Thursday, January 24, 2019

On Gangadeanian Slander

As I mentioned before, Anderson recently accused me of slander for referring to his church as a religious cult and for calling his reasoning and arguments (not him) sloppy, lazy, or messy. He even suggested that my usage of the term "Gangadeanian" was an insult and as we saw here, he suggesting that I was dishonest, and insinuated that my personal conduct (with him and others at his church) was in some way morally problematic. He even went so far as to falsely accuse me to ASU police of stalking/harassing him and never bothered to apologize even though there was obviously no real evidence of any stalking/harassing on my part. 

Further, as we saw in this tweet, Kelly Fitzsimmons Burton, instead of engaging with any of my arguments, dismisses me as a troll. (I don't know who this Jacob A. Alee fellow is, but he seems to agree with his friend as if he knows anything about me). There's more. I have recently learned that Burton has gone so far as to author a document that has been passed around entitled, "A History of Trolling." In it, she attempts to expose my identity and then again refers to me as a troll in addition to making several false accusations aimed at attacking my character. So, despite all their efforts to play the victim in all of this, it would seem that the Gangadeanians are the ones that are doing the slandering and insulting. Here's the relevant excerpt from Burton's "A History of Trolling" document, (I have redacted the names--of course, "J" refers to me). 

  1. S connects with J who takes the “Debunking” website from E from here to here and here and continues to troll to this day. J loves to troll Owen and slander those who go to WF church. J wants to remain anonymous, but in the name of truth and in pursuing justice in my case, I cannot continue to remain silent. His bogus website has harmed my reputation and those of many others, such as Owen, who are concerned to think critically...Philosophy ought to be done by argument and counter argument, but both J and S have undermined the very possibility of argument so that resort to personal attack is all that is left to them. There is a lack of integrity in J and S's unwillingness to live with the consequences of their positions. They engage in sophistry not philosophy. 

Many of Burton's statements are inaccurate, but this certainly feeds into their narrative as perpetual victims. What's interesting is that at the time that this document was authored, I hadn't even mentioned Burton in my blog. She wasn't even on my radar (though in recent days I've added her name to my intro post). So when she speaks of my "damaging her reputation" at best she can claim that my philosophical critiques of the arguments from Anderson and Gangadean have affected her insofar as she presents the very same arguments in her own work and talks. 

And there's a philosophically substantive inaccuracy to flag. I'm not undermining "the very possibility of argument." I just disagree with Burton's unsupported principle that we must have "clarity/certainty of basic things" in order for us to engage in meaningful philosophical discussions. 

Now to the factual inaccuracies. 

First, I didn't take over the "debunking Gangadean Website". In fact, I distanced myself from it in this post. The only part that she has got right is that I took over the facebook page from the original author and changed the nature of it so that it's merely a place where I update my blog posts. 

Furthermore, I don't "love to troll Owen" or "slander members of their church." To say that I "resort to personal attacks" as opposed to doing philosophy via "argument and counterargument" is simply ridiculous. This blog is largely about where I think the Gangadeanian arguments go wrong, with the occasional commentary about what I think are harmful outworkings of their worldview in practice. I've got well over a 100 articles where I present philosophical challenges. It's the Gangadeanians that refuse to provide counterarguments. Clearly, they are the ones resorting to personal attacks as this document makes evident. How they can seriously think of themselves as renewers of philosophy, retrievers of knowledge, and as Christ followers working towards "unity of the faith," despite such conduct is beyond me. 

Finally, the word "troll" is too easily thrown around by Burton and company. When you play too fast and loose with a term, when you stretch it too far, it loses it's meaning. The word is supposed to be inherently pejorative. But there's nothing inherently bad about a person that continues to challenge what they view to be very bad arguments and a harmful worldview. Yes, I won't go away. Yes, I'm probably very annoying to the Gangadeanians because I'm actively working to stop the further spread of their bad ideas. That doesn't make me a troll in any meaningful sense of the word. I keep writing and speaking out in an effort to shed light, out of a concern for truth and public well-being (particularly that of the unsuspecting young students who might get exposed to Gangadeanism). 

This morning I was listening to a podcast featuring a philosopher named Regina Rini who works on stuff related to social media and public discourse. She gives us what I think is a good characterization of a troll and talks about how people are often too quick to dismiss their interlocutors as such. She says, 
We all know internet trolls are out there. We know that there are people out in social media solely to cause grief. They don't actually believe the things they're saying. They don't actually care about the arguments they are having. They are just picking things that they know will make people upset and deliberately antagonizing people and it's just fun for them...
It makes perfect sense to dismiss people that fit this bill from serious discussions. It's a waste of time to talk to such persons because they pursue talk in bad faith as opposed to substantive discourse. But I don't see how anyone could honestly put me in that category. Look at my posts. It's all about trying to get to the bottom of things---things that I take very seriously and that I think are worth discussing. Interestingly, it's the Gangadeanians that are refusing to present counterarguments and resorting to ad hominems.

Regina Rini goes on to add,
I think a lot of times when there's an argument on twitter, facebook or what not, and someone says "Go away troll! Don't feed the trolls" the person they are calling a troll might not be a troll. We don't know, often. But it's easier to just dismiss someone you disagree with as a troll rather than engage with their arguments. And once you make that move-- conceptualizing the person as a troll, as somebody whose motivations are just to make you mad--they don't really mean what they are saying-- then obviously you can't take seriously what they are saying as equal participant in moral debate

Monday, January 21, 2019

Clear to Reason: What is it?

I've been talking a lot about whether we need for some things to be clear, or whether the Gangadeanians have shown us that some things are in fact, clear to reason. But here, I want to spend a little time focusing on what it means for the Gangadeanians that something is "clear to reason" to begin with.

It turns out that precise definitions are not easy to find from the Ganagdeanians who are quick to throw around the expression. (An interesting sociological note: I'm around philosophers more often than not and not one of them ever talks about things being "clear to reason.") As I've noted before, Gangadean says that to show that something (a proposition) is clear to reason is to show by way of proof that it couldn't possibly be false and to overcome common objections to it. That's about showing what is clear. But what is it for something to be clear? What's confusing is that if we remove the word "show" from the above account, we get that a proposition is clear if it couldn't possibly be false. But that would be a strange account of the clarity of a proposition. All and only necessary truths are such that they couldn't possibly be false. That would mean "clear" would be something like "necessarily true." But not every necessary truth is clear to reason, because not every necessary truth is readily knowable to all who seek (which is really what Gangadean wants out of clarity). For example, that water is H20, seems to be a necessary truth, but it's not like anybody could have deduced it from general revelation. It was discovered fairly recently with respect to world history and by way of empirical observation. No clarity about clarity yet.

That lead me to Anderson's first book, "Reason and Worldviews." Unfortunately, he actually forgoes a straight definition and gives us what he takes to be paradigm examples. He writes,
Throughout this book the term 'clarity' has been used, often in connection to 'reason'. What is clear, is clear to reason and therefore is objectively clear, as opposed to being personally/subjectively clear. The best way to define 'clarity' is to give an example: it is clear that 'a' is not 'non-a'. This is maximal clarity...
Of course, to say that something is clear just in case it's objectively clear, isn't to provide a particularly helpful definition because it uses the very word we'd like defined. But this example isn't entirely useless. Recall that Gangadean claims that God's existence is clear to reason. And what he means by that it is that is readily knowable to all (or at least those of average intelligence--according to that lecture on Youtube). How is it readily knowable? There's a proof that anybody could have come up with if only they were using reason consistently (yes that's a radical claim in itself). The point to stress is that there's a proof here--and on Gangadean's view, God's existence is clear because this argument/proof is in some way readily accessible to all. But as Anderson notes above, it's also supposed to be clear to reason that "a is not-non a" which is to say that propositions about basic distinctions, and the so-called laws of thought are apparently clear to reason, too. If you've been around these parts for a while you know that the Gangadeanians don't actually give an argument or proof for the claim that 'a is not-non-a' (the law of non contradiction). So God's existence is clear to reason dependent on the accessibility of a sound proof, but other things are clear to reason without such a proof being readily available. So, what's going on?

My puzzlement had me poking around one of the Gangadeanian websites, and I ran into this recent post by Kelly Fitzsimmons Burton. Of note is the following passage.
By reason is meant the laws of thought. It is self-evident that we think, and it is self-evident that there are laws of thought. Reason in itself is the laws of thought. These laws include Identity: a is a; Non-contradiction: not both a and non-a; and Excluded middle: either a or non-a.  We use reason to form concepts, judgments, and arguments. We use it to test for meaning. We use it to interpret all of our experiences. And we use it to construct a coherent world and life view (Emphasis added). 
For something to be "self-evident" is for it to be ascertained immediately. It isn't known via any sort of argument or inference. Interestingly--you don't find Burton's claims in particular (that it's self evident that there are laws of thought or that it's self-evident that we think) in Gangadean's book, Philosophical Foundation. But he does speak of self-evident truths in the following passage.
Reason has been misused as a source of truth. Certain convictions are treated as self-evident to reason, and foundational, requiring no further need for defense. Descartes' cogito ergo sum is said to be self-evident every time it is thought. Thomas Jefferson took it as self-evident that all men are created equal. These views may be true, but the question is, are they self-evident? Are alternatives immediately self-contradictory?...Or do they require at least a few steps in reasoning to show they are contradictory? (21). 
So, Gangadean believes that there are such things as self-evident truths. That is to say, things we know (that are clear to reason) immediately and not by way of any inference, or proof. As I've argued before, this is actually to allow that we can know some things via intuitions, which would be problematic for their worldview given how they claim to avoid intuitions. However, what the above passage also aims to do is to provide us with a criteria of distinguishing the legitimately self-evident from the pseudo-self-evident. Whatever it is immediately self-contradictory to deny = self-evident. (And presumably, what is self-evident is clear to reason but without the need for proof). The importance of this for Gangadean should be obvious. Anyone can easily claim that any proposition is self-evident, in which case, we would get "clarity" on the cheap (God's existence could be self-evident!) If there was no principled means of distinguishing between self-evident truths and merely those that people claim to be self-evident, appeals to self-evident truths would be no different than appeals to intuitions, which Gangadean is keen to avoid. (Note I think that ultimately intuitions must play a role in Ganagdean's worldview. That's because I see no way of getting around the idea that one immediately and non-inferentially apprehends when something is a contradiction as opposed to reasoning to it--which means one knows that a proposition is contradictory by way of intuition--but I'm setting this aside for now). So this criteria for self-evidency is crucial for Gangadean's worldview. It's basically a way for Gangadean not having to prove every bit of his worldview while managing to avoid the charge of fideism and intuition mongering which he finds unacceptable in others and skepticism and nihilism entailing. Does it work? Unfortunately, no.

If the litmus test of a self-evident claim is that it is immediately contradictory, then the natural question to ask is how we are to determine when something is immediately contradictory (as opposed to merely seeming to us that it is) vs. requiring "at least a few steps in reasoning to show they are contradictory." Again intuitions are unavoidable here (you either see something as immediately self-contractory or not--and this isn't by way of arguments). But we're setting that aside for the time being.

Instead I want to focus on the matter of conceptual or definitional disputes. Importantly, what strikes ones as immediately self-contradictory or not will depend largely on the conceptual vocabulary one adopts or one's background beliefs about the nature of things. And if there are disputes about what is immediately self-contradictory or not or if what counts as immediately self-contradictory is to some extent relative, Gangadean's purported test of self-evidency is of no use in which case appealing to "self-evident" truths fares no better than appeals to intuition.

Here's what I mean. If I define knowledge as entailing certainty/clarity, then to claim that I know that knowledge is not possible is to express something immediately contradictory. That's because it amounts to saying, "I'm certain that certainty is not possible." Likewise, if knowledge entails clarity, the very statement, "knowledge does not entail clarity" would be immediately self-contradictory because it would amount to saying that "knowledge is not knowledge." But if I define or conceive of knowledge as not entailing certainty, there is no such contradictions to be found. So what counts as immediately-self contradictory (as opposed to requiring multiple steps to show as contradictory) depends on one's concepts or definitions.

We can now appreciate just how important the dispute between the Gangadeanians and me over who has got the right theory of knowledge ends up being for the welfare of Gangadean's worldview. Not only do I submit that knowledge does not entail clarity, my claim is that they will be unable to prove that their theory of knowledge is the correct one over and above alternative accounts without begging the question. Importantly, neither is it self-evident that their theory of knowledge is correct according to Gangadean's own test of self-evidency because it's not immediately self-contradictory to deny that knowledge entails certainty (unless of course Gangadean is allowed to beg the question against me).

This is just one example and the point generalizes to other concepts over which philosophers have disputed (e.g., free will, eternality, epistemic justification, infinitude, justice, good, God, etc).  For instance, some philosophers and theologians define God as a necessary being. On such a conception, to say that God does not exist is to express a contradiction because it amounts to saying that a being who could not fail to exist, fails to exist. That's an immediate self-contradiction. But if you don't conceive of God in that way, then there is no such self-contradiction. So there's a kind of conceptual relativity at play which poses a serious problem for Gangadean's proposed test for self-evidency. What counts as self-evident can vary from person to person in much the same way that intuitions can from person to person.

It's also important to note that the burden of proof at this point is asymmetrical between team Gangadean and me. I am not the one claiming that we can have clarity or that we must have it. Neither am I the one purporting to be able to settle any and all disputes by way of rational presuppositional (note conceptual disputes are disputes). And I'm certainly not aiming to provide a sure-fire test of what makes a claim legitimately self-evidently true. Focusing again on the conflict over theories of knowledge, it is Ganagdean's claim that we need clarity (to avoid skepticism) that is driving him to adopt the theory of knowledge in which knowledge requires clarity/certainty. That being the case, they should be able to show why their theory is correct (on independent grounds) and how the purported test for self-evidency can get around this problem of disputes over concepts and definitions more generally. Another way to make this point about the burden of proof: if it turns out that we've got competing theories of knowledge (or justification, free will, moral responsibility, eternality, God, justice, mercy, good) and no principled way to choose the correct one with certainty/clarity, then that's enough to undermine Gangadean's search for clarity. It's their job to show why we aren't fated to this result.



Sunday, January 20, 2019

A quick revisit of the Youtube Convo.

A reader reached out to me letting me know that some Gangadeanians continued the Youtube convo between Anderson and Spencer, to which they attempted to respond. However, this reader (writing under the pseudonym, Hank M and wishing to remain anonymous) alleges that his/her two followup comments, which were submitted a week ago, never showed up.

I've stated several times that the Gangadeanians have trouble keeping basic distinctions straight--for all their talk of clarity and reason, it's a bit ironic. I don't mean to beat a dead horse, but the latest comments do a fine job of illustrating just what I mean--straight from the horses mouth (sorry, I'll stop horsing around).















Both G.A. Goodrich and Samuel are making the same errors that Anderson, Gangadean, and Burton have made repeatedly. As Goodrich's first comment illustrates, he seems to think that if someone allows for the mere possibility that any of their beliefs are mistaken, that makes intelligible dialogue impossible. But how does that follow? As I've pointed out in the past, that's not something that's true by definition--so they've got some explaining to do. As Spencer stated clearly in his exchange with Anderson, he affirms that reason is ontological (or that 'a is a') even if he doesn't claim that he couldn't possibly be mistaken about it. What team-Gangadean has failed to do is to explain just why merely believing (even to a high degree) that an argument is not the same as a non-argument is not enough for a meaningful philosophical dialogue to continue.

You can see the same kind of mistake in Samuel's comment that Spencer is "unable to distinguish between a and non-a." Again, you can believe something even while you think it's at least possible for you to be mistaken about it. We do this all of the time! And if someone like Spencer believes that "a is distinct from non-a", then why are they unable to distinguish between them? In fact, to believe that "a is distinct from non-a" is a way of distinguishing between the two. So Samuel's comment is trivially, false.

Fortunately, any reader with enough patience can look through the comments and see that contrary to what Anderson and Goodrich insist, there was never a sound proof given for Anderson's claim that "if there is no clarity at the basic level, then intelligible conversation is impossible." As I noted before, the closest thing to an "argument" was Anderson's statement that "if nothing is clear, then perhaps an argument is a non-argument." But just like Goodrich after him, Anderson never actually showed us why the mere possibility that an argument is a non-argument would thereby make all intelligible dialogue (or the evaluations of arguments), impossible. As long as someone believes that an argument is not a non-argument, that sound is not non-sound, and the like, it makes perfect sense for them to talk and evaluate an argument. Since Anderson and company are claiming we need more (i.e., clarity), they owe us an argument.

I'm not sure why Hank M's comments were not posted by the moderator. Perhaps the latter got busy, or perhaps they assumed that I was the one commenting. At any rate, Hank M basically asked Goodrich for the proof again, pointing out that his snarky remark lacked Anderson's alleged proof. He also pressed Samuel to explain just why he thought Spencer was unable to distinguish between 'a and non-a'--both fine points.