The Intellectual Hubris of Ending Discussions.

Lately, I've been thinking about the common practice of Gangdeanians to effectively end conversations with those with whom they fundamentally disagree. I've been wondering of the psychology involved in such a process--which is also epistemically informative. The express reason that Gangadeanians cite is that some of us are in effect, denying reason or some basic truths which are necessary for intelligible conversations. That is, further discussion, at some point, according to Gangadeanians is pointless. There are some things that we must affirm, if discussions are to have a point or even to be intelligible.

I've noted before that there might be something to this--that is, I don't necessarily disagree. But Gangadeanians play fast and loose with the term 'affirm' in this connection. To affirm a proposition, by their lights, is to in some suitable sense, fully convinced that it is true and to believe for the reasons which make it a guaranteed truth (excepting of course, when we get into their shady realm of "self-attesting" truths). But as I've pointed out elsewhere, the term 'affirm' is ambiguous in English. You might for instance, assume a claim to be true for the purposes of a discussion or investigation (as when a scientists assumes a hypothesis to be true, to see what might follow). Philosophers are no strangers to this approach--we assume, entertain, or imagine, or suppose premises all of the time in order to see what might follow from them in terms of logical implications and beyond. That's the heart of a reductio ad abusrdum for instance! None of this requires that the one affirming is certain or believes or knows (in the Gangadeanian sense) the proposition in question. So at the very least Gangadeanians do great violence to the semantics of 'affirm'. Maybe they've got some technical notion in mind---but the question is why we should follow them in adopting that special dictionary of theirs. 

The payoff is that discussions can indeed be purposeful, elucidating, instructive and the like even if we don't affirm (in the Gangadeanian sense) the basic beliefs of the Gangadeanians. At the very least, they haven't shown us that this contention is false. 

Moving beyond this fairly elementary oversight in reasoning, I started thinking about what it takes to truly understand or know what your ideological opponent believes. The fact is, there's a real problem of self-knowledge---not everything we know or believe is transparent to us. We can be fooled into thinking we believe one thing while actually believing the opposite---and I think even Gangadeanians need to grant this since they believe in such a phenomenon as "self-deception." How much more then for the beliefs that others hold. Of course, it's one thing if we're talking about very mundane beliefs. There's something of a presumption of truth when it comes to human testimony: we assume the words of others are innocent unless we have reason to think otherwise. So when I tell you that I really like sushi, then you should (in terms of epistemic rationality) believe that I like sushi. But what happens when it comes to beliefs concerning philosophical theories? I think things get much more complicated. The opacity problem that I sighted above is much more serious in this context, I think, because philosophical theories can get quite involved and convoluted. There is so much room for misunderstanding what the other person actually believes, what their views entail and what doesn't follow from their commitments and the like. I'm reminded of this quite frequently in doing philosophy. It's quite easy to, in subtle ways, misconstrue the views of another when you're playing the game of raising criticisms, even if you do so in good faith. 

It's no surprise then that philosophers frequently discuss their work with others. Before I invest too much work in a project, if I'm arguing against another philosopher, I will try to reach out to them to see if I've really understood their views, and also to see if they've got a ready response to what I am about to say. When I find a surprising view (for instance, one that seems strange or false to me) I try my best to understand why they believe what they believe---because I suspect there will be at least some considerations that lead them there that aren't entirely crazy. And sometimes, the process teaches me that I've got it all wrong and have made a mistake (big surprise, right?!). We are fallible beings. We make mistakes in reasoning, even those of us that do philosophy for a living. This is particularly the case when the material in question is very involved, depends on subtle distinctions and has many conceptual moving parts. 

So what does this have to do with the Gangadeanians? I highly doubt that they could in felicity say that they really understand where I stand on matters. What is more, based on conversations I have had with Gangadeanians, they frequently misconstrue my positions---often conflating them with nearby views in order to push over strawmen. Philosophy is hard. Knowing and understanding what someone believes about say the nature of knowledge, epistemic normativity and the like is really really hard. It takes a lot of work. It takes patience and a lot of back and forth and some humility. 

But Gangadean and his kin are frequently so quick to dismiss their critics (to end conversations) that I think there is a good chance they simply misunderstand them. I had a few conversations with Gangadean for instance, and he frequently misrepresented my views back to me, and yet still had the audacity to tell me just where we disagreed and why we couldn't continue to talk. A similar thing happened with me and some other Gangadeanians--ones that had at one time been among my friends. They simply didn't put the requisite time and effort in to really understand where I was coming from and what it was that I really believed. Instead, I suspect they simply took Gangadean at his word---and trusted that he charitably characterized my positions. Furthermore, I've been informed by multiple sources that Gangadeanians effectively ignore my arguments (and are dissuaded from reading my blog) on the basis of what their church deems as my questionable moral character. Of course that's nothing more than an ad hominem. 

I think this approach is regrettable, but more importantly it suggest some important vices. How confident they must be in their ability to understand and diagnose what another believes, to quickly cut-off dialogue and to ignore criticisms. That doesn't speak of intellectual integrity. It doesn't show a commitment to getting to the truth. No, it suggests unsubtle thinking, overinflated confidence, fear and ignorance.  

I was thinking about the asymmetry of my response in comparison to that of the Gangadeanians. And one thing I realized is that it has always been that Gangadeanians end conversations/contact. First it was Gangadean, who, after spending just a few hours talking with me, decided there was no more room for discussion because he diagnosed me as a full blooded skeptic. Then it was some of my former friends who strangely seemed to sparsely read my blog, but never bothered to talk to me about its substantive contents and instead kept arguing with me about my motivations for keeping the blog, or what they perceived as the "harsh" tone with which I wrote. Strangely, they too, one day decided in the end, that on the basis of core philosophical disagreements, we could no longer be friends. But in each case, it was their doing... I remained committed to continuing dialogue, to getting clearer on the source of our disagreements, and to understand their views, but these were clearly not shared values.

If I end conversation/relationship with you because we disagree (particularly, on complicated matters), then I close myself off from ever learning that I was mistaken. True, the chances of my error might be small depending on the context (for instance, I'm fairly confident that I understand the core of Gangadean's views because I spent years studying them), but that doesn't mean it should be dismissed outright. To have integrity on intellectual matters, to seek the truth in part, involves a commitment to not only understanding our own views or even the views that feel comfortable for us, but also to understand those views that differ from ours. It is unlikely to be realized within echo-chambers or by hiding from our critics.