Thursday, November 15, 2018

Anderson Youtube Convo Update

The saga on Youtube continues. But a philosophical discussion it has yet to become. Anderson writes,
By way of contrast, we needn't be involved in using insults or dishonesty. "Sloppy" and "lazy" are unnecessary insults. "Cult" is used because he is being dishonest about events behind anonymity. "Cult" has a specific meaning and does not apply to historic Christianity. So it doesn't follow that if he is right about our views being false then we are a cult. That would just mean that historic Christianity (as summarized in the Westminster Confession of Faith) is false. It is an insulting term being used dishonestly and shuts down conversation. Much of what needs to be addressed is private and cannot be replied to on a public blog To say we won't engage with him because we don't have an answer, as opposed to because of his own behavior, is a perfect example of the dishonesty. 
I hope you can see why your involving yourself with a source exhibiting such behavior is much more problematic than simply saying you think we are incorrect. You can come up with objections yourself without citing that kind of source. I'm not interested in having a proxy discussion with him through you. His private conduct toward me and others, and continued use of insults, is the reason I don't interact with him in public spaces.  
If you want to address the question of "what is eternal?" in good faith can we agree not to engage in that kind of behavior?
Calling Gangadeanian arguments/reasoning sloppy or lazy, hardly strikes me as insulting in the first place--its a colorful way of conveying the idea that the arguments are unsophisticated, imprecise, and bad. If you really think these words count as insults then you've lead a sheltered life. It's also a bit rich for the Gangadeanians, given the way they have treated me and others, to expect that I would in turn be so careful of what adjectives I use to spare their feelings. In the end, if they want to hide behind the fact that I've used words like, "sloppy" and "lazy," as a way of rationalizing why they are not dealing with my philosophical objections, that's on them. At least, Anderson's list of what counts as an insult seems to have narrowed from his initial one.

Further, Anderson claims that I'm not only being insulting in using the term "cult" (I believe I've done this only once) to refer to his church, but also dishonest. On the contrary, I maintain that I'm being sincere. All I mean when I apply that label to Gangadean/Anderson's church is that it has many of the bad-making features of paradigmatic cults and I know many others that agree. How do you decide when something is a cult? You start with paradigms (e.g., Scientology) and then when you see a family resemblance (to a significant degree), you apply the label. I'm sure members that belong to what most of us would refer to as a cults, would likewise find the term insulting, but the label is no less apt (let alone, dishonest) just because of that fact. Of course, Anderson may ultimately disagree with my evaluations, but to call me dishonest in my usage of the term seems to be insinuating that I'm attempting to mislead my readers with malintent. That couldn't be further from the truth. I genuinely believe Westminster Fellowship is a religious cult--maybe I'll add a post in the near future detailing why.

The portions of Anderson's most recent comment, which I put in bold, are interesting. To the first: Anderson again alleges that I'm being dishonest in suggesting the possibility that Anderson and other Gangadeanians actually don't have answers to my challenges, and that's the reason they won't engage. I may have said something of this nature in some of my posts. But again I'm not being dishonest. It's a hypothesis which is supported by several pieces of evidence.

First, it stems from my personal interactions with Gangadean, Anderson and some others, as well as, the interactions of others that I know. Even before I made this blog public, I encountered the very sort of evasion techniques that I suspect are being employed now in the Youtube exchange. It was very frequently, "I've got the answer to your challenge, but (for some reason) I won't just come out and tell you what it is. First, we have to get the basic things in place. But trust me, I've got the answers..." (One possible exception can be seen here. Unfortunately, Anderson in attempting to answer me directly, when Gangadean refused, presented me a terrible argument, and the exchange is not entirely free from evasive manuevers). If you really have the answers, why not just state them, and see if your opponent finds them plausible? You might be pleasantly surprised that they do and then you can move on! But if you find that there's disagreement, you can easily work backwards to show how your "answer" follows from more basic commitments. In turn you can then shift to talk about those more basic issues. It's not hard. In contrast, when you merely dangle the promise of an answer, without ever stating what that answer is, it looks suspect. It looks like you're buying yourself more time. To date there are 19 comments between Spencer and Anderson, but not a single one provides us with Anderson's "answer" to the original objection. There's a list of related issues, a bunch of counter-questions, a few promises that Anderson has got an answer, and then a disproportionate number of comments about me as the source of the original objection, my personal/moral character, and even Spencer's affiliation with me. That, too is suggestive. But there's more. Gangadeanians have a history of "ending discussions" with people with whom they disagree on grounds that they "deny reason." And this "diagnosis" frequently emerges in the process of "getting the more basic things in place." What this means is that it's frequently the case that the Gangadeanians fail to present the purported response (which they swear they have) to the challenges.

Finally, I've presented my objections and they seem to me (and a number of other philosophers with whom I've spoken) correct such that in some cases there seems no way that Gangadean can address them while remaining consistent to his other commitments. Relatedly, Gangadean and Anderson are claiming to have proven all kinds of substantive views which virtually no living philosopher would say can even in principle be proven. So, what I'm contending is that when we consider all of these facts together, the most plausible explanation is that the Gangadeanians are simply finding ways of evading difficult objections. That's why he and his people refuse to answer my challenges head on and hide behind this noise about slander and insults. In fact, I suspect this is in part, how Gangadean has managed to influence his followers for so long despite having really bad arguments. Basically, find some way to avoid addressing the difficult issues, and disqualify from conversations, those who continue to press you on them. Again, Anderson might disagree with me here, (and he could easily settle the matter by just answering an objection directly), but then it would be more appropriate to say he believes that I'm wrong as opposed to accusing me of being dishonest. I'm not trying to pull a fast one on anybody.

Finally, Anderson also made mention of my "private conduct towards him and others" as yet another reason why he refuses to interact with me in public. I assure you there's no scandalous story about why we no longer speak, at least on my end. I won't post the details on this blog because I don't want to stoop to that level, but if you want to know more about what happened between Anderson and me, just shoot me an email--I'm happy to share. Fortunately, I've still got the email where Anderson told me exactly why he didn't want to interact with me any longer so there will be less room for him to manipulate the narrative.

As for my "private conduct towards others," I have no idea what he's talking about. Since he's accusing me of personal misconduct with other Gangadeanians, I hope he can offer some sort of evidence that I misbehaved, otherwise he's the one being dishonest. All of my interactions with other Gangadeanians stopped either because Gangadean directed most of the congregation not to speak with me or in the case of my "close friends," they decided that we had no basis for a friendship in virtue of the fact that I maintain this blog and I (allegedly) deny what is clear to reason--there's no more to the story.




Monday, November 12, 2018

A Gangadeanian merely *thinks* that the principle of Clarity is true, but can't show that it is?

In a comment on my last post, Spencer directed me to the following talk given by a long time Gangadeanian, Kelly Fitzsimmons-Burton entitled, "What is Christian Philosophy?" As Spencer notes, Kelly says the following at the 26:49 mark.
"I am still learning... so what I'm going to say is that I *think* this is true...that there's this principle of clarity, that is, uh, part of philosophy--somethings are clear--and it's part of scripture. That part I'm not willing to let go of. But what I am willing to let go of is that I've gotten to clarity and I can show it to you...but I'm not willing to let go of this principle of clarity."
Kelly has been under Gangadean's direct instruction for decades. Somehow though, according to what she says here, she isn't in a position to prove that the principle of clarity (that some things are clear) is true. The essence of my last post about Gangadean's failure to show that we need clarity is pertinent---because the standard way that he tries to prove the principle of clarity is by purporting to show that if it's false, absurdities like skepticism and nihilism are sure to follow. Instead, Kelly seems to be saying that she simply chooses to assume that the principle is true. In other words, it's an article of faith. I don't have issues with philosophers assuming principles that they can't prove in general. We all gotta start somewhere--and any non-Gangadeanian philosopher is happy to admit this much. But for a Gangadeanian to do so is, quite surprising. Indeed this is what I've been trying to point out all along--that despite Gangadean's pronouncements (and criticisms of other philosophers for appealing to unproven principles), he, too must start with some basic articles of faith. Of course, Kelly hasn't said that Ganagdean himself is unable to prove the principle of clarity--but how strange for him to be able to do so, while someone under decades of his instruction, is unable. Surely, the proof can't be that complicated or hidden from his own followers--particularly, those that are as learned as Kelly.

I wonder if this means that Kelly isn't able to show that God's existence is clear to reason? Or what about the so called "laws of thought?" This would follow because if she could show anything to be clear, then she would have shown that the principle of clarity is true--that some things are clear to reason. Maybe she meant that she can't prove that some things must be clear vs. some things are clear. This would mean she misspoke because she explicitly says the principle of clarity is that some things are clear. Morever, since Gangadean rests his entire worldview on the necessity (rather than the actuality) of clarity, I don't see how that would help, either. So, I am not without some confusion.

There's a part of me that really appreciates this level of honesty from Kelly, though--at least if we take what she says at face value. I've never heard such a thing from a Gangadeanian (this isn't a jab--I'm being sincere about my experiences). Undoubtedly, the Ganagdeanians will find a way to explain this away--they will probably say that I'm misunderstanding or misconstruing what she has said, or that she simply misspoke although it's more likely that they'll just remain silent. Maybe they'll even cite the fact that she stated that she can't prove a conjunction (that the principle is "part of philosophy and scripture") so as to retain the principle in relation to at least one, but not both domains---although I think that would not help very much. One thing they won't provide is a proof that the principle of clarity is true. A tip of the hat to Spencer for bringing this to quote to my attention.

p.s. I've downloaded the file to my computer, just in case the link suddenly goes dead.




Saturday, November 10, 2018

If we don't need Clarity, then Gangadeanian's worldview is bust.

If you're like me, you just don't get why we need clarity (as Gangadean defines it) at the basic level, or any level for that matter. Now here's a conditional that even Gangadeanians will agree with.
If we don't need clarity, then the Gangadeanian philosophy is a non-starter. 
What is more, Gangadeanians are the ones claiming that we need clarity to begin with, so I think it's reasonable for us to expect some sort of argument. And since Gangadean requires that we show how our most basic assumptions are clear to reason, he ought also to agree with the following stronger conditional.
If Gangadean fails to show that it is clear that we need clarity, then the Gangadeanian philosophy is a non-starter. 
Gangadean has a few boogeymen up his sleeve which he says follow from the lack of clarity--that's essentially his case for the need for clarity. On his view, if we assume that there is no clarity, then certain absurdities (intuitively) follow. So, goes the argument, our working assumption (the lack of clarity) must be false. Here are the two big alleged absurdities.

1) Skepticism: in its extreme form is the view that we can't know anything. Gangadean claims that if the basic things are not clear, then we cannot have knowledge (i.e,. skepticism follows). In fact, on the very first page of his book, he seems to identify skepticism with the denial of the proposition that some things are clear.

I've said it numerous times that there's not actually an argument where we need one most. Why should we think that knowledge requires clarity at the basic level, in the first place? So Gangadean has failed to show that we need clarity to avoid skepticism because he's failed to show that knowledge requires clarity/certainty.

Interestingly, in his book (pg. 35), he merely presupposes a particular analysis of knowledge (a version of the justified true belief theory of knowledge). After presenting the three conditions of the Justified True Belief analysis, he writes,
"These three conditions are said to be necessary and sufficient for knowledge" (35, emphasis mine). 
Of course the natural questions are: Said by whom? And more importantly: Why should we take their word for it? What I found interesting is that he adds in a footnote (1) that this is in accordance with the theory of knowledge attributed to Plato in the Theatatus and the Meno. So basically, it's Plato's theory of knowledge (on a particular interepration) and Gangadean just takes for granted that Plato was correct. That's no good especially when virtually all living philosophers disagree with the Justified True Belief analysis of knowledge! We should expect him to use reason to settle this dispute about what knowledge is between him and the rest of us. (This is why I keep pressing the Gangadeanians for an actual defense of their theory of knowledge as opposed to a statement of it).

As a side note: I was just listening to a talk given by a Gangadeanian named Kelly Fitzsimmons Burton on "What is Knowledge?"  At the 25:12 mark, she talks about the need for "certainty." Her remarks were reminiscent of my last personal conversation with Gangadean. She (undoubtedly following Gangadean) says that at some point we can't get around the need for certainty. Then she says something about an alternative--where one might propose to believe things to various degrees of confidence (i.e., assign probabilities to propositions that are less than certain). Of course, we can model certainty with probabilities, too, so this is a bit imprecise (I daresay, sloppy). But I think what she meant to say was that even someone who thinks we should only assign probabilities that are less than 1 (or more than 0) to propositions can't get around the need for certainty at some point. And then she makes the very same egregious error that Gangadean once made with me. She states that a person can only form probability judgments over propositions if there is some standard of probability of which they are certain. But I have no idea what rationally justifies that last bit. Why can't a thoroughgoing probabilist consistently assign less than 1 (or more than zero) to propositions, including propositions about which probabilities they ought to assign and the very proposition that they ought to assign probabilities instead of being certain? I've pointed out before that there is nothing inconsistent or self-referentially absurd about this. But I welcome any Gangadeanian to provide an argument showing otherwise.

2) Nihilism/meaninglessness: Gangadean also writes, on the first page of his book,
"Consistently held, skepticism leads to nihilism--the loss of all meaning." 
But as we've just seen, he hasn't shown that we need clarity in order to avoid skepticism. In which case, the lack of clarity need not lead to nihilism. But maybe there's a different way to argue from the lack of clarity to nihilism. Here's how that usually goes.
Without clarity at the basic level, basic distinctions between "being and non-being, eternal and non-eternal, good and evil," collapse. And we need such basic distinctions not to collapse in order to have meaning. 
Unfortunately, this is no better. What does it mean that basic distinctions "collapse" in the relevant sense? And why should we worry ourselves of such collapsing? Well I hardly think Gangadean is making a metaphysical point. That would make him out to be an idiot. That is, he surely isn't saying "if I see no way of telling apart an oak tree from an elm tree, then there is no difference." He doesn't buy into that kind of idealism. Hence, he must be making an epistemological claim--that's what he must mean by basic distinctions "collapsing." Something like, if we can't be certain of anything, then we can't make basic distinctions like distinguishing between being and non-being. But while this is a tad better, it still falls short. This is no different than what I pointed out about Anderson's recent mistake.

The only thing that I can see that follows about basic distinctions from "nothing is clear" is that "basic distinctions are also not clear." That follows trivially. If we cannot be absolutely certain of anything, then it follows that we likewise can't be absolutely certain that there's a distinction between being and non-being. But that's very different from saying we can't (consistently) make basic distinctions. There's a gap to close here between being absolutely certain about a distinction on the one hand, and being able to make or draw the distinction, to use the distinctions in your reasoning, to form rational beliefs based on those distinctions and even to believe that for instance, 'a is not, non-a'.

Perhaps we couldn't have meaning if we were in no rational position to make, draw, or use basic distinctions in our lives. I could see how that might affect one's ability to make decisions, form beliefs and the like which would perhaps threaten one's ability to have meaning. But I see no reason to think that we have to be certain of basic distinctions if we are to have meaning--which is Gangadean's claim.

In fact, we can be less than certain of these distinctions and rationally (and consistently) make them in thinking about the world. And the fact that I can't have certainty that being is different from non-being doesn't entail that I can't be rational in believing that there's a difference. Just like it doesn't entail that I can't draw/make them for reasoning about what to do. In fact, on many theories of knowledge, I can even know that there's a difference between being and non-being (for example) without being certain that there is. Insofar as I can (consistently) do all of these things in relation to basic distinctions, there's no threat of nihilism. So I can see no need for clarity on grounds of the threat of nihilism. Again, we are desperate need of arguments.

Either prove that we can't rationally make or draw or use or believe in basic distinctions without being absolutely certain of the distinctions or else prove that meaningless somehow follows despite our being able to make, draw, use and believe in basic distinctions.

For good measure: there's yet another way we may construe what Gangadean means when he threatens the collapsing of basic distinctions. Perhaps the claim is through and through metaphysical. Something like,
If there is not a (metaphysical) distinction between being and non-being, then no meaning is possible. 
This is a bit better, I suppose, maybe if there really is no difference between something and nothing, then nihilism follows. First, this is still shy of anything resembling an argument--it's a stand alone claim. More significantly, the problem with this reading is that it's entirely disconnected from the principle of clarity which is an epistemological thesis. Someone like me is not denying that there are no distinctions (metaphysically speaking). Instead, I'm calling into doubt that we can (rationally) be sure of/certain of such distinctions (and whether we need to be) which is an epistemological issue. So this reading of what Gangadean might be up again seems to offer no help in the current context.

I started out by presenting a conditional that even Gangadean himself would agree with (or at least consistency would require that of him).
If Gangadean fails to show that it is clear that we need clarity, then the Gangadeanian philosophy is a non-starter. 
And I've argued that the antecedent is true. He has yet to prove that either skepticism or nihilism follows from the lack of clarity. That means (by way of logical inference) that the consequent must be true. The Gangadeanian worldview is a non-starter. 


ps: I should add that in speaking with Christians, Gangadean sometimes connects the need for clarity to inexcusability, the controversial theological doctrine that all persons are held responsible by God for unbelief. But keep in mind that that approach isn't going to work in the context of the present challenges because he would need to presuppose certain parts of Christian theism (e.g., the theological doctrine of inexcusability) to argue for the need for clarity which is putting the cart in front of the horse.