I know that I exist. I think you know you exist, too. I know that I just typed a series of words. I know that the sentence, "A horse is not a horse" if taken literally, expresses a contradiction. As alluded to in my previous post, Gangadean also takes himself to know these things (even though he has a much more stringent conception of what counts as knowing). The question is, how do we know them?
Again as I mentioned in my last post, Gangadean must navigate a fine line between accepting things on intuitions, and not. The tension arises because he thinks one can't know that God exists on the basis of intuition. Just like one can't know that the external world exists on the basis of intuition. You need deductively sound arguments which have as their conclusion those propositions, in order to know them. There are plenty of other things that, for Gangadean, fall into the category of things you can't know immediately, but a curious number of things that don't.
The issue is, what is the basis of the distinction? Why does he think that you can know (for instance) that you exist in an immediate and non-inferential way, but you can't know that God exists in this way? The necessary vs. contingent truth distinction is of no help, here. That is, just in case you were tempted to think that we can know things on the basis of intuition just in case, it couldn't have been otherwise. That won't help for at least two reasons. 1) Water = H20 is a necessary truth, but I can't know it immediately--in fact, nobody knew that claim until it was discovered. 2) That I exist, is a contingent truth (I may not have existed). Perhaps by a stretch you can insist that it's necessary in a hypothetical way---insofar as I exist, I must necessarily exist. But that goes for anything---insofar as a unicorn exists, it exists necessarily. That would make any claim necessarily true (albeit in this hypothetical way). That can't be right. Another way you might try to go is to suggest that insofar as I question my existence, I exist (Descartes). But that assumes that you know that you are questioning, which presupposes you exist and so it's question begging (I think Russell pointed this out).
So I wonder why Gangadean thinks that you can know with certainty that you exist by way of intuition, but not know other things by way of intuition. So here are two questions that you might raise for the Gangadeanian: 1) What is the basis of the distinction between things you can know (with certainty) via intuition and those that you cannot? 2) What legitimizes whatever theory you have about the basis of the distinction.
Thursday, May 7, 2015
Clearing the air
The most common Gangadeanian philosophical move is to paint you in a corner as a reason-denier. It's sort of like a reductio argument, though not quite. Assume something you believe or deny and "show" that it leads to an inconsistency. If you don't give up the assumed premise in light of the inconsistency that has purportedly been "shown", then you are lacking in integrity and there is no more room for discussion. No doubt some of you have or at least know people that have been labeled in this way which usually means other people at the congregation no longer talk to you until you agree to reject the purported inconsistency.
The reason I don't think it's a reductio and the reason 'shown' has been placed in shudder quotes, is that his method of "showing" you as a reason-denier is questionable and rests on what I think are actually intuitions or commonsense judgments. Unfortunately, I've had little success in having Gangadean and his kin acknowledge just how much they use intuition and commonsense of this sort in their theories. Although once, Gangadean sort of admitted something of this sort---when we discussed things like how do I know (with certainty) that a statement actually violates the law of non-contradiction? Or how do I know (with certainty) that I exist (which he granted was a contingent a priori claim)? He admitted that these were non-inferential bits of knowledge; in a word, intuitive. But he said they were based on "rational intuitions." When I followed his claim up with a question about how one determines a rational intuition (and thus appropriate) vs. a non-rational intuition, he argued in a tight circle. His basis for distinguishing the two ultimately rested on just an another intuition which he took to be rational, but this is to presuppose a way of distinguishing between the two which is what he was trying to show, hence the circle. Anyway, what I want to focus on in this post is to explain why I am not a reason-denier, and how Gangadean and I have some, albeit thin patch of common ground. This will also help in explaining the dialetical context of all of my other posts as well as allude to some of the ways we differ.
Gangadean claims that some things are clear. In fact, he takes himself to have absolute certainty regarding some propositions. For instance, that the laws of thought are required for meaning. He thinks that one cannot consistently deny the distinction between being and non-being (or any instance of a and non-a). At this level of generality, there's nothing too strange about such claims. I don't have the feeling of certainty that Gangadean and his kin do about these matters (for all I know it's just a psychological/subjective state of certainty)---I've tried, but I just don't have it. But I accept that if a theory or position leads to a denial of basic distinctions or denies the Aristotelian laws of thought, then it's a serious cost to that theory. If you come to me with a belief that entails the denial of the law of identity (or an instance thereof), then I'm going to seriously question your view or else start to wonder if I heard you correctly. Also if your theory tells me that a horse is actually a non-horse (where you're not playing fast as loose with the terms) then I'm going to give you an incredulous stare.
By the same token, if some genie in a bottle came up to me and said, "look, if you're wrong about the law of non contradiction, then everyone you love and care about will die a grueling death and be sent to an eternity of suffering, but if you're right I'll give you a $100" I wouldn't take the bet even though I'm quite sure about the law, and would like $100 rather than not. I'm sure about the law of noncontradiction, but not that sure. I wouldn't risk endless suffering for everyone I care about no matter how minute the risk is by my lights. Gangadean's notion of epistemic certainty seems to require that you be sure enough to take such a bet and I just can't get myself of that disposition. But this fact doesn't take away from what I said earlier about how I would respond to theories or views that entailed the denial of what I take to be basic truths.
So I don't think I'm a reason-denier. I just don't feel as sure as they do about things. I don't think we can have the kind of certainty that Gangadean claims to have, but I believe some of the same things he does (regarding the laws of thought, basic distinctions and the like) even if not to the same extent (It is interesting to note that even if the sort of certainty that Gangadean is after, were possible, I don't know what benefit there would be in having it. What's the upshot supposed to be? Maybe I'll explore this in a future post.) Of course, we disagree about a lot, too.
Still, there's a sense in which I agree with Gangadean, that some things are clear (true, I'm hesitant about his definition of 'clear', but let's just suspend that for now). We both at least believe that some things are clear, even if we feel different levels of confidence about the claim. Now even given this "common ground", we might still fuss over exactly what method one uses to determine what is clear to reason and also relatedly, what things count as clear and which, don't. Of course, the devil is in the details.
Gangadean for instance, thinks it's clear to reason that the God of theism exists and that man has sinned and needs a savior. I don't. He thinks it's clear to reason that the bible is the word of God, but as I've suggested in a previous post, I don't. He thinks it's clear that the mind is not brain, and I don't. He thinks that it's clear that we don't have libertarian free-will and I'm not so sure. This doesn't make me a reason-denier. Nor does it make him a reason-upholder. At least that isn't the default conclusion to draw if you're trying to look at it objectively. We have to look at the arguments and assess them in terms of their rational merits. [Edit on 6/29/30: I still maintain one can rationally believe each of these things despite them not being as clear (i.e., deductively proven) as Gangadean takes them to be].
So I want to be clear. My posts in this blog assume (for the sake of discussion)** at least some basic distinctions---I take certain things as obvious or clear or whatever. I don't call everything into question. I assume that any theory is seriously problematic if it calls into question the law of identity/contradiction/excluded middle. I use valid rules of inference to argue. I present arguments, point out what I think are illegitimate moves, presuppositions, or premises that Gangadean takes for granted.
Still, in assuming these very things, it is my view that Gangadean's more substantive claims (e.g., God's existence, theory of knowledge, the bible as special revelation, the nature of good and evil for man, the existence of the external world, etc) don't follow logically from accepting just the basic distinctions and the laws of thought. What is more, he thinks he is as certain about these matters as he is about very basic truths. But I contend that there are questionable premises and or bad inferences along the way. Some disagreement between us about what counts as basic and or clear of course will crop up now and again (in part, because he has some sort of infallible method in mind about determining what things count as clear and basic). Thus sometimes we won't agree on which things are counted as clear or basic. But what my blog is intended to show is that in effect, Gangadean's more substantive claims don't pass his own test of critical examination.
**
[Note there is a lot more to be said about the topic of assuming basic things/distinctions. For instance, I suspect that Gangadeanians often front-load the term 'assume' in this context to draw all sorts of conclusions. e.g., when they point out that in questioning the law of identity one assumes the law of identity, it isn't obvious what 'assumes' means, here. Is it assumes psychologically--as in I have to think in terms of the law of identity to question it? Dialectically--as in, I have to argue in terms of it in for the sake of discussion? or something like logically? And what does 'logically' mean here? So they really ought to get clearer on what they mean by 'assume' whenever they pull this move. Notice that if it's just psychological or dialetical facts they're talking about, then the normative conclusion they want to draw doesn't seem to follow. Suppose I assume basic distinctions in my questioning of anything---where this means that I am psychologically in a state of assuming basic distinctions in order to question anything. This is just a fact about human psychology. Or suppose we read assume in terms of what must dialetically be presupposed in discussion---this just tells us facts about discourse. But what Gangadean is really after is that reason is ontological. He wants to move from, 'a is a' is assumed in all questioning and so makes questioning possible, to 'a is a' is true out there in the world. So psychological and dialetical accounts seem insufficient for what he is after. Moreover, they are empirical claims---like how do you know that whenever I assert or think about something, I must be in a certain psychological state? Do you have access to my mind?]
The reason I don't think it's a reductio and the reason 'shown' has been placed in shudder quotes, is that his method of "showing" you as a reason-denier is questionable and rests on what I think are actually intuitions or commonsense judgments. Unfortunately, I've had little success in having Gangadean and his kin acknowledge just how much they use intuition and commonsense of this sort in their theories. Although once, Gangadean sort of admitted something of this sort---when we discussed things like how do I know (with certainty) that a statement actually violates the law of non-contradiction? Or how do I know (with certainty) that I exist (which he granted was a contingent a priori claim)? He admitted that these were non-inferential bits of knowledge; in a word, intuitive. But he said they were based on "rational intuitions." When I followed his claim up with a question about how one determines a rational intuition (and thus appropriate) vs. a non-rational intuition, he argued in a tight circle. His basis for distinguishing the two ultimately rested on just an another intuition which he took to be rational, but this is to presuppose a way of distinguishing between the two which is what he was trying to show, hence the circle. Anyway, what I want to focus on in this post is to explain why I am not a reason-denier, and how Gangadean and I have some, albeit thin patch of common ground. This will also help in explaining the dialetical context of all of my other posts as well as allude to some of the ways we differ.
Gangadean claims that some things are clear. In fact, he takes himself to have absolute certainty regarding some propositions. For instance, that the laws of thought are required for meaning. He thinks that one cannot consistently deny the distinction between being and non-being (or any instance of a and non-a). At this level of generality, there's nothing too strange about such claims. I don't have the feeling of certainty that Gangadean and his kin do about these matters (for all I know it's just a psychological/subjective state of certainty)---I've tried, but I just don't have it. But I accept that if a theory or position leads to a denial of basic distinctions or denies the Aristotelian laws of thought, then it's a serious cost to that theory. If you come to me with a belief that entails the denial of the law of identity (or an instance thereof), then I'm going to seriously question your view or else start to wonder if I heard you correctly. Also if your theory tells me that a horse is actually a non-horse (where you're not playing fast as loose with the terms) then I'm going to give you an incredulous stare.
By the same token, if some genie in a bottle came up to me and said, "look, if you're wrong about the law of non contradiction, then everyone you love and care about will die a grueling death and be sent to an eternity of suffering, but if you're right I'll give you a $100" I wouldn't take the bet even though I'm quite sure about the law, and would like $100 rather than not. I'm sure about the law of noncontradiction, but not that sure. I wouldn't risk endless suffering for everyone I care about no matter how minute the risk is by my lights. Gangadean's notion of epistemic certainty seems to require that you be sure enough to take such a bet and I just can't get myself of that disposition. But this fact doesn't take away from what I said earlier about how I would respond to theories or views that entailed the denial of what I take to be basic truths.
So I don't think I'm a reason-denier. I just don't feel as sure as they do about things. I don't think we can have the kind of certainty that Gangadean claims to have, but I believe some of the same things he does (regarding the laws of thought, basic distinctions and the like) even if not to the same extent (It is interesting to note that even if the sort of certainty that Gangadean is after, were possible, I don't know what benefit there would be in having it. What's the upshot supposed to be? Maybe I'll explore this in a future post.) Of course, we disagree about a lot, too.
Still, there's a sense in which I agree with Gangadean, that some things are clear (true, I'm hesitant about his definition of 'clear', but let's just suspend that for now). We both at least believe that some things are clear, even if we feel different levels of confidence about the claim. Now even given this "common ground", we might still fuss over exactly what method one uses to determine what is clear to reason and also relatedly, what things count as clear and which, don't. Of course, the devil is in the details.
Gangadean for instance, thinks it's clear to reason that the God of theism exists and that man has sinned and needs a savior. I don't. He thinks it's clear to reason that the bible is the word of God, but as I've suggested in a previous post, I don't. He thinks it's clear that the mind is not brain, and I don't. He thinks that it's clear that we don't have libertarian free-will and I'm not so sure. This doesn't make me a reason-denier. Nor does it make him a reason-upholder. At least that isn't the default conclusion to draw if you're trying to look at it objectively. We have to look at the arguments and assess them in terms of their rational merits. [Edit on 6/29/30: I still maintain one can rationally believe each of these things despite them not being as clear (i.e., deductively proven) as Gangadean takes them to be].
So I want to be clear. My posts in this blog assume (for the sake of discussion)** at least some basic distinctions---I take certain things as obvious or clear or whatever. I don't call everything into question. I assume that any theory is seriously problematic if it calls into question the law of identity/contradiction/excluded middle. I use valid rules of inference to argue. I present arguments, point out what I think are illegitimate moves, presuppositions, or premises that Gangadean takes for granted.
Still, in assuming these very things, it is my view that Gangadean's more substantive claims (e.g., God's existence, theory of knowledge, the bible as special revelation, the nature of good and evil for man, the existence of the external world, etc) don't follow logically from accepting just the basic distinctions and the laws of thought. What is more, he thinks he is as certain about these matters as he is about very basic truths. But I contend that there are questionable premises and or bad inferences along the way. Some disagreement between us about what counts as basic and or clear of course will crop up now and again (in part, because he has some sort of infallible method in mind about determining what things count as clear and basic). Thus sometimes we won't agree on which things are counted as clear or basic. But what my blog is intended to show is that in effect, Gangadean's more substantive claims don't pass his own test of critical examination.
**
[Note there is a lot more to be said about the topic of assuming basic things/distinctions. For instance, I suspect that Gangadeanians often front-load the term 'assume' in this context to draw all sorts of conclusions. e.g., when they point out that in questioning the law of identity one assumes the law of identity, it isn't obvious what 'assumes' means, here. Is it assumes psychologically--as in I have to think in terms of the law of identity to question it? Dialectically--as in, I have to argue in terms of it in for the sake of discussion? or something like logically? And what does 'logically' mean here? So they really ought to get clearer on what they mean by 'assume' whenever they pull this move. Notice that if it's just psychological or dialetical facts they're talking about, then the normative conclusion they want to draw doesn't seem to follow. Suppose I assume basic distinctions in my questioning of anything---where this means that I am psychologically in a state of assuming basic distinctions in order to question anything. This is just a fact about human psychology. Or suppose we read assume in terms of what must dialetically be presupposed in discussion---this just tells us facts about discourse. But what Gangadean is really after is that reason is ontological. He wants to move from, 'a is a' is assumed in all questioning and so makes questioning possible, to 'a is a' is true out there in the world. So psychological and dialetical accounts seem insufficient for what he is after. Moreover, they are empirical claims---like how do you know that whenever I assert or think about something, I must be in a certain psychological state? Do you have access to my mind?]
Sunday, April 12, 2015
Anderson on Knowledge vs. knowledge
Every now and then I find myself perusing Owen Anderson's blog. I happened to do so today and encountered the following post. Anderson claims that to Know with a capital 'K' is different from knowing with a lowercase 'k.' He claims that the former refers to having certainty and the latter is more probabilistic.
As I hope is clear by now, I think this represents a really shady approach of doing philosophy that is ubiquitous in the Gangadeanian approach.
In effect, Anderson acts as if he has something like the dictionary of the world or the dictionary according to God--i.e., that he has special access to the true definition of words. Of course, no such lexicon actually exists. The key issue is this---why should anyone trust that Anderson has got his definitions right? Maybe he just thinks he's right about what these words (and many others) mean, but he may be mistaken. So why should we trust him? Especially since lots of people would disagree about what we mean by the verb to 'know.' Moreover, a lot of people would disagree with Anderson about the idea that there are two sense of 'know' (i.e., the upper case denoting epistemic certainty and lower case denoting something comparatively weaker).
Now I'm not against making claims about what the meaning of a word in natural language is, I just think that one needs to tread lightly and freely admit that it's a lot of guess work. We should also appeal to empirical methods when available that give us some evidence about what competent language users seem to mean when they use certain words in ordinary conversations. And I don't think we can be absolutely certain about the meaning of a word in a given language--even though we can have good reasons to form beliefs about the matter. The meaning of words is conventional. It is developed by communities of people that in some way, over time, identify a sound or series of sounds and symbols with things (in the broadest sense to include concrete and abstract entities and everything in between). But it's a communal effort and it's also dynamic. It isn't as if one person sat down and dictated a natural language for everyone else. Moreover, words change in meaning over time. You might be thinking, well can't we just turn to a dictionary? You could, but if your desire is to build a philosophical argument to prove something on the basis of definitions that you derive from a dictionary, then your theory is going to be limited---you will have to say for instance, "know's" according to this lexicon at this time means X. More importantly though, you haven't actually settled the matter about whether the word as defined in the dictionary is correct. Dictionary's aren't infallible either since they are composed by a select group of persons who are trying to figure out what a given word means. So it turns out that trying to figure out what a word like 'knows' means, is a really tricky matter. (The reader may be starting to ask, what makes something the "correct" definition in the first place? Is there even such a thing? These, I think, are important questions).
But these facts don't seem to be appreciated by Anderson and Gangadean. Both think that you can just sort of think about a word and come to have infallible access to its meaning. They simply ignore the possibility that they may be mistaken and certainly don't provide anything like an deductive argument for why they've got the right definition of their key terms. So you just sort of have to take them at their word. The idea is that we have a priori access to the meaning of words. This is highly controversial view and I think it's quite wrong.
Interestingly they do this for a number of other words. For instance the same goes for words like, 'God', 'free will', 'eternal' 'being' 'reason' etc. They just say things like, "reason is the laws of thought.' 'God is a spirit, infinite, eternal unchanging in his being...' In fact, the very next post on Anderson's blog distinguishes between what he thinks is the definition of 'reason' vs. 'reasoning.' But same old trick. He just proclaims his definition of reason and distinguishes it from his definition of reasoning.
Likewise, 'free will' just means the ability to do what you want to do (rather than the ability to do otherwise). Again this approach is in effect assumes some infallible awareness of the meaning of a word but why should we grant that to Gangadean and Anderson?
What is worse, they build all sorts of arguments (that are supposed to provide certainty of their conclusions) on the backs of these presumed definitions. So their views are contentious from the very start, built on shaky foundations.
This is just bad philosophy for someone after absolute certainty and also for those that purport to be "rational presuppositionalists". It's nothing more than semantic chauvinism and certainly not an instance of critically examining one's most basic beliefs for meaning. After all, any argument where they have as premises, definitions of words, presupposes answers to the various questions about how we could begin to know/verify/grasp the true meaning of a word and what it is that makes for a true definition (and even if there is such a thing). So they should address these presuppositions on pain of consistency.
As I hope is clear by now, I think this represents a really shady approach of doing philosophy that is ubiquitous in the Gangadeanian approach.
In effect, Anderson acts as if he has something like the dictionary of the world or the dictionary according to God--i.e., that he has special access to the true definition of words. Of course, no such lexicon actually exists. The key issue is this---why should anyone trust that Anderson has got his definitions right? Maybe he just thinks he's right about what these words (and many others) mean, but he may be mistaken. So why should we trust him? Especially since lots of people would disagree about what we mean by the verb to 'know.' Moreover, a lot of people would disagree with Anderson about the idea that there are two sense of 'know' (i.e., the upper case denoting epistemic certainty and lower case denoting something comparatively weaker).
Now I'm not against making claims about what the meaning of a word in natural language is, I just think that one needs to tread lightly and freely admit that it's a lot of guess work. We should also appeal to empirical methods when available that give us some evidence about what competent language users seem to mean when they use certain words in ordinary conversations. And I don't think we can be absolutely certain about the meaning of a word in a given language--even though we can have good reasons to form beliefs about the matter. The meaning of words is conventional. It is developed by communities of people that in some way, over time, identify a sound or series of sounds and symbols with things (in the broadest sense to include concrete and abstract entities and everything in between). But it's a communal effort and it's also dynamic. It isn't as if one person sat down and dictated a natural language for everyone else. Moreover, words change in meaning over time. You might be thinking, well can't we just turn to a dictionary? You could, but if your desire is to build a philosophical argument to prove something on the basis of definitions that you derive from a dictionary, then your theory is going to be limited---you will have to say for instance, "know's" according to this lexicon at this time means X. More importantly though, you haven't actually settled the matter about whether the word as defined in the dictionary is correct. Dictionary's aren't infallible either since they are composed by a select group of persons who are trying to figure out what a given word means. So it turns out that trying to figure out what a word like 'knows' means, is a really tricky matter. (The reader may be starting to ask, what makes something the "correct" definition in the first place? Is there even such a thing? These, I think, are important questions).
But these facts don't seem to be appreciated by Anderson and Gangadean. Both think that you can just sort of think about a word and come to have infallible access to its meaning. They simply ignore the possibility that they may be mistaken and certainly don't provide anything like an deductive argument for why they've got the right definition of their key terms. So you just sort of have to take them at their word. The idea is that we have a priori access to the meaning of words. This is highly controversial view and I think it's quite wrong.
Interestingly they do this for a number of other words. For instance the same goes for words like, 'God', 'free will', 'eternal' 'being' 'reason' etc. They just say things like, "reason is the laws of thought.' 'God is a spirit, infinite, eternal unchanging in his being...' In fact, the very next post on Anderson's blog distinguishes between what he thinks is the definition of 'reason' vs. 'reasoning.' But same old trick. He just proclaims his definition of reason and distinguishes it from his definition of reasoning.
Likewise, 'free will' just means the ability to do what you want to do (rather than the ability to do otherwise). Again this approach is in effect assumes some infallible awareness of the meaning of a word but why should we grant that to Gangadean and Anderson?
What is worse, they build all sorts of arguments (that are supposed to provide certainty of their conclusions) on the backs of these presumed definitions. So their views are contentious from the very start, built on shaky foundations.
This is just bad philosophy for someone after absolute certainty and also for those that purport to be "rational presuppositionalists". It's nothing more than semantic chauvinism and certainly not an instance of critically examining one's most basic beliefs for meaning. After all, any argument where they have as premises, definitions of words, presupposes answers to the various questions about how we could begin to know/verify/grasp the true meaning of a word and what it is that makes for a true definition (and even if there is such a thing). So they should address these presuppositions on pain of consistency.
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