1) I am a conscious/rational being (i.e., I have the capacity to use reason to come to know).
2) If 1) and I am eternal, then I am all-knowing.
3) It is not the case that I am all-knowing.
4) Therefore, either not 1) or I am not eternal.
5) Therefore, I am not eternal.
Essentially the ideas seems to be that if a conscious being were eternal, then they would have gained all knowledge by now (since it's existed for all eternity). But since it is just obvious to us that we don't have all knowledge, it must be the case that we are not eternal.
The main problem is that it supposes omniscience is going to be sufficiently connected to eternality (at least for a conscious/rational being). But it isn't clear why we should accept this. Now in conversation, Gangadean and Anderson will say something like, "well if you had existed as a conscious/rational being for all eternity, then you would already have come to know everything."
But this just won't do. Presumably there are not a finite number of propositions (or true propositions) otherwise, one day, according to the Christian picture and Gangadean's theology, we could come to exhaust all knowledge which would hardly be eternal life as a rational being (we will have eventually finish our most basic pursuit to know God). But since this can't be right, there must be an infinite number of propositions. However, if there are an infinite number of propositions to be known, it means there are an inexhaustible number of propositions to be known. An infinite number of propositions cannot (by definition) be exhausted---and so regardless of how much time you have to learn, you cannot get it all. Even if you existed for all eternity, you could not "come to know" an infinite number of propositions. So premise 2) which is a conditional statement purportedy connecting eternal existence for a conscious/rational being with omniscience is false. But then the whole argument falls apart.
But this just won't do. Presumably there are not a finite number of propositions (or true propositions) otherwise, one day, according to the Christian picture and Gangadean's theology, we could come to exhaust all knowledge which would hardly be eternal life as a rational being (we will have eventually finish our most basic pursuit to know God). But since this can't be right, there must be an infinite number of propositions. However, if there are an infinite number of propositions to be known, it means there are an inexhaustible number of propositions to be known. An infinite number of propositions cannot (by definition) be exhausted---and so regardless of how much time you have to learn, you cannot get it all. Even if you existed for all eternity, you could not "come to know" an infinite number of propositions. So premise 2) which is a conditional statement purportedy connecting eternal existence for a conscious/rational being with omniscience is false. But then the whole argument falls apart.
I think you are forgetting that once the spirit is saved (through Christ), it is everlasting (beginning and no end). That is how we gain knowledge of the infinite, omniscient God. The spirit either grows in knowledge or delves deeper into death. As for God being omniscient and rational/conscience at the same time and same respect. God is eternal, meaning he is outside of time. He can never "come to know", he is.
ReplyDeleteHi Mariah,
ReplyDeleteI think you may be missing the point of my argument. I am simply trying to show that one cannot in princiople come to know all things (i.e., become omnisicient) provided that there are an infinite number of propositions to be known. It seems you grant this point, and if so, then my contention that we cannot rule out the self as eternal (as a metaphysical possibility) on this basis alone, goes through.
Secondly, you started your comment with a few claims:
1) That once we are saved, we have life everlasting.
2) And in virtue of 1), we [can] gain knowledge of the infinite, omniscient God.
3) The spirit either grows in knowledge or delves deeper into death.
I'll grant you 1) since I am a believer (although I won't pretend to be able to prove it). But can you prove to me that 2) and 3) are true? Thanks for the comment!
Hello J,
ReplyDeleteI agree Gangadean's argument is bad, but I do have a question, and then two comments.
Here's my question. If a soul were eternal, and therefore have passed thru an infinite amount of time, would it not be able to know and infinite number of propositions, assuming it can access these propositions?
My two comments are two more problems with the argument.
The first problem is that I can only know propositions that I can get in my head. Even if I existed from eternity, I just might not have access to the information I need to know everything.
The second problem is that maybe I can lose some of my knowledge. Maybe my soul cycles thru learning everything, losing everything, and then learning it all again.
Thoughts?
Hi Mysterio,
DeleteIt certainly depends on what you mean by "getting in my head" as it concerns propositions. For one thing, you are suggesting that a belief must be occurrent (as opposed to dispositional) to count as a bit of knowledge. Of course, we might want to define 'occurrent' in the relevant sense as well. For example, a moment ago I was not actively entertaining the proposition that 1+1=2. Does that mean my belief in that proposition isn't occurrent in the relevant sense? Or is there a sense in which it is stored in my memory so that despite not being currently "entertained" or "focused upon" it is still occurrent in some sense? Suppose we go with the former, that a belief is occurrent only if it is actively being entertained. Further that knowledge of a proposition entails that the proposition is actively being entertained. Then this would be that whenever you're not actively entertaining a proposition, you don't know it. If so, knowledge comes and goes quite frequently throughout time. I find that to be trouble for such a theory. At any rate, there are lots of interesting questions here. I think that some of this could be used as criticisms of Gangadean's theory of knowledge, for sure mainly because he doesn't have a particularly well thought out theory to begin with.
I certainly agree that one can lose knowledge by way of forgetting. There are a large set of facts which I once knew, but have now long forgotten. Of course, this might get into that tricky territory about occurrent vs. dispositional beliefs again--i.e., just what might count as losing or forgetting in the relevant sense? Some of these propositions might be "stored" in my memory, and accessible if triggered by stimuli--do I believe this things? Dispositionally? Occurrently?
At any rate, I think there is a problem here for the Gangadeanian argument above. If we table the tricky stuff for a moment, as you note, an eternal being might very well forget. So Gangadean owes us an argument about why an eternal mind could not possibly forget---that is to say, he needs to argue that by definition, an enteral mind is one that cannot ever forget (or even fail to believe) a single truth.