Here is a recent article that Anderson has written on the First Amendment. I couldn't help but laugh a bit at the disproportionately large picture of Anderson. I'm also not sure why there are single quotes around 'first in importance'. Single quotes signal to the reader that you're talking about or mentioning the expression in question rather than using it. In effect, the title as it is presented would lead the reader to think that he is writing about why the first amendment = the expression 'first in importance'. But now I'm just being pedantic.
I think it's interesting that this article is about the importance of allowing free public dialogue because it encourages free thinking. But if you know Anderson and company, you know that they'll talk to you only insofar as you agree with their basic beliefs. Only it turns out there are lots of them and many of them are controversial with lots of assumptions not the least of which have to do with philosophical methodology and special definitions of key terms. And even if you're being sincere in not seeing eye-to-eye with them, because for instance, you just don't share their intuitions (or what they call "immediately known" propositions) they haven't gotten enough humility and self-reflection to consider the possibility that their arguments aren't as good as they thought. Instead, disagreement with them about their basic beliefs as they see it just means that you deny reason and are being irrational (in other words, a bad person given their view about what it means to be a good human). Hence, there is no room for dialogue.
[Note, if you're thinking to yourself that I myself, exemplify some of the vices I accuse Anderson and company of then I think you're missing an important point. Yes, I'm confident that I am right about my critiques of their worldview. I believe that they are gravely mistaken. The difference of course is that I am open to continuing dialogue because I think the possibility always exists that I am in fact mistaken. The same cannot be said of their camp].
That's hardly a disposition that lends itself to finding common ground in any interesting sense. The oddest part of this idea of finding common ground is what they seem to require for agreement. Anderson and Gangadean will not speak to you if you don't agree with them, but they don't explicitly give anything like an analysis of 'agreement' (here their appeals to something like common sense are obvious). One might think for instance, that two people can agree to grant certain propositions for the purposes of a particular discussion. This happens all the time in philosophy. It's indicated by expressions like 'let's assume' or 'suppose that P'. The two parties are accepting a proposition even if they don't both believe it. Another manner in which two individuals might agree is when they both believe the proposition in question, but have different degrees of confidence in them (yes, beliefs seem to come in degrees). Suppose I have a stomach ache and I tell you that this is so. I probably have more confidence in the proposition that I have a stomach ache than you do, even if we both believe it. This suggests a different kind of agreement than the first, one that requires some degree of mutual belief. Yet another plausible reading of 'agreement' is when two people believe the same thing but for very different reasons (note this might account for varying degrees of belief). You might believe that it is raining outside on the basis of reliable testimony while I might be outside experiencing the rain.
Interestingly, Anderson and Gangadean both seem to think that agreement (at least as it concerns what they arbitrarily demarcate as "basic beliefs") requires believing the same things, to the same degree (namely, certainty), and for the same reasons (namely, Gangadean's proofs). But why should anybody accept such a strong account of 'agreement'? After all, this notion of agreement does some heavy lifting within their worldview. They think that without agreement of more basic things, there can be no agreement over less basic things. Without this kind of agreement, they think things will be really bleak and societies will inevitably crumble. Without this kind of agreement, they find grounds to kick people out of their church and to treat them as non-believers. Without this kind of agreement, they think that there is no common ground and thus no basis for pursuing discussion. Given that they have essentially stipulated what they mean by 'agreement' the question is whether any of these further inferences make any sense. Just why can't two people have a meaningful discussion either by agreeing to keep them fixed for the purposes of that particular discussion (and possibly future ones)? Why can't two people believe the same proposition or set of propositions for differing reasons and have a meaningful dialogue about what follows? Why can't two people believe the same proposition or set of propositions to different degrees and have a meaningful discussion about what follows? I'll leave it to the Gangadeanians to answer that.
The other response I had to the article was that I remembered how seductive the material can be. It is in a certain way very accessible to the layman and that's to Anderson's credit. This is true I think of a lot of the arguments on which his worldview (Gangadean's worldview) is based. The arguments are simple. The words used, tend to be non-technical. By the same token what is being said has got the appearance of being deep and interesting. This combination is partially what attracts young college students (in particular, conservative Christian students with little to no background in philosophy) to the teachings. It suggests to them that they can have sure answers to their big questions and it's not particularly difficult. It doesn't require special philosophical training beyond a few classes taught by Gangadean and his followers (which consists largely in memorizing and parroting Gangadean's arguments, his vocabulary and his conclusions). Moreover, much of what they learn is deconstructive of what they call "popular Christianity". Young people tend to be drawn to that. It makes them feel special and as if they have got the inside edge or some special insight that others are lacking. It's seductive and it certainly worked on me at one point.
Whenever I teach my students each term, most of whom have no background in philosophy, they initially feel like the answers to the questions that philosophers have been wrestling with for 2500 years, are rather obvious. Teach them a little bit about logic, and present some theories of rightness, or of knowledge, and they think they've got it all figured out. I think this because they have initially been presented with a cliff's notes version of philosophy. It's presented with fairly vague terms and without any of the nuances or complexities that lie below the surface. But it's also stuff that they haven't ever thought about before and have a feel or ring of truth to (probably because it appeals to their common sense), and so it draws them in. However, it's also imprecise. They are generally not used to asking the probing questions yet.
As a result much of my task throughout the rest of the semester is to point out problems with the proposals and their answers--problems that aren't so obvious and are easily overlooked. This is where philosophy gets difficult. It's the point at which it tries to make good on the initial claim that it has got answers to the fundamental questions of life. And things get messy and complicated, and if one is hell bent on getting certainty, to settle any and all doubt, then frustration and discouragement are sure to follow. This is the post-honeymoon stage.
My take is that Gangadeanians in general are not unlike my students--it's just that they haven't gotten to the point of truly critically analyzing their most basic beliefs. They get stuck at the initial stage of a kind of false-enlightenment and all the confidence that comes with it. To add insult to injury, they belong to a church culture that adds pressure to conform which implicitly discourages this kind of self-criticism. Sure they are taught to be critical of their beliefs whenever they might present a challenge to Gangadean's or Anderson's views. That is, when it threatens conformity. But the buck stops there. It never gets to really wrestling honestly with the doctrines of their leaders.
Reading Anderson's article reminded me of this. It, like much of his other published works as well as Gangadean's, presents the cliff's notes version of philosophy. It leaves things at the initial stage.
p.s. It's interesting to consider the culture of Westminster Fellowship in light of Anderson's article on the importance of the freedom of speech. For instance, it is an official doctrine of the church that women are to be silent in the church and to primarily be taught by their husbands "at home". There's also a common practice that if someone starts to call into question the doctrines of the church, their conversation partners are limited. The congregation is told not to speak to that person, and Gangadean steps in and determines that the questioner can speak with a few select individuals (usually including himself). But yeah, free speech.
Wednesday, December 14, 2016
Sunday, November 6, 2016
Gangadean, Descartes, and the Ontological Argument.
I've been reading some Descartes lately. He's always a fun read. As I've said before, Gangadeanians are Cartesians at heart. It was Descartes after all that sought an indubitable foundation upon which to build an entire worldview. Throughout his meditations, he seeks to find that which he can't possibly doubt. And if you've ever taken a philosophy course with a Gangadeanian, it's likely that you'll hear the cogito argument. I know of no other philosopher either in the past or present that seeks certainty in the way that Descartes does with the exception of Gangadean of course.
There are other similarities which is what prompted this post. For instance, Descartes believed that by simply unpacking the content of an idea, we could come to know about the world beyond our concepts. For instance, Descartes begins with his idea of a triangle and says the he perceives that the nature of triangle is to be (among other things) a three-sided figure. And importantly he could ascertain this nature simply by reflecting on his idea of a triangle. Indeed since he doesn't believe that triangles actually exist (he believes they are merely imperfectly instantiated in the concrete world), there is no other way he could come to know about them except via the reason.
Gangadean similarly takes it that "in a concept, one grasps the essence of a thing". That is to say, we can know at least some things about substantial reality in virtue of reflecting on our concepts of things. For example, as Gangadean sees it, you can just sit and reflect on the concept/word 'knowledge' or the concept/word 'eternal' and certain indubitable truths will come to mind. For instance, 'eternal' just means without beginning and end. 'Knowledge' just is a justified true belief. 'Evil' just is that which is contrary to one's nature. 'God' just is a spirit, that is infinite, eternal and unchanging in his being... 'Friendship' just is a relationship with a mutual aim towards the good...I'm only scratching the surface. As I've noted before Gangadeanians have their own vocabulary and it is in virtue of this vocabulary that many of their deductions turn out valid (although far from sound). So the similarity with Descartes is hard to deny. Descartes speaks of ideas, and Gangadean speaks of concepts, but they are functionally the same thing. Descartes speaks of the natures of things, and other times the essences of things, and Gangadean does the same. More importantly, both thinkers are committed to this idea that we could learn about the nature of things just by unpacking our concepts or ideas of those things. To be clear, neither Descartes or Gangadean are saying that you can know the nature of an idea by unpacking the idea (that would merely get one to idealism). Instead, they are both saying that by simply reflecting sufficiently on our ideas, we can know about things "out there" beyond our minds (that's what Gangadean means by "grasping the essence of things").
In his Fifth Meditation, Descartes, after speaking about triangles, seems to realize that if he can know (with certainty) about the very nature/essences of triangles simply by thinking about his idea of a triangle, then he should be able to extend this method to prove that God exists. After all, he's got a "clear and distinct" idea of God. Just like he has a "clear and distinct" idea of a triangle. So in the manner by which he could come to know about the nature of triangles by thinking about his idea of triangles, he argues that he can do the same as it concerns God.
Now for Descartes and many other theists that he was following, the very idea of God contains (necessary) existence. That is to say, just like one cannot really have an idea of a triangle that doesn't contain the idea of a three-sided figure, according to Descartes, to think of God is necessarily to think of a being that exists. On the other hand he says his ideas of other things like that of a lion or a mountain, do not have this feature. He can think of a lion that doesn't exist and he can think of a mountain that doesn't exist without committing anything like a contradiction or conceptual confusion. And insofar as his idea of God contains within it the further idea of existence, he concludes that this proves that God really does exist. Just like he can prove that a triangle has three sides by thinking about his concept of a triangle and realizing that he can't separate (in his mind) three sides from a triangle, he can prove that God exists by merely reflecting on his concept of God. He can't by his intellect separate his idea of God from his idea of existence, so he concludes that it is the very nature/essence of God to exist.
It's an ontological argument which are fascinating beasts even though they are largely rejected. However, the merits or faults of the argument itself are not what I'm interested in. What I'm wondering is how or on what grounds a Gangadeanian would reject such an argument. That is, how does it differ structurally from Gangadean's argument that "something must be eternal"? Recall, that that argument depends on the conceptual analysis that 'eternal' just means without beginning, and that 'none is eternal' entails that 'all began to exist'. If you ask a Gangadeanian how s/he knows that 'if none is eternal, then all is temporal and all began to exist' they will say that it's a matter of definition--that is to say, it's a matter of conceptual truth. One can just sit and reflect on the concept/idea of 'eternal' to realize what it entails about beginning to exist and temporality. Well, this is just what Descartes thinks is happening in his ontological argument for God's existence. It's perfectly plain to him that the very concept of God contains within it necessary existence. Thus it is in virtue of his definition of God, and his commitment to the idea that (in Gangadeanian terms) "reason is ontological" that the conclusion that God really exists, follows.
As I recall, Gangadean rejects this kind of ontological argument. What I'm currently interested in is whether he's got good grounds for rejecting it. Does he reject Descartes claim that it is part of the very concept of God that he exists? That is, does Gangadean believe one can have the idea of God and at the same time imagine God as not existing? I doubt it. Isn't God according to Gangadean, by definition, a being that is infinite, eternal and unchanging? And doesn't Gangadean believe that 'eternal' just means always existing? If so, it seems he must agree with Descartes' definition of God in an important sense. That is, to have a concept of God is to have a concept of an eternal (or always existing) being.
So if Gangadean wants to legitimately reject the Cartesian argument, he must looks elsewhere. As I see it there are only two more exit points. Gangadean must either reject the claim that we can know the nature of God by reflecting on our concept of God (i.e., he must say that one can have the concept of God without grasping the essence of God), or else he must deny the final inference that Descartes makes namely, "if it is part of the very essence of God to exist, then he does exist." But I don't see how he could deny either of these. To reject the first is to admit to a counterexample to his foundational claim about concepts. Remember, he says that "in a concept we grasp the essence of a thing". But if we can have a concept of God without thereby grasping the nature of God, then his thesis about concepts is falsified. To reject the latter of Cartesian moves is to admit that it is in God's nature to exist and yet God can somehow fail to exist. But again, if Gangadean accepts that by reflecting on his concept of God, he grasps the essence of God which includes eternal existence, then it's hard to see how Gangadean could reject the Cartesian inference unless of course something can have as its very nature existence while failing to exist.
Where this leaves us is that regardless of whether or not Gangadean actually rejects the ontological argument, there's a question about whether on pain of inconsistency, he should. I think we have reason to think his views actually force him to accept Descartes Ontological argument for God's existence and so much worse for his view. This is the cost of his commitment to the claim that we can know the essences of things just by a priori, analysis of our concepts in conjunction with his definition of 'God'.
There are other similarities which is what prompted this post. For instance, Descartes believed that by simply unpacking the content of an idea, we could come to know about the world beyond our concepts. For instance, Descartes begins with his idea of a triangle and says the he perceives that the nature of triangle is to be (among other things) a three-sided figure. And importantly he could ascertain this nature simply by reflecting on his idea of a triangle. Indeed since he doesn't believe that triangles actually exist (he believes they are merely imperfectly instantiated in the concrete world), there is no other way he could come to know about them except via the reason.
Gangadean similarly takes it that "in a concept, one grasps the essence of a thing". That is to say, we can know at least some things about substantial reality in virtue of reflecting on our concepts of things. For example, as Gangadean sees it, you can just sit and reflect on the concept/word 'knowledge' or the concept/word 'eternal' and certain indubitable truths will come to mind. For instance, 'eternal' just means without beginning and end. 'Knowledge' just is a justified true belief. 'Evil' just is that which is contrary to one's nature. 'God' just is a spirit, that is infinite, eternal and unchanging in his being... 'Friendship' just is a relationship with a mutual aim towards the good...I'm only scratching the surface. As I've noted before Gangadeanians have their own vocabulary and it is in virtue of this vocabulary that many of their deductions turn out valid (although far from sound). So the similarity with Descartes is hard to deny. Descartes speaks of ideas, and Gangadean speaks of concepts, but they are functionally the same thing. Descartes speaks of the natures of things, and other times the essences of things, and Gangadean does the same. More importantly, both thinkers are committed to this idea that we could learn about the nature of things just by unpacking our concepts or ideas of those things. To be clear, neither Descartes or Gangadean are saying that you can know the nature of an idea by unpacking the idea (that would merely get one to idealism). Instead, they are both saying that by simply reflecting sufficiently on our ideas, we can know about things "out there" beyond our minds (that's what Gangadean means by "grasping the essence of things").
In his Fifth Meditation, Descartes, after speaking about triangles, seems to realize that if he can know (with certainty) about the very nature/essences of triangles simply by thinking about his idea of a triangle, then he should be able to extend this method to prove that God exists. After all, he's got a "clear and distinct" idea of God. Just like he has a "clear and distinct" idea of a triangle. So in the manner by which he could come to know about the nature of triangles by thinking about his idea of triangles, he argues that he can do the same as it concerns God.
Now for Descartes and many other theists that he was following, the very idea of God contains (necessary) existence. That is to say, just like one cannot really have an idea of a triangle that doesn't contain the idea of a three-sided figure, according to Descartes, to think of God is necessarily to think of a being that exists. On the other hand he says his ideas of other things like that of a lion or a mountain, do not have this feature. He can think of a lion that doesn't exist and he can think of a mountain that doesn't exist without committing anything like a contradiction or conceptual confusion. And insofar as his idea of God contains within it the further idea of existence, he concludes that this proves that God really does exist. Just like he can prove that a triangle has three sides by thinking about his concept of a triangle and realizing that he can't separate (in his mind) three sides from a triangle, he can prove that God exists by merely reflecting on his concept of God. He can't by his intellect separate his idea of God from his idea of existence, so he concludes that it is the very nature/essence of God to exist.
It's an ontological argument which are fascinating beasts even though they are largely rejected. However, the merits or faults of the argument itself are not what I'm interested in. What I'm wondering is how or on what grounds a Gangadeanian would reject such an argument. That is, how does it differ structurally from Gangadean's argument that "something must be eternal"? Recall, that that argument depends on the conceptual analysis that 'eternal' just means without beginning, and that 'none is eternal' entails that 'all began to exist'. If you ask a Gangadeanian how s/he knows that 'if none is eternal, then all is temporal and all began to exist' they will say that it's a matter of definition--that is to say, it's a matter of conceptual truth. One can just sit and reflect on the concept/idea of 'eternal' to realize what it entails about beginning to exist and temporality. Well, this is just what Descartes thinks is happening in his ontological argument for God's existence. It's perfectly plain to him that the very concept of God contains within it necessary existence. Thus it is in virtue of his definition of God, and his commitment to the idea that (in Gangadeanian terms) "reason is ontological" that the conclusion that God really exists, follows.
As I recall, Gangadean rejects this kind of ontological argument. What I'm currently interested in is whether he's got good grounds for rejecting it. Does he reject Descartes claim that it is part of the very concept of God that he exists? That is, does Gangadean believe one can have the idea of God and at the same time imagine God as not existing? I doubt it. Isn't God according to Gangadean, by definition, a being that is infinite, eternal and unchanging? And doesn't Gangadean believe that 'eternal' just means always existing? If so, it seems he must agree with Descartes' definition of God in an important sense. That is, to have a concept of God is to have a concept of an eternal (or always existing) being.
So if Gangadean wants to legitimately reject the Cartesian argument, he must looks elsewhere. As I see it there are only two more exit points. Gangadean must either reject the claim that we can know the nature of God by reflecting on our concept of God (i.e., he must say that one can have the concept of God without grasping the essence of God), or else he must deny the final inference that Descartes makes namely, "if it is part of the very essence of God to exist, then he does exist." But I don't see how he could deny either of these. To reject the first is to admit to a counterexample to his foundational claim about concepts. Remember, he says that "in a concept we grasp the essence of a thing". But if we can have a concept of God without thereby grasping the nature of God, then his thesis about concepts is falsified. To reject the latter of Cartesian moves is to admit that it is in God's nature to exist and yet God can somehow fail to exist. But again, if Gangadean accepts that by reflecting on his concept of God, he grasps the essence of God which includes eternal existence, then it's hard to see how Gangadean could reject the Cartesian inference unless of course something can have as its very nature existence while failing to exist.
Where this leaves us is that regardless of whether or not Gangadean actually rejects the ontological argument, there's a question about whether on pain of inconsistency, he should. I think we have reason to think his views actually force him to accept Descartes Ontological argument for God's existence and so much worse for his view. This is the cost of his commitment to the claim that we can know the essences of things just by a priori, analysis of our concepts in conjunction with his definition of 'God'.
Tuesday, November 1, 2016
Contact
Since I've been getting some requests for my email address lately, here it is.
reasoniidoubt@gmail.com
reasoniidoubt@gmail.com
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