (i.e., unbelief). But we also have to keep in the background of our minds Gangadean's commitment to clarity. He thinks you must have certainty in order to know basic things. And so while other theodicies aimed at addressing the logical problem of evil merely try to show a possible answer to "why does God permit evil?" it's far from clear that this would be sufficient for Gangadean. At least insofar as Gangadean claims to know that God exists, he's got to know with certainty that his theodicy is correct. A tall order which he fails to achieve.
Importantly, all of the mentioned theodicies face of two significant and interrelated questions which we might use as a way of testing the strength of the theodicies. First, the legitimacy of the theodicies will depend on whether the reason that God permits evils is sufficient to justify him doing so. This gets to the question of whether it's worth it. Is it worth all the evil and suffering, that humans build virtues (i.e., the soul-making theodicy)? Is it worth all the suffering and depravity in the world, that some people get to exercise significant freedoms (i.e,. the free-will theodicy)? Secondly, is the necessity condition or as I'll call it, the "is it necessary?" question. Whether these theodicies are any good will depend on whether it's necessary (and in what sense) for God to permit evil and suffering to achieve whatever end is suggested by the theodicies as being worth all the evil. Is all the suffering and evil necessary for the exercise of free will? Is it necessary for building in us virtues? Or could God have achieved it some other way?
Gangadean seems somewhat aware of these two conditions. He addresses the "is it worth it?" question with respect to his own theodicy. Is revelation of God ultimately worth it when you consider all of the evil and suffering in the world? And he faults the free-will theodicies on failing to sufficiently address the "is it necessary?" question. For instance, he suggests that actual evil is not necessary for humans to exercise their free-will and thus it's possible that humans with freedom only do what is good. He further considers whether moral evil is necessary for revelation of God? Could God have achieved it some other way?
And in fact, Gangadean's theodicy fails on both of these fronts. I've already spoken some about these in my early posts concerning the problem of evil, but I'll try to further develop those ideas.
IS IT WORTH IT?
The "is it worth it?" question is a tricky one in a way that Gangadean doesn't seem to appreciate. The worth of some state of affairs seems to depend on values and also the relative subjects to whom the states are worth it. If I ask you whether an expensive meal was worth it, you will (roughly) consider what amount of good the meal brought to you (maybe pleasure + nutritional benefits) and consider the amount of bad that was brought about by the hit your wallet or purse. We're assuming here then that you've got some notion of good or bad in mind in virtue of which you calculate the worth of something else. Roughly, if enough good results from some state of affairs Y and there isn't an overriding amount of bad that results, then we might say that Y is worth it.
Secondly, we standardly ask whether something is worth it relative to a subject i.e., the person or being that is incurring at least some cost and at least some of the benefit. Just as I can ask whether it was worth it to you, that you paid a lot of money for a meal you enjoyed, I can ask whether it was worth it to me that you paid a lot for that meal which you enjoyed. In many cases the question won't make sense depending on the subject of interest. As my example shows, insofar as I didn't incur any costs or any benefits, it's strange to ask of me whether it was worth it that you paid a lot of money for a meal you alone enjoyed. And I'm not sure if there's a question that isn't relative to any subject whatsoever like "is it worth is simpliciter?" We've got to get clearer on all of this if we are going to make much headway in answering the question about whether all of the suffering and evil in the world is worth the revelation of God. The trouble is, the revelation of God's justice and mercy is relative to some subjects while the cost of such revelation is shared by all of creation. Both moral and natural evil are ubiquitous and according to Gangadean while moral evil is "permitted" to give some people a deeper revelation of God, it also leads to God instituting natural evil (suffering) as a "call-back" to repentance from sin. As a result, all people sin and every creature under the sun suffers and dies, but only a select few reap the benefits, if you will. Only Christians will enjoy the revelation. To add insult to injury, the evil that nonbelievers experience isn't limited to this plane. According to Gangadean, they will continue in spiritual death/moral evil, in ever increasing degrees, forevermore.
So when we ask whether "deepening revelation" is worth all of the evil in the world we've got to get clearer on who the relevant subject is. Worth it to whom? Is it worth it to Christians who by God's grace make it out, that all of creation is steeped in evils? I don't know how to begin addressing that question. That involves at least addressing the first question about values. How do we weigh the evils against the goods? By what system or calculus? I haven't a clue, but Gangadean had better have an impeccable answer here. The very peculiar part about Gangadean's theodicy, is that he merely glosses over these complications. He admits that his theodicy assumes that the revelation is worth it, but he doesn't address the "worth it to whom?" question. Instead he seems to presuppose that the only subjects we should be interested in when we address the "is it worth it?" question are Christians who reap the benefits of the revelation at the cost of grave evil experienced by all. This is not only entirely arbitrary, but also very hard to swallow. In a sense, the unbelievers who will suffer not only in this life but forevermore are casualties of God revealing himself. Combine this view with Gangadean's strong commitment to calvinism/predestination, and you've got a devil of a doctrine.
Why does God permit moral evil? Answer: well, because he desires to make himself known but only to some of the people he created i.e., his people which he determined before the creation of the world. But what about unbelievers? Weren't they chosen to fail to believe from the beginning? What of their suffering on earth and of the moral evil to come forevermore? Answer: well, it's worth it to the believers that they themselves experience limited suffering and evil and further that non-believers experience suffering in this life and evil forevermore. I find it incredible that anybody should be able to stomach this kind of teaching. I don't think Gangadeanians are sociopaths and so I think there are some biases which are keeping them from seeing such views clearly. For instance, in my encounters with Gangadeanians, I got the sense that they viewed me as an enemy and that I sort of have whatever evil results from my "unbelief" (as they would call it) is something I deserve. They speak of people like me and people that the consider "unbelievers" as "filling up their cup of wrath". And I think they fail to draw out the implications of their views about predestination, soft determinism, and the problem of evil. And I suspect that if more of them saw things a bit more clearly, they would find such teachings appalling. The trouble is, Gangadean has a way of using his "a priori definitions" to confuse his people out of appreciating such problems.
On his view, God creates humans and determines that people will sin and sin a lot. That the world would be filled with moral evil--indeed God determines this so that it can be no other way. The result is that people sin and reap the benefits of such sin; the world is steeped in unbelief, and evil. Sure natural evil serves as a call to repentance, but one must be regenerated in order to heed the call and it's only those that God chooses to grant with grace that do so. For only these people does natural evil serves as a "call-back" from moral evil. In turn, they get to enjoy the great revelation of God's justice and mercy. Not because they did anything deserving. No, God chose them. He chose to have mercy on a (relatively) select group. As for the rest, they will live in just the ways that God has determined them to live. If only they would seek or want to know God, they could. But God has determined that they never seek nor want to know God, so in effect, they never will in fact, unless there is contingency in God's will, it's impossible for them to do so. In a sense, they no more deserve their sad state than the regenerated deserve the grace bestowed upon them. These nonbelievers suffer (along with all of creation) and will live in spiritual death forevermore so that only the believers enjoy the benefits of a deepened revelation. It's hard to see how this is anything of a solution to the problem of evil. How is this exemplary of a perfectly-good, (and I would add, perfectly just and merciful) God? I just don't see it. I can't make sense of how this is the "greatest conceivable being." It seems to me that in presenting his "answer" to the problem of evil, Gangadean has inadvertently presented himself with another iteration of the problem.
Interestingly, Gangadean merely provides us with anecdotes from the bible (Job and Paul), to say that suffering is worth the revelation. But the important point is that he can't appeal to these as authoritative accounts because again that would be to presuppose that the bible is divine revelation and thus to presuppose God exists in a context where that is the very thing in question. Furthermore, I think these examples encourage one to ignore the point I am bringing up about evil and suffering in the lives of the nonbelievers. The way that Gangadean presents it, the question is something like, "is the suffering and evil in Job's life, worth the revelation that Job gets?" What I'm suggesting is that this is far too narrow. We ought to include the following unless Ganagdean can give us some principled reason to exclude it. Is the revelation that Job and other Christians get or will have received, worth all the suffering that not only they have and will experience, but also all of the suffering that nonbelievers experience and the everlasting and ever-increasing evil that they will experience? Would Gangadean give another "a presumptive unqualified 'yes' " to this? More importantly, can he give an actual reason that we should agree with him or even what he thinks Paul or Job would say?
IS IT NECESSARY?
As I said, there's the "is it worth it?" question as well as the "is it necessary?" question in evaluating theodicies. So is it necessary for God (according to Gangadean) that there be so much evil in the world in order to deepen his revelation to the believers? After all, if God could achieve his ends another way, a way that involves less moral evil or even natural evil, then he would have. Gangadean confidently answers in the affirmative. But he's got no business doing so. He claims, but fails to argue for the idea that moral evil must be removed gradually rather than abruptly (113). And he claims that unbelief (moral evil) must be permitted to come about in every combination. He further asserts, "Some things cannot be known except by experience-- such as hunger or pain, both physical and spiritual. A book version of human history, or a movie version, cannot supply this experience and is incomprehensible without it" (ibid). I've italicized each of the modals because they are very important.
I can't begin to tell you why Gangadean feels qualified and in a good enough epistemic position to claim these without some serious hedging. They are merely speculative, but you get no indication of that from his book. How does one know that moral evil must be removed gradually rather than abruptly in order for the revelation to be deepened. Note 'must' is a modal akin to 'necessarily' just as 'can/cannot' is akin to 'possible/impossible'. The question then is whether it's logically or metaphysically impossible for God to deepen the revelation while removing it abruptly? And he must be saying that it is logically/metaphysically impossible, but how does he know so much about evil and its removal as well as its relation to the revelation of God? And how could he possibly know that physical and spiritual pain can't (i.e., that it's impossible) be known sans first-hand experience (the sharp reader will wonder if this commits Gangadean to the claim that there are some things God can't know)? Remember, we're talking within the context of trying to answer the problem of evil and so he can't appeal to scripture as any authority in supporting these claims on pain of begging the question. So it's utterly a mystery how he could know with anything resembling certainty that these very strong modal claims of his are true. He certainly owes us an explanation.
Now for the most part I've been conflating moral and natural evil because when it comes to calculating the worth of revelation in relation to the cost of moral evil, we really should include the costs of natural evil as well. This is because without moral evil, there would be no natural evil according to Gangadean. So God creates the world in a way such that people will only know about his justice and mercy if there is much moral evil in the world and this leads him to institute natural evil. He must have known this "ahead of time" of course. So it's natural to conflate them in calculating for the worth of God's revelation. But prying them apart we can also ask about the necessity of natural evil in relation to calling people back to repentance from moral evil. This is something I don't see Gangadean addressing. But it's weird that he doesn't. If it's possible for God to achieve repentance from the subset of humans that he regenerates, without making animals suffer or without the prevalence of the millions of diseases that afflict us, or without small children literally starving to death, then arguably he must as a result of his perfect-benevolence. Now recall, from last time that there are different kinds of necessity just as there are different kinds of possibility. Importantly, when we ask whether natural evil is necessary to make humans repent, we should care about logical or broadly metaphysical necessity rather than merely nomological or causal necessity. This is because God is not bound by the laws of nature or any causal regularities. He's only limited with respect to making logical or metaphysical truths false (he can't make it so that 1+1=3). And it's far from clear that it is logically or metaphysically necessary that God must use natural evil to call those he has regenerated from their sin. Gangadean had better give an argument to the contrary, or else his theodicy fails in just the ways he claims that other theodicies fail i.e., there's no obvious metaphysically necessary connection between natural evil (and to the extent we have it in this world) and people repenting from moral evil.
So I contend that Gangdean's theodicy fails on two fronts. It fails in ways that he thinks other theodicies fail. Gangadean's God is anything but perfectly-good and all-powerful insofar as he must or chooses to deepen his revelation to some of his creation at the cost of determining that the rest of his creation will suffer both in this life and forevermore. Presented in these terms, it's far from clear that evil is worth the revelation. It's certainly not worth if we consider the well-being or good of those that are perishing. That's really uncomfortable to say the least. Secondly, it simply isn't clear that moral evil is necessary for the revelation, nor is natural evil necessary for repentance.
I'll close with one more related thought concerning the "is it worth it?" question. Gangadeanians say that humans have intrinsic dignity in virtue of their rationality. This is what makes murder (even murder of the unborn) wrong and I take it is also partially why they think utilitarianism gets it wrong. But it turns out that on their view, God treats such persons (the unregenerate) as mere means to achieve his ends (his revelation). Moreover, it's weird to think that such persons are being dealt with by God as essentially rational beings. He has darkened their minds so that apart from his act of regeneration, they can't see what is clear. How does this amount to treating them as rational beings? Or as beings with inherent dignity? The unbelievers will live, suffer both physically and spiritually, and die before being raised again for everlasting spiritual death. What makes it worth it? Well, that others will enjoy God's revelation. That sounds a lot like utility maximization gone wrong. The big moral here is that as Gangadean sees things, God calls us to act towards humans in ways that He himself is not willing.
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