Burton on Skepticism

Some Gangadeanians are promoting this recent interview of Kelly Fitzsimmons Burton on the topic of Skepticism. You'll notice that there isn't any critical engagement in this interview--perhaps of relevance is that the interviewer is a personal friend of Burton's and a Gangadeanian sympathizer if not a full-blown recruit.

One point of interest is what Burton says at the 1:15 mark. She uses the expression 'know for sure' in characterizing skepticism and at various occasions throughout. She states,

...I would say it [skepticism] is a philosophical position, in the area of epistemology that says knowledge is not possible--we cannot really know for sure...

This is interesting to me because for the Gangadeanians talk about "knowing for sure" should be redundant. Recall that they think knowledge requires epistemic certainty. That is, on their view, you only count as knowing that it will rain tomorrow, if you are absolutely sure/certain that it will rain tomorrow. If that is so, then it's awkward to speak of knowing for sure since in knowing something, you're already certain/sure that it is the case. In effect, to say, "I know for sure that it will rain tomorrow" is akin to saying something like, "I am sure for sure that it will rain tomorrow." It's a curious thing to note that in ordinary discourse, people sometimes say things like "I know for sure..." at least if the Gangadeanians are right that knowing something entails being sure of the thing believed.

On the other hand, if knowledge doesn't require certainty in the first place (the view that the vast majority of epistemologists maintain), there would be no redundancy in saying something like, "I know for sure that it will rain tomorrow." That is to say, on such a theory of knowledge (where knowing P doesn't entail being sure that P) "for sure" actually adds semantic content to such sentences. The upshot is that this is just more evidence that Gangadean's theory of knowledge is mistaken. But I also don't want to lose sight of the more important point that the Gangadeanians have yet to provide anything like a proof that knowledge requires certainty. They are through and through, fideists about their theory of knowledge.

Secondly, @1:20, Burton makes another standard Ganagdeanian mess. After her characterization of skepticism, she attempts to draw out a bad implication of the position by posing the following rhetorical question,

"...if nobody can really know for sure, then how do we act? How do we know what to do?" 

Setting aside the unfounded assumption that knowledge requires certainty, this remark suggests another questionable Gangadeanian presupposition which connects epistemology with norms of rational action.

For some reason, Burton has it in her mind that you need certainty in order to make rational choices. But of course she doesn't provide anything of an argument for it. All she adds is that "our thinking drives our actions and if we can't know for sure, then what do we do?" That's not an argument--it's merely a restatement of the assumption in question (actually, it's not even a statement but rather a rhetorical question).

I suspect, Burton's way of framing things may be due to a false dichotomy which the Gangadeanians commonly fall into. Later in the talk, Burton discusses the trouble of living by "mere opinions" as if one's inability to know anything for sure means one is relegated to forming mere opinions about everything. These mere opinions are spoken of pejoratively and so I think she has in mind something like beliefs without any rational basis. So according to her worldview, either we can know things for sure, or else we can only form opinions which cannot be rational.

But why can't there be a third option? I'm not (epistemically) sure what the weather will be like tomorrow, but I can form beliefs that are rationally better or worse about tomorrow's weather. If I survey several forecasts and they all converge around there being no rain, then I might come to believe it will not rain tomorrow. I may still not be sure in the epistemic sense--(i.e., as a matter of fact, it's possible that my belief is mistaken) because future forecasts aren't infallible. So the question is, given that it's remotely possible that I am wrong, does my coming to believe that it will not rain tomorrow on the basis of the weather reports mean that my belief is not rational? Is forming such a belief based on the the converging forecasts really no better than doing so on the basis of a coin flip, a palm reader's report, or a "gut feeling"? The Gangadeanians think it's obviously so, but what sort of argument can be given in favor of such a position that seems at first glance incredible?

The other thing to note is that while the Gangadeanians believe that some things namely the most basic are "clear to reason" and so knowable "for sure," they also think that lots of other things are not. But if we can only make rational choices based on things we know for sure, I wonder if they are unable to make decisions when we aren't sure of the relevant facts. Arguably, these decision are extremely common place. Can Burton know for sure that she woke up next to her husband this morning? Can she prove beyond all doubt that his body was not switched with a convincing facsimile, overnight by some mad scientists? What would such a proof look like? If she can't, then does this imply how she ought to interact with this person that she doesn't know for sure is her husband?