I've been toying with the idea of hosting a live chat on matters relating to Gangadeanianism. One of the reasons being that I find blogging fairly restricting in that it's not the most conducive for dialogue. Among other things, this leaves much more room for misunderstandings. I'm not sure how many of you would be interested in this sort of thing, but it would be a refreshing change for me.
In any event, if any of you has an idea of what platform might work best for this kind of chat, please send me a comment or email (reasoniidoubt@gmail.com). It would be best if people could participate in the chat without having to download/install any software or go through much of a sign up process and I think anonymity would be important, too. Currently, I'm leaning towards Reddit, but it looks like I would need to create a subbreddit in order to host a chat and that requires that I have an account that is at least 30days old (I don't) and that I have reached some unknown threshold of "karma" (I haven't).
A critical examination of the basic beliefs of Surrendra Gangadean, Owen Anderson and Westminster Fellowship Phoenix, AZ.
Tuesday, December 11, 2018
Friday, December 7, 2018
More from Anderson on Youtube
There's been a bit more action on youtube between Spencer and Anderson. But as I suspected, Anderson has again managed to avoid presenting an answer to the original objection.
To set the stage a bit: Anderson recently asked Spencer if he affirmed that "reason is ontological" that is to say, that our thinking at least sometimes tells us about the world as it were (as opposed to just our thoughts). And Spencer made some remarks that made Anderson (and me) think he didn't affirm that reason was ontological. To that, Anderson claimed they had no basis for further dialogue, because Spencer wouldn't be in a position to make basic distinctions and so he wouldn't be in a position to evaluate any arguments. Since that time Spencer has responded quite unequivocally. He wrote,
To set the stage a bit: Anderson recently asked Spencer if he affirmed that "reason is ontological" that is to say, that our thinking at least sometimes tells us about the world as it were (as opposed to just our thoughts). And Spencer made some remarks that made Anderson (and me) think he didn't affirm that reason was ontological. To that, Anderson claimed they had no basis for further dialogue, because Spencer wouldn't be in a position to make basic distinctions and so he wouldn't be in a position to evaluate any arguments. Since that time Spencer has responded quite unequivocally. He wrote,
@Owen Anderson But we do agree that the laws of thought are ontological. I've said in this thread that I "believe" and "agree" that 'a is a' applies to reality and is universal. So you're just wrong to say that "we don't agree on whether the laws of thought are also laws of being (ontological)."
Our difference seems to be on the epistemic status of our belief that reason is ontological. I think it's a presupposition of experience, or perhaps a non-inferential intuition. You think it's "clear to reason", meaning, you can show, without relying on intuition or a mere brute starting point, that reason is ontological. I'm asking what that demonstration looks like. Do you have an argument?
If you insist that the only coherent "common ground" is one where we can demonstrate that reason is ontological, it would seem that you shoulder the burden to show why that's necessary. You haven't done that. Thus, it's a loaded assumption on your part to maintain that we "know" (it's "clear to reason") or that we must "know" that reason is ontological, without showing it first.
To be clear, my asking you to show how it is that you know reason is ontological without appealing to intuition or common sense is not the same as me denying that reason is ontological.So it's quite obvious from this passage that he agrees with my position in that he affirms that reason is ontological even though he doesn't necessarily buy the other Gangadeanian baggage of thinking we can or even must have certainty about such matters (i.e,. the principle of clarity and the need for clarity).
Anderson has just responded with:
Spencer Hawkins No I don't think I'm wrong that we disagree. Here's what you said above:"To answer your question, I do, in a sense, "affirm" or "know" that 'a is a' beyond my own experience, but not in the way that you're assuming. I don't claim to be deductively certain when I claim to "affirm" or "know" the meaning of terms, the consistency that the world takes, and so on. I think human knowledge is fallible and the quest for a foundationalist (internalist) basis in incorrigible or infallible certainty is a lost cause." (Emphasis mine).
We can't know whether "eternal" is "non-eternal" so we can't assess the argument together.This comment doesn't reflect the attitude of someone that is engaged in an honest dialogue. He quotes something Spencer said several comments back without paying attention to Spencer's explicit remarks in the latest comment. If there is a tension between what Spencer has just said and what he said before, someone who was pursuing a philosophical conversation in good faith would ask their interlocutor to clarify their position as opposed to assuming the most self serving and uncharitable reading. He should have asked Spencer which of the two comments in tension really represents his view and also allow him to revise his positions. What matters is what Spencer believes not whether he's perfectly clear or consistent in what he says. Again it's not hard and Anderson should know better. What this looks like to me is someone who is trying to avoid answering a challenge and trying to save face in the process because he's been called out.
In fact it's worse than all of that. In the older comment that Anderson cites, Spencer clearly states that there is a sense in which he affirms or knows that 'a is a'. So there isn't even a tension between that comment and his latest remarks. But he adds that it isn't "knowledge" according to Anderson and Gangadean (which entails certainty). As I've noted before, the Gangadeanians have a quirky definition or analysis of 'knowledge' which they merely stipulate. I say it's quirky because the rest of us philosophers simply disagree. And they don't ever bother to justify their definition which is to say they never answer the question, "how are you certain that your definition or analysis of 'knowledge' is correct?" So when Anderson ends with, "We can't know whether "eternal" is "non-eternal" so we can't assess the argument together" he's using the verb 'know' to track the Gangadeanian definition which requires certainty. And by Spencer's own admission, he doesn't agree to that. But what Anderson needs to explain now is why we need that kind of knowledge (certainty) in order to assess an argument.
Anderson is right that if we can't know with Gangadeanian certainty whether eternal is non-eternal, then we can't know with Gangadeanian certainty whether an argument employing those notions is sound or not. Nobody is doubting that. But this triviality is simply of no consequence.
In contrast, if we can have knowledge without Gangadeanian certainty (which the VAST majority of philosophers accept) then we can know without Gangadeanian certainty whether eternal is non-eternal and we can assess arguments which employ those concepts just fine. So what the Gangadeanians owe us is an argument for why we need Gangadeanian certainty or Gangadeanian-Knowledge in the first place. If you're thinking this relates closely with some of my other recent posts, you're right. It's all connected to the idea of clarity. As I've been stressing for some time, the Gangadeanians have simply failed to demonstrate the principle of clarity (that some things are clear) and the need for clarity (that some things must be clear), which is to say they've fail to show that the core principles at the center of their entire worldview are clear to reason.
Wednesday, December 5, 2018
Kelly Fitzsimmons Burton on the Principle of Clarity
A new talk has been posted on one of the Gangadean affiliated sites on the principle of clarity-- i.e., the claim that some things are clear to reason. The last time I linked a talk by Burton I noted how she claims to simply take the principle for granted and wasn't in a position to show that it was true. In this latest talk she attempts to show that it's true or to provide definitive grounds for us to accept it. Hence, confusion persists about just what is her official position--maybe she's still working things out?
The most recent talk adds to the confusion in another way in that she begins her remarks by emphasizing that the principle of clarity is a "first-principle" or "starting point." What's peculiar about that statement is that philosophers don't normally try to demonstrate that their "first principles" or "starting points" are true--they simply take them for granted (usually on the basis of intuition) much akin to the axioms of mathematical systems which you use to prove other things, but don't prove within the system itself. This would be compatible with her initial claim in the previous talk that she isn't in a position to show that the principle of clarity was true. But then again she proceeds to try and prove that it is true which is the topic of this post.
In any event, either approach works against the Gangadeanians. This is because the argument that Burton provides (which is one I've already criticized before) is a bad one. So, either they accept the principle as an article of faith, or they stand behind it on the basis of a bad argument--whichever way they go, it seems that they fail to satisfy the very standards of rigor with which they are quick to burden others.
A quick word about the structure of Burton's argument. It looks to be a reductio ad absurdum. In this sort of argument you have a claim that you want to prove say, P (in this case, P = some things are clear to reason). The manner in which you get to proving P is by starting with its denial (not-P). If you can derive, a contradiction by starting with not-P and nothing more than uncontroversially true premises and valid rules of inference, then you've just proven that not-P is false (or that P is true). As we'll see in a moment, unfortunately for Burton's argument, the premises are not all uncontroversially true.
Also keep in mind that for something to be clear according to the Gangadeanian lexicon is for the opposite to be (determined as) impossible in the strongest sense. This is the manner in which clarity relates to the burden of proof for the Gangadeanians--to show that P is clear you have to demonstrate by way of a sound argument that not-P couldn't possibly be true. So in evaluating Burton's argument you shouldn't employ the ordinary everyday notion of 'clear.' For instance, I'd say that it's perfectly clear (in the mundane sense) that I am currently typing on a computer. Here, I'm using the word like most competent English speakers to denote something like "obvious." But I have to admit that it's at least remotely possible that I'm in a matrix like scenario so that there is in fact no computer and thus no typing and instead only the experience as if I'm typing on a computer (because I'm plugged into the output of a sophisticated program). So on Gangadean's view of things, it wouldn't be clear to reason that I am currently typing on a computer even though on the more ordinary notion, it remains obvious/clear that I am so typing because remote possibilities of that sort are just intuitively too ridiculous to take seriously. That's the sense of the word to keep in mind. Note: things would be different if I could somehow prove that I'm typing on a computer (i.e., if I could show that it's literally impossible for me to be in a matrix like scenario) which is something Gangadean attempts, but fails to do in his book. Okay enough with the prelims., here's the argument presented by Burton.
To begin, premise (4) is interesting. Notice how Burton includes "it seems like" in presenting (4). We normaly call that a "hedge"--that is, it flags a lack of full confidence in what follows. Why does Burton employ it if she's after demonstrating the principle of clarity? I'm not sure. Again more confusion. What is more, I wonder if what Burton is tracking here is the fact that it isn't obvious how such a thing is to be known by the Gangadeanians given their standards of proof and knowledge. Is it somehow self-attesting or self-evident that thought and talk are possible? If so, how is it that one goes about determining that something is "self-attesting" or "self-evident"? Or does it all boil down to just another basic intuition which the Gangadeanian's refer to by a different name? And just to anticipate a mistaken response, when I ask how it is that Burton or any Gangadeanian for that matter knows that (4) is true, I'm not thereby saying that I believe (4) is false. I'm merely inquiring into whether the Gangadeanian system is internally consistent and can get the advertised results.
The real stinker in this argument is Premise (3). There's no justification given for it and it's doing all of the heavy lifting. Just why is meaningful thought and talk impossible if we can't "make clear distinctions"? Burton doesn't say. The crucial word here is 'clear' as it features in Premise (3). The claim isn't that intelligible thought and talk are impossible if we can't make distinctions per se, but rather that intelligible thought and talk are impossible if we can't make clear distinctions. So what does it mean that we can't (consistently) make clear distinctions as opposed to that we can't make distinctions simpliciter? Since epistemic certainty is the thing at issue with this argument, what the Gangadeanian means is that in doubting clarity at the basic level, one cannot be absolutely certain that the distinctions one's draws are correct or reflect reality. I agree. But this is of no help to the Gangadeanians in establishing the truth of Premise (3).
You see, I can sort of see how if one is rationally unable to make basic distinctions per se, that intelligible thought and talk might be threatened. But what I don't see why we need to make clear distinctions. Or in other words, why must we be certain that our distinctions track reality in order to have intelligible thought and talk. Why do we need certainty or clarity for meaningful thought and talk to be possible? This is the central claim that needs to be shown for the argument to work. Premise (3) needs to be proven rather than merely taken for granted.
For good measure: Can Burton just drop the word 'clear' as I have done in my discussion so that Premise (3) changes to the following:
[note, I'm glossing over the fact that Burton's presentation of the argument is actually missing a premise between (3) and (4) namely, the premise that meaningful thought and talk are not possible--or in the above schematic, 'R'. That's the only way you get a contradiction which is required for a reductio ab absurdum to be valid. The sharp reader will notice that I spoke of the contradiction as implicit--and now you know why!]
If you change the wording of Premise (3) in the way required to make it more tenable (by dropping the word 'clear') you change the meaning of it. It would then be like changing 'Q' as it occurs Premise (3)' to some other letter not yet occurring in the above schema like 'T'. In which case, it becomes invalid and there's no reductio ad absurdum to speak of.
The most recent talk adds to the confusion in another way in that she begins her remarks by emphasizing that the principle of clarity is a "first-principle" or "starting point." What's peculiar about that statement is that philosophers don't normally try to demonstrate that their "first principles" or "starting points" are true--they simply take them for granted (usually on the basis of intuition) much akin to the axioms of mathematical systems which you use to prove other things, but don't prove within the system itself. This would be compatible with her initial claim in the previous talk that she isn't in a position to show that the principle of clarity was true. But then again she proceeds to try and prove that it is true which is the topic of this post.
In any event, either approach works against the Gangadeanians. This is because the argument that Burton provides (which is one I've already criticized before) is a bad one. So, either they accept the principle as an article of faith, or they stand behind it on the basis of a bad argument--whichever way they go, it seems that they fail to satisfy the very standards of rigor with which they are quick to burden others.
A quick word about the structure of Burton's argument. It looks to be a reductio ad absurdum. In this sort of argument you have a claim that you want to prove say, P (in this case, P = some things are clear to reason). The manner in which you get to proving P is by starting with its denial (not-P). If you can derive, a contradiction by starting with not-P and nothing more than uncontroversially true premises and valid rules of inference, then you've just proven that not-P is false (or that P is true). As we'll see in a moment, unfortunately for Burton's argument, the premises are not all uncontroversially true.
Also keep in mind that for something to be clear according to the Gangadeanian lexicon is for the opposite to be (determined as) impossible in the strongest sense. This is the manner in which clarity relates to the burden of proof for the Gangadeanians--to show that P is clear you have to demonstrate by way of a sound argument that not-P couldn't possibly be true. So in evaluating Burton's argument you shouldn't employ the ordinary everyday notion of 'clear.' For instance, I'd say that it's perfectly clear (in the mundane sense) that I am currently typing on a computer. Here, I'm using the word like most competent English speakers to denote something like "obvious." But I have to admit that it's at least remotely possible that I'm in a matrix like scenario so that there is in fact no computer and thus no typing and instead only the experience as if I'm typing on a computer (because I'm plugged into the output of a sophisticated program). So on Gangadean's view of things, it wouldn't be clear to reason that I am currently typing on a computer even though on the more ordinary notion, it remains obvious/clear that I am so typing because remote possibilities of that sort are just intuitively too ridiculous to take seriously. That's the sense of the word to keep in mind. Note: things would be different if I could somehow prove that I'm typing on a computer (i.e., if I could show that it's literally impossible for me to be in a matrix like scenario) which is something Gangadean attempts, but fails to do in his book. Okay enough with the prelims., here's the argument presented by Burton.
(1) Nothing is clear to reason. [Assumed for Reductio]The implicit contradiction is found between (3) and (4). So that's supposed to be grounds to deny premise (1) which is to prove that some things are clear to reason i.e., the principle of clarity.
(2) If nothing is clear, then no distinctions are clear.
(3) If we can't make clear distinctions, then (meaningful) thought and talk are impossible.
(4) But it seems like (meaningful) thought and talk are possible.
(5) Thus, some things are clear.
To begin, premise (4) is interesting. Notice how Burton includes "it seems like" in presenting (4). We normaly call that a "hedge"--that is, it flags a lack of full confidence in what follows. Why does Burton employ it if she's after demonstrating the principle of clarity? I'm not sure. Again more confusion. What is more, I wonder if what Burton is tracking here is the fact that it isn't obvious how such a thing is to be known by the Gangadeanians given their standards of proof and knowledge. Is it somehow self-attesting or self-evident that thought and talk are possible? If so, how is it that one goes about determining that something is "self-attesting" or "self-evident"? Or does it all boil down to just another basic intuition which the Gangadeanian's refer to by a different name? And just to anticipate a mistaken response, when I ask how it is that Burton or any Gangadeanian for that matter knows that (4) is true, I'm not thereby saying that I believe (4) is false. I'm merely inquiring into whether the Gangadeanian system is internally consistent and can get the advertised results.
The real stinker in this argument is Premise (3). There's no justification given for it and it's doing all of the heavy lifting. Just why is meaningful thought and talk impossible if we can't "make clear distinctions"? Burton doesn't say. The crucial word here is 'clear' as it features in Premise (3). The claim isn't that intelligible thought and talk are impossible if we can't make distinctions per se, but rather that intelligible thought and talk are impossible if we can't make clear distinctions. So what does it mean that we can't (consistently) make clear distinctions as opposed to that we can't make distinctions simpliciter? Since epistemic certainty is the thing at issue with this argument, what the Gangadeanian means is that in doubting clarity at the basic level, one cannot be absolutely certain that the distinctions one's draws are correct or reflect reality. I agree. But this is of no help to the Gangadeanians in establishing the truth of Premise (3).
You see, I can sort of see how if one is rationally unable to make basic distinctions per se, that intelligible thought and talk might be threatened. But what I don't see why we need to make clear distinctions. Or in other words, why must we be certain that our distinctions track reality in order to have intelligible thought and talk. Why do we need certainty or clarity for meaningful thought and talk to be possible? This is the central claim that needs to be shown for the argument to work. Premise (3) needs to be proven rather than merely taken for granted.
For good measure: Can Burton just drop the word 'clear' as I have done in my discussion so that Premise (3) changes to the following:
(3)* If we can't make distinctions, then (meaningful) thought and talk are impossible.As I've just said (3)* is intuitively more agreeable than (3). Unfortunately, that won't work either. Doing so would render Burton's argument invalid. The argument's validity depends crucially on an inference rule called "hypothetical syllogism" which requires a kind of matching up of the consequent of one premise with the antecedent of the subsequent premise. To illustrate, let's take a schematic version of Burton's argument using letters to stand for sentences.
(1)' ~P (assume)Notice that 'Q' occurs in the consequent of Premise (2)' and the antecedent of Premise (3)'. If it were not so, the argument wouldn't be valid.
(2)' If ~P, then Q.
(3)' If Q, then R.
(4)' ~R
(5)' Thus, P.
[note, I'm glossing over the fact that Burton's presentation of the argument is actually missing a premise between (3) and (4) namely, the premise that meaningful thought and talk are not possible--or in the above schematic, 'R'. That's the only way you get a contradiction which is required for a reductio ab absurdum to be valid. The sharp reader will notice that I spoke of the contradiction as implicit--and now you know why!]
If you change the wording of Premise (3) in the way required to make it more tenable (by dropping the word 'clear') you change the meaning of it. It would then be like changing 'Q' as it occurs Premise (3)' to some other letter not yet occurring in the above schema like 'T'. In which case, it becomes invalid and there's no reductio ad absurdum to speak of.
(1)'' ~PSo Burton's "proof" for the principle of clarity, fails. It fails not only because Burton on pain of inconsistency shouldn't help herself to Premise (4), but more importantly because she needs to prove Premise (3). That is, she needs a sufficient answer the following: why do we need to make clear/certain distinctions for meaningful thought or talk to be possible? The only other way out is to render her argument invalid.
(2)'' If ~P, then Q.
(3)'' If T, then R.
(4)'' ~R
(5)'' Thus, P.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)