This isn't a true FAQ because I don't often get these questions from my readers. Still, I continue to hear a small set of mistaken objections from team-Gangadean which indicates to me that they haven't taken much care to understand my views and as a result they keep punching at a scarecrow. I've dedicated entire articles to many of these points, but this is sort of a quick point of reference. I also think it's helpful to see all of these points together within the context of an imagined conversation. It's also just a start. I imagine that I will continue adding to it. If you have any specific questions of this sort, feel free to comment or email me.
1. Are you a skeptic?
If we understand a skeptic as one that denies the very possibility of knowledge, then my simple answer is No, I'm not a skeptic. But some nuancing at this point is warranted. I find that Gangadeanians often equivocate on the word 'knowledge' (and cognates) in order to strawman my position. Remember, between Gangadean and me, there are at least two notions of knowledge at play, but his camp tends to speak as if everyone uses the word in the way that Gangadean does. So when they say that I am a skeptic because I deny the very possibility of knowledge, they've got in mind Gangadean's account of knowledge. Roughly, Gangadean thinks that knowledge entails epistemic certainty. He's an infallibilist (and an internalist) about knowledge which means that knowing P requires (among other things) that it's impossible for you to be wrong about P (or that you've determined that it's impossible for P to be false). So as it concerns his account of 'knowledge', I lean towards skepticism. I'm still not a full-blown skeptic even on his definition of knowledge because I think it's at least possible that such certainty could be achieved, but importantly, Gangadean hasn't shown us a consistent way of achieving it. Notice on Gangadean's account of knowledge, most philosophers and probably most people, count as skeptics or at least lean towards skepticism like me. So when they apply that label to me, it's no cause for worry once we've made explicit what it means from the mouth of a Gangadeanian. On the other hand, if we think that knowledge doesn't require infallibility and certainty (even if it requires justification, truth and belief), then I'm far from a skeptic. In fact, I take myself and everyone else to know all kinds of things. In short, it largely depends on what you mean by knowledge and thus what you mean by a skeptic. One thing I do argue is that if Gangadean is being honest and consistent, he ought to be a skeptic by his own lights.
2. Given that you guys disagree about the definition of knowledge, isn't it just your word against his?
Well, if so, then that alone would undermine his project since he demands that his most basic beliefs are such that they can't possibly be false and that they be determined to be so (given his internalism). If we actually have no way of determining for instance, which theory of knowledge is preferable, then that would do considerable damage to Gangadean's project of showing that basic things are "clear to reason." Furthermore, I think there is much more to say in favor of my fallibilist view (actually it's the standard view in philosophy) than there is as it concerns his view. Of course, if the best we can do at this point is compare the pro's and con's of each theory against one another (no doubt a fallible process), then that too threatens Gangadean's project to show that basic things are clear to reason. Either way, it's a problem for him and not me (because I don't care about certainty) which is why the burden of proof rests squarely on his shoulders.
3. Wait so are you certain that certainty is not possible and isn't that self-undermining or self-referentially absurd?
That would (intuitively) be a self-referentially absurd position. Fortunately, I don't claim to be certain that certainty is not possible. To harbor and express doubts about Gangadean's claims to certainty doesn't mean that I am certain that certainty is not possible or even that I doubt in the possibility of certainty per se. You've got to be careful to resist the false dichotomy that the Gangadeanians are often guilty of. Now it turns out that I'm very doubtful, but at least open to the possibility that humans can achieve something like epistemic certainty. But the point is, even if such certainty is in fact possible, it doesn't follow that Gangadean's "rational presuppositionalism" is the way to it and indeed I argue that it's not.
4. Do you deny reason?
Well, according to Gangadean, I do, but that's just because Gangadean has basically stipulated a theory of reason so that anybody that disagrees with his views counts as denying reason. I'm always curious how so much of his book is dedicated to telling all of us just what reason (in itself, in it's use and in us) is, without ever explaining to us how he knows so much about reason and why we should take his word for it. It's very easy to come up with taxonomies of this sort because they amount to nothing more than mere assertions. The more difficult question which he doesn't ever bother to tackle is why we should think he's correct.
Now as far as I'm concerned, his worldview at its core is internally inconsistent or based on poor reasoning. For instance, he appeals to a false dichotomy in his argument for God's existence, he appeals to scientific findings and induction to "deductively prove" that matter is not eternal all the while arguing for a skepticism about empirical knowledge, he begs the question against the atheist in giving his theodicy, he decries the use of unjustified presumptions, common sense and intuitions while using them himself and he has one of the worst arguments I've seen for the existence of an external world. To me, intuitively, using reason minimally requires avoiding inconsistencies and poor argumentation. The difference between me and Gangadean is that I don't pretend to have some special access to the very nature of reason so my claims about reason are tentative and open to revision. I'm guessing most of my readers (including Gangadeanians) will agree that inconsistency and poor reasoning are contrary to reason and that's enough for my point. Thus on that sort of minimal picture of reason, Gangadean seems to be the one denying reason. Remember, I don't just assert this, I show it throughout this blog.
5. Do you deny the Aristotelian "laws of thought"?
No, at least if by 'denying' you mean that I believe them to be false. I sometimes don't know what to think of the law of excluded middle to be honest due to the problem of vague predicates, but at least as it concerns the law of identity and the law of non-contradiction, I am quite sure that they are true and exceptionless. By the same token, I wouldn't bet my life on that either, which indicates that my subjective confidence in them is something less than absolute. This is because to the best of my self-knowledge, they are the sorts of propositions which I believe on the basis of an intellectual seeming that is to say, I think about them and they just strike me as true (note, I don't really know what Gangadean means when he claims they are "self-attesting" so I won't go there). This best describes what I take to be why I believe in them i.e., my epistemic relation to the laws of thought. It isn't anything like proof. It's intuition.
So to be clear, I believe them, am fairly confident in them, but I don't take myself to have epistemic certainty with respect to them which is why my subjective confidence is less than absolute. In practice, if I ever encounter a theory or argument that in some way suggests that these laws are false or with exception, then I'm going to be skeptical of the theory or argument. By the same token, if some magic genie were to offer me a wager so that if these "laws of thought" are categorically true, I win 100 bucks, and if there is at least one exception, then I die an agonizing death, I would turn down that bet, even though I'd like 100 bucks as much as the next person. Of course, the crucial point here isn't merely about my betting dispositions, or of my subjective confidence in the laws of thought. As far as I can tell, Gangadean conflates subjective certainty with epistemic certainty as if the former entails the latter, but the two are distinct (you can for instance accept a deductive argument for a conclusion as sound, and nevertheless not feel sure about the conclusion). To reiterate, my point is that the reason I don't feel subjectively certain is at least in part, because I believe or affirm the laws of thought on the basis of intuition or because they "strike" me as true rather than because I've got anything like proof. Sure I can't imagine how they might turn out false, but it's at least possible that this is merely a limitation of my imagination. So it's straight up false that I deny the laws of thought. Gangadeanians are rather sloppy when they accuse me of denying the laws of thought. They sometimes get away with this because according to them you either wholeheartedly, with epistemic and subjective certainty, affirm the laws of thought or else you deny them and there's no more to the story. But what I'm suggesting is that this is a false dichotomy. See next question.
6. So it seems like you affirm the laws of thought after all.
Well, 'affirm' is another loaded expression for Gangadean. I agree or believe that the laws of thought are true (again a bit less with the law of excluded middle even though I tend to think it's right). I even take myself to know that they are, but again I wouldn't bet my life on them. The way I see it, there are many ways to affirm a proposition. The way Gangadean sets things up you either affirm something or you don't where affirming amounts to knowing it infallibly and/or with epistemic certainty. And he get's a lot of mileage out of this false dichotomy against his critics. But I think affirming a proposition is a much more complicated mental state or attitude. For instance, I affirm the proposition that I exist, differently than I do the proposition that I won't be hit by a meteor in the next hour. I affirm them both and I believe both of them. But I believe and affirm them for different reasons or via difference processes for example, the former I know via intuition and the second I know via induction. As a result, if I were forced to gamble on either of them, I'd wager much more (and at worse odds) with the former than the latter. In other words, I believe and affirm one more than the other or I am more confident in one than the other. But make no mistake, I affirm them both.
Now for Gangadean, affirming P = being fully certain that P and you should be wiling to bet the farm on P (at least if you're being rational). So on that fleshing out of 'affirm', I don't affirm the laws of thought. But on a more reasonable and common understanding of 'affirm' where one can affirm P by believing it (and to varying degrees), I do affirm them. In fact, I affirm them with a significant degree of confidence, and take myself to know that they are true, even if I wouldn't bet my life on them and even if I don't claim that they are clear in the sense that I've somehow determined that it is simply impossible for them to be false.
***But some of this is besides the point. On this blog, I rarely talk about my own views on the matter. I'm not here to build a systematic worldview like Gangadean purports to. Instead, for the time being, I'm interested in whether or not Gangadean's system is internally consistent. For instance, has he shown us that the "basic things" are "clear to reason" or does he cheat by relying on intuitions and presumptive principles all the while failing to acknowledge that he is doing so? And is his account ultimately informative or does it trade on unclear notions? Thought of in these terms, it simply doesn't matter what my actual view is about the laws of thought. This is because I don't ever use their denial as a premise in anything that I say. Nor do I ever use as a premise, the possibility that they are false. This is an important point. Think about a person that raises the problem of evil against the coherence of Theism. It really doesn't matter one lick whether such a person is actually a theist or an atheist. What matters is that they assume for the purposes of discussion that God exists and then considers what we would expect to follow from that. In much the same way my arguments often proceed by granting Gangadean key assumptions which include the laws of thought.
What's primarily at issue is how it is that Gangadean claims to know basic things with the sort of certainty he demands. He offers us a proposal, or tells a story about reason and "transcendental" or "self-attesting" principles. In response, one can question the legitimacy and/or coherence of this story without questioning the truth of the principles themselves (e.g., the laws of thought). I can question whether an empiricist has a coherent story about how we know that an external world exists, without actually questioning whether the external world exists. If you're starting to think to yourself, "oh so you do admit that we have to assume the laws of thought to engage in discussion" then you're missing much of what I'm saying and should probably re-read this document from the beginning.
There's a subtle yet significant distinction here. The way that Gangadean has set things up, either his method or approach ultimately succeeds or else we're all doomed to be skeptics. Hence, according to Gangadean if you question his proposed method of inquiry, you automatically question the conclusions. Stated another way, when you question the coherence and informativeness of his proposed method of how we know the laws of thought, you thereby question the laws of thought themselves. But this is a serious mistake and much of the Gangdeanians' characterization of my views rests on this error.
7. What about Gangadean's claim that the laws of thought don't need to be proven because they make thought possible?
Yeah I hear this on occasion. At least two problems arise. First, how does Gangadean (or anyone for that matter) come to know when something makes thought possible? Take for instance, the law of identity (a is a). What's the process by which one can come to know (with certainty) that it makes thought possible? Secondly, how can we determine that such a process is veridical? To the first of these questions: well, we've already ruled out that it's some sort of deduction. And it wouldn't help Gangadean if it was some empirical process or inductive generalization because that would preclude certainty. So I guess it's got to be that you just sit and reflect from your arm-chair and think about the thoughts you're having. But the problem remains: by what means does he ascertain that all thoughts share this feature namely, that they all assume or require the assumption of the law of identity? Now it seems to me that the correct answer is that "you just do." It's immediate. You just "see" it as such. It's a bit like recognizing that two distinct notes have just been played on a piano. Or the means by which you know that you're currently having at least one thought. Or how you know when you're hungry or that your arm itches rather than tickles. If this is right, then Gangadean must himself employ intuitions to get his system off the ground (I say more about why this is problematic for him below). Oddly, Gangadean just never bothers to address this question. Now suppose it's intuition or some sort of immediate process. The second question is how we can know that such a process is veridical. If you're like me, then you just take it as a presumption that is to say, it's assumed veridical until proven otherwise. Importantly though that allows for the possibility that it could be unreliable and that precludes certainty/clarity so I don't see how Gangadean could consistently adopt such a view even though I actually think he does.
The second problem is this: how does one go about supporting the claim that whatever makes thought possible cannot be questioned? There's really no supporting such a principle. It's merely asserted and again it just supposed to strike you as somehow obvious. Here too, I think intuitions or immediate non-inferential assent is at play, but Gangadean won't admit as much.
8. You sometimes accuse Gangadean of employing intuitions. But don't you do the same and isn't there something self-undermining about that?
Yes, I think that Gangadean must accept immediately known, non inferential, claims. And yes by all means, I do too. I suspect philosophy or any inquiry for that matter couldn't begin or continue without certain claims that we ascertain on the basis of intuition. Now it would be inconsistent if I faulted someone simply for employing intuitions while I do the same, but that's not quite the situation with Gangadean. I'm faulting someone who, on the one hand, denies the reliability of intuition and then on the other actually depends on his intuitions to do so. He insists that appealing to our intuitions is a questionable practice and is opposed to the use of reason (see pg. 18 of his book). I think this is an extreme and mistaken view. But then to see that Gangadean actually depends on intuitions (e.g., his apprehending when a proposition is self-attesting, or his apprehending when a statement violates the law of non-contradiction, or his apprehending his own existence) to get his whole worldview off the ground. On pain of inconsistency, he's got to allow that intuitions are actually acceptable (which opens up the possibility that we can know all kinds of things on the basis of intuition) or else he's got to show he doesn't use intuitions. A third option might be for him to distinguish between different types of intuitions (he attempted this once with me in conversation), but he's got to provide a means of distinguishing between the various kinds as well as independently motivate the distinction. Of course, there's more to the story. He also helps himself to plenty of presumptions (basically assumptions that are taken as innocent until proven guilty) like for instance, that he's got a sufficient grasp of the meanings of the words he employs, that whenever he evaluates an argument, his memory is being faithful in preserving content and the like. So intuitions and presumptions pervade his worldview which threatens its overall coherence.
9. So let's say that Gangadean uses intuitions after all, what other problem follows?
Again that would be in tension with what he explicitly says about the unreliability of intuitions in his book. But more specifically, one further worry is that his criticisms of say people who believe in God on the basis of intuition (those he refers to as "popular Christians"), are not going to have any bite. If Gangadean in fact employs intuitions to know things, even very basic things, then it's hard to see why others can't rationally do the same with other beliefs. To be sure, I'm not suggesting that we should favor mere intuition mongering, I'm just saying that since Gangadean actually employs intuitions, he can't condemn others for doing the same.
10. Do you think that we can only know things on the basis of deductive proof?
Not at all. I think we can know things on the basis of perception, intuition, memory, testimony, induction (and abduction). Deduction is just another way to come to know things. I sometimes press the point that we can prove very few substantive claims via deduction alone, as a criticism against Gangadean only because deduction plays such a central role in his worldview. For example, he claims that a theist must deductively prove that God exists in order to rationally believe that God exists and he even thinks we have to prove the existence of an external world against the skeptic! Sometimes it seems like he wants to include intuitions as a way of coming to know basic things. For instance, in his book (pg. 36-38) he talks about knowing by way of the "first and second acts of reason" and distinguishes this from coming to know things by way of argument (the "third act of reason"). Ignoring for a moment the thorny question about the legitimacy of this seemingly arbitrary taxonomy, I think he's really just talking about intuition. However, instead he introduces rather opaque notions like "transcendental" or "self-evident" principles (those which don't require deductive arguments) as a way of avoiding the admission that he uses intuitions like the rest of us.
11. So, on your view, is nothing clear to reason?
Again, I don't claim to be certain of this, but I suspect that there is nothing that is clear to reason in the sense that Gangadean claims. 'Clear to reason' is yet another loaded expression used by Gangadean. He means by it something like, "knowable with absolute epistemic certainty via pure thought." Importantly my denial of this doesn't make me a skeptic. Remember, I think we can know all kinds of things, even "basic" things. I'm just much more laxed about what it takes to know things. Moreover, I'm not opposed to the idea that we can know things from the arm-chair or a priori. I think we can know (even if this doesn't mean we're absolutely certain) that Vixens are female foxes, that there are no squaure-circles and that all bachelors are unmarried. As long as we've got a sufficient grasp of the relevant words or concepts we can know each of those claims to be true just by thinking. Hence, if we construe "being clear to reason" as that which can be known via thinking alone (where knowledge doesn't require certainty), then I agree that some claims are clear to reason. But that's just not enough for Gangadean because he disagrees with my account of knowledge and as a result about what it means for something to be "clear to reason". So in a sense I think some things are clear to reason, but just not in the sense that Gangadean demands.
12. But do your views undermine the intelligibility and possibility of thought, talk, and philosophical discourse?
I honestly have no idea why Gangadean and/or his followers insists that this is so. I've repeatedly responded to this both on this blog and in conversations with his followers. As I've said before, Gangadean presupposes that meaningful thought, talk and discourse requires absolute certainty concerning "basic things". But he never gives anybody a single reason to accept this assumption. As far as I can tell, it's just because he says so. Hence, my answer is no--my views don't undermine the possibility or intelligibility of any and all thought and talk. There's just no basis for that conclusion.
13. But Gangadean and his followers often speak as if the denial of clarity at the basic level will yield disastrous consequences like skepticism, meaninglessness or nihilism. What do you think?
Gangadeanians accept this line of reasoning as gospel, but I've never heard one of them questioning it. I think it just strikes them as intuitive or obvious. But what I was hinting at above is that there's no reason given for us to accept this and there should be because it's just an assertion or proposal. Now suppose that we can't have the kind of certainty that Gangadean says we need and can have. What is supposed to follow from that? As I mentioned earlier, on my view of knowledge, we can still know things because knowledge doesn't require certainty in the first place. We can also form rational beliefs because forming rational beliefs doesn't require certainty. Insofar as philosophy and inquiry in general is about coming to form rational beliefs about the world and to gain knowledge, the lack of clarity at the basic level does absolutely nothing to undermine the intelligibility and even fruitfulness of any of those pursuits.
14. Sometimes you question whether we can be certain of the very definition of even the words we use. But isn't it a contradiction to question the definition of words all the while hoping to communicate something to your readers using words.
This is also a misconstrual of my views. I submit that it doesn't look like we can have the kind of certainty that Gangadean demands about the very meaning of the words we use because he thinks we can only have that kind of certainty via deduction or "self-attesting" principles. But ascertaining the meanings of words in a given language isn't a matter of thinking through deductive arguments and there are no self-attesting principles to consider, here. It's an a posteriori process that provides nothing like infallible beliefs. Importantly though, this fact shouldn't bother anybody but Gangadean and his followers. As I noted before, Gangadean merely assumes that we need certainty about basic things (including the meaning of words in a given language). But he gives us no reason to accept this assumption. On my view, we are rational to adopt presumptive meanings of words. Further, we can have rational beliefs about the meaning of words, and we can even know the meanings of words we use. So there's no problem with my reliance on my understanding the meanings of lexical items, in my expressing my thoughts to others. If you and I can have rational beliefs and even knowledge about what words mean (even if we can't have certainty), then why would it be problematic for us to use words in discourse? Problems only arise if we demand certainty in the way that Gangadean does.
15. Gangadeanians often talk about the need for common ground. Without it, they insist that all conversation will be pointless or meaningless. What do you think?
Again we've got another loaded expression (are you starting to see a pattern?). On one reading of "common ground" (Gangadean's) I simply disagree and on another, which I think is the more widely accepted notion, I agree. Gangadean seems to think that a set of propositions will count as common ground between two parties if and only if both parties are epistemically certain about (i.e., know infallibly) each proposition. That is, both parties must affirm or know each of the common ground propositions with certainty, presumably the "basic things". But I see no reason ever given in support of this view. It seems like Gangadean has a list of various activities that only make sense if there is clarity or certainty at the basic level. Unfortunately, he never cares to justify the connection. Just why do we need clarity at the basic level to think, talk, form rational beliefs, know, and have discussions?
On another (more common) reading of "common ground" I agree that conversations will be pointless or at least incredibly frustrating and near fruitless without it. On this interpretation, for two people to share a common ground just requires that they agree to not call into serious question a certain set of propositions for the time being. So suppose I present you with an argument. Further suppose you disbelieve the premises and I know that. Being fully aware of your incredulity concerning the premises, I ask you simply if the argument is valid by your lights. At this point, I've just set up a context where it'll be in someway inappropriate for you to keep harping on the truth or falsity of the premises. This is because validity has nothing to do with the truth of the premises. In fact, at least insofar as you want to engage with my project, what you'd probably do is imagine that the premises are true (i.e., grant me the truth of the premises) and then consider whether the conclusion must follow. In that case, we've got common ground (the premises among other things). Of course, you are free to shift the context just as I am free to cooperate or resist. You might say, "ok, we've determined that the argument is valid, but what you should really be worried about is whether the premises are true." In which case, now the premises are not part of the "common ground" between us. At this point our conversation will only be fruitful so long as there are other common ground propositions that we at least both assume to be true for the sake of discussion.
Notice that none of this requires that you and I both know with certainty a set of propositions. It doesn't even require that we believe them. All that's needed is an agreement (often tacit) that we'll grant each other a certain set of background beliefs, vocabulary, and premises if you will, so that we can successfully navigate towards a conversational goal. On this account of "common ground" I think discourse would be pointless without it.
Now one thing to note is that Gangadean and I have at least this second kind of common ground so that discussions between us can in fact be fruitful. This is instanced when I grant him certain premises or claims and then show that they ultimately lead to bad results or inconsistencies. But Gangadean discontinued discussions with me only because he demanded the first kind of common ground (his very high standard). For whatever reason, he thinks that we have to both know, infallibly, a set of propositions in order for any further discussion to be meaningful. Again, I see no reason to accept this. In fact, I've even pointed out before that there's room for skepticism regarding one's self-knowledge, given Gangadean's standards (how does Gangadean know that he knows basic things?) and this certainly extends to determining what your conversation partner knows (how does Gangadean know what I know or don't know?). I suspect he and his people have ended many discussions of this sort on such a faulty assumption. Of course, they are free to choose their conversation partners, that's not at issue. What is at issue is the rationality of refusing to answer their critics for lacking only the first kind of common ground (Gangadean's) at least insofar as they claim to lead the examined life. But again I see no reason to accept his account of common ground as the important one in relation to philosophical discourse. Frankly, it's strikes me as bizarre and unmotivated and a bit like a child throwing a temper tantrum for not getting his way.
16. So you're not certain that certainty is not possible. But are you at least certain that you're not certain that certainty is not possible? Or are you certain that you're not certain that you're not certain that certainty is not possible?
Nope and Nope. Regardless of how many iterations, my answer will be the same. But so what? Why do we need certainty? And how can you be certain that we need certainty?
