The central issue that I've been concerned with is whether the following argument, which Gangadean presented in the Q&A of the talk, is sound.
Gangadean's Original Argument
Gangadean's Original Argument
(1) I have one thought after another.
(2) If (1) and my soul were eternal, then I would be eternal in time.
(3) If I were eternal in time, then I would be all knowing.
(4) I am not all knowing.
(5) So, I am not eternal in time.
I suggested that premise (1) needs an argument. More precisely, I don't see how a Gangadeanian can consistently claim to know (with certainty) that (1) is true. How do you know that one thought occurs after another if not in an immediate sort of way (sans proof or argument)? But I also suggested that the purported entailment in (3) is no good. It's possible for a being (say a mind/soul) to be eternal in time, without being all knowing. For example, an eternal mind might forget, might not care to know about everything, might stop believing some propositions that they once knew.
Spencer included this argument and a few others to which Anderson has been responding in the comments. Initially Anderson seemed to address my worry about the truth of (3) by tacitly conceding my point. I say this because he started asking about whether eternality entailed "being the highest power." So instead of defending the purported connected between eternal existence and omniscience as is featured in Gangadean's original argument, he suggested we would do well to think about whether "X is eternal' entails 'X is the highest power.' And as I noted in a previous post, that may be worth considering, but that's to present a different argument. Far from providing us a reason to accept (3) it hints at a new argument. Something like the following.
(1)' If X is eternal, then X is the highest power.
(2)' No soul like mine is the highest power.
(3)' So no soul like mine is eternal.
I think this is a better argument because it doesn't have the problematic premise (3), but it shares a different deficiency as the original--at least for the Gangadeanian who is after "clarity." Premise (2)' is the one that I would ask Anderson to prove. Just as I'm doubtful that the Gangadeanian can prove (in the strong sense) that our thoughts are ordered in time, I doubt they can prove that the self or any human soul for that matter is not the highest power. I should qualify this last bit. I doubt they can prove it without helping themselves to at least one more controversial premise. At some point, it's going to bottom out with an appeal to common sense claim, intuition or the mere historical/sociological fact that most people don't doubt things like that. If you're wondering why I am using "soul like mine" as opposed to "human soul" I want to hedge off the far too quick response that a Gangadeanian might be inclined to give which is to stipulate a definition of 'human' which includes a 'non-eternal' being. If we're really going to seek clarity and critically analyze our most basic assumptions, then we can't help ourselves to even the very mundane fact that each of us is human (as well as what that amounts to)--i.e, each of these things needs a separate argument.
Anderson in a followup comment then doubled-down and insisted that Gangadean's original argument was indeed sound. I've been trying to make sense of this. He writes,
On one reading, Anderson is assuming that 'finite' is interchangeable with 'not-eternal'. This is a contentious use of the terms, but it's also question begging. If the question is, "how can we determine that a soul like ours is not eternal in time?", then an answer that a finite (where this means "non-eternal") self cannot be eternal is assuming what needs to be proven. It's essentially responding with, "we can know that a soul like ours is not eternal, because it's not eternal." That's arguing in a circle if anything is.
On the other reading, which takes a certain amount of guess work, Anderson is not using "finite" as synonymous with "not-eternal" but is presupposing that there's an entailment relation of the following sort.
Additionally, in his last reply to Spencer (on a slightly different topic) Anderson makes the following curious claim.
Finally, Anderson also talks about the need for getting clear on the meaning of words like "bachelor" in an effort to evaluate the truth of 'there are no married bachelors'. And I'd like to know what the process is by which one gets "clearer" on the meaning of expressions. Further, can Anderson prove that this process (whatever it turns out to be) is veridical? Note how my question is analogous to his frequent complaints against externalists about knowledge/justification and intuitionists (those who believe we can know some things on the basis of intuition). I suspect that he's going to have to take either one of those routes himself to justify his claim that he knows the meaning of certain expressions. Tying all of this together---the definitional points are relevant because, as I mentioned earlier, not only does he need to defend the claim that 'X is finite entails that X is not-eternal' he's going to need to tell us what he means by 'finite/infinite' and also tell us why his definitions are correct.
(2) If (1) and my soul were eternal, then I would be eternal in time.
(3) If I were eternal in time, then I would be all knowing.
(4) I am not all knowing.
(5) So, I am not eternal in time.
I suggested that premise (1) needs an argument. More precisely, I don't see how a Gangadeanian can consistently claim to know (with certainty) that (1) is true. How do you know that one thought occurs after another if not in an immediate sort of way (sans proof or argument)? But I also suggested that the purported entailment in (3) is no good. It's possible for a being (say a mind/soul) to be eternal in time, without being all knowing. For example, an eternal mind might forget, might not care to know about everything, might stop believing some propositions that they once knew.
Spencer included this argument and a few others to which Anderson has been responding in the comments. Initially Anderson seemed to address my worry about the truth of (3) by tacitly conceding my point. I say this because he started asking about whether eternality entailed "being the highest power." So instead of defending the purported connected between eternal existence and omniscience as is featured in Gangadean's original argument, he suggested we would do well to think about whether "X is eternal' entails 'X is the highest power.' And as I noted in a previous post, that may be worth considering, but that's to present a different argument. Far from providing us a reason to accept (3) it hints at a new argument. Something like the following.
(1)' If X is eternal, then X is the highest power.
(2)' No soul like mine is the highest power.
(3)' So no soul like mine is eternal.
I think this is a better argument because it doesn't have the problematic premise (3), but it shares a different deficiency as the original--at least for the Gangadeanian who is after "clarity." Premise (2)' is the one that I would ask Anderson to prove. Just as I'm doubtful that the Gangadeanian can prove (in the strong sense) that our thoughts are ordered in time, I doubt they can prove that the self or any human soul for that matter is not the highest power. I should qualify this last bit. I doubt they can prove it without helping themselves to at least one more controversial premise. At some point, it's going to bottom out with an appeal to common sense claim, intuition or the mere historical/sociological fact that most people don't doubt things like that. If you're wondering why I am using "soul like mine" as opposed to "human soul" I want to hedge off the far too quick response that a Gangadeanian might be inclined to give which is to stipulate a definition of 'human' which includes a 'non-eternal' being. If we're really going to seek clarity and critically analyze our most basic assumptions, then we can't help ourselves to even the very mundane fact that each of us is human (as well as what that amounts to)--i.e, each of these things needs a separate argument.
Anderson in a followup comment then doubled-down and insisted that Gangadean's original argument was indeed sound. I've been trying to make sense of this. He writes,
Premise 3 is true if the finite and temporal self (the reader or audience, as you say) cannot also be eternal being. If the finite self has other limitations, like not seeking or incorrigible memory lapse, this only strengthens the premise (Emphasis mine).Recall that Gangadean's original argument was about whether we can determine that the questioner's soul were not eternal. And there, Gangadean suggested that we should think about what would follow (regarding the being's body of knowledge) if an eternal mind/soul like ours was in time (temporal). But here, Anderson has shifted to talking about what would follow for a finite being in time. That leaves us with at least two different interpretive paths from which to choose. And much depends on what Anderson thinks is the relationship between 'eternal/non-eternal' and 'finite/infinite'.
On one reading, Anderson is assuming that 'finite' is interchangeable with 'not-eternal'. This is a contentious use of the terms, but it's also question begging. If the question is, "how can we determine that a soul like ours is not eternal in time?", then an answer that a finite (where this means "non-eternal") self cannot be eternal is assuming what needs to be proven. It's essentially responding with, "we can know that a soul like ours is not eternal, because it's not eternal." That's arguing in a circle if anything is.
On the other reading, which takes a certain amount of guess work, Anderson is not using "finite" as synonymous with "not-eternal" but is presupposing that there's an entailment relation of the following sort.
(For any X), if X is finite, then X is not eternal.That is to say that finitude of a thing entails that it is not-eternal. This is perhaps the more charitable reading of what Anderson is up to, but his lazy style of communicating requires some work to get here. The real issue is whether or not Anderson can demonstrate that this entailment holds as opposed to merely presupposing it. In fact, I think he should first define how he's using 'finite' and 'infinite.' For instance, is 'finite' synonymous with 'limited' or 'imperfect'? He should also in some suitable sense defend his definitions (more on this below) for the sake of "clarity." Once he's made good on that, then we need the argument for why 'X is finite' entails that 'X is not eternal'.
Additionally, in his last reply to Spencer (on a slightly different topic) Anderson makes the following curious claim.
So we don't make subjective "conceivability" the standard, and we clarify ahead of time if the persons in the discussion are committed to 'a' is 'a.'Anderson and other Gangadeanians often throw around 'subjective' and 'objective' but I worry that they play fast and loose with the notions. If there is an intelligible sense of "conceivability' which is in some sense objective, I'd be curious how it differs from the so called, "subjective" sense. And how does one determine when something is objectively conceivable vs. subjectively (vs. merely appearing to one to be that way!)? I'm genuinely curious.
Finally, Anderson also talks about the need for getting clear on the meaning of words like "bachelor" in an effort to evaluate the truth of 'there are no married bachelors'. And I'd like to know what the process is by which one gets "clearer" on the meaning of expressions. Further, can Anderson prove that this process (whatever it turns out to be) is veridical? Note how my question is analogous to his frequent complaints against externalists about knowledge/justification and intuitionists (those who believe we can know some things on the basis of intuition). I suspect that he's going to have to take either one of those routes himself to justify his claim that he knows the meaning of certain expressions. Tying all of this together---the definitional points are relevant because, as I mentioned earlier, not only does he need to defend the claim that 'X is finite entails that X is not-eternal' he's going to need to tell us what he means by 'finite/infinite' and also tell us why his definitions are correct.
J,
ReplyDeleteRegarding the new argument you proposed, shouldn't one press Anderson to justify premise 1 instead of 2? Not to say that I disagree with your approach, it just seems to me a much more audacious claim (and a patently false one at that) to say that eternal existence necessarily entails being of the highest power. Also, what does Anderson mean by highest power? Anderson is arguing for the God of traditional theism, but highest power is not equivalent to infinite in power. Unless Anderson is using these two terms interchangeably, then his argument would not allow him to infer that an eternal being is omnipotent. Which is presumably what he is after.
David
DeleteHi David,
You're right that (1)' is perhaps the more contentious so I appreciate you pointing that out! I guess I'm pressing him to justify it in a more roundabout way. Basically, I think his argumentative strategy is to start from a more general principle (yet to be defended) that if a being is finite in any respect (including not being the highest power), then it isn't eternal. That's why I'm attacking the presuppositions at this level of generality, where premise (1)' of the new argument would be an instance of this more general (and no less contentious) principle.
J