Tuesday, January 15, 2019

Burton on What is Reason: On Gangadean's "First Principles"

Burton has a new article up entitled, "What is Reason?" There she makes the standard Gangadeanian claim that Reason is the laws of thought. I stress both 'claim' and 'is' here for a reason. As to the former, it's a claim in that it's truth-evaluable--meaning we can inquire into whether or not it's true and what reasons we might have for believing that it is. Secondly, there's an identity claim being made. What is being said is that Reason by its very nature is the law of identity, the law of excluded middle and the law of contradiction. So when we're inquiring into whether this Gangadanian slogan is true, we're asking whether we have sufficient reason to believe in their particular claim about the  nature of Reason. What is behind this identity claim? I'm not entirely sure. People use the word 'reason' in all sorts of ways. Sometimes it refers to a faculty, sometimes a process (as when you reason from P to Q), sometimes a justification or basis for a belief (as in, "the reason I believe P is R"). But the Gangadeanians seem to be thinking of Reason as a set of laws "governing" thought and that strikes me as peculiar. Why should anybody agree with this way of carving reality? The upshot: we shouldn't just let them take this proposal on faith. Instead we should ask them to rationally justify the proposal that Reason is the laws of thought.

======Skip this part if you don't want to get caught up in the weeds======

But there's more to question. What makes the "laws of thought" laws according to the Gangadeanians is that they hold without exception--which sort of follows from the identity claim. What they have in mind is that wherever there is a thought occurring, there is also the instantiation of what they call the laws of thought. You can't have thought without such an instantiation. In other words, all possible thought will by necessity instantiate or presuppose say, the law of identity (a is a). But what exactly does that mean? It's hard to say. They insist that anybody that is being intellectual honest will agree with it, but honestly, it's not very clear what it is that we are supposed to agree with. Just why a person that disagrees or fails to agree (note these are different doxastic states) is denying Reason is beyond me. I suspect that when we get to this level of abstraction, the Gangadeanians are prone to slippage. This is because presuppositions are more complicated than it would at first appear. People or epistemic subjects frequently presuppose a proposition in believing another or in arguing for another. In that sense of the word, to presuppose is to instance a kind of mental activity where you assume one thing to believe or argue for another. Let's call that the personal-sense of presupposition. Of course, two parties engaged in a debate can together presuppose a proposition too--if they take it for granted, or decide not to call it into question. And there are complexities here. To presuppose that 'a is a' in this sense need not be an "all or nothing," "one and done" affair. Two parties of a discussion might say that for the purposes of a particular discussion, they will not call into question some claim. That's a way for them to presuppose it. Thus presuppositions in this sense don't require belief or knowledge. Again if two people decide that for the purposes of a given talk, they are not going to call into question some claim, then they presuppose its truth without assenting to its truth. And what I've pointed out before is that contra what the Gangadeanians claim, meaningful discussions can occur even when two people don't come to fully endorse as true and exceptionless 'a is a'--as long as they assume it (decide not to call it into question).

On the other hand, there seems to be a more abstract, non-personal kind of presupposition which I think the Gangadeanians generally have in mind when they talk about all thought "presupposing the law of identity." I suspect they'd be inclined to say that every possible instance of thought *logically* depends on or presupposes the law of identity. That doesn't depend on any subject actually believing the law of identity or even deciding to assume it is true. But here again, it gets a bit difficult to understand what that's supposed to mean. Do you honestly have a strong grasp of what I've just said? Suppose that one thinks about this and finds not enough of a grasp of the ideas in order to honestly give assent. Does that make one intellectually dishonest? It is another Gangadeanian slogan that you can't agree/disagree (though you can be agnostic and fail to agree!) with a claim until you know what it means. Perhaps the Gangadeanians need to develop and communicate their fundamental ideas with more precision before accusing everyone else of being inconsistent or lacking integrity.

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Now even tabling these concerns, one might wonder how it is that the Gangadeanians come to "clarity" about the very nature of thought itself. Remember, by their lights, to know that something is clear to Reason, one must be able to show that it is by way of a sound proof which requires being able to show that the opposite is not possible. How can one show that the opposite is not possible when it comes to the claim that all possible thought presupposes the law of identity? Another way of making the point: if according to the Gangadeanians, Reason is the laws of thought, so that thought is not possible without say, the exceptionless truth of the law of identity, then to know what Reason is, is to know about the very nature of thought. But in all sincerity I wonder how one comes to achieve "clarity" about the nature of thought (which is to know about all possible thought--including perhaps the nature of God's thoughts, or the thoughts of angels, inasmuch as they have thoughts). What doesn't seem like a promising approach for the Gangadeanians here is to rest their case on their reflections about their own thoughts because that's a very small sample. Their claim isn't that all the thoughts that they themselves have considered presuppose the laws of identity. It's that all thoughts, period presuppose it. Can they prove it or show that the opposite is not possible? If not, what can they do while remaining true to their other committments? (Note it's not just an issue of hasty generalization, but also of why we should trust whatever reflections they have over their sample as veridical).

This brings us to Burton's latest article. In particular, she writes,
These laws are first principles and are assumed any time we think. They cannot be proven, but are the basis for any further proof. 
So her claim here is that there is no possibility of proving the law of identity as an exceptionless law of thought. That should be a red flag. I take it that she claims to know that the laws of thought are true, and so that means she's violated Gangadean's constraint that one can know a proposition only if, one is able to demonstrate or prove that it is true (which involves demonstrating that the opposite is not possible). What that means is that Gangadean allows that for at least some claims, we can know them without being able to prove them (or rule out even the possibility that they are false).

When someone starts to make exceptions to their own rules, the natural question to raise is whether the exceptions are principled or whether there's a worry of arbitrariness. If Gangadean is allowed to rest his case on what he claims are "first principles" that are unapologetically unproven, then why can't others (whom they are quick to criticize) proliferate principles that are also unproven and simply claim that no proof is required "because they make proof possible?"

The natural response from team Gangadean will be that they have a non-arbitrarily way to restrict what can rationally be taken for granted as a first principle. Namely, all and only that which makes proof (or thought) possible. But you should see why this is of no help in the current context. It only brings us back to what I've discussed above. We need only ask how it is that the Gangadeanians know (clearly) that the so called "laws of thought" make proof/thought possible. Again, employing their own theory of knowledge, to know a thing like this is to be able to demonstrate it by way of a sound argument. So, either they need to be able to prove that the law of identity makes proof or thought possible (i.e., that it is presupposed in all possible thought and proof) or else it's another first principle with no basis, taken on faith or intuition or something equally as problematic from the point of view of the Gangadeanians.

Remember that the reason Gangadean claims that we need his method (rational presuppositionalism) and clarity at the basic level is that he thinks we need to be able to rationally settle any and all disputes. (That's why he thinks it must be clear that God exists, if it isn't clear, then there's no way to objectively settle the dispute between theists and atheists and that's a serious problem). But what if someone sincerely disagrees with Gangadean about the laws of thought or Reason itself? What if they simply don't agree that all possible thought presupposes the law of identity? How can Gangadean rationally settle such a dispute? To invoke "first principles" which can't be proven at this point isn't to rationally settle any dispute. It's nothing more than saying to your opponent, "you're just wrong."

To be sure: I'm not saying I don't believe that 'a is a'. I'm not saying I don't know that 'a is a'. I'm not saying I don't think proof is possible. I'm merely pointing out that at the end of the day, the Gangadeanians rest their whole worldview on immediate judgments which aren't proven. That's what I tried to get Gangadean to see years ago to no avail. Since they like to criticize others for believing things without proof they need to figure out a way to harmonize this practice with the fact that they, too, ultimately depend on unproven (indeed, by Burton's admission, unprovable) assumptions. Otherwise they're just being hypocritical. And it seems like their approach is to invoke the claim that what they presuppose is the very laws of thought, which makes thinking possible. But again this is just another claim that might be true or false. Hence, we can ask the Gangadeanians about this further claim itself, whether it is something they know, whether it is provable, or whether it, too, makes proof or thought possible? Of course the claim that the law of identity makes thought possible, isn't a claim that itself makes thought possible--after all, it's a claim about what makes thought possible! So it must be provable then or else taken on faith or intuition or something of the sort--something problematic for the Gangadeanians.

Saturday, January 12, 2019

Fetishizing Clarity: disambiguating key terms.

Quick note: I've been spending an awful lot of time talking about knowledge and clarity in relation to the Gangadeanians. Part of the reason is that I think the cluster of related issues is the most fundamental of their worldview. Without it, they will have a hard time justifying why they have chosen to set themselves apart from the church at large. Without it, they will be hard pressed to explain why it is that they have pushed family members, former friends, former members (like myself) out of their fold. But it's also the case that this set of issues is among the more difficult to really understand. So I'm working on coming up with different angles in presenting the material in question. Ultimately, I hope to have a kind of master article which pulls all of this stuff which is covered in many of my articles together. I'm not only trying to be comprehensive, but I'm also figuring out how best to present the material for future projects that I have going on in the background. So bear with me and feel free to leave me feedback! Okay now for the substantive stuff...

This post has two parts. The first is my claim that the Gangadeanians have a strange fetish--a fetish for clarity of basic propositions. Not only that, but they are arguing that every human should share the same fetish. They believe that we all as rational animals, need clarity of basic things. So if you, like me, just don't see what all the fuss is about, then according to the Gangadeanians, you're being intellectually dishonest, self-referentially absurd, or denying reason in some important sense. The second is to try and introduce new terms as a way of disambiguating things. When people use the same words in importantly different ways, it helps to give the ideas behind them different labels and that's just what I think we should do with respect to 'skepticism,' 'knowledge,' 'nihilism,' and 'discussions.'

Just what is this clarity of which they speak? As I've noted before, it's not just what that word means when we (qua non-philosophers) use it. And it's not the feeling of full confidence. That's a psychological state. As best as I can tell, clarity is a property of propositions (e.g., that God exists). For some proposition to be clear is for there to be a sound argument which shows that the opposite is logically or metaphysically impossible. Now what gets tricky is that the Gangadeanians also relate clarity to knowledge and knowledge is not a property of propositions. Particular people know or don't know things.  Hence according to the Gangdeanians, a particular S knows that P only if S is able to show (prove) that the opposite of P is not possible (more on this below). That should be enough defining for now--let's get back to the question, must some things be clear to reason?

How does one go about showing that one denies reason insofar as they deny the need for clarity. Note the thesis that somethings must be clear is not the same as the claim that some thing are (actually) clear. To be sure, the two are related on at least one reading of 'must'. If we think that 'must' here means 'necessarily' so that the Gangadeanians are claiming that necessarily, some things are clear, then that entails that some things are actually clear. Just like 'necessarily, water is wet' entails that 'in actuality, water is wet.' (I won't bother you with how philosophers model such things in terms of possible world semantics, but feel free to ask if you like). But the entailment doesn't go in the other direction so the two claims are not equivalent. Generally, it's harder to prove a claim about what is necessarily the case than it is to prove a claim about what is actually the case because the former is logically stronger. So when the Gangadeanians try to prove that some things must be clear, they have their work cut out for them.

I started this post with a mention of a clarity-fetish and I've gone on to talking about proofs in relation to the thesis that necessarily, some things are clear. What's the relationship? Well, the way that the Gangadeanians try to prove that some things must be clear, is to appeal to what they think will logically follow if nothing is clear. As I've noted here and here, they argue that under the assumption that nothing is clear, we wouldn't be able to (coherently) do some stuff. What kind of stuff, exactly? This matters a whole lot. If they had merely shown that without clarity at the basic level, we couldn't coherently eat moon pies, or juggle 3 balls with one hand, or get a degree in art history, then they will not have proven much. That's because it isn't obvious that we all ought to care to achieve those things to begin with.

The Gangdaeanians claim that without clarity at the basic level (including clarity over basic distinctions), meaningful thought and talk are not possible. Sometimes they exploit this principle to stop a conversation by pointing out that their interlocutor can't coherently evaluate an argument because they don't agree that there is clarity at the basic level (because presumably, being able to evaluate an argument requires clarity of basic distinctions). I've already argued that they merely assert all of this (see the two links above). We haven't yet heard a non-circular or non-flat-footed response given for the thesis that without clarity, meaningful thought and talk are not possible. The mere possibility that an argument is a non-argument doesn't preclude one from believing (even to a high degree) that an argument is an argument rather than a non-argument. And if you believe to a high degree that 'a is a', there's nothing preventing you from evaluating arguments, coherently making distinctions, forming beliefs, and even coming to know things.

Tabling those considerations for now, there's another concern here. Suppose we grant the Gangdaeanians their contentious claim that we can't have intelligible/meaningful thought or talk without clarity at the basic level. I contend that even granting them this dubious and unsupported claim, there's still a question about why we should care about intelligible/meaningful thought or talk in the sense that they are using those expressions.  That is to say, maybe we can't have whatever kind of intelligible thought or talk they have in mind, but insofar as their notion of meaningful thought and talk is idiosyncratic, maybe we just need not worry ourselves about it. If it turns out to be like more like juggling, majoring in art history, or eating moon pies, then we need not be bothered even if we can't have it. Some people like them and other people don't. But it's not like we can demonstrate that all rational persons must desire or care about those very things.

To appreciate this worry I propose that we disambiguate some key expressions.

Here are some standard terms that philosophers at large frequently use and which are important for our purposes.

Skepticism: the view that knowledge is not possible.
Nihilism: the view that there is no meaning in the world.

Philosophers also engage in meaningful discussions regularly as a way of getting to some true picture of the world or at least to a close approximation. Outside of the Gangadeanians, I know of no philosopher that thinks we need certainty or clarity at the basic level or at any level in order for our discussions to have a point, or to be intelligible, or meaningful.

The thing is the Gangadeanians use these same common terms, but as recent posts and conversations have shown us, they seem to mean different things by these terms than the rest of us. That complicates matters and I suspect they do this on purpose as a way of deceiving their listeners. Think of a trojan horse from Greek mythology. During the Trojan war, legend has it that the people of Troy were presented with what looked to be a harmless wooden horse. Unfortunately, for them only after they accepted it within their walls did they learn that it hid a Trojan army. The Gangadaenians do this with words--hoping their listeners will agree to their arguments by using plain terms, without being upfront about how what they mean by those words is actually different in important ways from common parlance or even regular philosopher-speak. Then bad arguments which hinge on the Gangadeanian definitions are used to fight off objections. As such I think it's important from the start to think of the Gangdeanians as having their own lexicon. To make this explicit I want to introduce new labels which I'll try to start incorporating in my discussions.

Clarity-Skepticism: the view that knowledge which entails clarity, is not possible.
Clarity-Nihilism: the view that the sort of meaning which requires clarity is not possible.
Clarity-Requiring-Discussions: A special kind of dialogue that requires clarity at the basic level in order to be intelligible.

The three are intimately related for the Gangadeanians. Clarity-requiring-discussions seem to have a very particular point--it's dialogue aimed at getting to epistemic certainty. That's why they seem to think that if you don't have clarity at the basic level, there's no point in talking or thinking and that the very possibility of coherent discussion are impossible. And I think the picture of the relationship between the three is something like this: you start with basic claims which you know with absolute certainty, and then you proceed in having these certainty-requiring discussions in order to get more certainty--that way, you avoid clarity-skepticism and clarity-nihilism.

As you see, the two sets of terms appear to get at very different ideas. What follows from the possibility that some things are not clear is not skepticism or nihilism per se, but rather clarity-skepticism and clarity-nihilism. And it's not that no meaningful or intelligible dialogue is possible without clarity at the basic level, but rather only a special kind of discussion--the kind that requires epistemic certainty in the first place i.e., the kind that aims at clarity. 

Anderson's recent remarks about "retrieving knowledge" suggests that he would disagree with what I've said. He would say that the "correct" or "true definition" of knowledge just entails certainty and so skepticism (as the view that knowledge is not possible) just is clarity-skepticism as I've labeled it. I think he'd go so far as to say that philosophers (who don't think you need clarity for knowledge) have changed the definition of knowledge in an objectionable way. But the question is, can he prove so much? Can he use rational presuppositionalism and show that his definition is correct and that the rest of us philosophers have got it wrong? I highly doubt it.

Alternatively, we have a value question before us. Should we care at all if clarity-skepticism follows from our assumptions? Or what about clarity-nihilism? Furthermore, should we care at all if we can't have the kinds of discussions that Gangadean et al. insist we can't have if we don't have clarity at the basic level (i.e., certainty-requiring-discussions)? I don't see why. If we can have intelligible discussion, avoid skepticism and nihilism all without "clarity" at the basic level, then we need not worry ourselves with avoiding clarity-skepticism, clarity-nihilism and clarity-requiring-discussions. If the Gangadeanians are insisting that we'd be missing out on something important, they should explain what that is.

Keep in mind that I was kicked out of their church not because I didn't believe that 'a is a'. I was kicked out because I wouldn't agree with the claim that it's impossible for us to be wrong about 'a is a'. In fact, I was even willing to say, we need not bother ourselves with calling into question trivialities like 'a is a'. That is to say, my view was that we should just assume it or presume it to be true and move on with our lives. But that just wasn't enough for Gangadean. This is what I mean by fetishizing clarity.



Thursday, January 10, 2019

Fact Checking the Gangadeanians on Twitter.

My ventures into twitter have been interesting. So far, Anderson and Burton while refusing to talk to me (which would require actually doing philosophy) have opted to talk about me by way of ridicule and to dismiss me as a troll.







I guess, by their lights, this is a suitable way for professors and professing Christians to behave. I'd rather spend my time on substantive issues. 

What I find striking and what I hope you see is how they have misrepresented my views. I suspect that the Gangadeanians by in large are ignorant of what my views actually are because they are likely instructed by Gangadean not to read my blog. Instead I suspect they receive the "cliffs notes" version from the likes of Burton and Anderson. Given how Burton and Anderson are in the business of creating caricatures of my views, this is a sad state of affairs. 

Fact Check:

Anderson tweets that I deny that we can know that a is a (i.e., a triviality). That's wrong. I know that a is a. I think you do, too. I think we know lots and lots of things. Where Anderson and I differ is on what counts as knowing. He assumes (without argument) that knowing something requires that you are able to show that the opposite is not even possible. That is to say, for you to count as knowing that you have hands, you need to be able to rehearse, among other things, Gangadean's proof of the external world. Anybody that isn't able to do so won't count as knowing they have hands. I say, there are things you know which you aren't able to prove in that manner. That doesn't entail that I deny knowledge. Instead quite the opposite is true. I affirm that we know all kinds of things--in fact, much more than Anderson allows. I just think that Anderson's theory of knowledge is a bad one and at the very least something he needs to prove as correct.

Anderson's, "incorrigible memory lapses" comment is meant to be a jab at me, as is Burton's statement that she can't remember. Again this is predicated on a misrepresentation of my views. I once argued that the possibility that our memory isn't reliable is not something we can rule out by way of any proof. We needn't bother ourselves with the details. What matters is what I took to be the moral of that argument. I wasn't saying that skepticism wins just because it's remotely possible that our memory (which we depend on in evaluating an argument to store content) is unreliable. Instead, my claim was that the rational response is to rely on our memory presumptively--that is, to suppose that it is innocent until proven guilty. And I was trying to show Gangadean that he, too relied on such a presumption unless he could somehow prove all the occasions in which his memory couldn't possibly fail him. In turn the point was to see if such a presumption was compatible with his views concerning what it takes to know things (clearly).

Burton tweets that I don't think proofs are possible. Wrong again. I think that many of the arguments which the Gangadeanians claim to be proofs are unsound. But that's not the same as saying no proof is possible. Does Burton think that Gangadeanian "proofs" are the only "proofs" that there are so that if their arguments fail, no arguments can possibly succeed? Burton needs to mind her quantifiers. The claim that some purported proofs fail is not the same as saying that all purported proofs must fail. Again, this is a very simple distinction that a professor who purports to be retrieving knowledge and renewing philosophy should be able to keep straight.



Anderson also represents my view as positively believing that we can't have certainty that 'a is a'. That's sort of a half truth. It's correct only if by 'certain' we mean just what the Gangadeanians mean by it. It's wrong if by 'certain' he means what the rest of us mean by it. So Anderson is trading on an ambiguity which they themselves have created. I'm certain that 'a is a,' but I don't pretend to be able to prove that a is a or to be able to show that the opposite is impossible. I don't think you can (or even need to) prove such trivialities. More importantly, I argue that the Gangadeanian's have offered no such proof.

Finally, what is this bit about "Ad populum"? Anderson seems to be claiming that I have appealed to the fact that philosophers disagree with them about something and that that was proof that the Gangadeanians were wrong. My best guess is that he's referring to my challenge to his theory of knowledge. I have said many times before that most philosophers disagree with their account of what counts as knowing. But that's not an ad populum if you understand the upshot of my observation. I'm not arguing, "because the majority of philosophers disagree with Anderson's theory of knowledge, therefore, it is wrong." Instead I'm merely pointing out that there is disagreement over which theory of knowledge is correct and so the Gangadeanians can't just take for granted that they have a monopoly on the concept or term. Since the Gangadeanians claim that Rational Presuppositionalism can settle all disputes, they had better explain how they can settle this dispute about what is the nature of knowledge.