What does God's justice demand? Well, what is the nature of divine justice? And how are we to know what divine justice is?
There are various theories of justice and likewise various theories of infinite/divine justice. Many Christians take themselves to have a rather strong grasp of divine justice since they often cite it to answer objections about the doctrine of eternal damnation, and the need for atonement. Gangadeanians are no exception. They believe that divine justice requires that sin not be set aside, but rather must be accounted for. For God to simply overlook or forgive wrongdoing would be to violate his nature as divinely just. So sin must have consequences.
As Gangadeanians see it, the wages of sin are spiritual death which is failing to know what is clear. This is because at root sin is the failure to seek to know what is clear (to live contrary to what it means to be a rational animal/human). Failure to seek leads to ignorance. It's not clear what the nature of the connection is-- but they claim that there is an intrinsic link between failing to seek and failing to know what is clear. I'm skeptical of this purported conceptual connection because it isn't obvious to me that it is logically impossible for a human to know without seeking. I wouldn't limit God to that extent--if God so pleased, it seems to me that it's at least logically possible for him to give a human knowledge directly.
So ignorance of basic things = the wages of sin for the Gangadeanians. It's a very cognitive notion.
But they also believe that God is also infinitely merciful. Gangadeanians believe that even though God cannot (i.e., it's a logical impossibility) merely overlook sin because on their view, this would be incompatible with God's divine justice, God is also merciful. So he must save some (more on this below). But what does it mean to save some? Well, it requires that God forgive some of their sins. It isn't that God ignores the sin, but God atones for it or else again his divine justice would be threatened.
As you're thinking through these lines of reasoning, it's important to keep the following in mind in order to keep the Gangadeanians honest. Often it's not obvious just which claims are supposed to be known via general revelation (via reason alone) and which parts are known via special revelation (scripture). They want to argue for a particular fundamentalist brand of Christianity, but some of it comes from reason alone and others from scripture.
In the first place, the Gangadeanians are claiming to have quite a bit of insight into what God's justice consists of--or else much of the reasoning above won't make sense. But just how do they know that divine justice cannot merely set aside sin? How do they know that God is infinitely just (in just the way that they define 'justice')? How do they know that God is infinitely merciful? How do they know what infinite mercy looks like? In fact, answers to these questions should not appeal to scripture. This is because it is part of their argument for the bible as God's word--so that would be question-begging.
On more than one occasion, I've spoken to a Gangadeanian who assures me that justice consists in "treating likes as like" or in other words an "eye for an eye" notion of justice. People get what they deserve---there are consequences to sin just as there are consequences for good works. And according to Gangadean, divine justice is following this "system" perfectly.
Notice, that this doesn't answer the epistemological question: how do you know what divine justice is? It presupposes an answer and moves to offer a metaphysical theory about what divine justice consists of. This is an important point because it's just another juncture at which Gangadeanians appeal to intuition--they have a sense of what justice is and take it for granted as the correct one (just like they do with their theory of knowledge and any number of other concepts).
But even if we grant them this (and we really shouldn't since they are after epistemic certainty), more problems emerge. Insofar as they have this "eye for an eye" notion of divine justice in mind, and they think that it helps them affirm the bible as the word of God, they should find themselves in quite a quandary. Sure there are instances of "treating likes as likes" in scripture, but then you've got that whole bit about Jesus dying for the sins of his people. That isn't treating "likes as likes" and it's anything but "eye for an eye." It's fairly obvious that God incarnate who is without sin, dying for say billions of unrepentant sinners and thereby preventing them from reaping the intrinsic consequences of their sins is far from treating 'a' as 'a.' By definition, the regenerate don't get what they deserve. They simply don't reap what they sow. They reap infinitely better than they have sown.
Thus insofar as the Gangadeanian worldview suggests we can deduce from reason alone the claim that the bible is the word of God, based on their notion of divine justice, it's actually a non-starter. Their notion of divine justice should have them rejecting the bible (qua special revelation) outright. Alternatively, they may reject their starting notion of divine justice--but other problems will emerge for their worldview e.g., why is there are need for SR? and why is atonement only limited?.
What about their notion of divine mercy? Again, the same problems emerge as with justice. There are analogous epistemological questions: how do you know that God is infinitely merciful? How do you know what infinite mercy even looks like? Notice, again it would be question-begging to presuppose the bible has any authority at this point--since their claim that God is infinitely merciful (as well as what that looks like) must first be settled since it serves as a premise to their argument for the bible as the genuine word of God. But how reason alone, and considerations of whether something must be eternal, gets them to affirming that God is infinitely merciful, or even what it is that infinite mercy (or mercy at all) should look like (i.e., what the nature of mercy is) is beyond me. Interestingly, I've yet to hear Gangadean's theory of mercy let alone mercy of the infinite sort.
The way that Gangadean frames things then is that he's got a particular notion of divine justice and divine mercy in mind which he claims you can derive from reason alone (just by thinking). You can't and need not appeal to scripture at this point for any insight. Instead there are sound arguments starting from his argument for "something must be eternal" which can provide you with a proof that God is infinitely just and merciful (in just the way that Gangadean defines these things) and then ultimately to the conclusion that the bible is the word of God. I find the prospects of such deductions to be ludicrous. More importantly, Gangadean and his people are super shady about presenting them. My guess is that they don't actually have any such arguments. Instead their tactic is to "get more basic" and try to find a way to label you as someone that denies reason.
My take is that we have intuitive senses of justice and mercy--there are certain phenomena that we have contingently come to call 'justice' and 'mercy,' but there are likely to be difficult cases where we just aren't sure whether one or the other is being instantiated. But it doesn't provide us anything like a sure-fire means from which we can deduce that the bible is the word of God. At any rate, I'd like to see how Gangadean defends his notions of divine justice and mercy from any and all possible contenders.
Beyond that, there's an additional worry about how these twin notions work together. For Gangadean, the bible provides the only account of the reconciliation of divine justice and mercy in the face of sin. There is no other current competitor to our knowledge [notice: he has no epistemological right to say that there is no possible contender].
So in his mind, if we have reasoned carefully and correctly from basic things, we'll all "see" that there is some puzzle to be solved. We'll know with certainty that there is such a thing as sin, that humans have all sinned and also that God is infinitely just (as Gangadean defines it) and infinitely merciful (as Ganagdean defines it). And crucially, we'll further see a real tension between these. The tension is this: if God's justice demands payment for sin, and all have sinned then this is supposed to present some obvious puzzle for God's mercy. But to be frank, I don't know what that puzzle is. As I stated above, I've yet to hear Gangadean's theory of infinite mercy and so I can't even begin to assess whether or not there is some tension with his notion of divine justice. Without this tension, there's no need for special revelation and no "deduction" to the bible as the word of God.
Now, if we think about mercy in the legal setting we might think of it in terms of giving someone less than they deserve or else granting them favor (some good) that they don't deserve. But what would infinite mercy look like? Would it be to grant to all creatures who are undeserving, a little bit of favor? Or would it be to grant 49% of the undeserving, a bit more favor? Or perhaps only a handful with a whole lotta favor? Maybe just one person must get infinite favor? Or perhaps all undeserving creatures, less than infinite favor. Or perhaps all undeserving, infinite favor? How can we settle this via reason alone? I haven't a clue and neither does Gangadean.
What's emerging then is my puzzlement over Gangadean's purported puzzle. Gangadean can't define 'infinite mercy' in a way that contradicts his notion of infinite justice. Otherwise, God couldn't have both attributes on pain of inconsistency. But neither can Gangadean define 'infinite mercy' in a way that presents no tension with his concept of infinite justice or else by his lights, we could not come to affirm "the need for special revelation". Gangadean needs for there to be just the right sort of tension between the notion of divine justice and the notion of divine mercy that he purports to derive from reason alone. But just what is this notion of infinite mercy that he's got in mind? And what is his rational justification for adopting it in the first place? Your guess is as good as mine.
Monday, January 2, 2017
Saturday, December 17, 2016
'Knowledge' Again
Gangadeanians claim that without certainty at the basic level, we're doomed. I've often noted that they merely assert that meaninglessness and the like follow without clarity/certainty at the basic level. Which is not the same as having shown that it's true.
Often they cling to talk about clarity of basic distinctions which is to say we can be certain of basic distinctions or in other words, that we can't possibly doubt things like 'a is a' and 'eternal is not non-eternal'. Many times I've mentioned that they need to prove other things. For instance, Gangadean presents a theory of knowledge. It's a theory about the nature of knowledge--or a theory about the truth conditions of a sentence with the following schema, 'S knows that P'. What could make the sentence true? Well, they think that among other things, S must be epistemically certain that P such that it's impossible for S to be wrong about P given whatever process or reasons she has for believing P. We call this infallibilism about knowledge. It's a proposal. It's not a truism even though Gangadeanians treat it like it is.
The trouble is, Gangadeanians never defend their theory of knowledge, probably because they assume it is a truism. But let's "get more basic" here as the Gangadeanians say and critically analyze their most basic assumptions in order to test them for meaning. Consider the following argument which appeals to only premises that the Gangadean already accepts (note I don't accept them).
1. We must have clarity/certainty at the basic level or else knowledge and therefore intelligible dialogue and meaning are not possible.
2. The nature of knowledge (i.e., the answer to the question "which theory of knowledge is the right theory?") is at a basic level.
3. Therefore, one must have clarity/certainty about the nature of knowledge, if one is to have knowledge and therefore intelligible dialogue and meaning.
This is precisely why I have often pressed the Gangadeanians to defend their theory of knowledge. In their little bubble, they can get away with not defending it because Gangadean talks about his theory of knowledge as if it's true by definition (recall my discussion about vocab indoctrination). Consistency demands that they provide a defense or rational justification of their theory of knowledge (infallibilism) as the correct one. But I see no reason to think that knowledge requires certainty in the first place.
In fact, if knowledge doesn't require certainty, then this would be detrimental to Gangadean's worldview because he depends on this very assumption in order to argue that without certainty at the basic level, skepticism wins. That's supposed to be the cost of not affirming (notice not affirming is not the same as denying) certainty about basic things. For some reason, Gangadeanians have a hard time grasping the possibility that a person could fail to affirm clarity at the basic level, and not be a skeptic, because they adopt a different theory of knowledge (e.g. fallibilism). I don't know what to make of such an elementary mistake other than that it's revealing about the lack of careful thinking exemplified by team Gangadean.
For further reading:
Here and here I press the Gangadeanians to defend their theory of knowledge (beyond appealing to their own intuitions).
Here is an article where I press the Gangadeanians to defend the inference from, "not clarity/certainty" --> no point in further discussion, and ultimately meaninglessness."
Here is an article where I argue that figuring out the meaning of a word, or unpacking a concept (like 'knowledge' or KNOWLEDGE) isn't just an a prior process at least in the face of disagreements.
Often they cling to talk about clarity of basic distinctions which is to say we can be certain of basic distinctions or in other words, that we can't possibly doubt things like 'a is a' and 'eternal is not non-eternal'. Many times I've mentioned that they need to prove other things. For instance, Gangadean presents a theory of knowledge. It's a theory about the nature of knowledge--or a theory about the truth conditions of a sentence with the following schema, 'S knows that P'. What could make the sentence true? Well, they think that among other things, S must be epistemically certain that P such that it's impossible for S to be wrong about P given whatever process or reasons she has for believing P. We call this infallibilism about knowledge. It's a proposal. It's not a truism even though Gangadeanians treat it like it is.
The trouble is, Gangadeanians never defend their theory of knowledge, probably because they assume it is a truism. But let's "get more basic" here as the Gangadeanians say and critically analyze their most basic assumptions in order to test them for meaning. Consider the following argument which appeals to only premises that the Gangadean already accepts (note I don't accept them).
1. We must have clarity/certainty at the basic level or else knowledge and therefore intelligible dialogue and meaning are not possible.
2. The nature of knowledge (i.e., the answer to the question "which theory of knowledge is the right theory?") is at a basic level.
3. Therefore, one must have clarity/certainty about the nature of knowledge, if one is to have knowledge and therefore intelligible dialogue and meaning.
This is precisely why I have often pressed the Gangadeanians to defend their theory of knowledge. In their little bubble, they can get away with not defending it because Gangadean talks about his theory of knowledge as if it's true by definition (recall my discussion about vocab indoctrination). Consistency demands that they provide a defense or rational justification of their theory of knowledge (infallibilism) as the correct one. But I see no reason to think that knowledge requires certainty in the first place.
In fact, if knowledge doesn't require certainty, then this would be detrimental to Gangadean's worldview because he depends on this very assumption in order to argue that without certainty at the basic level, skepticism wins. That's supposed to be the cost of not affirming (notice not affirming is not the same as denying) certainty about basic things. For some reason, Gangadeanians have a hard time grasping the possibility that a person could fail to affirm clarity at the basic level, and not be a skeptic, because they adopt a different theory of knowledge (e.g. fallibilism). I don't know what to make of such an elementary mistake other than that it's revealing about the lack of careful thinking exemplified by team Gangadean.
For further reading:
Here and here I press the Gangadeanians to defend their theory of knowledge (beyond appealing to their own intuitions).
Here is an article where I press the Gangadeanians to defend the inference from, "not clarity/certainty" --> no point in further discussion, and ultimately meaninglessness."
Here is an article where I argue that figuring out the meaning of a word, or unpacking a concept (like 'knowledge' or KNOWLEDGE) isn't just an a prior process at least in the face of disagreements.
Wednesday, December 14, 2016
Anderson's piece for the Washington Times
Here is a recent article that Anderson has written on the First Amendment. I couldn't help but laugh a bit at the disproportionately large picture of Anderson. I'm also not sure why there are single quotes around 'first in importance'. Single quotes signal to the reader that you're talking about or mentioning the expression in question rather than using it. In effect, the title as it is presented would lead the reader to think that he is writing about why the first amendment = the expression 'first in importance'. But now I'm just being pedantic.
I think it's interesting that this article is about the importance of allowing free public dialogue because it encourages free thinking. But if you know Anderson and company, you know that they'll talk to you only insofar as you agree with their basic beliefs. Only it turns out there are lots of them and many of them are controversial with lots of assumptions not the least of which have to do with philosophical methodology and special definitions of key terms. And even if you're being sincere in not seeing eye-to-eye with them, because for instance, you just don't share their intuitions (or what they call "immediately known" propositions) they haven't gotten enough humility and self-reflection to consider the possibility that their arguments aren't as good as they thought. Instead, disagreement with them about their basic beliefs as they see it just means that you deny reason and are being irrational (in other words, a bad person given their view about what it means to be a good human). Hence, there is no room for dialogue.
[Note, if you're thinking to yourself that I myself, exemplify some of the vices I accuse Anderson and company of then I think you're missing an important point. Yes, I'm confident that I am right about my critiques of their worldview. I believe that they are gravely mistaken. The difference of course is that I am open to continuing dialogue because I think the possibility always exists that I am in fact mistaken. The same cannot be said of their camp].
That's hardly a disposition that lends itself to finding common ground in any interesting sense. The oddest part of this idea of finding common ground is what they seem to require for agreement. Anderson and Gangadean will not speak to you if you don't agree with them, but they don't explicitly give anything like an analysis of 'agreement' (here their appeals to something like common sense are obvious). One might think for instance, that two people can agree to grant certain propositions for the purposes of a particular discussion. This happens all the time in philosophy. It's indicated by expressions like 'let's assume' or 'suppose that P'. The two parties are accepting a proposition even if they don't both believe it. Another manner in which two individuals might agree is when they both believe the proposition in question, but have different degrees of confidence in them (yes, beliefs seem to come in degrees). Suppose I have a stomach ache and I tell you that this is so. I probably have more confidence in the proposition that I have a stomach ache than you do, even if we both believe it. This suggests a different kind of agreement than the first, one that requires some degree of mutual belief. Yet another plausible reading of 'agreement' is when two people believe the same thing but for very different reasons (note this might account for varying degrees of belief). You might believe that it is raining outside on the basis of reliable testimony while I might be outside experiencing the rain.
Interestingly, Anderson and Gangadean both seem to think that agreement (at least as it concerns what they arbitrarily demarcate as "basic beliefs") requires believing the same things, to the same degree (namely, certainty), and for the same reasons (namely, Gangadean's proofs). But why should anybody accept such a strong account of 'agreement'? After all, this notion of agreement does some heavy lifting within their worldview. They think that without agreement of more basic things, there can be no agreement over less basic things. Without this kind of agreement, they think things will be really bleak and societies will inevitably crumble. Without this kind of agreement, they find grounds to kick people out of their church and to treat them as non-believers. Without this kind of agreement, they think that there is no common ground and thus no basis for pursuing discussion. Given that they have essentially stipulated what they mean by 'agreement' the question is whether any of these further inferences make any sense. Just why can't two people have a meaningful discussion either by agreeing to keep them fixed for the purposes of that particular discussion (and possibly future ones)? Why can't two people believe the same proposition or set of propositions for differing reasons and have a meaningful dialogue about what follows? Why can't two people believe the same proposition or set of propositions to different degrees and have a meaningful discussion about what follows? I'll leave it to the Gangadeanians to answer that.
The other response I had to the article was that I remembered how seductive the material can be. It is in a certain way very accessible to the layman and that's to Anderson's credit. This is true I think of a lot of the arguments on which his worldview (Gangadean's worldview) is based. The arguments are simple. The words used, tend to be non-technical. By the same token what is being said has got the appearance of being deep and interesting. This combination is partially what attracts young college students (in particular, conservative Christian students with little to no background in philosophy) to the teachings. It suggests to them that they can have sure answers to their big questions and it's not particularly difficult. It doesn't require special philosophical training beyond a few classes taught by Gangadean and his followers (which consists largely in memorizing and parroting Gangadean's arguments, his vocabulary and his conclusions). Moreover, much of what they learn is deconstructive of what they call "popular Christianity". Young people tend to be drawn to that. It makes them feel special and as if they have got the inside edge or some special insight that others are lacking. It's seductive and it certainly worked on me at one point.
Whenever I teach my students each term, most of whom have no background in philosophy, they initially feel like the answers to the questions that philosophers have been wrestling with for 2500 years, are rather obvious. Teach them a little bit about logic, and present some theories of rightness, or of knowledge, and they think they've got it all figured out. I think this because they have initially been presented with a cliff's notes version of philosophy. It's presented with fairly vague terms and without any of the nuances or complexities that lie below the surface. But it's also stuff that they haven't ever thought about before and have a feel or ring of truth to (probably because it appeals to their common sense), and so it draws them in. However, it's also imprecise. They are generally not used to asking the probing questions yet.
As a result much of my task throughout the rest of the semester is to point out problems with the proposals and their answers--problems that aren't so obvious and are easily overlooked. This is where philosophy gets difficult. It's the point at which it tries to make good on the initial claim that it has got answers to the fundamental questions of life. And things get messy and complicated, and if one is hell bent on getting certainty, to settle any and all doubt, then frustration and discouragement are sure to follow. This is the post-honeymoon stage.
My take is that Gangadeanians in general are not unlike my students--it's just that they haven't gotten to the point of truly critically analyzing their most basic beliefs. They get stuck at the initial stage of a kind of false-enlightenment and all the confidence that comes with it. To add insult to injury, they belong to a church culture that adds pressure to conform which implicitly discourages this kind of self-criticism. Sure they are taught to be critical of their beliefs whenever they might present a challenge to Gangadean's or Anderson's views. That is, when it threatens conformity. But the buck stops there. It never gets to really wrestling honestly with the doctrines of their leaders.
Reading Anderson's article reminded me of this. It, like much of his other published works as well as Gangadean's, presents the cliff's notes version of philosophy. It leaves things at the initial stage.
p.s. It's interesting to consider the culture of Westminster Fellowship in light of Anderson's article on the importance of the freedom of speech. For instance, it is an official doctrine of the church that women are to be silent in the church and to primarily be taught by their husbands "at home". There's also a common practice that if someone starts to call into question the doctrines of the church, their conversation partners are limited. The congregation is told not to speak to that person, and Gangadean steps in and determines that the questioner can speak with a few select individuals (usually including himself). But yeah, free speech.
I think it's interesting that this article is about the importance of allowing free public dialogue because it encourages free thinking. But if you know Anderson and company, you know that they'll talk to you only insofar as you agree with their basic beliefs. Only it turns out there are lots of them and many of them are controversial with lots of assumptions not the least of which have to do with philosophical methodology and special definitions of key terms. And even if you're being sincere in not seeing eye-to-eye with them, because for instance, you just don't share their intuitions (or what they call "immediately known" propositions) they haven't gotten enough humility and self-reflection to consider the possibility that their arguments aren't as good as they thought. Instead, disagreement with them about their basic beliefs as they see it just means that you deny reason and are being irrational (in other words, a bad person given their view about what it means to be a good human). Hence, there is no room for dialogue.
[Note, if you're thinking to yourself that I myself, exemplify some of the vices I accuse Anderson and company of then I think you're missing an important point. Yes, I'm confident that I am right about my critiques of their worldview. I believe that they are gravely mistaken. The difference of course is that I am open to continuing dialogue because I think the possibility always exists that I am in fact mistaken. The same cannot be said of their camp].
That's hardly a disposition that lends itself to finding common ground in any interesting sense. The oddest part of this idea of finding common ground is what they seem to require for agreement. Anderson and Gangadean will not speak to you if you don't agree with them, but they don't explicitly give anything like an analysis of 'agreement' (here their appeals to something like common sense are obvious). One might think for instance, that two people can agree to grant certain propositions for the purposes of a particular discussion. This happens all the time in philosophy. It's indicated by expressions like 'let's assume' or 'suppose that P'. The two parties are accepting a proposition even if they don't both believe it. Another manner in which two individuals might agree is when they both believe the proposition in question, but have different degrees of confidence in them (yes, beliefs seem to come in degrees). Suppose I have a stomach ache and I tell you that this is so. I probably have more confidence in the proposition that I have a stomach ache than you do, even if we both believe it. This suggests a different kind of agreement than the first, one that requires some degree of mutual belief. Yet another plausible reading of 'agreement' is when two people believe the same thing but for very different reasons (note this might account for varying degrees of belief). You might believe that it is raining outside on the basis of reliable testimony while I might be outside experiencing the rain.
Interestingly, Anderson and Gangadean both seem to think that agreement (at least as it concerns what they arbitrarily demarcate as "basic beliefs") requires believing the same things, to the same degree (namely, certainty), and for the same reasons (namely, Gangadean's proofs). But why should anybody accept such a strong account of 'agreement'? After all, this notion of agreement does some heavy lifting within their worldview. They think that without agreement of more basic things, there can be no agreement over less basic things. Without this kind of agreement, they think things will be really bleak and societies will inevitably crumble. Without this kind of agreement, they find grounds to kick people out of their church and to treat them as non-believers. Without this kind of agreement, they think that there is no common ground and thus no basis for pursuing discussion. Given that they have essentially stipulated what they mean by 'agreement' the question is whether any of these further inferences make any sense. Just why can't two people have a meaningful discussion either by agreeing to keep them fixed for the purposes of that particular discussion (and possibly future ones)? Why can't two people believe the same proposition or set of propositions for differing reasons and have a meaningful dialogue about what follows? Why can't two people believe the same proposition or set of propositions to different degrees and have a meaningful discussion about what follows? I'll leave it to the Gangadeanians to answer that.
The other response I had to the article was that I remembered how seductive the material can be. It is in a certain way very accessible to the layman and that's to Anderson's credit. This is true I think of a lot of the arguments on which his worldview (Gangadean's worldview) is based. The arguments are simple. The words used, tend to be non-technical. By the same token what is being said has got the appearance of being deep and interesting. This combination is partially what attracts young college students (in particular, conservative Christian students with little to no background in philosophy) to the teachings. It suggests to them that they can have sure answers to their big questions and it's not particularly difficult. It doesn't require special philosophical training beyond a few classes taught by Gangadean and his followers (which consists largely in memorizing and parroting Gangadean's arguments, his vocabulary and his conclusions). Moreover, much of what they learn is deconstructive of what they call "popular Christianity". Young people tend to be drawn to that. It makes them feel special and as if they have got the inside edge or some special insight that others are lacking. It's seductive and it certainly worked on me at one point.
Whenever I teach my students each term, most of whom have no background in philosophy, they initially feel like the answers to the questions that philosophers have been wrestling with for 2500 years, are rather obvious. Teach them a little bit about logic, and present some theories of rightness, or of knowledge, and they think they've got it all figured out. I think this because they have initially been presented with a cliff's notes version of philosophy. It's presented with fairly vague terms and without any of the nuances or complexities that lie below the surface. But it's also stuff that they haven't ever thought about before and have a feel or ring of truth to (probably because it appeals to their common sense), and so it draws them in. However, it's also imprecise. They are generally not used to asking the probing questions yet.
As a result much of my task throughout the rest of the semester is to point out problems with the proposals and their answers--problems that aren't so obvious and are easily overlooked. This is where philosophy gets difficult. It's the point at which it tries to make good on the initial claim that it has got answers to the fundamental questions of life. And things get messy and complicated, and if one is hell bent on getting certainty, to settle any and all doubt, then frustration and discouragement are sure to follow. This is the post-honeymoon stage.
My take is that Gangadeanians in general are not unlike my students--it's just that they haven't gotten to the point of truly critically analyzing their most basic beliefs. They get stuck at the initial stage of a kind of false-enlightenment and all the confidence that comes with it. To add insult to injury, they belong to a church culture that adds pressure to conform which implicitly discourages this kind of self-criticism. Sure they are taught to be critical of their beliefs whenever they might present a challenge to Gangadean's or Anderson's views. That is, when it threatens conformity. But the buck stops there. It never gets to really wrestling honestly with the doctrines of their leaders.
Reading Anderson's article reminded me of this. It, like much of his other published works as well as Gangadean's, presents the cliff's notes version of philosophy. It leaves things at the initial stage.
p.s. It's interesting to consider the culture of Westminster Fellowship in light of Anderson's article on the importance of the freedom of speech. For instance, it is an official doctrine of the church that women are to be silent in the church and to primarily be taught by their husbands "at home". There's also a common practice that if someone starts to call into question the doctrines of the church, their conversation partners are limited. The congregation is told not to speak to that person, and Gangadean steps in and determines that the questioner can speak with a few select individuals (usually including himself). But yeah, free speech.
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