Monday, January 21, 2019

Clear to Reason: What is it?

I've been talking a lot about whether we need for some things to be clear, or whether the Gangadeanians have shown us that some things are in fact, clear to reason. But here, I want to spend a little time focusing on what it means for the Gangadeanians that something is "clear to reason" to begin with.

It turns out that precise definitions are not easy to find from the Ganagdeanians who are quick to throw around the expression. (An interesting sociological note: I'm around philosophers more often than not and not one of them ever talks about things being "clear to reason.") As I've noted before, Gangadean says that to show that something (a proposition) is clear to reason is to show by way of proof that it couldn't possibly be false and to overcome common objections to it. That's about showing what is clear. But what is it for something to be clear? What's confusing is that if we remove the word "show" from the above account, we get that a proposition is clear if it couldn't possibly be false. But that would be a strange account of the clarity of a proposition. All and only necessary truths are such that they couldn't possibly be false. That would mean "clear" would be something like "necessarily true." But not every necessary truth is clear to reason, because not every necessary truth is readily knowable to all who seek (which is really what Gangadean wants out of clarity). For example, that water is H20, seems to be a necessary truth, but it's not like anybody could have deduced it from general revelation. It was discovered fairly recently with respect to world history and by way of empirical observation. No clarity about clarity yet.

That lead me to Anderson's first book, "Reason and Worldviews." Unfortunately, he actually forgoes a straight definition and gives us what he takes to be paradigm examples. He writes,
Throughout this book the term 'clarity' has been used, often in connection to 'reason'. What is clear, is clear to reason and therefore is objectively clear, as opposed to being personally/subjectively clear. The best way to define 'clarity' is to give an example: it is clear that 'a' is not 'non-a'. This is maximal clarity...
Of course, to say that something is clear just in case it's objectively clear, isn't to provide a particularly helpful definition because it uses the very word we'd like defined. But this example isn't entirely useless. Recall that Gangadean claims that God's existence is clear to reason. And what he means by that it is that is readily knowable to all (or at least those of average intelligence--according to that lecture on Youtube). How is it readily knowable? There's a proof that anybody could have come up with if only they were using reason consistently (yes that's a radical claim in itself). The point to stress is that there's a proof here--and on Gangadean's view, God's existence is clear because this argument/proof is in some way readily accessible to all. But as Anderson notes above, it's also supposed to be clear to reason that "a is not-non a" which is to say that propositions about basic distinctions, and the so-called laws of thought are apparently clear to reason, too. If you've been around these parts for a while you know that the Gangadeanians don't actually give an argument or proof for the claim that 'a is not-non-a' (the law of non contradiction). So God's existence is clear to reason dependent on the accessibility of a sound proof, but other things are clear to reason without such a proof being readily available. So, what's going on?

My puzzlement had me poking around one of the Gangadeanian websites, and I ran into this recent post by Kelly Fitzsimmons Burton. Of note is the following passage.
By reason is meant the laws of thought. It is self-evident that we think, and it is self-evident that there are laws of thought. Reason in itself is the laws of thought. These laws include Identity: a is a; Non-contradiction: not both a and non-a; and Excluded middle: either a or non-a.  We use reason to form concepts, judgments, and arguments. We use it to test for meaning. We use it to interpret all of our experiences. And we use it to construct a coherent world and life view (Emphasis added). 
For something to be "self-evident" is for it to be ascertained immediately. It isn't known via any sort of argument or inference. Interestingly--you don't find Burton's claims in particular (that it's self evident that there are laws of thought or that it's self-evident that we think) in Gangadean's book, Philosophical Foundation. But he does speak of self-evident truths in the following passage.
Reason has been misused as a source of truth. Certain convictions are treated as self-evident to reason, and foundational, requiring no further need for defense. Descartes' cogito ergo sum is said to be self-evident every time it is thought. Thomas Jefferson took it as self-evident that all men are created equal. These views may be true, but the question is, are they self-evident? Are alternatives immediately self-contradictory?...Or do they require at least a few steps in reasoning to show they are contradictory? (21). 
So, Gangadean believes that there are such things as self-evident truths. That is to say, things we know (that are clear to reason) immediately and not by way of any inference, or proof. As I've argued before, this is actually to allow that we can know some things via intuitions, which would be problematic for their worldview given how they claim to avoid intuitions. However, what the above passage also aims to do is to provide us with a criteria of distinguishing the legitimately self-evident from the pseudo-self-evident. Whatever it is immediately self-contradictory to deny = self-evident. (And presumably, what is self-evident is clear to reason but without the need for proof). The importance of this for Gangadean should be obvious. Anyone can easily claim that any proposition is self-evident, in which case, we would get "clarity" on the cheap (God's existence could be self-evident!) If there was no principled means of distinguishing between self-evident truths and merely those that people claim to be self-evident, appeals to self-evident truths would be no different than appeals to intuitions, which Gangadean is keen to avoid. (Note I think that ultimately intuitions must play a role in Ganagdean's worldview. That's because I see no way of getting around the idea that one immediately and non-inferentially apprehends when something is a contradiction as opposed to reasoning to it--which means one knows that a proposition is contradictory by way of intuition--but I'm setting this aside for now). So this criteria for self-evidency is crucial for Gangadean's worldview. It's basically a way for Gangadean not having to prove every bit of his worldview while managing to avoid the charge of fideism and intuition mongering which he finds unacceptable in others and skepticism and nihilism entailing. Does it work? Unfortunately, no.

If the litmus test of a self-evident claim is that it is immediately contradictory, then the natural question to ask is how we are to determine when something is immediately contradictory (as opposed to merely seeming to us that it is) vs. requiring "at least a few steps in reasoning to show they are contradictory." Again intuitions are unavoidable here (you either see something as immediately self-contractory or not--and this isn't by way of arguments). But we're setting that aside for the time being.

Instead I want to focus on the matter of conceptual or definitional disputes. Importantly, what strikes ones as immediately self-contradictory or not will depend largely on the conceptual vocabulary one adopts or one's background beliefs about the nature of things. And if there are disputes about what is immediately self-contradictory or not or if what counts as immediately self-contradictory is to some extent relative, Gangadean's purported test of self-evidency is of no use in which case appealing to "self-evident" truths fares no better than appeals to intuition.

Here's what I mean. If I define knowledge as entailing certainty/clarity, then to claim that I know that knowledge is not possible is to express something immediately contradictory. That's because it amounts to saying, "I'm certain that certainty is not possible." Likewise, if knowledge entails clarity, the very statement, "knowledge does not entail clarity" would be immediately self-contradictory because it would amount to saying that "knowledge is not knowledge." But if I define or conceive of knowledge as not entailing certainty, there is no such contradictions to be found. So what counts as immediately-self contradictory (as opposed to requiring multiple steps to show as contradictory) depends on one's concepts or definitions.

We can now appreciate just how important the dispute between the Gangadeanians and me over who has got the right theory of knowledge ends up being for the welfare of Gangadean's worldview. Not only do I submit that knowledge does not entail clarity, my claim is that they will be unable to prove that their theory of knowledge is the correct one over and above alternative accounts without begging the question. Importantly, neither is it self-evident that their theory of knowledge is correct according to Gangadean's own test of self-evidency because it's not immediately self-contradictory to deny that knowledge entails certainty (unless of course Gangadean is allowed to beg the question against me).

This is just one example and the point generalizes to other concepts over which philosophers have disputed (e.g., free will, eternality, epistemic justification, infinitude, justice, good, God, etc).  For instance, some philosophers and theologians define God as a necessary being. On such a conception, to say that God does not exist is to express a contradiction because it amounts to saying that a being who could not fail to exist, fails to exist. That's an immediate self-contradiction. But if you don't conceive of God in that way, then there is no such self-contradiction. So there's a kind of conceptual relativity at play which poses a serious problem for Gangadean's proposed test for self-evidency. What counts as self-evident can vary from person to person in much the same way that intuitions can from person to person.

It's also important to note that the burden of proof at this point is asymmetrical between team Gangadean and me. I am not the one claiming that we can have clarity or that we must have it. Neither am I the one purporting to be able to settle any and all disputes by way of rational presuppositional (note conceptual disputes are disputes). And I'm certainly not aiming to provide a sure-fire test of what makes a claim legitimately self-evidently true. Focusing again on the conflict over theories of knowledge, it is Ganagdean's claim that we need clarity (to avoid skepticism) that is driving him to adopt the theory of knowledge in which knowledge requires clarity/certainty. That being the case, they should be able to show why their theory is correct (on independent grounds) and how the purported test for self-evidency can get around this problem of disputes over concepts and definitions more generally. Another way to make this point about the burden of proof: if it turns out that we've got competing theories of knowledge (or justification, free will, moral responsibility, eternality, God, justice, mercy, good) and no principled way to choose the correct one with certainty/clarity, then that's enough to undermine Gangadean's search for clarity. It's their job to show why we aren't fated to this result.



Sunday, January 20, 2019

A quick revisit of the Youtube Convo.

A reader reached out to me letting me know that some Gangadeanians continued the Youtube convo between Anderson and Spencer, to which they attempted to respond. However, this reader (writing under the pseudonym, Hank M and wishing to remain anonymous) alleges that his/her two followup comments, which were submitted a week ago, never showed up.

I've stated several times that the Gangadeanians have trouble keeping basic distinctions straight--for all their talk of clarity and reason, it's a bit ironic. I don't mean to beat a dead horse, but the latest comments do a fine job of illustrating just what I mean--straight from the horses mouth (sorry, I'll stop horsing around).















Both G.A. Goodrich and Samuel are making the same errors that Anderson, Gangadean, and Burton have made repeatedly. As Goodrich's first comment illustrates, he seems to think that if someone allows for the mere possibility that any of their beliefs are mistaken, that makes intelligible dialogue impossible. But how does that follow? As I've pointed out in the past, that's not something that's true by definition--so they've got some explaining to do. As Spencer stated clearly in his exchange with Anderson, he affirms that reason is ontological (or that 'a is a') even if he doesn't claim that he couldn't possibly be mistaken about it. What team-Gangadean has failed to do is to explain just why merely believing (even to a high degree) that an argument is not the same as a non-argument is not enough for a meaningful philosophical dialogue to continue.

You can see the same kind of mistake in Samuel's comment that Spencer is "unable to distinguish between a and non-a." Again, you can believe something even while you think it's at least possible for you to be mistaken about it. We do this all of the time! And if someone like Spencer believes that "a is distinct from non-a", then why are they unable to distinguish between them? In fact, to believe that "a is distinct from non-a" is a way of distinguishing between the two. So Samuel's comment is trivially, false.

Fortunately, any reader with enough patience can look through the comments and see that contrary to what Anderson and Goodrich insist, there was never a sound proof given for Anderson's claim that "if there is no clarity at the basic level, then intelligible conversation is impossible." As I noted before, the closest thing to an "argument" was Anderson's statement that "if nothing is clear, then perhaps an argument is a non-argument." But just like Goodrich after him, Anderson never actually showed us why the mere possibility that an argument is a non-argument would thereby make all intelligible dialogue (or the evaluations of arguments), impossible. As long as someone believes that an argument is not a non-argument, that sound is not non-sound, and the like, it makes perfect sense for them to talk and evaluate an argument. Since Anderson and company are claiming we need more (i.e., clarity), they owe us an argument.

I'm not sure why Hank M's comments were not posted by the moderator. Perhaps the latter got busy, or perhaps they assumed that I was the one commenting. At any rate, Hank M basically asked Goodrich for the proof again, pointing out that his snarky remark lacked Anderson's alleged proof. He also pressed Samuel to explain just why he thought Spencer was unable to distinguish between 'a and non-a'--both fine points.


Thursday, January 17, 2019

Drawing out some implications: Why Other Christians Should Care and Why they are a Cult.

I've been telling my students this term that good philosophy involves considering a claim or set of claims (whether the premise of an argument or a conclusion) and carefully drawing out implications that might not otherwise be obvious to a casual observing, by connecting it/them to other propositions. It is sometimes the case that what a person argues for, or what they take for granted, by itself seems harmless or germane. What makes philosophy so interesting is that one can, on the basis of valid rules of inference, sometimes show that something surprising or unexpected follows from an otherwise seemingly innocuous claim or set of claims.

I've been thinking lately about the Gangadeanians ramping up their public appearances and how they occupy instructor and headmaster positions among many of the valley schools (both secondary and post-secondary). If I'm right that they believe such implausible things which they ultimately use to harm people and divide believers, how is it that they seem to be gaining momentum at least by some measures? And why aren't there more people speaking out against them in public? I should note that I've spoken to persons who are actually afraid to speak out against them in public which is troubling in its own right. Setting those persons aside, one explanation is that they have gotten better with how they present things and what it is that they set forth. That is to say, they tend to avoid talking about some of the natural corrollaries of their views which I think many people, in particular, Christians would take serious offense to--and more importantly I think Christians would think to be false and heretical. It takes a bit of work to connect the dots though and so I want to do a bit of that in this article.

In his book Philosophical Foundation, Gangadean writes,
If one knows what is clear one should be able to show what is clear and be able to overcome commonly held objections to what is clear...To show what is clear requires giving a sound argument (valid inference and true premises) (4). 
First, a quibble. Why does he say that you have to be able to overcome commonly held objections to what is clear, if you are to count as knowing what is clear. That feels awfully arbitrary. What counts as a "common" objection? My best guess is that it's the popularity of the objections otherwise, I have no clue what he could mean. But then why musn't a person care about unpopular objections? Does popularity entail correctness? Unpopularity incorrectness? This is bizarre. I don't get why the popularity of an objection should matter to whether you count has knowing. What is more, an objection may be popular relative to one group, but not another just as the popularity of an objection can shift depending on the time period.

Setting that quibble aside, what Gangadean is saying is this: if you aren't able to give a sound argument for something or are unable to overcome commonly held objections to it, then you don't count as knowing it. Now ask yourself, how many claims can you, by way of argument, prove in this sense? Remember to show that something is clear, is to show that you couldn't possibly be wrong about it---that it's impossible that the thing believed is false. I suspect you'd be hard pressed to find many things which you believe (and take yourself to know) to fall into this category.

Now it turns out that the Gangadeanians take themselves to know all kinds of things and so they take themselves to be able to prove as many claims (and to overcome commonly held objections to them). Here's a list of just some.

  • That God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.
  • That Good for a man = spiritual life = to know basic things about God, man, good and evil. 
  • That we are body soul unities (i.e., substance dualism is true). 
  • That Matter couldn't possibly be eternal. 
  • That the bible in its entirety is the word of God (or special revelation) and has been faithfully transmitted and preserved by God. 
  • That we are not in a Matrix like scenario (that there is a mind-independent- external world i.e., external world skepticism is false). 
  • That no other religion is the way to God (i.e., Jesus is the only way to God/salvation). 
  • That Calvinism (TULIP) is true. 
  • That postmillenialism is true. 
  • That compatibilism (or soft determinism) concerning free will and moral responsibility is true. 
  • That the Westminster Confession of Faith and the longer and shorter catechisms = the most faithful respresentation to date of Christianity. 
  • That Christians ought not to use any instruments or sing anything, but Psalms in corporate worship services. 
  • That the church ought to baptize infants belonging to parents of believers. 
  • That women are to remain silent during worship services because men have a special duty to instruct their wives and daughters at home. 
  • That young earth Creationism is true.

This is just a sample of the things they take themselves to know, which means that they can produce a series of sound arguments which have as their conclusions each of these things and that they can overcome "commonly held objections." Some of these concern interpretations of what the bible says--and yes, they think they can prove that their interpretations are not possibly incorrect. Now the thing to note about this list is that some of these are commonly held beliefs among Christians and some (the bulk of them) are hotly contested among Christians. As to this latter group, I suspect that many Christians will find it incredible that the Gangadeanians claim to be able to show that the opposite of them is impossible---that the Gangadeanians claim that they couldn't possibly be wrong concerning the truth of Calvinism for instance seems just wild.

Let's set those claims aside. Let's focus on the mere claim that God exists and that the bible is the word of God. Remember, according to Gangadean, if you aren't able to prove that the opposite of these claims is impossible, and aren't able to overcome commonly held objections to them, you don't count as knowing those things. This by itself, means that the vast majority of Christians who believes these things count as failing to know them. That's because by all accounts, most Christians don't come to believe that God exists or that the bible is the word of God by way of philosophical arguments, let alone being able to "show" or demonstrate such an argument.

But it's even worse than that. Even if a Christian believes that God (as conceived by classical theism) exists on the basis of a philosophical argument and is able to rehearse such an argument, that won't cut it either. It must be a sound argument. It must be an argument that definitively shows that it's impossible for God (as conceived) to not exist. Now Christian philosophy has a rich history. There are lots of theistic arguments produced and refined by Christian philosophers over the years. Do these count as proofs according to Gangadean? Nope. That's why he wrote his book. That's why he started a church that sets itself apart from others. As he sees things, none of the classical or contemporary arguments are sound and he and Anderson spend time in their works showing why the most common theistic arguments simply fail to show that it's impossible for God not to exist (or that it's clear that God exists). That's the main premise of Owen Anderson's book, the Clarity of God's existence! On the other hand, Gangadean claims that he's got The proof of God's existence and all the items on the above list and more!

Pulling these things together, we get the following corollary. According to the Gangadeanians, the vast majority of Christians fail to know that God exists. It's only those that know Gangadean's purported proof for God's existence, agree that it is sound, and are able to produce it (while overcoming commonly held objections) that count as knowing that God exists. On a very liberal estimate I would say that's about 200 or so people in the world. To be sure, they grant that people believe that God exists, but belief is not knowledge. The same is true of the proposition that the bible is the inspired word of God. The vast majority of people either don't know of Gangadean's proof or find it unsound--in that case, according to the Gangadeanians, the vast majority of Christians don't count as knowing that the bible is the word of God. The same is true of anything on the above list and more! In some cases, since some of the things enumerated above are contentious, you might think that that is a good thing. But if you read between the lines a bit, you should find such a view problematic for any Christian not in agreement with the Gangadeanians. That you don't know that the bible is the word of God (because you aren't able to rehearse Gangadean's argument for that claim) entails that you don't know that Jesus died for your sins! In other words, if we take Gangadean's express standard of knowledge, there is utter and widespread ignorance among Christians. Of course, by their lights, the ignorance also affects non-Christians equally.

Anderson finds it offensive that I have referred to his church as a cult. But is it really in line with orthodoxy, that the vast majority of Christians (save the 200 or so that may have bought into and are able to rehearse Gangadean's arguments) don't know that Christianity is true, that God exists, that Jesus died for their sins and that the bible is the inspired word of God? Hardly. What is more, it is Gangadean's view that failing to know what is "clear" is spiritual death. So, if by his lights, most Christians don't know that God exists, and that is among the clearest of things to be known, most Christians are in a kind of spiritual death. Further, Gangadean claims that spiritual death is inherent in not seeking to know--that's because Gangadean thinks his arguments are so obvious, so attainable, that anybody that was seeking to know, would know and agree. The root of sin for Gangadean is not seeking to know what is clear to reason. In fact, the only reason that anybody failed to come up with his proofs, or fails to agree that they are sound is if they are in some important sense failing to seek to know the truth, with integrity. So not only is there widespread ignorance of the core tenets of the Christian faith within the church, there's widespread spiritual death and widespread failure to seek the truth.

Now I should add something here. If you ask a Gangadeanian whether they believe other Christians (those that are unaware or unable to rehearse their proof for God's existence for example or those that know it, but disagree that it is sound) are "saved" or among the chosen ones, they will answer in the affirmative. I'm not sure this makes a lot of sense and might actually be an inconsistency in their worldview since they equate knowledge of God with spiritual life, not mere true belief. What was commonly said within the inner circle was that such Christians would be saved by the "skin of their teeth" (as one that barely escapes the fire by the mercy of God: see 1 Corinthians 3:15).

The sociological harm is this. They keep teaching, at least the views that entail all of these implications as "historic Christianity" a clever moniker intended to convey something like "the proper set of doctrines that represent the gospel." They teach this in several charter schools across the valley to unsuspecting middle school and high school students. They teach it across several community college campuses (in religious studies and philosophy courses) and even at Arizona State University-West. They also take it upon themselves to preach to their friends and family members who are often fellow Christians. When people don't respond to their arguments, or find them unsound, they consider them as neglecting, avoiding, resisting or denying reason. [Quote: "There is no rational justification for failure to know what is clear. One has to neglect, avoid, resist, deny reason in order to fail to see what is clear (Gangadean 4)."] Or if one of their own starts to question the soundness of their arguments, they disassociate from them as having no basis for a true friendship.

Perhaps now my readers (in particular the Christian ones) can better appreciate why I think their definition or theory of knowledge (in conjunction with the need for clarity-knowledge) is largely where they go wrong. If either we accept that knowledge doesn't require being able to demonstrate or produce Gangadean's proof (or any perfectly airtight proof), then it's possible that lots of people know that God is. And is it that surprising if God, according to Christian theism, can make his existence known in a multitude of ways and not limited to a single proof? Alternatively, if we allow that knowledge of the Gangadeanian isn't valuable to the faith, then we aren't forced to bite this huge caliber of a bullet that the Gangadeanian's are committed to biting--maybe (though unlikely) they've got the right theory of knowledge, but it turns out that knowledge that such knowledge is so hard to come by for the rest of us, that it isn't even worth worrying about. Either way is bad for the Gangadeanian worldview. Either knowledge doesn't require clarity or it does, but there's nothing valuable about that kind of knowledge to begin with. They can pick their poison.

The public talks, the books, the lectures they give in their classrooms (both secondary and post-secondary) and the like are ultimately on their view a way to bring people into the truth---which is to buy into Gangadean's arguments. So despite their best efforts to soften their approach, to be more crafty in their rhetoric, make no mistake---they believe that the vast majority of Christians are severely mistaken and ignorant---they might have gotten to a lucky true belief, but they don't have knowledge of the core elements of their faith.